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Abstract. 
In a letter to Kate Baker, circa November 1910, Furphy wrote, 
'[b)ut ain't it anomalous that the erratic G.H [Grant Hervey], the 
saintly Dr. Strong, and the perverse T.C. [Tom Collins] should be 
working strenuously toward the same goal, namely, the uplifting and 
upbulldtng qf Australia' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259. My 
italics). This thesis is an investigation of the ideas of uplifting and 
upbutldtng, and their relevance to Tom Collins and his concerns. The 
reason for Furphy waiting so long to lay bare his designs can only be 
speculated. Rather than accepting the general critical stance that 
Collins is unreliable, and that Furphy meticulously sets out to 
expose his flaws, this thesis argues that this is not the case. Since 
he distanced himself publicly from his own novels, refusing to have 
authorship credited to his name, Furphy wanted his readers to 
respond to Collins not as his literary creation, but as a fully 
developed and self-reliant identity capable of setting an example of 
what it means to uplift and upbuild a national community. 
The ideas of uplifting and upbuilding are simple enough to 
comprehend. Yet a proper appreciation of their scope in the novels 
requires a careful consideration of the historical context which links 
Collins to many issues of the 1880s. The chief issue is the textual 
construction of an Australian identity vis-a-vis an Anglo-Australian 
identity, and the influence literature has on the common mind. 
Because of his involvement with uplifting, upbuilding and self-
reliance, there is a complexity to Tom Collins that is the result of his 
being the implied author, controlling the selection of characters and 
their narratives, as well as his own self-image, in the novels. The 
thesis argues that Collins' representation of "Collins", and other 
characters in the Riverina, is designed to represent the "right" 
qualities for an Australian character or type, which is consistent 
with uplifting and upbuilding. For these reasons, the novels are 
considered as Collins' strategic response to the contemporary 
representations of life in terms of their value to the search for 
meaning, and to ways of seeing and responding to the good of an 
Australian life. 
iii. 
Indeed, the character of Tom Collins is very much concerned 
with personal and communal well-being in an environment of 
colonial loyalties, rivalry and division, and a landscape often 
categorized as exotically cruel or dangerous. Because this is so, 
Collins is concerned with the value of education, with the value of 
notable Western thinkers and artists, and with the shifting of 
ignorance for better judgment. He is also concerned with the benefits 
of democracy and the democratic temper over aristocracy and its 
emphasis on class and station. Collins is quite a modem thinker, 
deeply concerned with actions and consequences in art and life. He is 
a modern thinker because he believes, as Paine, Emerson and 
Whitman do, that the idea of natural rights is the cornerstone of 
moral progress for civilization, but only if men and women accept 
and practise the civil rights that necessarily come with the pursuit of 
liberty, fraternity, equality and happiness. 
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Introduction: remarks on unreliable narration and the 
direction of the thesis. 
Since this thesis investigates what Furphy meant by the 
nationalist ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, one of the key aims is to 
tease out the complexity of Furphy's creation, Tom Collins. During 
my research, I became increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional 
view that Tom Collins is simply an unreliable narrator, and that 
Furphy intervenes in the novels quite regularly in order to foreground 
the blindness of his narrator to the actual state of affairs in the 
"world" around him. Simply put, Furphy shows his readers that Tom 
Collins is an inept chronicler of life by providing the clues which 
Collins does not notice during his observations, despite the fact that 
these clues occur rtght before his eyes. Collins is an observer, but he 
is not observant, and by aligning ourselves with Furphy we are privy 
to Collins' inadequacies and mistakes, making the necessary 
connections Collins fails to make. 
There are two important points underpinning this view, namely 
Furphy's 1903 review of the novel and Wayne Booth's idea of the 
unreliable narrator. In the last paragraph of the review, Furphy 
states that '[u]nderneath this obvious dislocation of anything 
resembling continuous narrative run several undercurrents of plot, 
manifest to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author' 
(1969:130). According to Booth's (1983:158-159) view, an unreliable 
narrator is a main character whose observations and opinions of the 
world run contrary to the observations and opinions expressed by the 
implied author, who represents the core values of the text. The idea 
of the implied author, for Booth (1983:73-75), is the result of a need 
to distance the real author from his or her text, and therefore avoid 
the issue of having to determine whether or not the core values of 
the text are, for proper appreciation, sincere or insincere with the 
real author's life. 
Because of this idea of the unreliable narrator, critical opinion 
has generally taken the last paragraph of the 1903 review to be 
Furphy's way of making his readers aware that there are things they 
should notice which Collins does not. In this sense, critics have 
1. 
implicitly identified Collins with Booth's idea of the unreliable 
narrator, while Furphy is identified with both the real and implied 
author. There are, however, problems with this view. Firstly, as I will 
discuss in my thesis, Furphy, in light of A.G. Stephens and William 
Cathels' perplexity with Such ts Life, wrote the review in order to alert 
future readers to be observant rather than expect a traditional 
narrative structure in which they could relax and enjoy the ride. 
Also, it is important to bear in mind that Stephens had asked 
Furphy to write a synopsis of Such ts Life, which would be published 
in The Bulletin, but he instead wrote a review. I do not think that 
Furphy could not distinguish the meaning of these two words, and it 
is for this reason that I believe the review to be a carefully designed 
piece of insight into his creation, Tom Collins, and the core values 
he represents. 
Secondly, despite being the author, Furphy wrote his review as 
a reviewer of Such ts Life, making no mention of his being either the 
real or implied author. Furphy did not write that there were several 
undercurrents of plot ostensibly unnoticed by the narrator. In other 
words, Furphy is determined to manufacture a distance between 
himself and his creation. He is careful to attribute authorship to 
Tom Collins, and he makes this clear several times in the review. 
Indeed, the situation is such that it seems more than likely that 
Furphy intended readers to accept Collins as the real author. The 
1903 review strongly supports this situation, as does the textual fact 
that Such ts Life is penned by Collins from his supposedly real life 
observations in a contemporary brand of pocket diaries, namely Letts. 
Although I do look at the issue of distance between Furphy and 
Collins towards the close of chapter two, my main concern is to 
examine Collins' status as the implied author of the novels, rather 
than the intended real author. 
Thirdly, if Furphy is taken to be the implied author, then how 
do these critics explain Collins' many discussions of his own 
authorship in the novels? To say that the implied authorial voice 
belongs to Furphy while the narratorial voice belongs to Collins is to 
make a rather odd distinction between the "I" of the implied author 
and the "I" of the narrator, especially since the texts give us no 
necessary indication of such a distinction within their first-person 
structure. Booth states that 'Flaubert is right in saying that 
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Shakespeare does not barge clumsily into his works' (1983:75), and 
readers need to apply the same observation to Furphy. In short, 
Furphy wanted readers to see Collins as the implied author. 
As I will show in my thesis, Furphy refused to have authorship 
attributed to him, even though A.G. Stephens had made this request. 
With the exception of the short story, 'O'Flaherty's Troubles', 
Furphy's name did not appear on any of his work until 1916, four 
years after his death, when Kate Baker edited a book of his poetry, 
which was published by the Lothian Book Publishing Company and 
had been subtitled '"Tom Collins, author of Such is Life"' (Croft, 
1991:265). But this subtitle is much more indicative of Baker's desire 
to have Furphy publicly recognised as an author rather than fulfil 
what Furphy would have actually wanted himself. By placing 
Furphy's name on the cover of each novel, as publishers have done 
With modem versions. Collins' significance is over-looked. 
The fact that Furphy readily attributed authorship to Tom 
Collins is rather interesting in light of the last paragraph of the 1903 
review. To say that there are 'several undercurrents of plot. manifest 
to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author', does not 
necessarily mean that the author, namely Tom Collins, fails to 
notice the undercurrents of plot in his own narrative strategies. This 
is simply absurd. What this suggests is that the author either 
pretends not to notice these undercurrents or has no intention of 
foregrounding them to his readers in the traditionally expected sense. 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'ostensible' as 
something that is '[ d]eclared, avowed, professed; put forth as actual 
or genuine; often [opposed] to "actual", "real", and so [equals] merely 
professed, pretended' ( 1933: 1390). This definition first came into use 
circa 1771, becoming only recently obsolete, and is more than likely 
the one used by Furphy in his 1903 review. In short, Furphy uses the 
adverbial form of "ostensible" to modify the verb "unnoticed" in order 
to indicate that Collins' not noticing the undercurrents of plot is 
merely professed or pretended. 
Collins is not an unreliable narrator in Booth's sense of the 
term; nor is he a reliable narrator in the traditional sense of overtl.y 
showing what needs to be shown in terms of plot or character 
development. Equally, Collins is not a reliable author in the 
traditional sense of overtly guiding the reader through the tWists and 
3. 
turns of his narratives. Either of these two views runs contrary to 
the stress placed on observant reading. Though he reads the novels 
in the traditional way, Croft's idea of 'Tom's ... cunning concealment' 
(1991:36) offers an excellent insight into Collins' self-professed 
tactics as the implied author and narrator. According to Collins, '[i]n 
the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint 
for the tactical moment' (SiL, 215. My italics). 
This leads me to clarify another important point. Where do we 
locate Tom Collins as a narrator? Do we locate him inside the 
narrative world of the Rivertna and its characters or outside with the 
implied author? Although there are many literary examples where the 
'"[n]arrator"' or '"I" of the work ... is seldom if ever identical with the 
implied image of the artist' (Booth, 1983:73), Furphy's novels, like 
Defoe's MollFlanders or Sterne's Tristram Shandy, do not conform to 
this state of affairs. When Collins narrates, we are confronted with a 
complexity in the novels where it becomes difficult, if not impossible, 
to dissociate the implied author who is outside the narrative world of 
the Rivertna and comments on that world from the Tom Collins who 
is within the narrative world of the Riverina. In short, the term 
"narrator", although fruitful to some extent, seems to me to be an 
insufficient categorisation which does nothing more than confuse an 
already complicated issue. 
In order to establish what I consider to be greater clarity, I 
have chosen to use the term "hero" in this thesis, and to discuss 
Collins in light of his status as implied author and hero. Because it 
automatically invokes the idea of the role model, the term "hero" is 
quite consistent with Collins' preoccupation with the moral 
consequences of roleplay and with the overall issue of identity in the 
novels. To all intents and purposes, I intend to show, in this thesis, 
that Collins, as implied author, articulates an heroic image of 
himself within the narrative world of the Riverina, and that this 
image of himself, as the hero, naturally suits the many issues which 
occur as a result of the thematic preoccupation with uplifting and 
upbutldtng. 
Before the issue of the unreliable narrator and the implied 
author could be addressed properly, I felt that it was necessary to 
place the novels firmly in context. The reason for this has to do with 
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establishing the core values of the novels, namely uplifting and 
upbuilding, which underpin Collins' status as implied author, and 
his representation of himself as the hero. For this reason, chapter 
one focuses on the socio-historical context of the 1890s, and looks 
at a select number of reasons for the colonial division and rivalry 
which plagued the federation movement. A section is devoted to 
exploring some of Furphy' s views of the world and sets out to 
establish him as an enlightened thinker, a phUosophe, rather than a 
socialist. Furthermore, Chapter one examines the characterisation of 
the bullockies and looks at the story of the Penguin and the Man-0'-
War Hawk as a parable of the opportunism which was widespread in 
colonial Australia. Furphy's other main character, Jefferson Rigby, is 
also discussed, and the view that Rigby's socialism is the epitome of 
Furphy's own views is challenged. Finally, chapter one ends with a 
discussion of Collins' view on uplifting and upbuilding through 
democracy and rights, comparing this view with that of Thomas 
Paine. 
In addition to the implied author and hero discussion 
mentioned above, chapter two establishes Furphy's views on art in 
light of the socio-historical context discussed in chapter one. 
Chapter two sets out to show that Furphy's views on art are 
intimately related to the value and function of art in society. In this 
sense, a major concern underpinning Collins' view of authorship is 
the need to tackle the ignorance, rivalry and division so peivasive in 
colonial Australia, and to stress the importance of education and 
right judgment through literature in lieu of the popular debate 
concerning democracy, national identity and federation tn literature. 
This is no different from A.G. Stephens' notion of seeing Australia 
'through clear Australian eyes, not through bias-bleared English 
spectacles' ([ 1901] 1973:ix. My italics). The chapter also explores 
Collins' preoccupation with roleplay within this context. In short, 
Furphy's creation, Tom Collins, is preoccupied artistically with social 
architecture, as stated in the opening paragraphs of Such ts Life, and 
it is within this context that the relevance of the ethical theory of 
the controlling alternatives is developed. 
Chapter three connects the preceding topics of discussion to 
the idea of guardianship. Furphy's idea that life's purpose can be 
discovered through calm courage, clear intellect and high moral 
5. 
standards is explored in light of Tom Collins as implied author and 
hero. The chapter connects Furphy's tripartite idea with Plato's idea 
of the Guardians and the three elements needed for justice in 
society, arguing that any image of the national type, for Furphy, had 
to embody these qualities. Furphy's idea of the national type is 
developed as a Half Bushman and Half Bookworm, and the chapter 
puts forth the notion that Tom Collins, as implied author, 
articulates his own heroic image within that context. The chapter 
also discusses Plato's idea that women can be Guardians if they have 
the aptitude for calm courage, clear intellect and high moral 
standards, and explores Collins' preoccupation with the 
"Australienne" in this light. Finally, chapter three looks at the 
function of the many marriages in the three novels, finishing with 
the Falkland-Pritchard marrtage in light of Fred Falkland-Prttchard's 
capacity for tall stories about himself as an heroic Australian, and 
Lillian Falkland-Pritchard as the epitome of the Australienne. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the romance plot and its 
philosophical issue of induction. 
6. 
1. Man and Nation: towards an understanding of the 
ideas of uplifting and upbuilding . 
... every avenue to distinction is not closed ... We're 
knocking at the gates of Futurity for the Australian 
pioneer of poetry -fiction -philosophy -what not? 
-Such is Life, 1903/1991:224-
1.1. Furphy's 1880s: a searchfor meaning in the public domain. 
In a recent essay, John Barnes states that 'Such is Life was 
written by an autodidact working in isolation in a late nineteenth-
century country town, and in my view that profoundly affects both 
its form and substance. I should like to see future studies of 
Furphy's book look more closely at Such is Life as a cultural creation' 
(1993:48). It is a view shared by Wieland (1985) who argues that Such 
is Life is both a product of and an experience in the past. Or. as 
MacKenzie explains, 'Such is Life can be said to be cultural business 
arising' (1993:534). But what is this cultural business that supports 
a reading of Such is Life as a cultural creation? Barnes (1993) and 
Wieland (1985), like Gilding (1967:201) almost thirty years earlier, do 
not raise any specific points, preferring instead to emphasize the 
necessity of a socio-historical approach to curb potential misreadings 
of the novel. MacKenzie is more specific, arguing that 'identity in 
Australia is fundamentally controversial as a result of an old/new 
double bind, and is even a matter of imposture' (1993:534). In 
comparing Furphy with Marcus Clarke on the issue of imposture in 
Australian cultural business, MacKenzie argues that 'Furphy 
foregrounds the idea of imposture to a degree that surpasses even 
Clarke' (1993:534). 
The question of imposture in Australian cultural business, or 
culture building, is a tricky one. It seems to suggest that, more than 
anywhere else, Australian culture is the product of an illegal theft. 
MacKenzie seems to reinforce this idea when he states that 'an 
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Australian cultural nationalist not only shares identity with a 
European bookworm, but also competes with him for this identity, 
imitates and impersonates him and so to an extent robs him of it' 
(1993:535. My italics). It is in this way that MacKenzie describes Tom 
Collins as 'a phantom identity' and 'a trickster' (1993:540). In my 
opinion, such a view of Furphy's novel, as well as Australian culture 
building generally, tends to dismiss the complex reasons for the 
cultural process that works with the old/ new double bind. 
Furthermore, the notion of imposture also seems to suggest that 
Australian cultural identity is an elegant forgery vts-a-vts the genuine 
European article. 
Nevertheless, MacKenzie is correct in observing that Such ts 
Life is concerned with cultural business. Readers ought to bear in 
mind Barnes' advice for the direction of Furphy studies, for the social 
and political horizon of the 1890s provides signposts for a greater 
understanding and appreciation of the structure and themes of the 
novels. The fact that Collins is so obviously concerned with 'a fair 
picture of Life' (SlL, 2) should be sufficient to direct the reader's 
attention to the historical period about which it is written. Equally, 
the fact that Collins is concerned with a fair picture, rather than a 
true picture, should also indicate that cultural business is never a 
clear or easily resolved issue, and yet must, to some extent, have 
clarity and resolution. 
A fair picture of life makes cultural business an ethical and 
moral issue so that life ts selectively represented in order to inform 
human judgment about necessary courses of action in light of the 
good. Contrary to this, a true picture of life seeks to represent life as 
it ts. True pictures do not, properly speaking, concern themselves 
with the good. In this sense, Furphy's novels and Collins' narratives 
do not just set out to mimic life in all its looseness and adversity, 
but to provide a solution to 'that engaging problem' (SlL, 2) of human 
affairs in nineteenth-century colonial Australia. 
In light of this focus on cultural business, Indyk points out 
that '[i]nstead of a sense of national identity, there is the constant 
assertion of national differences. The characters are English first or 
Irish, Scottish, Cornish, Chinese, Dutch, German, French, or 
Aboriginal -with each group having its own distinguishing dialect' 
(1986:305). According to Indyk's observations, '[e]ven where two 
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bullockies belong to the same group, it will nevertheless make a great 
deal of difference if one of them comes from Victoria, the other from 
NSW' (1986:305). Thus, '[i]n a novel which was acclaimed as an 
Australian classic in the years folloWing [f]ederation, there isn't a 
character who thinks of himself or herself as Australian' (lndyk, 
1986:305). Indeed, the social, historical and political "world" of 1880s 
Australia is marked by an intercolonial rivalry which threatened to 
keep the colonies separated due to ethnic loyalties. According to 
Manning Clark, 
[a]s early as 1842, when the agitation to divide the old 
New South Wales into two or three separate colonies 
first got under way, the far-sighted presented the case 
for some central government on the grounds of 
convenience; but their counsel fell on the deaf ears of 
men bent on the tri-section of New South Wales, or 
those even deafer ears in South Australia that 
confounded all central government or federation 
proposals with domination by New South Wales 
(l 995a:201). 
In the words of the historian, David Day, 'it was a time for 
jealousies and protecting one's individual interests' (1996:195). As 
Gibb explains, 
[f]or colonists, identifying with their colony was 
always a substitute for identifying with their 
continent. Rivalry between Sydney and Melbourne, 
and between New South Wales and Victoria, was 
endemic. Tasmanians were suspicious of and resented 
their 'mainland'. Sou th Australians were proud of 
their freedom from the convict 'taint'. The Western 
Australians and Northern Queenslanders felt that they 
were 'a thousand miles away'. Governments promoted 
rivalry in numbers of ways, for example by tariffs and 
extending railways into other colonies. The difficulties 
of getting united action on defence and immigration 
questions were reasons why politicians became active 
9. 
in the federation movement (1982:78). 
Historically, socially and politically, this scenario forms the 
basic structure of chapter one in Such ts Life, and it is interesting to 
note that one of the first social issues with which readers are 
confronted, besides the squattocratic monopoly on grass, is the 
rivahy among the colonies, especially Victoria and New South Wales. 
Evidence of this rivalry is implied by the terms 'Port Phillip' and 'the 
mother colony' (SiL, 3), or in Mosey's retort to Cooper, the New 
South Welshman: '[r]oll up Port Phillipers! the Sydney man's goin' to 
strike a match!' (SiL, 5). Or Cooper's remark to Mosey on 'Port Phillip 
ignorance' (SiL, 26). Rivalry is also foregrounded by Collins in his 
pointing out that '[t]he Victorian carrier, formidable by his lack of 
professional etiquette and his extreme thrift, is neither admired nor 
caressed by the somewhat select practitioners of Riverina' (SiL, 7). 
And one can equally find this rivalry in the volley of terms like 
'Cabbage Garden', 'a 'Sucker' or 'a Port Philliper' for Victoria and the 
Victorian, and 'Cornstalk' for the New South Welshman (SiL, 35). 
Indeed, it is within this last context that 'the Separation' of 
1851 is invoked, when Victoria ceased to be called 'the District of 
Port Phillip' and ceased to be a 'Colony of New South Wales' (SiL, 
35). According to Serle, '[m]any New South Welshman, clutching at 
pretensions of historical dignity, found it difficult to look calmly on 
upstart breakaway Victoria whose astonishing progress had rested on 
the chance presence of gold deposits' (1969: 13). There are, of course, 
other examples in chapter one of the division among colonial 
Australians. But these tend to unveil this colonial rivalry in an 
indirect manner through economic opportunism among the men in 
Riverina. For example, one can see this rivalry and opportunism in 
the clues to Dixon and Bum's attempted theft of Collins' horse, 
Cleopatra, especially with Collins' sudden acquisition of a new 
saddle on his horse which he had left unsaddled overnight (SiL, 39, 
41 ). This incident stands directly opposed to the egalitarianism 
usually associated with Furphy's rendition of the bullockies and 
Riverina society. According to Furphy, this episode is '[n)ot only true 
to nature, but true to fact', for '[t]he plot wouldn't be obscure to 
straight-ahead reader -particularly bushman' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:92). 
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Devlin-Glass, Eaden, Hoffmann and G. W. Turner, the Furphy 
scholars who worked on The Annotated Such ts Life, (1991:322) 
explain that parts of the novel allude to the battle for economic 
control of Rivertna between Victoria and New South Wales: a battle 
that was very topical in 1883, the year in which the novels are set. 
Gibb states that '[c]ompetition between rival economic interests for 
the Riverina had brought bitterness between New South Wales and 
Victoria. Victoria's protection policies and practices and her stock 
tax infuriated free trade New South Wales' (1982:78-79). Serle 
(1969: 15) also points out that the Riverina became the economic 
battleground for Victoria and New South Wales because each 
thought that the control of trade in the Riverina meant greater 
status and prosperity for their own colony. 
From the 1860s to the 1890s, when economic ventures became 
more uniform for the Australian colonies, both Victoria and New 
South Wales each set out to claim Riverina economically, imposing 
eccentric standards that can be seen as an expression of this rivalry. 
For example, Victorians constructed 'a Victorian-gauge' railway, 
'both colonies adopted a policy of differential freight rates', and 'New 
South Wales began running early newspaper-trains to the Riverina at 
considerable financial loss to combat the insidious influence of the 
Melbourne papers' (Serle, 1969: 15). Evans et al state '[t]hat the 
parochialism which characterized life in nineteenth-century 
Australia was not simply the product of a narrowness of vision or a 
preference for the local and the limited' (1997:92). Indeed, '[g]iven the 
separate development of each of the colonies, and their primary 
identification with a power base in London rather than with other 
colonial capitals, the process to achieve any form of union would be 
necessarily slow' (Evans et al, 1997:93). 
Gibb explains that '[c]olonial governments competed with one 
another for loans on the London money market and for immigrants 
in Britain generally' (1982:78). As Serle indicates, '[t]he colonial 
economies were largely insulated from each other; the nationalising 
of the Australian economy in the eighties and nineties greatly 
smoothed the path to federation as the hindrances of colonial 
barriers to day-to-day business became increasingly irritating' 
(1969: 12). According to Cantrell, '[ t]h ough the economic and 
industrial upheavals of the time made progress slow, they also 
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underlined some of the disadvantages of the present state of disunity' 
(1977:84). 
In view of this disunity and rivalry, we should consider what 
Collins is doing in the Riverina. If. as Croft believes, 'the time of 
composition of Tom's memoirs is ... some time after the shearer's 
strike of 1891' (1991:91), then why focus spec!Jlcally on the years 
1883 to 1884? I place emphasis on spec!Jlcally because one cannot, 
after almost a century of criticism, appeal to Collins' claim that he 
opened a Lett's Pocket Diary 'at random', and it Just happened 'to be 
the edition of 1883' (SiL, 2). As readers now know, Collins repeatedly 
and overtly refutes his claim to sketching random selections of life. 
The answer, I believe, lies in a letter to Kate Baker, circa November 
1910, when Furphy wrote, '[b]ut ain't it anomalous that the erratic 
G.H [ Grant Hervey], the saintly Dr. Strong, and the perverse T.C. 
[ Tom Collins] should be working strenuously toward the same goal, 
namely, the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259. My italics). 
The English novelist, Anthony Trollope, visiting the colonies in 
the early 1870s, noted that '[a]n Englishman cannot be month in 
Australia without finding himself driven to speculate -almost driven 
to come to some conclusion- as to the future destinies of the 
colonies', since 'they are loyal to England with an expressive and 
almost violent loyalty of which we hear and see little at home' ([ 1873] 
1968:52). Trollope explains that '[a]n Australian of the present day 
does not like to be told of the future independence of Australia', and 
that he had 'met no instance where the proposition on [his] part was 
met with an unqualified assent' ([ 1873] 1968:52). This is despite his 
steady belief that 'the independence of Australia will come in due 
time' (Trollope, [ 1873] 1968:52). But, '[b]efore that day shall arrive 
the bone and sinews of the colonies must be of colonial produce' and 
'[t]he leading men must not only have lived but have been born in 
Australia, so as to have grown up into life without the still existing 
feeling that England is their veritable "home"' (Trollope, [ 1873] 
1968:52-53). 
According to Trollope's observations, '[t]he Australian colonies 
are very Jealous of each other, and in their present moods are by no 
means ready to unite' ( [1873] 1968:53). Indeed, 'the divisions already 
made, and any new divisions which may be made, are not 
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incompatible with national unity', but they 'certainly need not be 
accompanied by the all but hostile feeling, by the unloving and 
unbrotherly condition, which is inseparable from custom-houses 
between the one and the other [New South Wales and Victoria]' 
(Trollope, [1873] 1968:337-338). In a chapter devoted wholly to life in 
the Riverina, Trollope states that 'she is terribly hindered' because 
'every article carried across the Murray is subject to the interference 
of the custom-house', and '[t]he Riverina and Victoria, instead of 
being to each other as are Lancashire and Yorkshire, or as are New 
York and New Jersey, are in reference to their custom-house laws as 
are France and Germany' ([ 1873] 1968:334). 
It is interesting to note that Furphy, during the rewrite of Such 
is Life, shifted the scene from the settled areas around the Murray to 
the vast space of Rivertna, as pointed out by Croft (1989:10). Why did 
Furphy make such a dramatic change? In part, this question has 
already been answered. If Riverina is the place where New Sou th 
Wales and Victoria express their rivalry to the fullest, then it also 
stresses the need for a unity of vision in Australian society. Perhaps 
this is what Collins means when he states that, '[i]t is not in our 
cities or townships, it is not in our agricultural or mining areas, that 
the Australian attains full consciousness of his own nationality; it is 
in places like this [Riverina], and as clearly here as at the centre of 
the continent' (SiL, 65. My italics). In view of the political and social 
climate I have just sketched, it is my contention that the shift to the 
Riverina marks a thematically mature investigation into the uplifting 
and up building of a "nation", foregrounding the 'wasteful 
competition' (Serle, 1969: 15) so prominent in colonial Australia. 
Given that Victoria and New South Wales both engaged in a 
"thirty-year war" over the economic control of Riverina, and that this 
issue was very topical in 1883, what other historical events underpin 
Collins' uplifting and upbuilding in the 1883-84 diary narrative? 
Collins states that 'the subject of grass' was 'a vital question in '83, 
as you may remember' (SiL, 4). As Croft explains, '[t]hings are worse 
than usual in September of 1883, because of a prolonged dry spell 
during winter -the spring rains have not yet arrived and the signs of 
over-grazing are evident' (1991: 129). According to Croft, '[i]t is 
interesting to see that Tom assumes the reader would be aware as 
any bullocky of the condition of grass in the Riverina in 1883. It is as 
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if the issue of land and its alienation is assumed to be the common 
denominator of all social reality in Australia' (1991:129). While I 
agree with Croft's notion that land is an important denominator in 
Australian social reality, as the battle for Riverina indicates, I do not 
think that a reader's familiarity with the grass issue automatically 
concludes a link between landscape and alienation. 
It might be better to consider the grass question in light of the 
prevailing rivalries between New South Wales and Victoria, and to 
say that the rivalry between squatter and bullocky is just one more 
example of the division in colonial Australia. Speaking from personal 
experience, perhaps Furphy wanted to point out that the effects of a 
prolonged dry spell for the people of Rivertna is not made any easier 
by the discord between Sydney and Melbourne. Indeed, the subject of 
grass is immediately punctuated by a remark on the '[d]ivision of 
labour' as 'the secret of success': a practice which Dixon considers to 
be the '[s]ecret of England's greatness' (StL, 4), rather than 
Australia's. Willoughby's rejoinder to Dixon that '[t]he true secret of 
England's greatness lies in her dependencies' (StL, 4) hints that the 
success of a division of labour depends on unity, something which is 
lacking in Australia. It is interesting to note that the aforementioned 
colonial rivalry in chapter one is woven into this 'committee on the 
subject of grass' (StL,4). All in all, the opening dialogue of chapter 
one gives much information to 'the observant reader' on the 'fair 
picture of Life' (StL, 2 ). Since Collins asks observant readers to 
remember the importance of the grass question in 1883, it is also 
possible that he wants readers to remember that the grass question 
was but one issue of a much more divided political climate. 
One such important issue can be seen as a first move towards 
economic and political unity. Clark ( 1995a: 178), Gibb (1982: 79) and 
Serle (1969:1) note that on the 14th of June 1883, many New South 
Welsh and Victorian members of the public joined notables at Albury 
to toast the railway link between their respective colonies. According 
to Serle, '[ e]lectric light dispelled the wintry gloom, flowers covered 
the pillars and tables, and on high an allegorical painting showed 
Victoria and New South Wales clasping hands in unity, while behind 
them an engine was crossing a bridge' ( 1969: 1 ). More important than 
this festive coming together was Victoria's 'confidence that the 
inevitable result of the rail union would be the union of the colonies 
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themselves' (Clark, 1995a: 178). Indeed, the Premier of Victoria, James 
Service, publicly announced that 
[w)e have been long separated, and rivalries and 
jealousies and ignorance of each other have sprung up 
in consequence; but now we are looped together with 
bands of iron ... Gentlemen, we want federation and we 
want it now .. .l decline to subscribe to the doctrine 
that I am to die before the grand federation of the 
Australian colonies. There ts no earthly reason why it 
should not be achieved .. .I tell my honourable friend, 
the Premier of New South Wales, that at a very early 
opportunity ... we intend to test this question. The 
Government of Victoria have determined to send a 
message to New South Wales asking them what are 
the obstacles that stand in the way? (in Serle, 1969:1-
2). 
On the 23rd of June 1883, the Bulletin wrote that 
[t}here's been a big drink on at Albury. It was a Federal 
affair. Away down here in the country, where 
thousands have watched for twenty years or more the 
outcome of a bitter rivalry between people of kindred 
blood, and in reality, common interests, -down here 
on a spot for ever rendered historic by the enterprise of 
bold prisoners, though afterwards 'utilized' by political 
charlatanism as a starting point of tntercolonial 
rancour -down here at Albury, where the Murray flows 
between the shores of New South Wales and Victoria, 
there's been a big drink! The influence of trade has 
done what so-called statesmanship failed to effect. The 
railway systems of the two colonies are united! And 
over the union there's been a great shtvoo (in Ward 
and Robertson, eds, 1980:208). 
The Bulletin's sceptical tone mirrors the scepticism prevalent in 
New South Wales at the time. As Serle explains, 'at the 1880-1 
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Intercolonial Conference, the Victorians brushed aside Parkes's 
proposal for a Federal Council', thus 'there was some reason why 
many in Sydney reacted with surprise and suspicion to the Victorian 
initiative of 1883' (1969:15). Indeed, '1884 was to be a bad year for 
the cause' (Serle, 1969: 17). Furthermore, Serle (1969:49-50) explains 
it was not until 1888-9 that some reconciliation on the issue of 
federation occurred when New South Wales and Victoria were both 
delighted by the South Australian decision to join the Federal 
Council. All in all, 'the extent of opposition to federation, the lack of 
desire to co-operate with other colonies, the strength of New South 
Wales provincialism and the weakness there of a sense of Australian 
identity remain baffling' (Serle, 1969:55). As Gibb points out, '[p]ride 
in colony always remained a difficulty and New Sou th Wales was the 
most vacillating of the major colonies on federation' (1982:79). This 
colonial pride was so strong that '(i]n 1887 Parkes enthusiastically 
commended to the New South Wales Legislative Assembly the 
provocative proposal to rename New South Wales as Australia' (Gibb, 
1982:79). 
Serle indicates that '(i]n view of the lack of national feeling, 
Service's campaign of 1883 was obviously premature and ill-prepared' 
(1969: 12). If Furphy wanted to draw the observant reader's attention 
to this ill-prepared and premature push for unity, then his many 
remarks on ignorance shifting, in his novels and letters, certainly 
cuts to the heart of the matter. Shifting ignorance has the capacity 
to resolve colonial jealousies and rivalries. Of further interest to 
Furphy's observant reader is the following. Gibb (1982:79) and Serle 
(1969: 12) both note 1883 was the first year that the two most 
prominent Victorians, the Premier James Service and the Victorian 
chief justice George Higinbotham, had set foot in New Sou th Wales 
with the specific intention of "uplifting and upbuilding Australia". 
Given the deep-seated and extensive rivalry between the two colonies, 
as well as the 1880s New South Welsh view that 'Victorians were 
"people to be mistrusted"' (Sir Robert Garran cited in Serle, 1969: 13), 
it is rather interesting that Collins, the native-born Victorian, works 
for 'the New South Wales Civil Service' (Croft, 1991:91, 1986:155-
157). 
It seems that Furphy wanted readers to see Tom Collins as a 
key figure in the public domain of meaning, federation and 
16. 
nationalism, for the clues to his narratorial identity are equally clues 
to the social and political climate in which he exists. Perhaps it is 
for this reason that Collins' narrative begins almost three months 
after Service's proposal at Albury. According to Ward, the 'internal 
and external conditions [of the 1880s and 1890s] enabled Australians 
to pause, to look inward on themselves, to take stock as it were, and 
to indulge in what their predecessors in the land might have called a 
"dreaming"' (1966:208). In my view, Collins' uplifting and upbuilding 
is also an attempt to address and solve the problems 'of an old/ new 
double bind' and, in this sense, 'can be said to be cultural business 
arising· (MacKenzie, 1993:534). In short, colonial rivalry is as 
anachronistic to Australia's future as the colonial romance to which 
Collins is so vehemently opposed. Although problematic, Vance 
Palmer speaks some truth when he states that '[t]he notion of a 
national dream-time is not at all a myth. The forward-looking spirits 
of those days really did find a stimulus in their isolation; vague, 
creative impulses germinated in their minds' (1963:14). 
Perhaps what Palmer should have said is that the national 
dream-time is not Just a myth, for the creative idealism of 
intellectuals and artists is an ostensive phenomenon. As Ward 
explains, '[m]en sought, partly by looking for those things which 
distinguished them from their British fathers and congeners, to know 
themselves and their country better, and at the same time they saw 
utopian visions of a national future in which Australia, unsullied by 
the wars and wrongs of the old world, would be a light to less happy 
lands' (1966:208). This seems to be also Turner's view, who states 
that 'the Lawson-Furphy brand of nationalism in fiction includes not 
only a set of definitions of Australian cultural identity, but also a 
major strategy for measuring that identity against the English, and 
valorising those aspects of our national character which depart from 
English values and loyalties' (1993: 114). While this is true, there are 
also problems in neatly conflating Furphy with Lawson and speaking 
about a "Lawson-Furphy" brand of nationalism. 
As Ozolins explains, 'a glance backwards reveals that in the 
second half of the 19th century, Australia experienced a period of 
considerable cultural and linguistic diversity, with a huge influx of 
population during the gold rushes of thel850s from Europe, Asia and 
the Americas' (1993:3). If, as Ozolins argues, language is 'one of the 
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clearest and most evident manifestations of cultural diversity' 
(1993:2), then Furphy and Lawson are miles apart in their respective 
renditions of the 1890s in narrative. In his 1903 review of Such is 
Life, Furphy states that Collins is, '[b]eyond all other Australian 
writers, ... a master of idiom', for 'the education of each speaker is 
denoted by his phraseology; the dialect of each European bespeaks 
his native locality; and, above all, the language of the most 
unbookish bushman never degenerates into "caster"' (1969:129). Not 
only does Furphy demonstrate 'a brilliant use of the strategy of code-
switching·, but his 'employment of language variance represents a 
stage of "becoming" which exists between [a sense of diversity and a 
sense of unity]' (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1989:73). 
One should not be deceived in to thinking that the germination 
of nationalist ideas or the pursuit of meaning for "Australia" was 
homogeneous. Neither Furphy nor Lawson shared the same vision for 
Australia, as I will show in appropriate parts of the thesis. As 
Stewart states, '[t)he "1890s debate" is not a simple dialogue directed 
by unchanging assumptions and goals, or fixed questions and 
answers. It is usually perceived today as a dynamic of interactions 
amongst contending discourses' (1996:10). For example, commenting 
on Australia's cultural obsession with Youth, Stewart points out 
that 
[i)n the 1890s Australia could be represented as a 
beautiful and athletic young woman, her torch lighting 
the future; or a young bushman or axeman, an 
allegorical emblem of industry or pioneering; or a baby 
blowing bubbles, naive, lovable, immature; or a little 
boy, often from Manly. The metaphor might be 
simultaneously a metonymy: the young person is an 
Australian; Australians are "young and free", as 
Advance Australia Fair decreed. You might easily feel 
that Australians were not actually, and certainly not 
typically, old; and that a young country had "more" 
future, and more opportunity with a longer life to 
come, than an "old" country (1996:1-2). 
According to Stewart, '[t]he Young Country provided an 
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important, perhaps dominant code, which was almost universally 
employed; but it was not the only code. Its power in the 1890s 
created a context for the inevitable articulation of disappointment, 
one for use of an alternative "Australian" code of stoicism, 
iconoclasm and scepticism. You do not feel young and free in a 
depression, a drought, or a strike; some writers felt, in the 1890s and 
later, robbed' (1996:6). The meaning and vitality of Youth can be 
rather problematic, not only for one's expectations of the local 
milieu, but also for one's position among the nations and empires of 
the world. Docker's notion that '[t]he very confidence and elan of the 
Nineties' literary and intellectual communities presented them with 
dilemmas in terms of the inherited British-Australian cultural 
relationship' ( 1991 :238) is fitting. 
According to Evans et al, '[t)he position of British-Australians, 
who composed the vast bulk of the colonial population, was also 
somewhat ambiguous, for not only were they the citizens of a potent 
new nation, but also the subjects of a far mightier Empire' (1997:24). 
As Evans et al explain, '[t]o many, Britain was still "home" rather 
than the suburban villa, worker's cottage or selector's hut they now 
inhabited on the opposite side of the world. For an expatriate people, 
the British connection remained a guarantee of their essential 
kinship, even though the British themselves tended to regard 
colonials more as embarrassing country cousins than as warmly 
recognized brothers and sisters' (1997:24). Rather than a ·great age of 
literary and cultural nationalism', the 1890s 'was a varied and 
exciting scene, full of drama and conflict and contradiction' where 
'its actors had to contend with more than just each other' 
(Docker, 1991 :238). 
It is, therefore, difficult to swallow Ward's notion that '[w]hen 
the dreaming was over the values and attitudes of the nomad tribe 
[or pastoral workers] had been largely adopted by the whole nation' 
(1966:208). Such values and attitudes may have been adopted by 
some of the nation, but even here the degree to which such an 
adoption occurred depends greatly on being able to smooth over a 
variety of contending discourses. As McCauley explains, 'Ward is not 
concerned with what Australians are really like, but with the myth or 
stereotype, the idealized self-portrait representing a particular set of 
demands and approvals' (1962:124). Ward may be rtght in stating 
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that, after the influential decades of the 1880s and 1890s, 'the "noble 
bushman" was already firmly enshrined in both the popular and the 
literary imagination' (1966:212). But this does not answer the 
question as to which image dominated the nationalist outlook. 
Given the poor public response to Such ts Life, one may say that it is 
not Furphy's "Tom Collins", but what of Lawson's "Joe Wilson" or 
Paterson's "Clancy of the Overflow"? 
Palmer's 'forward looking-spirits' may have had 'a deep sense of 
responsibility to the country they were making their own' (1963:14), 
but the cultural obsession with Youth does not necessarily mean 
that such an obsession created a unity of meaning, vision or 
purpose. Nor does it guarantee a safe haven from Western Europe's 
'fatal nest' to which O'Dowd alluded (in Cantrell, ed, 1977:86). The 
'new settler' may have wanted 'as few links as possible with the 
Europe he had left behind' (Palmer, 1963:15), but the new world is 
not so new as to be wholly independent, for ideas and evils migrate 
with people. Come an Australian dusk, Collins may state that 'the 
sun went on its way to make a futile attempt at purifying the 
microbe-laden atmosphere of Europe' (SiL, 11). But the thematic 
preoccupations of chapter one with the duffing of grass, opportunism 
and the intercolonial rivalries seem to suggest that Australia's 
atmosphere is currently as equally "microbe-laden" as Europe's. 
In the search for "new" meaning in the new world, individual or 
group optimisms can easily turn into pessimism. And it is this 
conflict, this tension between optimism and pessimism that marks 
1880s andl890s nationalism primarily as a search for meaning, or a 
desire to build meaning vis-a-vis the dynamic conflicts of contending 
discourses. Barnes' notion that 'future studies of Furphy's book 
[ should] look more closely at Such ts Life as a cultural creation' 
( 1993:48) is important. Such ts Life is not, as Green would argue, 'a 
formless slab' (1930: 12 7). Furthermore, one should equally consider 
both Rtgby's Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga in the same 
light. Again, readers should ask themselves the question "what is 
Collins doing in the Riverina?" In conjunction with this question, I 
think it is also important to consider why Furphy has Collins 
present a diary narrative to the public. 
Both of these questions are important in terms of the search 
for human meaning, and the "Australia" of the late nineteenth 
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centuiy is an excellent example of the need for this search. According 
to McLaren, '[t]he characters of Such is Life are trapped in lives of 
search and pursuit. The search varies from Tom Collins' pursuit of 
meaning to the teamster's constant quest for grass' (1989:58). Or, as 
Henricksen notes, Furphy's 'fiction becomes not art for didacticism's 
or nationalism's sake, but art which tries to find a solution, if not 
an answer, to the riddles of human existence' (1985: 10). And, in this 
sense, 'Furphy's fiction ... meditates and speculates on the role of man 
in the cosmos, on God, on the cosmic order of things, and on man's 
response to the cosmic reality' (Henricksen, 1985: 157. My italics). 
It may be true, as Henricksen notes, that '[t]he closer Furphy 
approaches his monastic truth, the more pluralistic does his universe 
become, and the more unschematizable does truth become' 
(1985: 166). However, one should not take this view, as Armbruster 
does, to the extreme and conclude that Such is Life is 'a veritable 
hotch-potch of meaning' (1991:85). In light of the novels' historical 
background, as well as Furphy's own reference to Collins' concern 
with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, I disagree with 
Armbruster's view that Furphy's 'self-referential mode of writing' and 
'deliberate self-contradiction and ambiguity avoids any mimetic 
commitment' (1991:121. My italics). Nor do I agree with Armbruster's 
notion that this artistic approach 'reduces the need for definite 
meaning' (1991:121). 
Although the self-referentiality and pluralism in Such is Life 
·greatly enhances the text's affirmative potential', it is fallacious to 
assume that '[t]he reader may construct an almost infinite number of 
meanings' (Armbruster, 1991:121). As Wieland states, 'thematically, 
Furphy is concerned with life lived and life speculated about, he is 
not, as many twentieth-centuiy writers are, affronted by the 
possibility of a meaningless reality, even as he recognizes its 
relativity and complexity' (1985: 24). If we are to approach Furphy's 
novels as cultural creations, as art and meaning in the public 
domain, then we must acknowledge that this artistic self-
referentiality and pluralism in his narratives are meant to serve as 
evidence for the mimetic commitment to "life". 
Within this mimetic commitment, there is the more important 
thematic concern with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, 
which is not just mentioned in the letter to Kate Baker, but also 
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alluded to in Furphy's 1903 review of Such ts Life. Croft may state 
that '[t]he complexity of the first and the final versions of Such ts Life 
(and its offsprings) arose from a mind which attempted to bring 
together a series of vinegar and oil opposites, at one time giving more 
oil, at others more vinegar' (1991:10). But one should not just look 
for '[t]he key to Furphy's mind and art' in 'the division between the 
male and female worlds of his family' (Croft, 1991:11). Although it is 
difficult to ascertain Just exactly what Furphy knew and considered 
important in the 1880s and 1890s socio-cultural climate, one can 
safely assume that the key to the pluralism in the novels ls found in 
the division of society, politics and culture. 
For this reason I must disagree with Partington, who states 
that the 'contemporary political system, like political history, had 
only marginal interest for Furphy .... [The] political parties and 
political issues being contested in Australia during the 1880s do not 
directly feature in the Furphy novels' (1993:170). Perhaps 
Partington's statement builds on Barnes' (1990:145) observation 
that, although Furphy had an interest in State Socialism, he 
belonged to no particular political group nor partook in any political 
activities while working and writing in Shepparton. But Partington 
takes this a step further by concluding that Furphy's lack of political 
involvement is a direct result of a lack of interest in the 1890s socio-
political scene. This is a hasty generalisation, for Furphy, in a letter 
to Cathels dated the 14th of July, 1901, spoke of 'the cares of Art 
and the deceitfulness of Politics' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995:69). As Gilding states, 'Furphy's novels are themselves 
perceptive comments on political notions, and his realism and 
romanticism add up to a personal search and vision which signify a 
great deal more than nothing' (1967:202). 
Wallace-Crabbe (1962: 144-145), Kiernan (197la:19, 197lb:148, 
1964), and Barnes (1968:vi) all state that the emphasis of Such ts Life 
lies not in a distinctive core or philosophy, for the novel is more 
concerned with Collins' response to life than with a theoretical 
orientation to life. As Collins states, '[n]o one except the anchorite 
lives to himself; and he is merely a person who evades his 
responsibilities' (SIL, 71 ). In this sense, Collins is extremely 
interested in 'Happenology' (RR, 30) and in 'the marvellous tactics of 
Destiny' (RR, 235. My italics). But, although Wallace-Crabbe, 
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Kiernan, and Barnes each points out valid readings of the novel, it is 
my contention that the novel has a philosophical 'core', namely the 
ideas of uplifting and upbuilding. Also, Collins' response to life 
incorporates a theoretical orientation to life because of the search for 
meaning through art, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Of further 
importance to the novels' philosophical core is Gilding' notion that 
'the novels are a "way of seeing'" (1967:201). This point is also made 
by Barnes, who states that the novels 'offer a way of seeing which 
illuminates the experience of living' (1979:27). 
For these reasons, I disagree with Barnes' earlier notion that, 
'[because] Furphy's "philosophy" seems rather nebulous, and because 
there is no core to Such ts Life, no human situation which contains 
in itself the central theme, the novel Jails to give a sense of life 
developing' (1971:131. My italics). Central to the development of the 
novel's narrative is the issue of identity. Thematically, both the 
socio-historical concerns of the narrative and Collins' identity exist 
in a symbiotic relationship. One cannot but note that Collins' 
identity develops in conjunction with his response to life, his search 
for meaning and his way of seeing. When investigating the persona of 
Tom Collins, one should note that his articulating an identity is 
meant to be a culturally ostensive phenomenon. On a personal and 
national level, one can say that identity, like '[e]ach undertaking, 
great or small, of our lives has one controlling alternative, and no 
more' (StL, 68). Although I will investigate the notion of identity as a 
controlling alternative in chapter two, it can be said for now that the 
themy of the controlling alternative is part of Furphy's attempt to 
address the division and rivahy in colonial Australia. 
As Gilding notes, 'behind the philosophy of the controlling 
alternative lies an awareness of the complexity of human experience' 
(1967:97). Although D'Alton and Bittman do not in any way discuss 
Such ts Life, their sociological explanation of an individual's position 
in the world is indirectly a rather revealing explanation of Furphy's 
thematic aim and the novel's "core": 
[e]ach individual in society must order his world so 
that it has meaning for him or else there is no reason 
for action at all. A choice must be made. Even a choice 
not to act is still a choice, as it is a denial (a chosen 
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denial) of the alternatives of action which are open 
and it is an active denial of the alternatives to the 
extent that the alternatives of action are repudiated. 
Consequently most people ... have a theory about the 
world. In a sense, everyone's knowledge of the world is 
a 'theory' in that 'knowledge of the world' refers to that 
world order which different individuals identify. There 
may be as many world orders as there are individuals 
but nevertheless each person, simply to act in the 
world, must have some way of ordering, of 
understanding, that world so that courses of action 
can be decided upon and so that courses of action can 
be carried out (1972:98-99). 
1.2. A Philosophe: some historical and epistemologi.cal orientations 
of Joseph Furphy. 
Barnes (1990: 1 70-2) postulates that Furphy, circa 1890, may 
have encouraged the Mechanics Institute at Shepparton to purchase 
both the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Chambers' Encyclopedia, 
which he constantly used as his reference during the writing of Such 
is Life. While it is only an hypothesis, Barnes' comment sits well with 
a man whose primary concern appeared to be the eradication of 
ignorance. In a letter to Stephens, Furphy states that 'I find myself 
continually blocked by my own infernal ignorance, so that I have 
worn a pad from my sanctum to the Ency.Brit., at the Mechanics' (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:68). One might say that Furphy's 
love for the Mechanics Institute at Shepparton is indicative of his 
love for knowledge, since the Mechanics Institute could be neatly 
described as the bricks-and-mortar symbol for those seeking 
enlightenment. To Cathels, Furphy declared that he had 'to shift a 
bit of [his] fearful burden of congenital ignorance by reading any new 
scientific book that finds its way into our local Mech.Inst.,' (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:119). 
And, to Cecil Winter, Furphy wrote that, '[d]uring the spell I 
had in Melb., 12 years ago, a few weeks at a time, I wore a cattle-
track from the West End Hotel to the Public Library .... Now, artisans 
are, as a rule, more bookish and better informed than clerks, 
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shopmen &c., and yet of the 16 or 18 hands at the Foundry, only 3 
besides myself are members of the Mechanics Institute -though 
subscription is only 2 / 6 a quarter' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995: 168). One can do no worse than to see Furphy, as well as 
Collins, as a Phllosophe. But what does it mean to be a PhRosophe? 
Zeitlin explains that 'the PhRosophes investigated all aspects of social 
life; they studied and analysed political, religious, social, and moral 
institutions, subjected them to merciless criticism from the 
standpoint of reason, and demanded to change the unreasonable 
ones' ( 1968:3). 
According to Zeitlin, '[m]ore often than not, traditional 
institutions were found to be irrational', thus proving the point that 
these 'institutions were contrary to man's nature and thus inhibitive 
of his growth and development' ( 1968:3). Kramnick states that 
·unassisted human reason, not faith or tradition, was the principal 
guide to human conduct. ... Everything, including political and 
religious authority, must be subject to a critique of reason if it were 
to commend itself to the respect of humanity' (1995:xi). In light of 
1890s division and rivalry, this need for reason is very applicable to 
Furphy, for Franklin, when she spoke of Furphy's relationship to 
knowledge, wrote that '[h]e took nothing on authority' (1944:9). As 
Collins proudly states, 'a revolt undreamt of by your forefathers is in 
progress now -a revolt of enlightenment against ignorance; of justice 
and reason against the domination of the manifestly unworthy' (SU,, 
90). 
In The Life and Opinions of Tom Collins, Croft states that 
[t]o me, Joseph Furphy himself is just not there in the 
record we have of him, nor is he clearly present in 
what has survived of what he has written. The man is 
like his fictions, layers of oil and vinegar, each 
separate from the other. Perhaps that was a product of 
the time: Protestant Christians with the vestiges of 
Calvin and Puritanism in them, living in a world of 
scientific determinism modelled on the laws of 
thermodynamics and the laws of natural selection. 
One could believe in Christ, but only as a prophet of 
the major intellectual movement of the late 
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nineteenth- century -socialism. The individual was not 
important in this system, hence Furphy's deep 
attraction to classical Stoicism. An individual was 
important only as an agent of change directed by 
inescapable historical processes. Thus Furphy's view of 
human affairs is summed up in the famous metaphor 
of the railway tracks: the way is laid out before us, 
accept it and do not whine; but there are choices to be 
made at certain points ... and that is where individual 
courage and volition come in. The historical process is 
bigger than any individual, but each individual has an 
opportunity to influence the unfolding of that process. 
We should submit; but we should also strive (1991:19-
20). 
Indeed, Croft, in his conclusions to this major study, repeats 
this view by stating that '[Furphy] believed in individual choice, 
individual responsibility, and the redemptive power of human love; 
but he also believed in a divine love and purpose which shaped in 
mysterious ways the progress of human affairs' (1991 :275). If what 
Croft says is true, then what do we make of Furphy's artistic 
conviction that 'Man, in this vocation [ of creative art], is a god, a 
creator, and cannot create but in his own image· (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). I think Croft makes too much of the 
tension in the novels as a direct manifestation of Furphy's own "oil 
and vinegar" mind. In my view, there is a consistent view in the 
novels which can be attributed to Furphy, and that view is the view 
of the Phtlosophe. However, Croft is correct in pointing out the 
importance of historical processes to the novels, but I must disagree 
with his notion that the individual's importance stems from his or 
her being just a subordinate agency to that historical process. 
Such a view personifies the historical process to the status of 
God and belittles the emphasis on the theory of the controlling 
alternatives. As Collins states, '[w]hether there's a Divinity that 
afterwards shapes [the chosen alternative] is a question which each 
inquirer may decide for himself (SiL, 70). What is important is the 
fact that '(a] Divine Idea points the way, clearly apparent to any 
vision not warped by interest or prejudice, nor darkened by 
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ignorance; but the work is man's alone, and its period rests with 
man' (SlL, 95). Furphy and his hero stand true to the Ph.ilosophe's 
primary concerns. The uplifting and upbuilding of Australia is 
equally an uplifting and upbuilding of the human being and his or 
her experience in the world. As I hope to show in the next section, 
readers should see Furphy's orientations to socialism within the 
context of the PhUosophe. 
The "order of things" does not refer to some mysterious or 
divine force in the universal scheme of things, but to that historical 
power or force which directly emanates from individuals acting in the 
world. The order of things is a human order and, within the context 
of Furphy's views on art, should be equally seen as the public 
domain of meaning. Furphy seems to be saying that progress or 
tension in the unfolding historical processes is a direct product of 
human interaction and human expression in the history of ideas. If 
this is the case, as I think it is, then Furphy's constant emphasis on 
ignorance-shifting, in both the novels and the letters, is an appeal to 
informed action rather than an ignorant exercising of one's agency in 
the controlling alternatives. As Collins explains, '[t)he major 
alternative is the Shakespearian "tide in the affairs of men," often 
recognized, though not formulated' (SlL, 69). According to Collins, 
'how often do we accept a major-alternative, whilst innocently 
oblivious to its gravity!' (SlL, 69). But, as Collins' warns, '(i]sn't 
history a mere record of blundering option, followed by iron servitude 
to the irremediable suffering thereby entailed?' (SlL, 73) 
In Furphy, the individual and his or her agency is the 
historical process, and one can see that the rivalry between the 
colonies is a direct manifestation of a series of blundering options 
rather than strategic moves and countermoves. Although the novels 
are thematically rooted in nineteenth-century Australian history, 
Furphy's views are surprisingly modem. Discussing the relationship 
between 'the philosophy of history' and 'man as a historical being', 
Levy states that 'the process of human history' is 'the record and 
adventure of an ontologically finite being striving to realise his no 
less finite potential upon a cosmic stage whose limits, though always 
incompletely unknown, constitute the absolute frontiers of possible 
human achievement and thus of what we commonly mean by history' 
(1993:66). According to Levy, 'man must be conceived as something 
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more than a self-constituting being' (1993:~4). But, although the 
human being is bound by .. the limits of history", one 'should not 
underestimate the degree of free, self-constituting activity which is 
possible in this space', just as one should not 'ignore the limits to 
which it is subject' (1993:75). 
With this in mind, one should see that there is a profoundly 
humanist dimension in the symbiosis between the historical process, 
the controlling alternatives and the order of things, for the order of 
things is a human order. Barnes (1990:243) validates this notion by 
noting that the order of things is also a synonymous term for reality. 
As Collins argues, 'each alternative brings into immediate play a 
flash of Free-will, pure and simple, which instantly gives place -as far 
as a particular section of life is concerned- to the dominion of what 
we call Destiny' (SiL, 69. My italics). And, according to Collins, free-
will and destiny 'should never be confounded' (SiL, 69). In the 
oscillating ideas and tensions of human history. destiny and free-
will, or consequences and choices, creatively give form to the complex 
dialectic called .. life" or reality. This ties in directly with the emphasis 
on the response to life, the way of seeing, and the search for meaning 
discussed in the previous section, for these things can seen to 
constitute the content of "life" or reality. 
In the human order of things, a controlling alternative is best 
seen as the creative choice through which one makes a response to 
life in the search for meaning. Once made, the choice engages a way 
of seeing and a series of options generally labelled as destiny. Or, as 
Collins puts it, 'Destiny puts in her spoke, bringing such vicissitudes 
as are inevitable on the initial option' (SiL, 70). In my view, the way 
in which Furphy sees this symbiosis between human beings and 
history works on all levels of human affairs from art to politics. One 
can see the human order of controlling alternatives operating on a 
small scale in the many episodes throughout the novels, hence 
Collins' claim that he is commissioned 'to use [his] own judgment, 
and take [his] own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). 
Equally, one can see the aggregation of these episodes, or these units 
of humanity, as the evidence for the ignorant actions that lead to 
irrelevant and irrational consequences in the 1890s order of things. 
This is a particularly revealing way of seeing Furphy's own 
orientations to 1880s and 1890s rivalry. Readers could say that the 
28. 
theory of the controlling alternatives is Furphy's response to life, 
depicting the human being as a unit of measure in history and the 
search for meaning. In the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, one 
should not just submit to history or tradition. Rather, one should 
critique that which is irrelevant and irrational and strive to make 
history, for history is the direct result of measurable human affairs. 
Again, as Collins argues, 
[w]hether there's a Divinity that afterwards shapes 
[the chosen alternative] is a question which each 
inquirer may decide for himself. Say, however, that 
this postulated Divinity consists of the Universal mind, 
and that the Universal Mind comprises the aggregate 
Human Intelligence, co-operating with some Moral 
centre beyond. And that the spontaneous sway of this 
Influence is toward harmony -toward the smoothing qf 
obstacles, the healing qf wounds (SiL, 70. My italics). 
Or, as Furphy explained to Cecil Winter in a letter dated the 
23rd of September, 1903; 
Now, a man doesn't need to be a psalm-singing sneak 
to admit that beyond the material elements of life, 
beyond the minerals, plants and animals, beyond the 
changing seasons, and so forth, there lies a purpose. 
We don't know definitely what this purpose may be; 
but I don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric banking 
accounts. Same time, I believe it is fulfilled by the 
production of men and women of high moral standard, 
calm courage, and clear intellect (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. My italics). 
Let us now turn to the issue of historical narrative, veracity 
and identity. In her discussion of the importance of "history" to 
nineteenth-century Victorian thought, Crosby states that '(h]istory is 
a regime of truth to which knowledge in general is subject, which 
governs philosophy and philosophical novels; historical novels and 
history "proper"; melodrama and social studies; theology, aesthetics, 
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and autobiographical fiction' (1991: 10-11 ). In terms of this 'regime of 
truth', Crosby further explains that 
"man," in the nineteenth century ... is distinguished by 
his historicity, and can be understood fully only in the 
context of historical realities which are the 
preconditions of the present, the necessary foundation 
of both social and individual life. The priority accorded 
to the past, then, and to the forces of history, means 
that history is divided; "history" is both the general 
ground of human life and also an empirical science of 
events, the study and representation of the 
past. ... History must be purged of fiction, must be 
objective and scientific in order to be truthful, for 
science, as the knowledge of positive realities, is the 
modem discourse of truth. The opposition of "history" 
to "fiction" is that of truth to falsehood, the exclusion 
of the latter guaranteeing the scientificity of the 
former .... However, the objects of history ensure that 
the discipline of history can never successfully 
foreclose fiction, for fiction is the place not of 
falsehood, but of questions about the conditions of 
representation, the processes of signification, the 
constitution of the subject .... "Fiction," then, always 
returns to haunt history, although the discipline has 
been largely successful in repressing the problems with 
which fiction engages. Fiction is thus imagined as 
other than -indeed, the opposite of- history ( 1991 :45-
46). 
Reading Furphy's novels, one finds that the discipline of 
"history" is equally important to nineteenth-century Australian 
thought. Furphy is not, as Brady erroneously argues, 'ignorant of, or 
at least indifferent to, history' (1981 :65). Nor is he boasting that 
'Australia somehow stands outside the course of history' (Brady, 
1981:65). In Furphy's novels, the importance of history is primarily 
asserted through the pursuit of Australianness in opposition to an 
established sense of Britishness. Indeed, the difference between 
30. 
Australian history and British history is simply that British history 
does not begin with an exact point of origin in historically-recorded 
time. In this sense, what is written as the facts of British history, 
and the facts of the British national consciousness or character, 
stretches far back into an antiquity of myth and legend. 
Although this is not in accordance with the scientific veracity 
of history, there is a "dreaming" from which the British can establish 
a positive sense of personal and national identity without having to 
fear the needle of fact. From Antiquity to Empire, one could say that 
British history can rationally accommodate historical fact, historical 
fiction and fiction per se. Through these distinctions, British history 
can comfortably pursue its celebration of national "truth" and 
character on many factual and fictional levels. As White points out, 
'[t]he concept of national types fitted snugly into the nineteenth-
century intellectual landscape, a central feature of liberal, national 
and racial ideology. It was the product of an obsession for 
categorisation which dominated the science of the day' (1981 :64 ). 
"Australia", on the other hand, was more or less born into the 
modern science of history, and the facts surrounding her birth 
cannot be effaced. Historically, she is a convict colony, which is a 
rather unsavoury fact for contemporary views of the national type. As 
Turner states, '[i]n the relationship between the structures of social 
order and the "normal" in Australian society, we can sense the 
traumatic condition of subjection into which the first [white] 
inhabitants of Australia were thrust' (1993:76). According to Turner, 
'(i]t seems inevitable that this would have a profound effect on the 
myths and meanings articulated within the culture then and since' 
( 1993:76). This is an important point to remember when reading 
Furphy, for the Victorian emphasis on the truth-function of history, 
in conjunction with a popular interest in eugenics, means that an 
"Australian" nation-state and the unique Australian type are forever 
marked by the history of convictism. 
Boehm states that 'from whatever perspective they viewed the 
new world, the one constant concern of writers on all levels, official, 
experiential and fictional, bond and free, was with convictism' 
(1973:ix). For example, according to Palmer, '(o]ne of the chief things 
the Bulletin had set out to destroy was the tradition of the convict 
system that still, in its view, cast an ugly shadow over the life of the 
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country' (1963:95). This leads me to ask the following question. If 
Furphy created a hero who was concerned with the uplifting and 
upbuilding of Australia, and colonial .. Australia" was in the grips of 
an ongoing but messy debate concerning both federation and 
national identity, then what does one do with .. Australia's" convict 
history? Hughes (1987:158-159) points out that, until the 1960s, 
Australia's convict history was the cultural stain on the national 
consciousness, and much of convict history was mythologized to 
avoid having to deal with skeletons in the closet. 
In Such ts Life, reference to Australia's convict origins ls 
expressed stylistically like a footnote. This sits nicely with Collins' 
stress on observant reading in light of Hughes' point about convict 
skeletons in the closet. After his authorial introduction, Collins 
begins his narrative with the statement that '[t]his record transports 
you (saving reverence of our "birth stain") something more than a 
hundred miles northward .. .' (SiL, 52). He then proceeds to describe 
the scene at the Willandra Billabong, and makes no more mention of 
transportation or the birth stain. Yet, if we ask ourselves what the 
function of a footnote is, then we would at least answer that its 
purpose is to direct readers to research and think more about a 
particular topic or issue. Having said this, the value of this 
"footnote" in Such ts Life can be explained by Furphy's advice to Cecil 
Winter, '[a]ttend well to details, without making them prominent' (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:146). In short, the "footnote" in the 
narrative was, according to Furphy's artistic style, sufficient enough 
to engage 'the observant reader' (SiL, 2). As G. W. Turner notes, 
'ls]ometimes it is the esoteric nature of a scrap of knowledge that is 
valued most in Furphy's writing' (1986: 179). What was it that 
Furphy, as well as Collins, sought to communicate? 
In my view, the message readers receive from this .. footnote" 
has much to do with the uneasiness of the convict legacy to 
nineteenth-century Australian society. Although the "footnote" ls 
short, an investigation of its semantic allusions reveals a rich source 
of meaning. Semantically, "birth stain" suggests a "birthmark", or 
something which one has for 'life', supposedly making one's origins 
and one's status in the world ideologically and biologically black and 
white. This accommodates the nineteenth-century interest in 
eugenics, perhaps justifying the binary view of England's ·good stock' 
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versus Australia's 'bad stock'. Eugenics has some very interesting 
implications for the concept of a national type. White argues that 
'lt)he idea that it was possible to isolate national "types" was the 
most important intellectual pillar supporting the complex structure 
of ideas about national character which developed in the nineteenth 
century. The national type was given not only physical and racial 
characteristics, but also a moral, social and psychological identity' 
(1981:64). As Willoughby states, 'high breeding and training are 
conditions of superiority in the human as well as in the equine and 
canine races; pedigree being, of course, the primary desideratum' (SiL, 
26). 
Of interest to this view, expressed by White, Hughes states 
that 'lu]ntil well into the 1820s, the word "Australian" was a term of 
abuse, or at best of condescension; it carried an air of seediness on 
the rim of the Pacific' (1987:325). This air of condescension towards 
the term "Australian" did not entirely end with the 1820s, for it is 
still apparent in the contradictory views of the national type in the 
1890s. This can be further qualified by the fact that "stain" suggests 
something that can be cleaned up with hard work, or "elbow-grease", 
but never removed entirely. Or "birth stain" suggests that it is 
something which can be aesthetically covered up to hide 
unpleasantries, despite the fact that it can always be seen if one 
looks in the right places. Perhaps the greatest problem for 
nineteenth-century "Australians" was the fact that their emerging 
national type was quite capable of both veiling and unveiling their 
origins. Readers should note that both "birth stain" and "transports" 
generate a metonymic allusion to the convict system and indicate, 
through Collins' offhand remarks, the social and cultural uneasiness 
to the system's shadows1 • 
Although Shaw is correct in stating that 'le]conomically 
[transportation) had greatly helped Australian development' because 
'it had provided a labour force, which if less efficient than free 
workers was far better than no workers at all', I disagree with his 
notion that 'ls]ocially it did no great harm' (1966:358). Hughes 
points out that 'lt)he basic class division of early colonial Australia -
guards versus prisoners- lived on as a metaphor of future disputes' 
1 It is also interesting to note that these "transports" and "birth stain" should directly follow chapter 
one, where readers have become intimately acquainted with some of 'the Lower Orders' (SiL, 34) of 
the Riverina. One wonders how many Furphian heroes are ticket-of-leave men. 
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(1987:158). In short, the convict system can be seen as an important 
background to the search for meaning, a way of seeing and the 
response to life in Australian history. Indeed, not only was there 
rivalry between the newly-formed states to the penal colony of New 
South Wales throughout the nineteenth century, but there was also 
the animosity of the Australian born to a British judicial and 
cultural system, which had transported and wanted to continue 
transporting felons to his or her home. As Palmer notes, 
The freed community could begin to build up a self-
sufficient Australia if it had the will .... But memories 
of the convict era remained .... At the time of [Sir 
Charles] Dilke's visit [in 1866] the shadow of the penal 
system still clouded the eastern colonies. A jealous 
watch was kept on immigrants, and a fine of £100 
could be inflicted upon captains of ships bringing 
convicts into Melbourne. Cases of crime or lawlessness 
on the mainland were invariably attributed to 
Tasmanian "bolters" ... ( 1963: 15 ). 
Furphy, who was born in 1843, must have had, at the age of 
eight, some understanding of the ideological rivalry that surrounded 
the stigma of the convict system and the breaking away of new 
colonies, especially since, in 1851, he was no longer a native-born of 
New South Wales, but one of "Victoria". It is quite probable that 
these experiences shaped the novels and his views of the colonial 
rivahy surrounding the Federal movement. When the Furphys arrived 
in the colony of New South Wales, landing at 'Port Phillip on 1 
March 1841', the 'Argyle', the barque on which they had arrived, 'was 
one of the first ships to come under the bounty system in what was 
to be a bumper year for immigrants' (Barnes, 1990:6). This bumper 
year brought '7000 assisted immigrants' (Barnes, 1990:6) into the 
Port Phillip district. But what Barnes does not mention is the fact 
that Samuel and Judith Furphy essentially arrived in a convict 
colony. According to Brian Pilbeam ( 1973:4), Samuel and Judith 
Furphy were employed by a squatter named Anderson before they had 
even left the ship, and both were the only free employees amongst the 
ticket-of-leave men on his station, which lay twenty miles outside of 
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Melbourne. Barnes (1990:8) also notes this fact. 
What they thought of this situation is not documented, but it 
is quite probable that, once settled, they would come to share the 
views of the majority of free settlers. According to J. M. Ward, 'the 
rapid increase of free immigrants in the thirties coincided with the 
heaviest period of convict arrivals' and '[b)y the end of the decade free 
immigrants were much more than balancing the growing number of 
convict arrivals' (1966:37). Because '[t)he free population observed 
and resented the horrors of convict life', they 'helped to bring the 
system under severe scrutiny in both colony and homeland' (J. M. 
Ward, 1966:37). A great stigma of convictry was the belief 'that 
convicts depressed wages and produced social and moral standards 
that were detrimental to nearly all working people' (J. M. Ward, 
1966:42). As Collins states, '[t)he folklore of Riverina is rich in 
variations of a mythus, pointing to the David-and-Goliath combat 
between a quiet wage-slave and the domineering squatter, in the 
brave days of old' (SiL, 204). Indeed, 
.... The squatter of half-a-century ago dominated 
his immigrant servants by moral force -no 
difficult matter, with a ·gentleman' on one side 
and a squad of hereditary grovellers on the other. 
He dominated his convict servants by physical 
force -an equally easy task. But now the old 
squatter has gone to the mansions above; the 
immigrant and old hand to the kitchen below; 
and between the self-valuation of the latter-day 
squatter and that of his contemporary wage slave, 
there is very little to choose .... Either the 
anachronistic tradition must make suicidal 
concessions, or the better class people must 
drown all plebeian Australian males in infancy, 
and fill the vacancy with Asiatics (SiL, 205-206). 
The labour question in Such ts Life is not just a question 
governed by socialist views on class and exploitation, but also a 
question richly shaped by the convict presence that represented a 
threat to the livelihood of free settlers who had initially nothing 
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more to offer than their labour. Hughes states that, by 1838, 'native-
born Australians had come to hate the stigma of convictry -and the 
competition from assigned convict labour. In 1840, all 
transportations to New South Wales ceased' (1987: 162). But, one 
needs to remember that 'Transportation to Van Demon's Land was 
not abolished until 1853' and that the last transport ship brought 'a 
group of Irish Fenians' to Western Australia in 1868 (Hughes, 
1987: 162). Nor should one think that this was the end of 
transportation, for '[t]hey were to come, not as convicts, but as 
"exiles" bound not to return to Britain until the expiration of their 
sentences' (J.M. Ward, 1966:39). 
Here we see one of the variations of the mythus to which 
Collins alluded, for '[s]ome of the pastoralists, avid for cheap labour, 
welcomed the suggestion' (J. M. Ward, 1966: 39). Three years after 
Samuel and Judith Furphy, these exiles arrived '[i]n 1844', when 'the 
transport vessel Royal George had landed twenty-one convicts at Port 
Phillip Bay, the first felons to arrive in the future state of Victoria 
since the abortive attempts at a convict settlement there back in 
1803' (Hughes, 1987:553). With these alterations to transportation 
in place, 'the lines of class conflict over the arrival of Exiles were 
drawn. It was city versus country, worker versus squatter' (Hughes, 
1987:554). However, the plan was later modified so that '[instead of 
sending exiles to the colonies', Britain 'would send men on tickets-
of-leave at the expiration of half their sentences' (J. M. Ward, 
1966:41). Or, as Shaw explains, 'the convict would have to undergo 
"separate" imprisonment and then labour on the public works in 
England; only after that would he be sent to Australia, where there 
was a great demand for his labour' ( 1966:320). 
Even though, as Hughes (1987:346) explains, New South Wales 
was not a Jail, for Norfolk Island filled that role, it was nevertheless a 
colony of free settlers with a large proportion of convicts. Indeed, 
Hughes (1987:367) points out that by 1840, forty-five per cent of the 
population were convicts: a number which decreased to twelve per 
cent in 1842 when the remaining percentage obtained their ticket-of-
leave. According to J. M. Ward, though '[t]icket-of-leave men were 
not road-gang convicts or assigned servants, ... they were obviously 
convicts in the eyes of the colonists and the law' (1966:41). One can 
imagine that an ever-increasing influx of free settlers into a colony, 
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which had only recently ceased receiving transported felons, could 
not but lead to an ideological conflict between the notions of free 
and bond. J. M. Ward states that '[h)ostility to transportation was 
not the preserve of any single class or district .... Most emancipists 
opposed the system, believing that so long as it existed, the shameful 
distinction between bond and free would continue' (1966:42). Indeed, 
'[a)ntl-transportation views, by the late 1840s, were a commonplace 
of every pulpit sermon and most political meetings' (Hughes, 
1987:559). 
And yet, 'for all the protests, the meetings and the airing of 
grievances at the enforced Stain, there was never any question of 
secession' (Hughes, 1987:560). Loyalty to the Empire remained strong 
for a variety of reasons. Hughes argues that this view was due to the 
notion that 'the stereotype of convict evil was fixed beyond the power 
of any individual's experience to alter it. Get rid of convictry, keep 
the imperial attachment -such was the local reformer's tune' 
(1987:559). Perhaps loyalty to the Empire was seen by some reformers 
as a safeguard to stop the fatal shore from turning into the fatal 
nest. As Evans et al explain, Anglo-Australian loyalism should also 
be seen within the context of Western notions of good citizenship; 
[ i)n the Australian colonies, as elsewhere in the 
Western world at this time, respectability and right-
living were seen to be consistent With such personal 
virtues as thrift, industriousness, purity and Christian 
sanctity. Idleness, on the other hand, led directly to 
temptation, and temptation to profligacy, over-
indulgence and the abandonment of all sensual 
restraints. By various moral arbiters, especially from 
the middle class, it was viewed as a titanic struggle to 
convince citizens -and especially working class men- to 
forgo instant sensory gratification for the more delayed 
and less tangible pleasures which hard work, saving 
money, monogamy and family devotion promised to 
bring. The struggle in Australia was seen to be more 
vital and difficult than in Britain, largely because of 
the former's convict origins. Morally shameful 
beginnings and the heritage of a 'convict taint' made 
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the need for respectable behaviour all the more 
pressing in Australia (1997:83-84). 
Within the context of good citizenship and the convict taint, 
Manning Clark has made some interesting observations on the 
historical tension between labour and capital in 1883: 
I ti hroughou t the whole civilized world the labouring 
millions were in revolt against the organized army of 
capitalists. Labour was becoming militant and 
aggressive; capital was stolid and defiant. In Australia 
the struggle was complicated by a legacy from the past. 
In Sydney and Melbourne an 'irruption of barbarians' 
was threatening the very foundations of society. The 
old convict strain had inoculated the working classes 
with the virus of destruction. The question was 
whether civilisation could find the right varnish with 
which to coat the underlying barbarism .... In Victoria 
by 1883 40 per cent of the population were city-
dwellers. The problem was to find in this ancient, 
barren land the roots that would clutch, branches that 
would grow out of the stony rubbish and prevent 
Australian society from degenerating into barbarism 
(1995b:416). 
It is interesting to note that the flavour of Clark's narrative 
brings new light to the city-bush dichotomy. One could argue that 
the rivalry between a militant labouring class and a defiant capitalist 
class, as well as the emphasis on good citizenship, finds its 
immediate expression in the city-bush debate. The bush can be both 
the moral saviour and the militant agitator. This is not because the 
bush is janus-faced, but because the bush comes to serve the 
political ends of a way of seeing and a response to life in the search 
for meaning. But, while the emphasis on good citizenship is meant 
to efface convictism and barbarism, it equally lends support to 
jingoism, thereby reinforcing the rivalrous barbarism loyalists hoped 
to overcome. As Collins states, 'le)ighteen-and-a-half centuries of 
purblind groping for the Kingdom of God finds an idealized Messiah 
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shrined in the modern Pantheon, and yourselves .. a chosen 
generation," leprous with the sin of usury; "a royal priesthood," 
paralysed with the cant of hireling clergy; .. a holy nation," rotten 
with the luxury of wealth, or embittered by the sting of poverty; "a 
peculiar people," deformed to Lucifer's own pleasure by the curse of 
caste .. .' (SiL, 89). 
This is important, for an appreciation of Furphy's art must 
include an understanding of the history of colonial rivalry in order to 
understand his emphasis on ignorance shifting to overcome these 
divisions. Collins states that '[i]n our democracy, the sum of 
cultivated intelligence, and corresponding sensitiveness to affront, is 
dangerously high, and becoming higher' (SiL, 205). It appears Furphy 
wants to stress that an uplifting and upbuilding of Australia must be 
an informed and enlightened programme, rather than just a set of 
traditionally learned guidelines to good conduct, a fervent 
parochialism or jingoism and a series of suspicious accusations 
about the intentions of colonial neighbours. In an essay supporting 
the concept of "world federation", Furphy argues that 
[ o Jurs is pre-eminently the age of goodwill; it is the age 
of goodwill because it is the age of enlightenment; it is 
the age of enlightenment because throughout the 
civilized world a thousand pens, such as petrified 
prejudice and vested interests can never hire, are 
writing in varied style and phrase the unchallengeable 
charter of human brotherhood, and the whole world, 
being kin, responds gallantly to the touch of nature 
(1890:54. My italics). 
Under the influence of the Meerschaum pipe, that 'storage-
battery, or accumulator, of such truths as ministers of the Gospel 
cannot afford to preach' (SiL, 85), Collins claims that '(t]he world's 
brightest intellects are answering one by one to the roll-call of the 
New Order, and falling into line on the side championed by every 
prophet, from Moses to the .. agitator" that died o' Wednesday' (SiL, 
90). Furthermore, Collins is convinced that 'the soul-slaying loyalty 
to error draws near its close; for the whole armoury of the Father of 
Lies can furnish no shield to turn aside the point of the tireless and 
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terrible PEN -that Ithuriel spear which, in these latter days, 
scornfully touches the mail-clad demon of Privilege, and discloses a 
swelling frog' (SiL, 90). And, in this sense, 'I c]ontemperaneous 
literature .. .is our surest register of advance or retrogression; and, 
with few exceptions indeed, the prevailing and conspicuous element 
in all publications of more than a century ago is a tacit acceptance 
of irresponsible lordship and abject inferiority as Divine ordinances' 
(SiL, 90. My italics). 
In what can best be described as the "self-evident truths" of an 
enlightenment thinker, Furphy argues home the point that 'la]n 
enlightened age repudiates the blunders and concessions of an 
ignorant age; it is a self-appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober' 
(1890:54-55). Or, as Collins claims, 'John Knox's wildest travesty of 
eternal justice never rivalled in flagrancy the moving principle of a 
civilisation which exists merely to build on extrinsic bases an 
impracticable barrier between class and class: on one side, the 
redemption of life, education, refinement, leisure, comfort; on the 
other side, want, toil, anxiety, and an open path to the Gehenna of 
ignorance, baseness and brutality' (SiL, 88. My italics). According to 
Collins, 'ly]our conception of heavenly justice is found in the 
concession of equal spiritual birthright, based on the broad charter 
of common humanity, and forfeitable only by individual 
worthlessness or deliberate refusal' (SiL, 88). Driving the point home, 
Collins asks a choice question to his readers: 'lw]hy is your idea of 
earthly justice so widely different -since the principle of justice must 
be absolute and immutable' (SiL, 88). 
In the human order of things, 'lt]he mustard seed has become 
a great tree, but the unclean fowls lodge in its branches' (SiL, 89). 
But, rather than taking the axe literally to the tree, Furphy took the 
pen. One could say that the pen is only mightier than the sword 
because the former is the symbol of he or she who thinks. According 
to Collins, 'le]rudition, even in the humblest sphere of life, is the 
sweetest solace, the unfailing refuge, of the restless mind; but if the 
bearer thereof be not able to do something well enough to make a 
living by it, his education is simply outclassed, overborne, and 
crushed by his own superior ignorance' (SiL, 34). In short, 'lilt is 
such men's ignorance -their technical ignorance- that is their curse. 
Education of any kind never was, and never can be, a curse to its 
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possessor; it is a curse only to the person whose interest lies in 
exploiting its possessor' (SIL, 34). 
It will be of further interest to the reader to note that the latter 
half of the nineteenth century marked an intense debate on the 
status of education in Australia. Clark points out that 
[t]he need was great. In the cities the men with 
education were conscious ... that here in Australia 
everything was 'anti-podean'. In Europe there was 
enlightenment; here there was semi-barbarism. In 
Europe and North America there were expensive 
schemes for the education of all children; here the 
wealthy alone could enjoy the highest branches of 
knowledge. In Europe and North America many 
countries had already introduced free education for all; 
here narrow-minded class legislation and sectarian 
animosity thwarted all such attempts. 
Bedevilled by sectarian suspicion and bitterness, 
and despairing of Protestants and Catholics ever 
reaching agreement on a general system of education, 
the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria and 
Queensland had introduced a dual system of national 
schools and denominational schools (1995b:366). 
Ignorance, as Furphy sees it, is inseparable from a complex 
and deeply-ingrained social and cultural rivalry, and so long as it 
remains inseparable, education and federation will suffer. This is 
particularly important to 'the Lower Orders' (SIL, 34) because they 
make up the largest portion of the Australian population and appear 
to be the most susceptible to ignorance. In the letter to Cecil Winter, 
dated the 23rd of September, 1903, Furphy declares that '(t]here is 
much in your suggestion respecting the causes of pessimism in the 
Out-back man (who is the real Australian); but, as you say, 
Ignorance is at the root of it. Does anyone suppose that unbroken 
prosperity is good for a man or a nation? No one, I think; and the 
inability to apply the rule to one's self personally is one 
manifestation of Ignorance' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. 
My italics). 
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Indeed, Collins argues that 'there is a time to be born, and a 
time to die; a time to mourn and a time to dance. Alternate sunshine 
and rain is the law of Nature; alternate smiles and tears is the law of 
human life; and this rhythmic reaction is as necessary to healthy 
moral being as the tide to the sea, or the wind to the atmosphere' 
(BBB, 23). In short, one must accept and work with life's lessons, 
rather than suspiciously reject or hastily build barriers to that which 
"appears" to be a threat. As Ralph Waldo Emerson argued in 
'Nature', '(s]pace, time, society, labor, climate, food, locomotion, the 
animals, the mechanical forces, give us sincerest lessons, day by day, 
whose meaning is unlimited. They educate both the Understanding 
and the Reason' ([ 1836) 1985:55). It is interesting to examine the 
connection between Furphy's novels and some of the ideas espoused 
by Emerson. In their respective biographies, both Franklin (1944:6) 
and Barnes (1990:56) note that amongst the many books on the shelf 
in the Furphy household at Corop was a copy of Emerson's essays. 
Barnes (1990:243) also notes that Furphy's use of the phrase 
"the order of things" may have been a borrowing from Emerson's 
essay 'Nature'. This is rather interesting, for Emerson's essay maps 
out the basic intellectual concerns which underpin Furphy's novels 
and their theme of uplifting and upbuilding Australia. Furthermore, 
a comparative reading of Furphy's novels and Emerson's essays 
reveals not only a similarity of theme, but also a similarity in style, 
especially with Collins' meditations. Perhaps Furphy saw himself as 
an Australian version of Emerson, seeking to communicate to his 
bush-born readers the universal values of reason and understanding. 
Although he does not discuss the connection between Furphy and 
Emerson, Barnes points out that 
[t]he bushman is at the centre of Furphy's world; it is 
as a bushman that he writes for a local audience, 
quite free of the notion of colonial inferiority .... Not 
that Furphy wished to cut himself off from the English 
culture. Quite the reverse. He tries to link his own 
writing to the English tradition by constant allusion. 
The Bible and Shakespeare are never far from 
conscious recall, offering phrases which embody rich 
insights into the permanent in human life (1979:36). 
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Green (1961:613) and Hope (1971:112) have both noted that 
Furphy's active accumulation of knowledge resembles that of the 
magpie, insinuating that Such is Life is an undisciplined nest of 
items collected through desire and greed. While I do not disagree with 
the analogy of the magpie, I should like to affirm that the published 
version of the novel is highly disciplined, for this scholarly 
eclecticism is primary to Collins' presentation of his identity as an 
enlightened and educated thinker. One should not forget that Collins 
himself comes from 'the Lower Orders' (SiL, 34) and that he is 
concerned with 'the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia' (in Barnes 
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259). Indeed, one only needs to think of the 
'ten masterpieces of poetry' (RR, 53) with which Collins tries to 
educate other Furphian heroes to see that the notion of 
enlightenment is one crucial factor of the novels' thematic 
momentum. 
Richters states that '[i]t ls, incidentally, not the least of 
Furphy's achievements to suggest an immemorial tradition peivading 
an order of things of such very recent historical origin' (1979:259). 
But this immemorial tradition serves a purpose. As Partington 
(1993:147, 208) explains, Furphy saw the need to align the great 
cultural traditions of Britain and Europe with the Australian 
experience because such an alignment would have a liberating effect 
on the individual and social groups. G. W. Turner points out that 
'[s]ometimes a European expression is acclimatized by expressing an 
Australia experience, sometimes Australian idiom expresses moral or 
philosophical truths from a European tradition or simply expresses 
well a subtle or complex idea. There ls a constant bringing together 
of the two traditions. Both are respected' (1986: 173). Or, as 
Henricksen explains, '[p)olitical philosophies, ideas, arguments, 
propagandist techniques, set mythological or historical or Biblical 
exempla, single allegorical images: all were transplanted in the 
amalgam of Australian idiom and English literature, and directed to 
healing Australian ills' (1985: 127). 
In this sense, one should see Such is Life as a book that 'is 
meant to educate its readers in various ways' (Pons, 1979: 119). But I 
would extend this qualification equally to Rigby's Romance and The 
Buln-Buln and the Brolga, for all three novels are 'an educational 
game of the first order rather than a fireworks display testifying to 
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the author's cleverness' (Pons, 1979:120). If, as Pons rightly states, 
'education means the development of one's intellectual capacities, 
one's ability to interpret correctly the various events to which one is 
a witness' (1979:120), then the educational quality of the novels is 
rather pertinent in light of the pervasive but unnecessary ignorance 
and rivalry in nineteenth-century Australia. As Collins states, 
'[h]uman ignorance is, after all, more variable in character than in 
extent. Each sphere of life, each occupation, is burdened with its 
own special brand of this unhappy heritage. To remove one small 
section of inborn ignorance is a life-work for any man' (SiL, 32). 
This applies equally well to Furphy, who wrote to Stephens 
that 'another ray of light has tended to dissipate that midnight 
darkness of ignorance with which Nature somewhat unjustly started 
me on the pilgrimage of life' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995: 118). And, to Miles Franklin, Furphy stated that '[i]n the 
matter of Education, I am confronted, whichever way I turn, by my 
own fearful and wonderful Ignorance' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds 
1995: 174). This is an interesting use of two opposed adjectives, for 
ignorance is fearful when it breeds rivalry and division. Perhaps 
Furphy was much influenced in his views by Emerson's notion that 
'(f]ear always springs from ignorance' (( 1837)1985:97). But ignorance 
can also be wonderful in the sense that it can encourage one to 
accept one's shortcomings and to search for knowledge. As Collins 
states, '(t]hose who are personally acquainted with me will readily 
believe that the most difficult self-disciplinary lesson of my life has 
been obtaining a practical mastery of that fine Rabbinical precept, 
"Learn to say, I do not know"' (BBB, 121 ). One is reminded of 
Socrates and his investigations into the knowledge and ignorance of 
his fellow Athenians. 
It would seem that, for Furphy, nation-building is a universal 
concern, and cannot be conducted under the pretext of exclusivity. 
Nor can nation be built in an era of rivalry over education. Furphy 
wanted to point out that one cannot uplift nor upbuild a nation by 
remaining ignorant of, and closed to, other cultural traditions and 
other expressions of universal concerns. Equally, one cannot upbuild 
or uplift a nation in an air of suspicion and rivalry. In fact, Furphy 
stands opposed to the popular discourse of an Australian type that 
has evolved from a narrow stance to a rtvalrous history. According to 
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Palmer, the type was 'a laconic but sociable fellow with his own 
idiom and his own way of looking at things. He had humour of a dry 
sardonic kind, a sensitive spirit with a tough covering, initiative and 
capacity that were qualified by "near enough" standards of 
achievement' (1963:169). Ward also points out these qualities in the 
Australian type, with the added observations that '[h]e swears hard 
and consistently gambles heavily and often, and drinks deeply on 
occasion' (1966:2). Furthermore, Ward notes that the Australian type 
is strongly anti-authoritarian, 'a "knocker" of eminent people', 
strongly egalitarian, for he will 'stick to his mates through thick and 
thin' and 'a great improviser' (1966:2). 
As Harris explains, '[l)ife was a matter of rough and ready 
adaptation to the environment. Self-reliance of this kind, allied to a 
dislike of the boss-cocky, is recorded as far back as the first 
generation of currency lads and lasses' (1962:54). While I am of the 
opinion that Furphy did not disagree with some of these qualities of 
the national type, the extent to which they became the norm struck 
a dissonant chord in him, especially given his passion for learning. 
What Furphy stood most opposed to in the popular discourse of the 
Australian type, most notably the prose sketches of Lawson, was the 
fact that the Australian type's 'mental horizons were comparatively 
narrow', for this overturns, as I have tried to show, the notion that 
'his sympathies were broad' (Palmer, 1963: 169). Indeed, Furphy 
desires to overturn the notion that the Australian type 'is a "hard 
case", sceptical about the value of religion and of intellectual and 
cultural pursuits generally' (Ward, 1966:2). 
Ward states that 'all these characteristics were widely 
attributed to the bushmen of the last century', particularly 'the 
outback employees, the semi-nomadic drovers, shepherds, shearers, 
bullock-drivers, stockmen, boundary-riders, station-hands and 
others of the pastoral industry' (1966:2). It is rather interesting to 
note that, within the opposition of ignorance and knowledge, Furphy 
wrote a novel focussing on many of the aforementioned occupations 
and created a hero who has worked extensively in the bush without 
succumbing to the narrow outlook of the Australian type. It is also 
interesting to note that the people who filled these occupations were 
avid readers of the Bulletin: a popular newspaper that perpetuated 
and thrived on rivalry, contradiction, suspicion and fear. Furphy may 
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have written for the Bulletin, but his eclectic and scholarly style 
ensured that he was not published often. Furphy's writings were not 
as saleable as Lawson's or Paterson's writings. This is evident by the 
sheer length of time it took to publish Such is Life. 
Indeed, if we consider the Bulletin as the major shaper of a 
national identity and all things Australian, then it might be said 
that its readership was getting an education equivalent to that of 
modern tabloid press. In a letter to Kate Baker, Furphy wrote, '[t]hat 
idolatrous red-covered journal hasn't yet printed our remarks of 
Tennyson. I have a par[agraph] in its columns now and then, but 
only something trijling .... Also I [will] send [you a] duplicate of a yam 
which that immoral rag fired into its basket with contumely. But 
"they are an ignorant lot"' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 100. 
My italics). Perhaps Furphy's attitude is adequately surmized by 
Collins, who states that 
the censorious reader may have already noticed [my] 
habit of airing some scrap of unhackneyed 
information, apparently, though not actually, with a 
view to effect. Immoral as the practice is, and pert as it 
may seem to the unbookish critic, I hold it to be far 
less reprehensible than the converse impropriety of 
writing for full-grown people in the painfully simple 
manner so often affected in literature intended for the 
"masses" (BBB, 88). 
One could say that the Bulletin, although Furphy's only literacy 
outlet, eventually fell prey to the same scorn that was normally 
reseived for the romance novelist. Again, it is important to note that 
the Bulletin, like the colonial romance, had a wide readership, which 
makes it very influential in terms of a popular way of seeing and 
responding to life in Australia. Furphy wanted to educate, as well as 
entertain this mass readership. He wanted to address the ignorance 
that divided Australian society and plagued the fledgling national 
movement. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the 1903 review 
Furphy wrote for his own novel, where he points out that 
[t]he corresponding penalty of this National 
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consciousness is a certain narrowness of outlook, a 
spontaneous impression that the sun rises over the 
Barrier Reef and sets behind the Leeuwin. When 
darkened by Stolidity, such focalized regard is 
sometimes amusing, sometimes regrettable -which, 
however, doesn't signify much, as it seldom reaches 
the dignity of print. Shrivelling into provincialism, it 
becomes contemptible; and, festering into the 
imperical-cum-provincial sentiment, it becomes 
obscene. 
But when illuminated by intelligence, the same 
insular survey ccystallizes into far-sighted patriotism. 
When further reinforced by acute observation, and cast 
into literacy form, it invests with interest the minutest 
details of National life (1969:128-129). 
Turner states that '[i]f ... our nationalist myths are not 
unmediated reflections of histoiy but transformations of it, then they 
must work to construct a very specific way of seeing the 
nation .... This way of seeing the nation is dependent upon a relatively 
narrow range of myths -primarily those attached to the radical 
nationalists icons of bushman and the digger' (Turner, 1993: 107). 
Furphy understood this too, and found the myth much too narrow. 
Thus, within the context of the Federal push, jingoism, the convict 
taint and colonial rivalries, Furphy's consistent but eclectic use of 
the European cultural canon and his focus on ignorance shifting 
suggests his pledge to an Australian programme of enlightenment, 
through an Australian programme of education. Furphy was 
dissatisfied with the ignorance that became so much a part of an 
anti-intellectual stance in the national type. Indeed, if we consider 
how other Furphian heroes reflect the Australian type more 
accurately than Collins, then we can see that Furphy desires to 
encourage a healthy intellectualism in this "type". 
To return to Crosby's discussion on the tension between fact 
and fiction in the discipline of history, it can be said that the 
colonial sense of Australian history has utilized this tension to the 
fullest in order to mythologise a grand, national life rather quickly. If 
histoiy cannot be effaced, then the next alternative is to examine 
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history's status as fiction, smoothing over the obstacles and healing 
the wounds of colonial Australia. To stress Crosby's previous points, 
such an examination does not mean a preoccupation with history as 
a falsehood, but with 'the conditions of representation, the processes 
of signification [and] the constitution of the subject' (1991:45). This 
accords with Furphy's views on art. But, since ignorance seems to be, 
for Furphy, at the root of the problem, it must also be said that the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, or the art of nation, besides 
being concerned with representation, signification and the 
constitution of identity, must also consider the dangers of ignorance, 
sophistry and rivalry that can result from a particular way of seeing 
and a particular response to life. 
Consider the following enthusiastic excerpts from a speech 
entitled 'The Mind of a Nationalist' by R. Thomson: 
... [l]et the critic sneer at 1788. It shall yet be a date 
that the wide world shall honour. What though our 
land was born in sorrow and shame; yet out of the 
cradles of poverty and sin, empires have emerged and 
the regenerators of mankind have arisen. 
When we think of the teachings of history we can 
well believe that in the time to come -it may be before 
this generation has passed away- 1788 will be a date 
that will be classed in the world's history with the 
founding of Rome, the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers, 
or the storming of the Bastille. There will be but one 
greater day in our own Australia's annals, and that 
will be the anniversary of the Declaration of her 
Independence. For that great date ... it is the duty of 
our countrymen to make preparation. It will be a 
fateful event, and epochs of that character are slow in 
coming and are not the progeny of chance. Work, 
earnest work, must smooth the way, and the more the 
labourers and the more earnest their labour, the 
sooner and the better will the triumph be achieved. 
Too many of my countrymen give no thought to the 
morrow. It suffices them that they eat, drink, and be 
merry. But empires are not built by muscles and 
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bodies alone. Brains must also be exerted. There must 
be they who will plan and work for other ends than 
those which are demanded to obtain the wherewithal 
to eat and drink {in Clark, 1955:792). 
Furphy seems to share the flavour of Thomson's concerns. If, 
historically speaking, convictism is one of the most prominent 
factors in the shaping of a national type, and the once negative 
qualities of the convict type are appropriated by the rural and urban 
masses as a celebration of a society and culture, then it can be said 
that the emerging national type ignorantly celebrates the very thing 
that has perpetuated rivalry and consistently divided the people. 
Indeed, Ward argues that the qualities of the Australian type were 
not just shaped by 'the material conditions of outback life', but also 
by the fact that 'the first and most influential bush-workers were 
convicts or ex-convicts, the conditions of whose lives were such that 
they brought with them to the bush the same, or very similar, 
attitudes' (1966:2). This is reminiscent of Hughes' aforementioned 
notion that '[t]he basic class division of early colonial Australia -
guards versus prisoners- lived on as a metaphor of future disputes' 
(1987: 158). 
Perhaps this link between the convict stereotype and the anti-
intellectualism of the newly-emerging national type is just one of the 
reasons why 'the coming Australian is a problem' {SiL, 144) for the 
scholarly Furphy. Indeed, it may have even been one of the primary 
reasons for his pessimism in the last two years of his life, for he 
wrote to his mother that 'all my interminable reading has the effect 
only of impressing me with the vast extent of my own present 
ignorance. Yes, there is another effect, namely, a realisation of the 
similar ignorance of all our leading men of letters. There is hardly a 
book worth reading' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253). The 
letter was written ten years after federation on the 1st of April, 1910. 
But even in this letter there is present an undeniable and deep-
seated optimism, for Furphy wrote 
[and] yet, running beneath all the "personal equation", 
prejudice, and general trashiness of our best literature 
there is a blind, half-futile aspiration toward 
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something better; and this aspiration is not without 
its effect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253). 
At the time when the Furphys arrived, colonial society had 
begun to feel the birthpangs of federation, and one can only imagine 
the impact it had on the free settlers, emancipated convicts and their 
native-born children who, like Furphy, represented an "Australian" 
socio-cultural future. As a writer who sought to write about an 
Australia for Australians, it is obvious that Furphy sought to bring 
Australia to its full potential as a nation amongst nations. But the 
manner in which he undertook this strategy was to emphasize the 
importance of a commitment to education, for education would, in 
turn, emphasize the importance of that which is other to the self. In 
short, education takes the people out of the microcosm of ignorance 
in to the macrocosm of knowledge and understanding. 
Perhaps the events of 1883 in the Rivertna brought Furphy to 
an understanding that the success of Australia as a nation amongst 
nations depended on a common 'smoothing of obstacles' and a 
common 'healing of wounds' (SiL, 70) in the human order of things. 
But the turn of events in nineteenth-century colonial Australia 
perhaps suggested to Furphy that the removal of obstacles and the 
healing of wounds can only occur by epistemologically eradicating 
the sophistry that perpetuates the problem of colonial rivalry and the 
stigma of convictism. As Collins states, 
[h]istory marks a point of time when first the 
Humanity of God touched the divine aspiration in 
man, fulfilling, under the skies of Palestine, the dim, 
yet infallible instinct of every race from eastern Mongol 
to western Aztec. "The Soul, naturally Christian," 
responds to this touch, even though blindly and 
erratically, and so from generation to generation the 
multitudes stand waiting to welcome the Gospel of 
Humanity with psalms and hosannas, as of old; while 
from generation to generation phylactered 
exclusiveness takes counsel against the revolution 
which is to make all things new. And shall this 
opposition -the opposition by slander, conspiracy, 
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bribery, and force- prevail till the fatal line is once 
more passed, and you await the Titus sword to drown 
your land in blood, and the Hadrian-plough to furrow 
your Temple-site? (SiL, 90). 
This cannot be if, as Collins believes, one takes part in the 
'revolt of enlightenment against ignorance' (SiL, 90). 
1.3. The Penguin and the Man-0'-War Hawk: a parable on 
opportunism. 
In a letter to his mother, Judith Furphy, dated the 10th of 
April, 1910, Furphy wrote, 
Though I have learned something of the history of the 
human race, I am only on the fringe of knowledge. 
Beyond Rome lies in rotation Palestine, Greece, 
Babylon, Assyria, with Egypt, India & China, all to be 
inquired into. But the Siege of Troy and the episode of 
Jepthah (about the same date) are matters of 
yesterday. Beyond History lies Tradition, then Legend; 
and beyond this stands the Cave Man, clamoring for 
recognition .... But the main interest of Science lies far 
beyond the earliest of those early times, and extends 
onward through the Future to a time when our 
descendants will be as superior to ourselves as we are 
to those evil-smelling ancestors of ours. And to this 
end Socialism expects every man to do his duty 
(Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253-254). 
Given our knowledge of Furphy's interest in history and his 
support for education, Green is correct to state that Furphy had a 
keen 'desire to understand the nature and history of the evolution of 
man' (1961:613). But how does this relate to Furphy's socialist 
concerns? What does Furphy mean when he states that "to this end 
Socialism expects every man to do his duty"? There is no denying 
that Furphy keenly expressed his concerns for the social. But was 
Furphy a committed socialist? In a letter to Cathels, discussing the 
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'Darwinist' and 'Antinomian' climate of Victorian industry, Furphy 
voices hls opinion that he has little 'hope' for 'the consummation of 
the social economic ideal' in 'Victoria' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995:20). But, in the self-same letter, Furphy also writes, 
(y]ou'll think by all this that I've been reading myself 
stupid ln the literature of Socialism. Not so, my last 
exercise has been Fielding and Smollett, both of whom 
I had partly read long ago .... By the way what a rotten 
world lt was before Paine preached and Bums sang 
and Byron scoffed and Carlyle snarled. I find great 
comfort ln the ferment of society ln these our days, 
but Gude save us! What a lot of suffering lt takes to 
earn a little progress (ln Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995:20)2 • 
The letter was dated January, 1894. But, ln a letter to Mlles 
Franklin, written on the 31st of July, 1904, Furphy explains that 
'being a State Socialist, I am not under the Dlvlne malison, and am 
consequently able to see things as they are -chiefly the great fact 
that my own private interests are not worthy to count for -/2 against 
the public welfare' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 174). This ls 
interesting, for one could argue that, by the time Furphy had written 
the aforementioned letter to hls mother on the 10th of April, 1910, 
he had converted fully to socialism. But I do not think so. While lt ls 
an undeniable fact that Furphy had social concerns, I think lt ls 
necessary to approach this wlthln the context of the phllosophe's 
concern for rational human progress. As Furphy had stated to 
Cathels, 'I am about the busiest man in Shep., for when the Adamlc 
penalty of each day has been duly paid, my labour of love -ignorance 
shifting- Just begins' (ln Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:23). It ls 
this labour of love which probably led hlm to adopt some socialist 
ideas. But, unlike Barnes (1990:145), Croft (1991:86; 1996:215) or 
Ewers (1943), I would not classify Furphy as a socialist. Perhaps 
Henrlcksen's notion that Furphy articulated a 'reasoned socialism' 
(1985: 175) comes closest to the truth. 
Furphy ls a phllosophe and hls socialist ideas, Just as hls 
2 l will discuss Paine's relevance to Furphy more fully in the last section. 
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nationalist ideas, should be seen within this context. Thus, it is the 
object of this section to show some of the reasons why I think this is 
the case. In the words of that other phllosophe, Tom Collins, 
if the censorious reader has detected here and there in 
these pages a tendency toward the Higher Criticism, or 
a leaning to State Socialism, or any passage that 
seemed to indicate a familiarity with cuneiform 
inscriptions, or with the history and habits of Pre-
Adamite Man, he may be assured that, at the time of 
writing such passage, I had been smoking the mighty 
pipe -or rather, the mighty pipe had been smoking me -
and the unlawful erudition had effeivesced per motion 
of my scholastic ally (SiL, 272). 
Firstly, Furphy's own interests in individual and social 
circumstances are too complex and variform to be simply pinned 
down to one political view of the world. Indeed, Furphy wrote in his 
essay on world federation that '[t]here are stupendous industries 
awaiting development; there are untrodden labyrinths of science lying 
beyond the vestibule where we stand to-day; there are artistic and 
literary possibilities to which present attainments are the mere 
alphabet; there are ten thousand beneficient outlets for the inborn 
combativeness and effeivescent energy and limitless aspiration of 
enfranchized humanity' (1890:55). Although socialist ideas can be 
identified in this essay by choice words such as proletartat or class, I 
do not agree with Barnes' notion that, '[a]lthough the term is never 
used, "Socialism" ... is clearly the philosophy which is being espoused' 
(1990:157). Though Barnes is correct in noting that Furphy's 
'personal philosophy ... was a mixture of Protestantism, Stoicism and 
Socialism' (1990:148), one ought to subordinate this mixture of ideas 
to the enlightenment programme of shifting the ignorance that 
jeopardises human progress and the ·gospel of equal rights' (Furphy, 
1890:55)3. 
What, then, do we make of Furphy's socialist ideas in his 
narratives? Though Croft classifies Furphy as a socialist, he points 
out that 'what we get is not a comprehensive picture of life in the 
3 I will discuss the importance of rights in more detail in the next section. 
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Rivertna in the 1880s. Instead, there is an absence, a silence, which 
must worry those readers who turn to the text as an example of 
socialist propaganda in the 1890s' ( 1991: 17). According to Croft, 
'[t]hat Furphy should attempt to write an epic of socialism without 
ever showing unionists and in particular the shearers, the historical 
agents of socialism, is explicable only in terms of the confusion of 
Furphy's mind when he came to deal with life in the Riverlna in the 
1880s' (1991:18). But in a recent essay, Croft states that 'Such is Life, 
Rtgby's Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga certainly put the 
case for socialism and egalitarianism but an analysis of the ideas in 
the novels, and their method of presentation through a conservative 
narrator [ Tom Collins] and a flawed spokesman for state socialism 
[Jtef{ersonRlgby] compromise those ideas, and confuse the readership 
of the novels' ( 1996:226). 
If one considers that Rtgby's Romance is the most consistent 
expression of State Socialism of the three novels, one really ought to 
reevaluate just what Furphy intended in regards to socialism. The 
socialist issue is only marginally present in Such is Life and virtually 
non-existent in The Buln-Buln and The Brolga. Toward the close of 
the latter narrative, however, Collins has this to say to his readers: 
[Barefooted] Bob was a bushman by nature, as well as 
by compulsion. His individuality was clear-cut as a 
cameo. Faithful and single-hearted, he was sternly 
honest in his criminality, and pious in his 
acknowledged wrong-doing. For instance, his sympathy 
with bushrangers and horse-stealers was as 
magnanimous as your own tenderness for usurers, 
profit-mongers, nobleman, etc. In a word, he walked 
conscientiously in a light that was extremely dim. 
Every unselfish man is loyal to something extraneous; 
at that date Bob was loyal to capitalism and M'Gregor; 
a few years later, he was still more loyal to the 
Queensland strike leaders and Socialism-in-our-time 
(BBB, 140-141). 
Is Collins not hinting at Barefooted Bob's opportunism? Is 
Furphy suggesting that the desire, or human spirit for opportunism 
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is as prevalent as ignorance? If so, then could we not argue that the 
rivahy and contradictions of the 1890s are due to the prevalence of 
ignorance and opportunism? If egalitarianism and socialism in the 
novels are not what they seem, then perhaps one to ought consider 
Furphy's narratives as suggesting something other than the run-of-
the-mill themes through which we see the 1890s and its literature. 
Of particular interest to my view is Jack the Shellback's account of 
the "Penguin and the man-o'-war Hawk". 
The account is an interesting one because of its central theme 
of hunger. Indeed, this theme of hunger is introduced through the 
voracious appetite of Collins' kangaroo-dog, Pup. Readers of the 
three novels are well informed of Pup's entertaining antics in his 
quest for food. According to Collins, '[o]ne peculiarity of the 
kangaroo-dog is ... that he can smell food through half-inch 
boilerplate; and he rivals Trenck or Monte Cristo in making way 
through any obstacle which may stand between him and the object of 
his desires' (SIL, 274). This is important, for it is through Pup that 
Furphy alludes to the themes of desire and opportunism, and it is 
because of Pup's hunger that Jack the Shellback gives his account of 
the man-o'-war hawk. Collins may state that '[t]he kangaroo-dog is 
the hungriest subject in the animal kingdom' (SIL, 274), but, 
according to Jack the Shellback, 'he ain't in it with the man-o'-war 
hawk' (SIL, 274). Furphy is surely alluding to an even hungrier 
subject in the animal kingdom than either the kangaroo-dog or the 
man-o'-war hawk, and that is Man. 
Because of Jack the Shellback's profanity, Collins paraphrases 
the account: 
[t]he man-o'-war hawk, it appears, utters a thrilling 
squeal of hunger the moment his beak emerges from 
the shell; and his hunger dogs him -kangaroo-dogs 
him, you might say- through life. At adult age, he 
consists chiefly of wings; but, in addition to these, he 
has a pair of eager, sleepless eyes, endowed with a 
power of something like 200 diameters; and he has 
also a perenially empty stomach -the sort of vacuum, 
by the way, which Nature particularly abhors. He can 
eat nothing but fish; and, since he suffers under the 
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disadvantage of being unable to dive, wade, or swim, 
someone else must catch the fish for him. The penguin 
does this, and does it with a listless ease which would 
excite the envy of the man-o'-war hawk if the 
unceasing anguish of hunger allowed the latter any 
respite for thought (SiL, 275). 
In contrast, the penguin 'presents a pointed antithesis to the 
man-o'-war hawk' (SiL, 275). The penguin's 'life is unadventurous; 
some might call it monotonous' (SiL, 275). Indeed, the penguin is 
never required 'to act either on reason or impulse', for he 'has few 
wants, and no ambition. Dreaming the happy hours away -that is his 
idea' (SiL, 275). The small bird 'knows barely enough to be aware that 
with much wisdom cometh much sorrow' (SiL, 275). And, [o)nce a 
day, he experiences a crisp, triumphant appetite, which differs from 
hunger as melody differs from discord' and he 'selects a fish as for 
size, flavour, and general applicability [that) will best administer to 
his bodily requirements, and gratify his epicurean taste' (SiL, 275). In 
short, while the penguin's desires are well-fed, the man-o' -war hawk 
must use strategy in order to live by the principle that 'the most 
important of all economies is the economy of time' (SiL, 276). 
From a socialist perspective, one could say that the man-o' -
war hawk represents the maxim that "time is money" and the social 
Darwinist notion of the survival of the stronger. Indeed, one could 
conclude, as Croft (1991:205) and Henricksen (1985:135) do, that the 
account is a parable of nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism, 
and that the man-o'war hawk represents the exploiter and the 
penguin the exploited. But readers should note that the manner in 
which Collins paraphrases the account has much to do with 
attributing human qualities to both the penguin and the man-o' -war 
hawk. Effectively, this makes the two birds the measure of how one 
desires to exist in the world. Indeed, according to Collins, '[a)fter 
listening with much interest to the description here loosely 
paraphrased, I fell asleep with the half-formed longing to be a 
penguin, and the liveliest gratitude that I was not a man-o'-war 
hawk' (SiL, 277. My italics). 
In short, the man-o'-war hawk must suffer in his labours for 
his fleeting moment of happiness, while the penguin appears to have 
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the perfect life. As Croft notes, 'this is a curious inversion of the 
usual socialist picture of the economic problem' (1991:206). But I 
disagree with Croft's notion that the parable 'is no answer to the 
great problems of social inequality in the late nineteenth century' 
(1991:206). Sharkey is correct in noting that the parable is 'a subtle 
analogy for the reader's interpretation of the plot' (1984:23). But I 
think that the parable foregrounds more than just 'the relationship 
between narrator and audience' ( 1984:23). Is Furphy suggesting that, 
while human beings desire to be like the penguin, perhaps even 
obtaining a degree of bliss in the pursuit of happiness, they are more 
than likely to act and interact in the manner of the man-o'-war 
hawk? Is the desire to live like the penguin more a case of 
opportunism than an honest expression of socialism, mateship or 
working class solidarity? Indeed, Ward points out a rather humorous 
but 'well known story' where 'a socialist orator promised his audience 
that there would be strawberries and cream for all after the 
revolution' (1966: 181). 
Though earlier than Manning Clark, was Furphy already 
pointing to the fact that the labour movement 'was corrupt, 
opportunist' and 'riddled with bourgeois prejudices', showing 'no 
intention of working for the regeneration of mankind' (1980: 14). If 
this is the case, as I think it is, then Partington is quite right in 
concluding that 'Jack the Shellback's parable of the man-o'-war 
hawk and the penguin suggests there are basic differences between 
individuals or groups which may persist through all social 
arrangements' (1993: 176). As she points out, 
the theme of class-conflict by no means constitutes 
the whole of Such ts Life. Indeed, it is difficult to 
recognise the naive antithesis of wicked squatter and 
worthy plebeian as even a defensible reading. There 
seems little reason to suspect that selectors, 
bullockies, or stationhands, although they have little 
enough to show for their efforts, are any less 'land-
hungry' than the squatters (1993: 172). 
To put it simply, '[m]en and women in the Riverina lie and 
steal in similar ways to the rest of humanity' (Partington, 1993: 123). 
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One only needs to remember Dixon and Bum's attempt to steal 
Collins' horse, Cleopatra, or the impounding of Warrigal Alfs 
bullocks while he is sick to note the widespread opportunism in the 
Rivertna. From this, one could say that the account is a parable of 
the opportunism that turns the individual longing for happiness into 
the individual pursuit of happiness, with little regard for society or 
ideology. This is interesting in light of a neat little remark made by 
Collins and our previous investigation of the importance of ignorance 
to the narrative. If people long to be like the penguin, and the 
penguin lives 'in total ignorance of the man-o'-war hawk' (SiL, 276), 
then people long to be ignorant of the internal and external factors 
that affect and determine their positions in the world. Although, as 
Collins states to Warrtgal Alf, 'one must love something' and 'one 
must hate something' (SiL, 135), one must also be aware of why one 
loves or why one hates and what effect one's hatred or love has on 
one's response to life. 
To live in the penguin's blissful ignorance does not necessarily 
mean that one's happiness is of benefit to self or society. Indeed, 
Sam Brackenbridge's conversion to socialism and his belief that 'us 
Socialists is no more responsible for the comin' revolution than the 
mere petrel is for the storm it prognosticates' (RR, 255) is one 
example of the penguin's blissful ignorance as well as the man-o'-
hawk's opportunism. Socialism is not a '[m]ere matter of evolution' 
(RR, 255), but a purposeful strategy executed by people in the human 
order of things. And it is a strategy with major and minor 
alternatives. In this sense, one could consider the parable of the 
penguin and the man-o' -war hawk as a further illustration of the 
theory of the controlling alternatives and the need for education. 
This applies equally to Furphy's earlier views towards ignorance-
shifting and human progress. It also allows Furphy to use the 
parable to indicate further the damaging attitudes and orientations 
of colonial Australians toward the uplifting and upbuilding of 
Australia. Thus, while the account of the penguin and the man-o' -
war hawk can be read as a parable of economic conditions, its 
designs are better seen as a study of desire and interaction in human 
nature. 
One must remember that neither the penguin nor the man-o' -
war hawk is unduly disadvantaged by the economics of their 
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relationship in the order of things. Both live in a state of 
opportunism relative to their desire or epicurean taste. In light of 
this, I would like to tum to a letter that Keats wrote to his brother 
and sister, George and Georgiana, for it brings some interesting 
points to the discussion at hand. In this letter, dated the 19th of 
March, 1819, Keats wrote that 
[ i]n wild nature the Hawk would lose his Breakfast of 
Robins and the Robin his of Worms. The Lion must 
starve as well as the swallow -The greater part of Men 
make their way with the same instinctiveness, the 
same unwandering eye from their purposes, the same 
animal eagerness as the Hawk -The Hawk wan ts a 
Mate, so does the Man -look at them both, they set 
about it and procure one in the same manner -They 
want both a nest and they both set about one in the 
same manner -they get their food in the same manner 
-The noble animal Man for his amusement smokes his 
pipe -the Hawk balances about the Clouds -that is the 
only difference of their leisures. This it ls that makes 
the Amusement of Life -to a speculative Mind. I go 
among the Fields and catch a glimpse of a stoat or a 
fleldmouse peeping out of the withered grass -the 
creature hath a purpose and its eyes are bright with it 
-I go amongst the buildings of a city and I see a Man 
hurrying along -to what? The Creature has a purpose 
and his eyes are bright with it (in Rollins, ed, 1958:79-
80. My italics). 
Thematically, the flavour of Jack the Shellback's account is 
very similar to Keats' letter. Considering that Keats' letter had been 
originally published in 1848, it ls quite possible that Furphy had 
read the letter. Indeed, Keats' letter foregrounds not just the issue of 
hunger, but also the issue of purpose in the account of the hawk and 
the penguin. This ls important, for we are already familiar with 
Furphy's belief that 'beyond the changing seasons ... there lies a 
purpose' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). But, while Keats' 
letter speaks generally about the presence of purpose in hawk and 
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man, I find lt interesting that Furphy's parable should focus on a 
particular type of hawk associated with tmages of the 'high seas' (SiL, 
274), with "treasure", "heroism" and "opportunism" in the human 
order of things. This has some rather interesting ramifications for 
Keats' analogy on purpose, the ramifications of which he seems to be 
aware. Indeed, Keats wrote that '[t]here is an electric fire in human 
nature, tending to purify; so that, among these human creatures, 
there is continually some birth of new heroism; the plty ls, that we 
must wonder at lt, as we should at finding a pearl in rubbish' (in 
Houghton, ed, [ 1848) 1927: 158). 
Referring to the Australian type, Palmer states that 'there was 
a streak of idealism in his nature that expressed itself in his 
sentiment about mateship and in the political movements that made 
for equality' (1963:170). Indeed, according to Ward, '[t]he later 
bushman exhibited, perhaps even more clearly than hls fore-runners, 
that "manly independence" whose obverse side was a levelling, 
egalitarian collectivism, and whose sum was comprised ln the 
concept of mateship' (1966:180). This may be true for some 1890s 
writers and their depletion of the type, but not Furphy. While Furphy 
considered the bushmen to be indicative of the real Australian type, 
one should not forget their opportunist nature, their willing 
participation in some form of colonial rivalry and their tendency for 
overhasty and ignorant actions. 
As Clark (1980:12-17) has pointed out, egalitarianism, or the 
belief that brotherhood, equality and mateshlp were universally 
extended to all ls a fallacy, for such a view was much more 
prominently a front for anti-loyalist sentiments. Clark argues that 
'[m]ateship was the product of a way of life: a mate was a bulwark 
against loneliness, a help in time of sickness and accident' (1980: 16). 
This is what Furphy's narratives indicate, for there are numerous 
examples of this kind of "mateship" which in no way espouse true 
equality, brotherhood or egalitarianism, as Ward or Palmer describe. 
For example, one could consider Collins' tending to Warrigal Alfs 
sickness and his retrieval of Alf s impounded bullocks within Clark's 
description of mateship. Likewise, one could also see Clark's 
description of mateship operating in chapter one of Such ls Life, when 
the bullockies help Cooper to tow his wagon out of the bog, despite 
the fact that there is a deep colonial rivalry between the men. 
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According to Kiernan, Collins' 'digressions may present us with the 
ideals of Australian democratic socialism but, when we glance at the 
characters and situations in the novel, society is seen as far from 
ideal.. .. Society is seen as absurd in its pretensions, and corrupt 
behind its facade of respectability' (197lb:143). I think Collins' 
digressions are designed to direct our attention to this fact. 
Douglas places much of Such is Llf e firmly in the picaresque 
tradition, arguing that '[t]heft and deception are the stock-in-trade of 
the picaresque tradition' and that '[t]he picaro .... sets out to rise in 
the world by skills picked up from bandits, toughs, card-sharpers, 
pimps, burglars, pickpockets and confidence men' (1978:19). While 
such a variety of characters do not grace Furphy's pages, it is rather 
interesting that the bullocky, like the plcaro, 'has cruelties inflicted 
on him, and returns them with interest', for '[h]e practices the trades 
of the world to which he belongs' and 'engages in a battle of wits to 
see who will emerge the deceiver and who the deceived' ( 1978: 19). 
Indeed, '[t]he picaresque "hero" shows no consciousness of wrong-
doings except in so far as he reveals some of his misdemeanours by 
accident rather than design' (Douglas, 1978:21). One could do no 
worse than to remember the manner in which Dixon tries to pass off 
his bad back to Collins after he and Bum tried to thieve Collins' 
horse during the night. For this reason, I must disagree with Brady, 
who claims that Furphy's 'bullock-drivers ... are the equivalent of 
O'Reilly's Aborigines, noble savages unspoiled by the corruptions of 
civilization' (1981 :52). 
This directly affects the manner in which socialism, mateship 
or egalitarianism are practised in the world of Furphy's three novels. 
The picaresque tradition also ostensively directs readers to consider 
further the actual status quo of "life" in the 1890s. Of equal 
importance to this and to the picaro's plying the skills of his trade is 
occupation. According to Croft, '[i]f we look at the range of 
occupations of the characters in Furphy's work, it is apparent that 
most of them are of [the class of journeymen, skilled workers and 
minor entrepreneurs], or of higher class allegiances' (1996:211). And, 
for Croft, Furphy's bullockies are 'minor entrepreneurs in the sense 
that present day "truckles" are minor capitalists' (1996:211). Barnes 
states that '[t]he Riverina carriers were an unusual group: capitalists 
of a sort, their capital being invested in their carrying plant and 
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teams, they were individualists with strong group loyalties' 
(1990:125). This is important, for one could do no worse than to see 
the bullockies as subcontractors who, even to this day, are a problem 
for the success of socialist or unionist movements. 
As Docker points out, '[t]he men work largely for themselves, 
although always in danger of commercial failure, and [al return to a 
working-class wage existence' (1991: 113). Furphy wished to show 
that the bullockies were one group of minor entrepreneurs who 
desired to live like penguins but acted as man-o'-war hawks to 
achieve their aims. Thus, I agree with Docker that '[i]t is, not 
surprisingly, individualism we see them attracted to, not co-operative 
socialism' (1991: 113). In terms of their occupation, one could argue 
that it is the environment in which they ply their trade that makes 
them so. But I am of the view that while this is not false, it is 
neither entirely true, for the parable of the penguin and the man-o'-
war hawk indicates that hunger, or desire, plays a great role in the 
major or minor alternatives of one's purpose. 
In short, Furphy's observations on the 1890s environment 
equally take into account that rather complex and persistent "thing" 
called human nature. In this sense, does environment dictate 
"human nature", or does human nature dictate "environment"? 
Given the theory of the controlling alternatives, it is my contention 
that Furphy thought the latter to be the case without totally 
discrediting the former. Again, one must remember that, according to 
Collins, 'the coming Australian is a problem' (SiL, 144). This is 
equally so in light of our previous discussion on convictism and the 
pervasiveness of the convict stereotype in many of the power 
struggles of nineteenth-century Australia. After reading Furphy's 
novels, readers should come to some understanding that the 
celebrated ideals of 1890s egalitarianism or mateship are, in the 
words of Keats, pearls in rubbish. Yet, according to Collins, 'if we 
decline a brotherhood of mutual blessing and honour, we 
alternatively accept one of mutual injury and ignominy' (SiL, 95). 
Or, as Furphy wrote in his essay supporting world federation, 
'[i]ntelligent co-operation and mutual goodwill are the only necessary 
conditions to organisation; loyalty is the sole condition to stability; 
and loyalty is the central instinct of humanity -good night, indeed, 
to civilisation if it were not so!' ( 1890:55). This may be taken to be 
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socialist, but it could just as easily be understood to mean 
enlightenment humanism, for one could see Furphy as having the 
philosophe's rational passion for the uplifting and upbuilding of 
Australia and Australians. To recall Furphy's belief in purpose, he 
wrote that 'we don't know definitely what this purpose may be; but I 
don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric banking accounts. Same time, I 
believe it is fulfilled by the production of men and women of high 
moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). 
Neither the opportunism of the man-o' -war hawk nor the 
blissful ignorance of the penguin will clarify the purpose of men and 
women in the human order of things. As Dorothy Green notes, 
Furphy does not 'deny that one's neighbour has needs', but he does 
much 'to refine the perception of what those needs are and to admit 
that there are a genuine scale of priorities' (1980:33-34). Or, as Indyk 
states, '[i]t is not the fact of diversity but the failure to acknowledge 
reciprocity and equality that prevents the development of a binding 
sense of community' (1986:307). But it is not socialism alone that 
can bind the community, for one needs a much broader education 
than just the socialist message. Perhaps one could say that the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia is worth ·a great deal more to 
one who has been nourishing a youth sublime with the curious facts 
of Science and the thousand-and-one items of general information 
necessary to any person who ... above all other strife contends 
especially to know himself; and that physically, as well as morally' 
(SiL, 280. My italics). 
It is well documented in Barnes' biography (1990:123) and 
Barnes and Hoffmann's collection of Furphy's letters (1995:1) that 
Furphy had camped with Charlie Sullivan one night in the Rivertna, 
and that the pair had discussed the content of many literary and 
philosophical works. One of these was Plato's Republic. According to 
Sullivan, Furphy was 'the most learned bushman' he had 'ever met, a 
real bushman', leading him to conclude that 'Furphy was of us, but 
not one of us'. With regard to that famous maxim of the Delphian 
oracle, Furphy seems to share Plato's notion that 'the just man is 
wise and good and the unjust man bad and ignorant' (bk. l.350e). 
Because of this, 'just men are more intelligent and more truly 
effective in action, and ... unjust men are incapable of any joint action 
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at all' (Rep. bk. l .352b). I think Furphy supported Plato's idea that 
society 'must look for the Guardians who will stick most firmly to 
the principle that they must always do what they think best for the 
community' (Rep. bk.3.413c). Also, Furphy appears to believe that 'it 
is ... in education that our Guardians must build their main defences' 
(Rep. bk.4.424d), for it is 'the direction given by education that ls 
likely to determine all that follows' (Rep. bk.4.425b-c). 
Socrates' argument 'is not a trivial one', for he states that 'our 
whole way of life ... is at issue' (Rep. bk. l.352d). Furphy places similar 
emphasis on the art of living, for one of the main themes in his 
novels, as in Republic, is that of justice and injustice in light of 
ignorance, education and conduct in life. Key ideas from Plato's text 
echo profoundly throughout Furphy's novels. As Partington points 
out, '[t]he force and passion of Furphy's affection for literature and 
history make it difficult to think of him as a naively exclusive 
admirer of wisdom derived directly from everyday experience in the 
working world' (1993:64-65). Although she discusses Furphy's 
affinities with Plato's concern for epistemology, Partington does not 
discuss Plato's continually stressing the need for knowledge and 
education in political science and justice, since, in Plato's view, 
Athenian democracy was prone to the manipulation and 
opportunism of the sophists. This is important, for Furphy's novels 
also expand on this philosophical theme in light of the colonial 
rivalries of the Federal movement, as I have attempted to show. 
Indeed, Thrasymachus· notion that 'justice or right is simply what ls 
in the interest of the stronger party' (Rep. bk. l.338c) is a particularly 
apt description of the oscillating moods in 1890s Australia. 
What, then, of Jefferson Rigby? Firstly, there is much that can 
be said about Rigby and his sermon, and no critic, to my knowledge, 
has taken a detailed approach in the spirit of the obseivant reader to 
this rather interesting character. To some greater or lesser degree, 
critics such as Croft (1996:215) or Barnes (1990:205-206) are content 
to say that Rigby ls a manifestation of Furphy's socialist views vts-a-
vis Collins' declaring that he is a 'Conseivative' (RR, 12). As Furphy 
had stated to Cathels in 1898, 
[lit may be worth while to remark that the uncritical 
public, as represented by Jim Gourley, et hoc genus 
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(adj.) omnes, look on that pedant [Rigby] as the pillar 
which supports the book. Sam Brackenbridge's 
admiration for the man is a common complaint. 80 per 
cent of masculine readers will long to be like Rigby; 
and that feeling will disarm criticism. I deliberately 
intended Rigby as a man of offensively large 
information, one who knows more than any person is 
justified in knowing' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995:44-45). 
However, approximately four years later in a letter to Cecil 
Winter, Furphy states that he 'noticed an unconscious plan in the 
story. Every other character is a foil to the Commodore [Rigby] -
Dixon, in his good-natured but brutal worldliness -Thompson, in his 
dense but generous Individualism -Furlong, in his docile devotion to 
revelation as popularly accepted -and so on through the company' (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147-148). This "unconscious plan" 
changed Furphy's designs for the novel. As Partington points out, 
'[a]t the end of rugby's lengthy discourses we are little the wiser as to 
just what policies "State Socialism" would entail if [Rigby] had his 
way. rugby's social and political program, in a curiously similar way 
to the religious sermons he ridicules, never comes alive' ( 1993: 161 ). 
To some extent, readers should approach the novel as 'menippean 
satire' (G.W. Turner, 1971:lx-x; Docker, 1991:119-120). 
Alluding to the work of Northrop Frye, G.W. Turner explains 
that '"Menippean satire" deals less with people as such than with 
mental attitudes, and is especially likely to present the phllosophus 
glortosus, the learned crank or obsessed philosopher' (1971:x). From a 
Bakhtinian perspective, Docker states, 'Rtgby's Romance incorporates 
the Menippean ... mode of parody where the parody is not necessarily a 
rejection of the parodied object, but rather represents an argument 
between different positions, different philosophies' (1991:120). In 
short, 'ideas are more important than manners and psychological 
analysis in Furphy's world, and the people in his stories, though so 
"real" ... are primarily mouthpieces for ideas and points of view, 
especially particular ideas about Providence and free will and human 
responsibility' (G.W.Turner, 1971:xi). But, one wonders if this is 
because of the stylistic rules of the menippean genre or because 
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Furphy's novels investigate the heady pluralism of 1890s culture and 
ideology? 
In light of Furphy's comment on the "unconscious plan" of 
Rigby's Romance, one wonders if Docker is correct in stating that 'the 
parody of Rigby as an ideologue doesn't mean his particular socialist 
ideas are not to be taken seriously' (1991:120). To turn to the issue 
of Collins' conservatism, readers ought to note the explanation he 
gives for its use vis-a-vis state socialism. According to Collins, 'I 
adapt myself to the times and the seasons, whilst he [Rigby, or the 
state socialist) thinks the conformity ought to be on the other side' 
(RR, 12). In other words, Collins' conservatism indicates that, '[i)n 
occupation, I change involuntarily, like the chameleon, according to 
my surroundings· (RR, 15). Interestingly enough, the explanation 
Collins gives for state socialism is surely much more suited to a 
traditional and popular understanding of conservatism, and I think 
readers are meant to query this inversion of meaning. More 
importantly, Collins' explanation of the conservative and the state 
socialist, in the spirit of the penguin and the man-o' -war hawk 
parable, also unveils how much two diametrically opposed identities 
depend on desire and strategy. 
According to Docker, '[t]here is a particular rivalry between 
Collins and Rigby, a rivalry that is both personal and ideological' 
(1991: 110). Whatever support Furphy had originally intended for 
Rigby and state socialism in Rigby's Romance, the final version 
serialized in the socialist newspaper, The Barrier Truth, is far from a 
welcome celebration of this 1890s ideological movement. With this in 
mind, Collins' function in the narrative should be reevaluated. He is 
not just a hero who ls 'unable to find any coherent pattern in the 
events that he describes' nor a hero who 'cannot learn' (G.W. 
Turner,1971:x). Nor does Docker's view that Collins 'is pessimistic 
about human nature' (1991: 111) seem plausible, simply because he 
points out that, rather than the pursuit of knowledge, '[a)ny sensible 
bloke. if he were restricted to one course, would select damper and 
bacon, as being both wholesome and filling' (RR, 164). Collins is 
quite rightly pointing to the fact that 'if you could take statistics of 
the whole human race I fancy you would find a very large number 
who never trouble themselves over any other consideration' (RR, 164). 
In light of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk parable, the issue 
66. 
of desire and strategy permeates and shapes many ideologies 
concerned with human purpose and progress. 
Given his explanation of conseivatism, Collins' status in 
Rtgby's Romance is an important one, for he is not Just 'a figure of 
fun' (Croft, 1996:215). As Collins had stated in Such ts Life, '(i]n the 
race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for 
the tactical moment' (215. My italics). Or, as Collins points out in 
the proem to Rtgby's Romance, '[y]ou must take me as a hard-working 
and ordinary actor on this great stage of fools; but one who, 
nevertheless, finds a wholesome recreation in observing the parts 
played by his fellow-hypocrites. (The Greek hupokrtsts, I find, 
signifies, indifferently, "actor" and "hypocrite".)' (xviii). In this sense, 
Collins acts as chameleon-like foll for Rigby's sermon, strategically 
directing the reader to obseive the flaws in the socialist order of 
things. What hypocrisies, therefore, can we obseive and are meant to 
obseive in Jefferson Rigby? Although there are many obseivations 
which are interesting and pertinent to the points I have made, I will 
select a sample of evidence which strongly supports my case. 
Firstly, it is fair to say that not all of Rigby's polemic is 
hypocritical. Nor is Rigby's sermon without its pertinent points, 
despite the fact that Rigby ls, I believe, drawn as a sophist. One of 
the main propositions of state socialism, the notion that 'Jack is as 
good as his master' (RR, 215), is important to Furphy's way of seeing 
because such a proposition shows some concern for the uplifting and 
upbuilding of Australian society, culture and nation vts-a-vts British 
empiricism. But Rigby's sermon is not without its problems. 
Consider the following dialogue between Collins and Rigby: 
"Persuade Jack to the contrary, and his master will 
clothe you in a belltopper, and make you the third 
ruler in the kingdom," replied the Sheriff [Rigby]. 
"Individualism has helped the lower dog to the great 
discovery you mention; therefore, we have at last 
reached the time -the first time in history, mark you-
when a man's foes are they of his own household. And 
'household', in the English of James I, doesn't mean 
'family'; it means 'holders of the house· - formerly 
chattel-slaves, now wage-slaves. The house is divided 
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against itself, and the breach is widening perceptibly 
year by year- day by day, for that matter. But for any 
possible disorder of the body politic there is, in the 
veiy nature of things, an accessible, appropriate, and 
infallible remedy. In this case ours is State Socialism. 
What is yours?" 
"But is Socialism a remedy?" I asked querulously. 
"If you divide everything today, how long will it be 
before you require another division, and another, and 
so on?" 
"Let some advocate of Individualism answer that 
question, since it concerns him alone," replied the 
Major. "For this ebb and flow in private fortune, this 
rhythmic accumulation, confiscation and re-
distribution of property confront us as the most 
conspicuous feature in the working of our present 
system, and one of the most disastrous and 
demoralising. This perpetual division and re-division of 
wealth is the distinctive outcome, and the just and 
certain curse of Individualism ... (RR, 215). 
This is despite the fact that Rigby had 'led Binney to believe 
that Socialism meant the abrupt confiscation of farms, and the 
degradation of farmers to the ticket-of-leave level' (RR, 231). Indeed, 
Collins' question to Rigby concerning Socialism and social divisions 
is an excellent example of reductto ad absurdum, for rugby's answer 
is both lame and ignorant of the many reasons for rivalry and 
division in colonial Australia. Furthermore, Rigby is ignorant of the 
fact that, economically speaking, socialism is as responsible for the 
growing economic division in society as the man-o'-war-hawk tactics 
of industrialism and capitalism. Again, Sam Brackenbridge's belief 
that 'us Socialists is no more responsible for the comin' revolution 
than the mere petrel is for the storm it prognosticates' (RR, 255) is 
an ignorant conclusion. Socialism, like capitalism or industrialism, 
is built on the notion that 'one must love something' and 'one must 
hate something' (SlL, 135). In other words, one lives and responds to 
life and the human order of things in much the same manner as the 
man-o'-war hawk and the penguin in their order of things. 
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Of further interest to rugby's proposition that 'Jack ls as good 
as his master' (RR, 215) ls Plato's notion that such a way of seeing 
creates rivalry and division between rich and poor, promoting an 
ignorant but popular concept of liberty that leads to tyranny. 
According to Plato, '(t]he extreme of popular liberty ls reached [ln 
democracy] when slaves ... have the same liberty as their owners -not 
to mention the complete equality and liberty in the relations between 
the sexes' (Rep. bk.8.563b). From this, Plato argues that 'the minds 
of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint 
ls resented as intolerable, till finally, ... in their determination to have 
no master they disregard all laws, written or unwritten' (Rep. bk.8. 
563d). In other words, 'from an extreme of liberty one is likely to get, 
ln the individual and ln society, a reaction to an extreme of 
subjection' (Rep. bk.8.564a). But this is the least of Plato's problems, 
for this extreme of popular liberty in a democratic society does not 
necessarily mean that a society cannot function as a democracy, 
even though Plato does not consider lt to be an ideal form of 
government. What concerns Plato ls his expectation for 'tyranny to 
result from democracy' because of this tension between 'the most 
savage subjection' and 'an excess of liberty' (Rep. bk.8.564a). 
In books eight and nine of Republic, Plato spends some time 
formulating a theory of political psychology. This ls most important, 
for Plato wants to show Adelmantus, as well as his readers, that 
certain types of societies and their political systems are the direct 
result of a certain type of human character. Given the climate of 
extreme and popular liberty, Plato expects a tyrannical character to 
grow naturally within the larger democratic character of politics and 
society. Employing the analogy of bees, Plato directs his argument to 
a certain type of character: 'a class of thriftless idlers, whom [he 
compares] to drones, their energetic leaders to drones with stings, 
the more inert mass of followers to drones without stings· (Rep. 
bk.8.564b). This ls important for understanding the potency of 
Colllns' attack on Rlgby's proposition that 'Jack ls as good as his 
master', as well as the notion that socialism is an 'infallible remedy' 
(RR, 215) for the ills of industrialism and capitalism. Speaking of the 
drones, Plato states that, in a democratic society, 
[e]veryone's on the make, but the steadiest characters 
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will generally be most successful in making 
money ... And the drones find them a plentiful and most 
convenient source to extract honey from ... And so this 
group, on which the drones batten, are called the rich 
(Rep. bk.8.564e). 
Or, as Furphy, writing under the nom de plume of Warrigal 
Jack, stated in the article, 'The Mythical Sundowner', 
while human nature sports into so many varieties and 
degrees of laziness, the sundowner proper will never 
fail; men may come and men may go, but he goes on 
for ever. Pastoral interests may wax and wane: 
stations may be incorporated, divided, sold, or 
foreclosed; managers may die, resign, be sacked, or 
received into partnership; the Mantchoorian boundary 
man may supersede the Inda-Germanic, but while 
there exists a circuit of stations as a basis of 
operations the phoenix-like sundowner shall flourish 
in immortal youth ([ 1889] 1981: 396). 
While the sundowner may not have a sting, he is nevertheless 
an opportunistic drone, for he forms part of what Rigby calls the 
'helpless minority' (RR, 186). The problem, however, is not so much 
this stingless drone, but the 'single popular leader', the drone with 
the sting, 'whom [the stingless drones] nurse to greatness' (Rep. 
bk.8.565c). According to Plato, '(i]t is he who. leads the class war 
against the owners of property' (Rep. bk.8.566a). And, as Collins so 
poignantly asks Rigby, 'If you divide everything today, how long will it 
be before you require another division, and another, and so on?' (RR, 
215). Or, as Plato states, 'when [the owners of property] see the 
people trying to wrong them, not with intent, but out of ignorance 
and because they've been misled by the slanders spread by their 
leaders, why then they've no choice but to turn oligarchs in earnest, 
not because they want to, but again because the drones' stings have 
poisoned them' (Rep. bk.8.565b-c). Thus, a popular but reactionary 
concept of liberty and equality leads to further rivalry and division in 
an already reactionary society. As Plato sombrely states, 
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[t)he mob will do anything [the popular leader) tells 
them, and the temptation to shed a brother's blood is 
too strong. He [the popular leader] brings the usual 
unjust charges against him [his brother], takes him to 
court and murders him, thus destroying a human life, 
and getting an unholy taste of blood of his fellows. 
Exiles, executions, hints of cancellation of debts and 
redistribution of land follow, till their instigator [the 
popular leader) is inevitably and finally bound either 
to be destroyed by his enemies, or to change from man 
to wolf and make himself tyrant (Rep. bk.8.565e-566a). 
Furphy is actually much more concerned with studying and 
understanding human nature, in relation to a particular belief or 
tsm, than advocating a reactionary way of seeing and responding to 
life. If one were to classify theoretically Furphy's concern for the 
social, I think it is more appropiate to say that Furphy advocated 
humanitarianism and education rather than the politically and 
economically reactionary views of the socialists. For Jack to be as 
good as his master, Jack must be shifted out of his ignorance, since 
an educated individual is understood to know what is best for 
himself, his political system, and his society. In light of Plato's views, 
consider the following revealing comment by Collins, who states that 
'[w)ithout vassal loyalty, or abject vassal fear, the monopolist's sleep 
can never be secure. Domination, to be unassailable, must have 
overwhelming force in reserve -moral force, as in the feudal system, 
or physical force, as in our police system. The labour leader, of 
accredited integrity and capability, though (so to speak) ducally 
weedy, has moral force in reserve; and we all know how he controls 
the many-headed' (SiL, 205. My italics). 
Or, as Plato explains in his analogy of the sophist and his 
"science" of sophistry: 
Suppose a man was in charge of a large and powerful 
animal, and made a study of its moods and wants; 
why it was especially savage or gentle, what the 
different noises it made meant, and what tone of voice 
to use to soothe or annoy it. All this he might learn by 
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long experience and familiarity, and then call it a 
science, and reduce it to a system and set up to teach 
it. But he would not really know which of the 
creature's tastes and desires was admirable or 
shameful, good or bad, rtght or wrong; he would simply 
use the terms on the basis of its reactions, calling 
what pleased it good, what annoyed it bad. He would 
have no rational account to give of them, but would 
call the inevitable demands of the animal's nature 
right and admirable, remaining quite blind to the real 
nature of and difference between inevitability and 
goodness, and quite unable to tell anyone else what it 
was (Rep. bk.6.493a-c). 
Although there are problems with Plato's analogy in light of 
empiricism, the notion that the sophist can skilfully gain political 
control by pandering to public passions or pleasures is nevertheless 
made. As Thompson observantly states, '[g]reat Socialist Rigby 
is, ... but it's more the power of controversy than the force of 
argument. An ounce of fact is worth a mile of theocy, they say' (RR, 
217-218). Or, indeed, as Rigby himself confesses to Collins, '[d]on't 
mistake me for an organiser. I'm merely an agitator, a voice in the 
wilderness, preaching preparation for a Palingenesis. The program is 
hidden in the order of events, and will be evolved in its own good 
time. To be fettered by a programme now would be fatal' (RR, 231 ). 
Claiming a stylistic affinity to John the Baptist, Rigby attempts to 
push home a universal truth about socialism, hoping to pander to 
the passions and pleasures of a popular desire for 'the Kingdom of 
God' (RR, 231). But, according to Rigby, '[i]f we assuaged our zeal by 
bearing in mind that Socialism is relative, not absolute -that it must 
come by evolution, not by miracle- we should be much further ahead 
than we are' (RR, 231). 
And yet, to confuse matters more, Rigby claims that he is 
merely 'a watchman, imperfectly qualified, I admit, though Divinely 
commissioned' (RR, 231. My italics). One wonders whether or not 
Rigby, the sophist, desires to have his portion of strawberries and 
cream after the revolution. Readers can be certain of one thing, and 
that is Sam Brackenbridge's naively devotional observation that 
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Rigby is 'an artist' (RR,91) and that he is 'quick on the trigger' (RR, 
92). In short, Rigby is no less an opportunist than many of the other 
Furphian heroes. Indeed, rugby's curriculum vitae is impressively 
broad. According to Collins, Rigby is currently a '[s]econd-rate 
photographer and descriptive writer' but '[h]e has been a first-rate 
engine-driver, also mechanical expert, a third-rate Journalist, and a 
fourth-rate builder' (RR, 12). Furthermore, Rigby has been 'ranked 
high up to ninth and tenth rate in something like a score of other 
and more menial occupations; but speaking with actuarial precision, 
he's a land suiveyor' (RR, 12-13). 
Readers also find out that Rigby had had 'an excellent little 
industry in connection with a carpenter in Sandhurst' buying 'empty 
weatherboard houses at Sandhurst' and selling 'them, re-erected, on 
the Spring Creek' goldfields (RR, 122-123). And, although his old 
employer, Milligan Brothers, 'declined to employ' Rigby because he is 
'an agitator', Rigby nevertheless refuses to take the matter further 
because 'Leslie Milligan is the most astute man of [his] 
acquaintance' (RR, 234). Indeed, Rigby admirably states that Leslie 
Milligan 'can see ten years further ahead than the average 
Conservative does -in other words, he can see a decade ahead of the 
present moment. I mustn't build too much on his hostility' (RR, 234). 
While Leslie Milligan can see opportunities for future avenues of 
business, Rigby cannot. It would seem that rugby's socialism is not 
Just a sophistic pandering to pu bile passions and pleasures, but also 
an opportunistic preaching of a fashionable gospel. As Devlin-Glass 
points out, '[c]learly Furphy means us to take Rigby at face value ... by 
insisting that he is an ideologue, an agitator, rather than an 
organiser of the Christian Socialist Utopia' (1974:75). 
There is another interesting example of Rigby' s sermon to 
which I would like to refer. This example not only further qualifies 
rugby's status as a sophist with a sting in a divided community, but 
also gives readers a better insight into rugby's character. In this 
example, Rigby pits law against the human spirit. According to 
Rigby, '[h]appiness is not an ingredient of life, subject to the 
augmentation or diminution by prescription. It is the outcome, or 
rather the fruition, of an inherent susceptibility, which latter is 
governed in tone, though not affected in extent, by the conditions 
whichform individual character' (RR, 184. My italics). While Rigby is 
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correct in noting that '[m]an can no more exist without drawing his 
dole of so-called happiness than without breathing' (RR, 184-185), 
the manner in which Rigby proposes to implement that happiness 
leaves much to be desired. Indeed, rugby's concept of happiness 
appears to be heavily dependent on his notion of goodness: ·goodness 
is anything that intuitively or of set purpose makes for the 
establishment of a human relationship which will develop each 
man's best, and staroe each man's worst' (RR, 186. My italics). 
What Rigby ignores, purposefully or not, is the fact that one 
man's best may be his worst according to the Views of another. For 
example, we are well acquainted with the opportunism of many of 
Furphy's heroes. If this opportunism is considered to be the best a 
particular indivtdual has to offer, then starvtng that best, because it 
is seen as a worst in the eyes of the socialists, will do nothing to 
bring that indivtdual into harmony with the concept of society or 
community. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether or not an 
ideology or form of government can purposefully starve the worst in a 
community in order to bring out the best. But this is exactly what 
Rigby proposes to do in the name of socialism. Indeed, Rigby begins 
to introduce his proposition that law shapes human spirit by an 
appeal to Provtdence. According to Rigby, '[a]part from the stings of 
conscience, and the retribution of the world to come, God punishes 
by the agency of our Criminal Law' (RR, 193). 
Rigby's sophistry, and perhaps his ignorance, is caught out by 
a young kangaroo-hunter: 
"Sposen there's a man in a place called Sussex, in 
England, an' this man shakes a bushel o' wheat for 
his Missus to boil for the kids to keep them from 
starving -does God give that man seven years' laggin', 
and then set him adrift, with his ankles wore to the 
bone with the irons, and his shoulders like a soojee 
bag with floggin? Well, that was my gran'father -an' as 
decent a man as ever your gran'father knowed how to 
be. Is that God's style o' punishin' people with the 
Criminal Law? Don't talk rubbage (RR, 193). 
The story is a familiar one and, as we already know, quite 
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capable of stirring deeply felt passions in colonial Australia. rugby's 
answer is again a rather lame attempt to dodge the issue: 'I admit 
that, where offences against property were concerned, the law was 
exceedingly severe in the days of our forefathers; indeed, it is, 
perhaps, too severe still in some instances, but-' (RR, 193). Rigby is 
cut short by Dixon, who sharply states '(b]ut God backs it up. Stick 
to your argyment' (RR, 193). Rigby does not get a chance to talk 
himself clean, and the discussion is placed on hold. At a later time, 
Rigby manages to steer the argument back to his initial proposition. 
According to Rigby, if you '(g]lve us laws Socialistic in principle, with 
a system of mutual polity', then 'all things are possible to man as a 
law-abiding animal' (RR, 201). This is the crux of rugby's argument, 
underpining both the concepts of happiness and goodness, for Rigby 
believes that '(y]ou can make men anything you please by Act of 
Parliament ... provided that such Act is sanctioned by a preponderant 
moiety of the national intelligence' (RR, 201). 
But is it an act based on wisdom or an educated shifting of 
ignorance? Or is such an act merely a pandering to the popular 
passions and pleasures of the democratic majority? There is some 
truth to rugby's proposition, for one can tum men from British 
colonials into Australian nationals by an act of parliament. But it 
remains to be seen whether or not one can make men good, happy or 
virtuous by an act of parliament. I do not think, for example, that 
anyone would support the proposition that one can make men 
intelligent by an act of parliament. While laws have their place and 
purpose in the human order of things, they do not occupy the status 
given to them by Rigby. In short, 'human nature is' not as 'plastic as 
the clay from which it is derived', nor is '(o]ur collective moral 
nature, in its response to the contract of laws, usages, and 
culture, ... subject to rules of scientific exactness' (RR, 208). 
Speaking of 'Furphy's criticism of socialist ideals',· Gilding 
argues that Furphy maintained 'that idealism of rugby's kind is 
largely incompatible with real life', since 'Rigby's redoubtable 
political code is a little less than human' (1967:30). Indeed Gilding 
notes that '(h]e is so absorbed in his argument that he has become 
impervious to sentiment or tenderness' (1967:30-31). Or, as Croft 
states, 'it is equally hard to ignore rugby's personal emotional 
desiccation and his inability to love at the intimate level' (1996:216). 
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Indeed, Collins states that '[w]hen the Ego has ceased to be a hobby-
ridden man, and culminated into a man-escorted hobby, there is no 
hope of restoration' (RR, 262). It would seem, on a personal level, 
that Rigby's preoccupation with law and the plasticity of human 
nature is an attempt to lead a painless and comfortably utopian 
existence. 
Most readers are aware of the argument that occurred between 
Rigby and his sweetheart, Kate Vanderdecken. Collins informs us 
that Rigby thought the argument to be 'entirely her own fault', for 
'[s]he was petulant and quarrelsome, frivolous and heartless' (RR, 
17). According to Rigby, 'the best thing that had ever happened to 
him was this quarrel, inasmuch as it had swept away all tawdry 
romance from his life, and laid bare its grand realities' (RR, 17). 
Given our understanding of Rigby's character so far, one wonders to 
what extent the argument between him and Kate was due to his 
dogmatic character. Collins states that '[i)n describing this quarrel 
he was bitterly precise; yet I experienced disappointment, even injury, 
in failing to detect any blame attachable to the other party, whilst 
my dad's judicial mind could find no cause of misunderstanding 
whatsoever' (RR, 1 7-18). The following piece from rugby's sermon may 
offer a clue, for Rigby believes that 'Christianity must be translated 
into secular law, and such law must be sternly enforced' (RR, 202. My 
italics). Although speculative, one wonders if Furphy wanted his 
readers to comprehend rugby's character through Plato's concept of 
the tyrannical character. According to Plato, the tyrannical character 
has 
[ in I his early days ... a smile and a kind word for 
everyone; he says he's no tyrant, makes large promises, 
public and private, frees debtors, distributes land to 
the people and to his own followers, and puts on a 
generally mild and kindly air .... But I think we shall 
find that when he has disposed of his foreign enemies 
by treaty or distraction, and has no more to fear from 
them, he will in the first place continue to stir up war 
in order that the people may continue to need a leader 
(Rep. bk.8.566d-e). 
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Even though the public domain of the 1880s and 1890s is 
important to the novels, Furphy wants his readers to see that it is 
Rigby's spirit that shapes and articulates MRigby", not the 
omnipotent power of the law or environment, as argued by the 
socialists. As Collins explains, 'in love as well as in other things, 
there was nothing but roguery to be found in villainous man, I had 
only to remember the Senator [ Rigby], and keep on believing ... .I used 
him as an object lesson in fidelity' (RR, 1946:19). Collins' lesson in 
fidelity is the notion that one must educate, or uplift and upbuild 
the individual human character and spirit in conjunction with the 
uplifting and upbuilding of the nation. By '[learning] to say, I do not 
know' (BBB, 121), one can set a course to learn and to know, hence 
the continual stress on ignorance-shifting in the novels. In light of 
Pons' notion, readers should see Furphy's writing as 'an educational 
game of the first order rather than a fireworks display testifying to 
the author's cleverness' (1979:120). 
Indeed, when Collins states that 'the Order of Things, rightly 
understood, is not susceptible of any coercion whatsoever' (SiL, 215), 
it is my contention that it is the human order to which he refers, for 
Rigby's sermon on the Murray foregrounds the ideological and 
emotional resistances of many of the Furphian heroes throughout 
the three novels. Collins' notion that '[i]n the race of life, my son, 
you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' 
(SiL, 215) could be a popular maxim. In short, one may coerce a 
percentage of the human order to do something, but one can never 
coerce every human being. There will always be resistance. As Collins 
points out, 'to everything there is a time and a season -a time for 
work, and a time for repose- hence you find the industrious man's 
inveterately leg-weary set of frames in hopeless competition with the 
Judiciously lazy man's string of daisies. The contrast is sickening· 
(SiL, 215). Because of this, I shall disagree with Sutherland, who 
notes that 'one of Furphy's firmest convictions was that environment 
exerts a far more powerful influence upon the growth of human 
character than does heredity' (1951:169). 
Finally, towards the close of Rigby's Romance, Collins states 
that '[t]o sane minds, the Universal Plan is the enigma of the ages; 
detached, objective, and wholly intangible -any attempt at solution 
thus being a capricious speculation, shaped by the proclivities or by 
77. 
L 
the experience of its projector, and varying even With his mood' (RR, 
261). What does this say about Jefferson Rigby? If Rigby is meant to 
be the manifestation of Furphy's own ideology, then why should 
Collins have the last word? Is Collins suggesting that State 
Socialism, whether espoused by Rigby or another, is a "universal 
plan" shaped by the experience and mood of the orator rather than 
being the universal plan? In the search for meaning, this is 
interesting, for Furphy does not offer anything resembling a 
Universal Plan. Rather, he offers a series of common sense, 
philosophical solutions to the mismatched affairs in the human 
order of things. Accordingly, 'truth [may be] relative [and not] 
absolute' (BBB, 8), but such relativity does not necessarily mean 
that the human order of things needs to be divided. 
In a letter to William Cathels circa May or June, 1893, Furphy, 
discussing the Melbourne depression, writes: 
And what price your Individualism now? The present 
spectacle for gods and men which Vic. presents is the 
natural and necessacy outcome. And if you argue that 
'we should have done the same thing ourselves if we 
had the chance', I reply that we should have been 
sternly repressed. And if you argue that 'you can't 
make men virtuous by act of parliament', I reply, Just 
wait till I publish what I have written on that point 
during the last week .... 
Personally, I hope and trust that one whom I 
have learned to value as I have you, is not a victim of 
the hideous depression brought on by the unbridled 
greed of vile men in high places. My own pity for the 
unfortunate is swallowed up in anger at the so-called 
Christians who could not see prosperity in the country 
Without looting it. Christian as I am, myself, I say, 
Damn them (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 15). 
Was Furphy hinting at his agreement with Cathels and so 
thematically exploring the tension between virtue, law and human 
spirit in Rigby's Romance? Again, in a letter to Cathels dated the 
12th of January, 1894, Furphy continues: 
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The fact is that our fathers were a bad class of people. 
Their ethics were Darwinism, and their religion 
Antinominian, the survival of the thriftiest, and 
somebody else, anybody else, to be sacrificed. 
They were fine enterprising men, but they 
have Somersetted the country, and I wish we were out 
of it. Too much premium on the wisdom of the Serpent 
and too much penalty on the harmlessness of the 
dove .... We're on the wrong track. Our forefathers made 
a slippery hitch in their apotheosis of Individualism 
and we have to suffer for it. The only hope of my own 
petty little soul is to spoke the ole chariot along the 
rtght track (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:20). 
Or, as Collins states, 'in this pandemonium of Individualism, 
the weak, the diffident, the scrupulous, and the afflicted, are thrust 
aside or trampled down' (SIL, 89). But, Furphy does not rebuke the 
"fine enterprising" spirit of his father's generation. Instead, he 
considers their opportunist spirit to be the direct result of an 
ignorant glorification of individualism: a glorification that has 
ruined the country. To recall the economic battle over Riverina and 
the colonial rivalry between Victoria and New South Wales discussed 
earlier, I am of the view that Furphy is not strictly anti-capitalist, 
nor is he strictly pro-socialist. It would be better to say that the 
flavour of the letter points to the detrimental aspects of a rivalry due 
to a specific way of seeing or ideology: a rivalry based on desire, 
social Darwinist principles and an Antinomian indifference to the 
moral considerations of others. But there is also another important 
context which perpetuates rivalry, and that is division within the 
'tripartite' (RR, 262) nature of the self, as exemplified by Rigby. In 
this sense, "to spoke the ole chariot along the rtght track" could be 
Furphy's alluding to Plato's key concept of justice and the just man: 
Justice ... is a principle of this kind; its real concern is 
not with external actions, but with a man's inward 
self, his true concern and interest. The just man will 
not allow the three elements [Reason, Thumos, Desire] 
which make up his inward self to tresspass on each 
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other's functions or interfere with each other, but, by 
keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale ... will 
in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-
mastery and order, and live on good terms with 
himself. When he has bound these elements into a 
disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become 
fully one instead of many, he will be ready for action of 
any kind, whether it concerns his personal or financial 
welfare, whether it is political or private; and he will 
reckon and call any of these actions just and 
honourable if it contributes to and helps to maintain 
this disposition of mind, and will call the knowledge 
which controls such action wisdom. Similarly, he will 
call unjust any action destructive of this disposition, 
and the opinions which control such action ignorance 
(Rep. bk.4.443c-e). 
Furphy's message is clear. In the uplifting and upbuilding of a 
nation, individuals must not only strive to shift ignorance, rivalry 
and division, but must also strive to know themselves, thereby 
uplifting and upbuilding their own character. If there is a purpose in 
the human order of things, then Furphy believed that this purpose 'is 
fulfilled by the production of men and women of high moral 
standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). I will investigate this more fully in 
chapter three, where I shall discuss this issue in light of Furphy's 
rendition of the male and female "Australian" type. 
1.4. The Gospel According to Collins: uplifting and upbuilding 
through the idea of rights. 
G.W. Turner ( 1986: 174-175) and K.A. McKenzie ( 1966:273-276) 
have both noted that Such ts Life is rich in its allusions to both the 
Old and New Testaments. Indeed, a study of 'the annotations' 
(Devlin-Glass etal, 1991) will confirm many of the biblical allusions 
to which Collins and other Furphlan heroes refer. Discussing the 
frequent use of specific sources, K.A. McKenzie states that 'Furphy's 
fondness for the Book of Job, Ecclesiastes, and Isaiah may have been 
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due ... to attitudes which he found congenial' (1966:273). According to 
G.W. Turner, 'the biblical reference is acclimatised, given new and 
unexpected life in its new setting' (1986: 174). More importantly, 
'[t]he biblical is no longer remote from life nor life remote from the 
Bible' (G.W. Turner, 1986:175). Although I agree with Turner's point, 
it is not without its problems. The Bible does play an important role 
in the intellectual scheme of the novels, but the novels show that its 
place in colonial society and culture is far from what it ought to be. 
Furphy believed that its most cherished principles on human 
relations were often ignored by the Church and her laity, particularly 
with the 'Gospel of Thrift' (SiL, 89). Also, in an 1894 article for the 
Bulletin, Collins points out that 'the Bible is not the secret of 
Riverina's greatness' (1981:398). 
Collins' conclusion is based on the prevailing ignorance of 
scripture, for 'there is no doubt that the healthy recoil from 
priestcraft is carrying us too far', and that '(t]he Bible-hater is no 
less irrational than the Bible-faddist' ((1894] 1981:398). According to 
Collins, '(t]he O.T. is the most interesting, instructive, and authentic 
section of ancient history within the range of literature, and an 
inexhaustible mine of fearless philosophy and sublime forecast' 
([ 1894] 1981:398). Furthermore, '(t]he N.T., rightly read, will be the 
textbook of ideal Socialism when its professional perverter is more 
extinct and less regretted than the Tasmanian blackfellow. In the 
interests of moral progress, the Bible must be read; and in the 
interests of honest interpretation, the parson must go' ([ 1894) 
1981:398). This issue of honest interpretation finds fuller voice in the 
novels, for Collins' concern with uplifting and upbuilding underpins 
his directing readers to the Bible for the sake of moral progress. 
But he also refers to the Bible in order to foreground the 
division and rivalry between the Church and currency. Towards the 
close of Such ls Life, Collins finds the opportunity to comment that 
'an open-mouthed, fresh-faced rouseabout ... was just undergoing that 
colonising process so much dreaded by mothers and deplored by the 
clergy· (SiL, 293). The mainstay of this division and rivalry is the 
clash of customs, particularly the Anglo-Australian views of piety 
and good citizenship vis-a-vis the growing popularity of larrikinism, 
considered to be evidence of the ever-peIVasive convict taint or 'birth 
stain' (SiL, 52). On this note, I agree with Clive Hamer that the 
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majority of characters in the novels 'are not idealized members of the 
working class', nor are they 'shining examples of virtue trampled 
down by the oppressing class' {1964:146). For example, the bullockies 
are discerningly labelled by Collins as either 'outlaws' {SlL, 51) or 
'Ishmaelites' {SlL, 42). Within the context of the latter, the bullocky 
ought to be seen as 'a wild ass of a man,/ with his hand against 
everyone/ and everyone's hand against him;/ and he shall live at 
odds with all his kin' (Genesis, 16.12). 
Croft explains that 'Such ts Life is a parodic epic in which 
Furphy tries to make sense of society and belief, by comparing the 
stem Calvinism of his forebears with the new and exciting notions of 
a Christian Socialism' {1986: 160). But, in order to implement an 
ideological perspective like Christian .. Socialism", one must first 
redeem .. Australians" from the historically determined notion that 
they 'are all under sin' {Romans, 3:9). According to Hughes, 'the 
[birth) Stain would not go away: the late nineteenth century was a 
flourishing time for biological determinism, for notions of purity of 
race and stock, and few respectable native-born Australians had the 
confidence not to quail when real Englishmen spoke of their convict 
heritage' {1987:xii). As Bum had remarked, 'People seem to think 
Gawd made these here colonies for a ru bbage heap' (SiL, 25 ). It is a 
sentiment echoed by Cooper, who had stated much earlier that 'this 
is about the last place God made' {SlL, 5). 
To all intents and purposes, the novels indicate that the rivalry 
. and division between Church and currency are both unnecessary 
extremes which, because of prejudice, interfere with the idea of rights 
and moral progress. Attacking the Church for its customary division 
between 'earthly justice' and 'heavenly justice', Collins and the pipe 
state the following: 
Yet while the Church teaches you to pray, .. Thy will be 
done on earth, as it is in heaven," she tacitly 
countenances widening disparity in condition, and 
openly sanctions that fearful abuse which dooms the 
poor man's unborn children to the mundane perdition 
of poverty's thousand penalties. Is God's will so done 
in heaven? While the Church teaches you to pray, .. Thy 
kingdom come," she strikes with mercenary venom at 
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the first principle of that kingdom, namely, elementary 
equality in citizen privilege. Better silence than 
falsehood; better no religion at all -if such lack be 
possible- than one which concedes equal rights beyond 
the grave, and denies them here (SIL, 88-89). 
Furthermore, 
[t]he Church quibbles well, and palters well, and, in 
her own pusillanimous way, means well, by her silky 
loyalty to the law and the profits, and by her steady 
hostility to some unresisting personification known as 
the Common Enemy. But because of that pernicious 
loyalty, she has reason to complain that the working 
man is too rational to imbibe her teachings on the 
blessedness of slavery and starvation. Meanwhile, as 
no magnanimous sinner can live down to pseudo-
Christian standard, unprogressive Agnosticism takes 
the place of demoralised belief, and the Kingdom of 
God fades into a myth' (SIL, 89). 
In this sense, 'Burns and Paine flashed their own strong, 
healthy personalities on the community, marking an epoch; and from 
that day to this, the Apology of Humanity acquires ever-increasing 
momentum, and ever-widening scope' (SIL, 91). According to Paine, 
'[t]hough I mean not to touch upon any sectarian principle of 
religion, yet it may be worth observing, that the genealogy of Christ 
is traced to Adam. Why then not trace the rights of man to the 
creation of man?' ([1791] 1995:117). Indeed, '[t]he duty of man is not 
a wilderness of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets 
from one to the other. It is plain and simple, and consists but of two 
points. His duty to God, which evecy man must feel; and with respect 
to his neighbour, to do as he would be done by' (Paine, [ 1791] 
1995:118-119. My italics). Paine's essay asserts the practicality of the 
Christian idea through the distinction between '[n]atural rights', 
defined as 'the rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort 
and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of 
others', and '[c]ivil rights', which 'are those which appertain to man 
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in rtght of his being a member of society' ((1791) 1995:119). Indeed, 
Paine argues that '[e]very civil right has for its foundation, some 
natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of 
which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently 
competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and 
protection' ([ 1791 J 1995:119). 
According to Collins, 'if social-economic conditions fail to keep 
abreast with the impetuous, uncontrollable advance of popular 
intelligence, the time must come when ... the latter shall assail the 
former; and the scene of this unpleasantness ... is called in the 
Hebrew tongue, Armageddon' (SlL, 91). Paine's most consistent point 
of attack is the idea of aristocracy, or that rights are for the few, not 
the many. It is interesting to bear this in mind when reading 
Furphy's 'The Teaching of Christ'. This article, published in 1894 in 
the Bulletin, has Collins replying to an earlier correspondent who had 
assumed 'that He [Christ] was an artstocrat ... and that He denounced 
only the bourgeoisie, and that He was not a democrat' (1981:399). In 
the spirit of Paine, Collins states that, '[o)wing to enlightenment, 
[aristocrat] is not a name to conjure with -in fact, it is impossible to 
touch it without a pair of tongs and a respirator, or contemplate it 
without an ounce of civet to sweeten the imagination; and the time 
is not far distant when it will be carried out on a spade and buried in 
quicklime, at midnight, in some secluded place' ((1894) 1981:399). 
Discussing 'Christ's favourite title, Son of Man', Collins states 
that '[He] struck at the very root of caste when He established a new 
aristocracy of usefulness, in which he that was greatest should be 
servant of all' ((1894) 1981:399-400). Or, as Collins points out in 
Such is Life, '[h]eaven knows I am no more inclined to decry social 
culture than moral principle; but I acknowledge no aristocracy except 
one of service and self-sacrifice, in which he that is chief shall be 
servant, and he that is greatest of all, servant of all' (33. My italics). 
In the article, Collins also asserts that '[t)he Sermon on the Mount 
is permeated by the most perfect democracy ever breathed on earth, 
whilst the last awful denunciation of Jerusalem impartially embraces 
artistocrat and bourgeois, and no other' ([ 1894) 1981 :400. My italics). 
This view is repeated in Such ts Life, where Collins states that the 
'Sermon on the Mount .... is no fanciful conception of an intangible 
order of things, but a practical, workable code of daily 
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life ... delivered ... by One who knew exactly the potentialities and 
aspirations of man' (SiL, 89-90). In short, the New Testament is seen 
as the template for a democratically enlightened Christianity and its 
emphasis on rights, rather than a Christian Socialism with its view 
of Christ as the redistributer of wealth. 
In a letter to Stephens, Furphy wrote, 
I am an Optimist and a Christian ..... Optimistic, in the 
sense that I can see in the future a type of humanity 
further above present attainment than the latter is 
above lowest conceivable savagery. Christian, 
inasmuch I believe Jesus (or His inventor) to have 
given us a Square, which obviates any necessity for 
working out a mathematical problem when we wish to 
gauge the Absolute Morality (or Ultimate Expediency) -
in a word, the Squareness- of this or that action (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:95). 
And, in "The Teaching of Christ", Collins states that '[t]he 
founder of a religion which aimed at making things new by the 
obliteration of meretricious distinctions could not count aristocrat, 
bourgeois or pauper, common or unclean. All were potential material 
for the perfect democracy He purposed' (1894) 1981:400). As Furphy 
stated in his essay on world-federation, '(t]he best hope of religion 
rests not in the distorted Christianity which fences monopoly and 
points the plundered tailor to a heaven won by mental suicide and 
moral self-abasement, but in the restored gospel of equal rights to the 
fullness of God's earth and equal liability to the consecrated penalty 
of work' (1890:55. My italics). On the basis of these points, I disagree 
with Dorothy Green's notion that '[t)he proper function of 
Christianity may not be, as Furphy thought, to provide a blue-print 
for socio-economic organisation, but to act as a beacon to light men 
back to "caritas", to loving-kindness, when they have wandered too 
far away from it' ( 1980:33). Furphy was as much concerned with 
"caritas" as he was with the necessary socio-economic milieu for its 
success. 
Nor do I agree with Brady's reading of the biblical dimension in 
Such ts Life. She argues that 
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[t]here is something profoundly sour as well as comic, 
in fact, about Furphy's sense of life, something more 
despairing than a Christian vision could be, since the 
Christian has a sense of God at work, even here and 
now, in the midst of injustice and confusion. Despite 
the optimistic words he allows Tom about the future of 
Australia, Furphy offers no way to that future 
(1981:61). 
Yet Brady had stated earlier that Furphy 'gives priority ... to 
orthopraxis, right action, rather than to orthodoxy, right belief 
(1981:47). Is not orthopraxis dependent on orthodoxy, and vice 
versa? The two may be distinct ideas but they are not mutually 
exclusive. If, for her, '[t]he great weakness of Such is Life .. .lies in its 
inability to deal with the material of life as it presents itself to 
experience' (1981 :67), then this weakness occurs because she has 
misinterpreted the novel's philosophical preoccupation with seeing 
and responding to the material of human life. Whether or not God 
works in the world, Furphy rightly shows that man must work to 
uplift and upbuild man, regardless of man's aptitude for injustice or 
confusion. Contrary to Brady's view, Furphy shows us that we must 
put our 'trust in what is human, "all too human"' (1981 :67). As 
Hamer argues, '[n]ot always is virtue rewarded and wrong punished; 
the rain falls alike on the just and the unjust. Furphy scoffs at 
people of blind faith who look for divine help but ignore natural 
cause and effect; and he scorns the related attitudes of complacency 
and self-righteousness' (1964: 143). 
Hamer points out that '(i]t is more difficult to establish 
Furphy's Christian viewpoint from Such is Life alone. There is a 
compelling unity about the whole of Furphy's writings: he wanted to 
present the three novels to the reading public for the price of one' 
( 1964: 146). To this I would also add Furphy's articles and letters, 
since he was quite consistent in his views. Among other issues, 
Furphy used Collins throughout the three novels to investigate the 
religious attitude towards, what Morgan calls, 'the foundation myth 
of Australia' (1979:57). According to Morgan, this foundation myth 
stipulated that Australia was 'a new, clean, unpolluted land, where a 
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new beginning could be made and the old mistakes not repeated; a 
whole nation, one people, unified, not divided by ancient quarrels; 
self-sufficient, independent and free, and protected from the rest of 
the world by its vast surrounding seas' (1979:57). One is reminded of 
Bernard O'Dowd's poem 'Australia' (in Cantrell, ed, 1977:86) as an 
excellent example of this perspective. However, Furphy takes it a step 
further by pointing out that new beginnings must require new 
attitudes if old mistakes are not to be repeated, for damaging 
customs can build a fatal nest. 
While Brady (1981:76) is content to attribute a link between 
Patrick White's writings on Australia and the biblical dimension of 
the Old Testament, she cannot see this link in Furphy's work despite 
the obvious intertextual evidence. She does not see that Furphy's 
heroes, like White's 'characters[.] are ... strangers and pilgrims in their 
society' and that 'they are faithful to the life of the spirit' (1981: 76). 
Nor does she see that Collins is as much a part of 'the crucible in 
which prophets are shaped' (1981:76) as any of White's heroes. 
Richters may consider Collins to be a 'clownish anti-Christ' or 'a 
malign rather than divine fool' (1979:261). But I think this is much 
too severe a judgment based on his notion that 'it is man's "fallen" 
nature that Furphy ... is ultimately concerned with' (1979:257), and 
that the chief of the "fallen" is Collins. It is true that Furphy is 
concerned with man's "fallen" nature, but so is Collins. As Collins 
states to Stewart, 'if Adam fell in the days of innocency, what should 
poor Tom Collins do in the days of villainy?' (SiL, 168). 
This leads us to consider another important aspect of Furphy's 
novels, especially if one considers the value of Tom Collins, as I will 
do in the next chapter, and that is the opposing values of the social 
and the individual. In a letter to Miles Franklin, dated 20th of 
August, 1904, Furphy states, '[w]ould you believe it -I tried Religion 
(Church of Christ); but had to give it best; not because it was too 
exacting. but the other way about. I didn't want a church that 
prohibited actual vice -for I'm not vicious- but I wanted one that 
would expel me with contumely for having two coats while another 
bloak had none' (Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 172). It would 
appear that Furphy privileges the social over the individual, but we 
must remember that it is a particular version of individualism to 
which Furphy is opposed, namely one that extends rights to the few 
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and not the many, or one which treats others as means to an end. 
Nevertheless, Furphy's novels do exhibit a strong social orientation, 
placing much emphasis on the concepts of society and community. 
Furphy would agree with Plato's notion that '[s]oclety 
ortginates ... because the individual ls not self-sufficient, but has 
many needs which he can't supply himself (Rep. bk 2.369b). In this 
sense, 'when we have got hold of enough people to satisfy our many 
varied needs, we have assembled quite a large number of partners 
and helpers together to live in one place; and we gtve the resultant 
settlement the name of a community or state' (Rep. bk 2.369c). 
Similarly, one wonders if Furphy was aware of Aristotle's assertion 
'that every state ls a sort of partnership, and that every partnership 
ls formed in order to attain some good' (Pol. bk 1.1), or that 'the state 
ls natural, and man ls by nature an animal designed for living in 
states' (Pol. bk 1.2). Bearing in mind the ideas of uplifting and 
upbulldtng, Furphy would agree that human beings are social 
animals, and that there ls a need for a way of seeing and responding 
to life which does not interfere with natural rtghts, with civil rights, 
nor with the common pursuit of goodness and happiness, or that 
which ls called well-being. 
Perhaps this ls what Furphy hinted at when he wrote "(y]et do I 
cling ... to Plato's beautiful thought that no soul misses truth 
willingly' (SiL, 87). Or why Collins, in the closing chapter of Rigby's 
Romance, meditates on the concept of happiness: 
But, after all, what ls happiness? "Felicity" ls its 
closest synonym, and you will observe that both words 
have the alternative import of Compatibility or 
Accordance -as when we speak of "a happy 
combination", "a felicitous phrase", and so forth. Such 
a coincidence in double-meaning ls not without 
stgntflcance, since it betokens an instructive sub-
consciousness that Happiness must not be 
incongruous, or out of place, in respect of the 
Universal Harmony. Doubtless, our field of thought ls 
invaded by a prophetic forecast, a twilight revelation of 
completer life, not directly formulated, though finding 
cryptic register in everyday speech. Then -taking 
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Happiness in the double-intent of the word- who shall 
presume to interpret its manifestation, or limit its 
scope? Passing over the vanishing happiness of the 
moment, the ephemeral happiness of the day, and the 
scarcely less transitory happiness of the lifetime, may 
not the Ultimate Happiness of the Moral Universe be 
in some way consistent with the cross-purposes of 
human life? .... And if there be a Universal Purpose, 
beyond individual welfare, and apart from the wayside 
interests of existence -if each lifetime be but one pace 
of Humanity in a decreed journey toward some 
Ultimate Good- then, measuring the consummation by 
its incalculable cost, that Good may be taken as the 
Inconceivable Best 
Ay, but -mortal men, Hal, mortal men. And women 
still more inveterately mortal. Mortality is here 
emphasized, not in trite confession of its precarious 
tenure, but because of its abject servility to terrestial 
conditions (260-261 ). 
As one can see, Furphy uses the socio-historical climate of 
political divisions and rivalry to underpin his concerns with moral 
progress, and this is particularly the case with the cultural idea of a 
national type during the federation movement. If we recall the rivalry 
between colonial governments, particularly the New South Welsh and 
Victorian squabbles over the Riverina, it appears Furphy thought 
that society, whether in the form of Church or government, should 
not be of such a nature as to interfere with or curb the needs of the 
individual within a particular geographic experience. Indeed, as 
Furphy's novels insinuate, disorder in society is not just a disorder 
within politics, but also a disorder amongst individuals and their 
need for a particular custom vts-a-vts the convict taint. Besides an 
emphasis on public welfare in Furphy's novels, there is an equally 
strong focus on individualism and what an individual ought to do 
within the context of cultural production, particularly through the 
character of Tom Collins. For this reason, I think Furphy's views of 
nineteenth-century Australia share an affinity with Emerson's views 
of America: 
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Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the 
manhood of everyone of its members. Society is ajoint 
stock company, in which the members agree, for the 
better securing of his bread for each shareholder, to 
surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The 
virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is 
its aversion. It [society] loves not realities and 
creators, but names and customs ([1841] 1985:178. My 
italics). 
Both Furphy and Emerson believed that the concept of society 
in the new world ought to be a joint stock company or a partnership 
of creators and realities, not just names and customs adopted from 
another time and place. According to Emerson, '[a]ll men have my 
blood and I all men's. Not for that will I adopt their petulance and 
folly, even to the extent of being ashamed of it' ([1841] 1985:192). In 
short, the emphasis is not on the abandoning of old world knowledge 
and values, but a retranslation of their cultural and social relevance 
by the new world experiencefor the new world experience. As Lillian 
Falkland-Pritchardstates to Collins, 
"Strange, isn't it -to think that a word, impalpable to 
touch and invisible to sight, should be more enduring 
and reliable than any material monument? The history 
of nations -their migrations, settlements, conquests-
can be traced by the philologist far back into ages 
which afford little or no clue to the antiquarian. Yet in 
spite of the paramount significance of local 
designations -or, perhaps because of it- the map of 
this young land is already defaced by ugly and 
incongruous names, transplanted from the other side 
of the world" (BBB, 71. My italics)4. 
It is interesting to note that Collins does not disagree with her, 
and I think this is Furphy's way of satirizing the Anglo-Australian 
4 I will discuss the value of Lillian Falkland-Pritchard more fully in chapter three, where I discuss 
Collins' interests in the "female" version of the national type. 
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attempt to uplift and upbuild Australia through the hasty adoption 
of British names and customs, which try to efface the negativity of 
the fatal shore. For example, the fact that New South Wales was 
called 'the mother colony' (SiL, 3) suggests that the penal system is 
not only bequeathed to the much newer 'child' colonies, such as 
Victoria, but also suffers under an 'adolescent' rebellion in which the 
child strategically throws off the system of the parent in order to 
come of age. One could say that the name change, in 1851, from the 
"Port Phillip District" in New South Wales to the colony of Victoria is 
the first move in effacing the convict taint. It is equally, and more 
importantly, a socio-cultural homage to the head of the Empire and, 
in this sense, an appeal for redemption. 
Responding in an 1883 editorial to the threat of a proposed 
French convict colony in the Pacific island of New Hebrides, the 
Victorian Premier, James Service, stated that '[a]s far as France is 
concerned, Australia is simply a geographical expression. But we 
want to make it more than that; we want to make ourselves a 
nation, a united people ... who are able to command respect' (in Serle, 
1969:32). Furthermore, Service argued that '[e]very one of us must 
feel our hearts beat strong and more strong when we think of 
ourselves not merely as Victorians, or New South Welshmen ... but as 
Australians' (in Serle, 1969:32). And yet, in that same year at the 
Australasian Convention, Service declared that '[w]e cling to the idea 
of the Unity of the Empire. We do not wish to see anything of 
estrangement between Young Australia and Great Britain. We want 
our sons and daughters to grow up to love the Old Country' (in Serie, 
1969:32). Serle describes Service as 'a fervent imperialist' and states 
that '[j Jingo enthusiasm swept Victoria remarkably early', for 
'nowhere else in the colonies was there more consciousness of 
growing threats to the Empire or stronger demands for a no-
nonsense imperial policy' (1969:32). 
Although Furphy did not consider a clean-break from the old 
country to be possible or necessary, it is my contention that, rather 
than support jingoism, Furphy would have wanted his readers to 
follow Emerson's advice for the new world citizen: 
[b]e it known unto you that henceforward I obey no 
law less than the eternal law. I will have no covenants 
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but proximities. I shall endeavour to nourish my 
parents, to support my family, to be the chaste 
husband of one wife, -but these relations I must fill 
after a new and unprecedented way. I appeal from your 
customs. I must be myself. I cannot break myself any 
longer for you, or you. If you can love me for what I 
am, we shall be the happier. If you cannot, I will still 
seek to deserve that you should. I will not hide my 
tastes or aversions. I will so trust that what is deep is 
holy, that I will do strongly before the sun and moon 
whatever inly rejoices me and the heart appoints. If 
you are noble, I will love you; if you are not, I will not 
hurt you and myself by hypocritical attentions. If you 
are true, but not in the same truth with me, cleave to 
your companions; I will seek my own. I do this not 
selfishly but humbly and truly. It is alike your interest, 
and mine, and all men's, however long we have dwelt 
in lies, to live in truth' (Emerson, [1841) 1985:192-
193). 
In Furphy's views on the truth of cultural production and the 
idea of a national type, self-reliance is as important as ignorance 
shifting. As Emerson postulates, '[i]s not a man better than a town? 
Ask nothing of men, and, in the endless mutation, thou only firm 
column must presently appear the upholder of all that surrounds 
thee' ([ 1841] 1985:202). Ask nothing of men and the uplifting and 
upbuilding of a nation shall come to nought. Furphy stressed, in his 
own way, Emerson's notion that '[n]othing can bring you peace but 
yourself. Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles' 
([ 1841] 1985:203). According to Collins, '[c]ollective humanity holds 
the key to that kingdom of God on earth', for '[t]he kingdom of God is 
within us; our all-embracing duty is to give it form and effect, a local 
habitation and a name' (SiL, 95. My italics). One should see Collins' 
statement as a principle, advising the new world "child" to be true to 
him or herself and his or her experiences vis-a-vis the customs and 
values of the old world. It is a call to self-reliance, to uplift and 
up build the new individual and the new nation through the ideas of 
natural and civil rights, as well as the shifting of ignorance. Once 
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this road is taken, it is then possible to establish the rightful 
identity of community, society and nation. As Henricksen explains, 
[i]n Furphy's fiction, nationalism is never a simple and 
absolute good. There is always this striking ambiguity. 
Furphy was always eager to espouse pragmatic 
solutions to Australia's problems and nascent evils, 
usually as suggested in the Bulletin. On the other 
hand, he never apotheosized nationalism. He always 
saw it as ultimately marred by a flawed humanity, 
always imperfect, and never utopian. The more 
characteristic nationalism of the Nineties was a 
mixture of over-reacting pragmatism and romantic, 
numinous overtones. With Furphy's nationalism, as 
with his Christianity, Furphy promptly accepted the 
pragmatic road to assumed social improvement, but 
cast a skeptical glance at the numinous ( 1985:66). 
Generally, Henricksen is correct, although his thinking that 
Furphy was sceptical of the "romantic", does pose a problem: a 
problem to which I will devote more attention in the next chapter. 
Nevertheless, if one were to identify a universal theme in Furphy's 
novels, then it would be quite apt to say that his work evolves 
around the search for meaning, or the avid pursuit and production of 
unifiable cultural experiences, for a group of people must seek 
common ground in order to make their experiences, however diverse, 
a public property that promotes social, cultural and individual well-
being. In this sense, I must disagree with Brady, who concludes her 
analysis of Furphy with the notion that 
[t]he great weakness of Such ts Life, then, lies in its 
inability to deal with all the material of life as it 
presents itself to experience. This failure manifests 
itself in the stiffness and emotional wariness of the 
characters and also in the discontinuity and general 
sense of inconsequence of the story line which reflects 
on the one hand, as we have suggested, a certain 
humility, but on the other a kind of cowardice, a 
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desire not to push questions but rather go around 
them ( 1981 :67). 
As we shall see in the next chapter, where I will deal with 
Furphy's views on art in more detail, nothing is further from the 
truth. 
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2. Man and Art: the ethics of representing Australia for 
Australia. 
Of course, you're not responsible for India; 
but, by Heaven, you're responsible for Australia! 
-Rigby's Romance, 1946:91-
2.1. The Normative Theory of Art: creativity, culture and value. 
Having discussed some of the important issues of the socio-
historical background to the novels, it is now time to turn our 
attention to Furphy's views on art. Previously I discussed the view 
that Furphy's novels are an education. This view has broader 
implications than a mere recognition of the sheer number of literary 
and non-literary allusions in Furphy's work. Chiefly, this view that 
Furphy's novels are an education should be seen within the context 
of art and knowledge, or art as a way of understanding. According to 
the philosopher Gordon Graham, '[t]he theory that art is valuable 
because of what we learn from it is sometimes called "cognitivism", a 
label derived from the Latin for knowing' (1997:43). 
Graham calls this cognitive approach to art the '[n]ormative 
theory of art', for it 'is not concerned with the essential nature of 
"art" but with explaining the different ways in which it can be of 
value and the relative importance we should attach to each [artistic 
work]' (1997: 127). Thus, '[i]nstead of seeking a definition of art in 
terms of necessary and sufficient properties, or seeking to determine 
its social function, we see what values music, or painting, or poetry 
can embody, and how valuable this form of embodiment is' (Graham, 
1997: 173). In Graham's view, this is especially important because 
'the fact is that generation after generation and a wide variety of 
cultures all have attributed a special value to certain works and 
activities, and this suggests that some of the things we call art have 
an abiding value' (1997: 176). How this value enriches knowledge and 
understanding, so becoming a norm, depends on what 'imaginative 
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creations' can bring 'to evecyday experience as a way of ordering and 
illuminating [that evecyday experience)' (Graham, 1997:62). 
Appropriately, this has some vecy interesting implications for 
art. Discussing art's ability to allow human beings to reflect upon, as 
well as structure their 'world of political experience,' Graham states 
that 
[a]rt can have the same sort of relation to moral and 
social experience. One way of putting this point is to 
say that we should think of artistic creations not as 
stereotypes but as archetypes. The images of the 
greatest artists do not provide us with distillations or 
summations of the variety in experience (stereotypes) 
but imaginacy models against which we measure that 
variety (archetypes). And in certain contexts these 
archetypes may be said to constitute the only reality 
that there is. Things such as 'a lover', or 'a gentleman', 
or 'the perfect marriage', or 'a consuming passion', or 
'innocence', do not await our discovecy in the way that 
black swans or seams of gold do. They are patterns 
which structure our approach to the social and moral 
world in which our lives have to be lived and determine 
our attitude to the behaviour of ourselves and others. 
Works of art that come to have a common currency 
contribute to the formation of these patterns, and in 
the case of the greatest works -some of Shakespeare's 
plays for instance- they have been definitive. Art thus 
contributes to social and moral experience, and for 
this reason may be said to provide us with the 
possibility not only of understanding but also of self-
understanding ( 1997: 128-129). 
When using the term "archetypes" in this context, we are not 
dealing with Jung's idea of 'the collective unconscious' and its 
'contents' of 'primordial types' or 'universal images that have existed 
since the remotest times' ([ 1959) 1980:5). Instead, we need to tum to 
Locke. Without delving into the finer details of Locke's distinctions, 
we can contrast Graham's idea of stereotypes with Locke's 'simple 
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ideas', which 'all agree to the reality of things' even though some may 
not be 'the images or representations of what does [actually] exist' 
(Essay, 2.10.2). Similarly, Graham's archetypes correspond to Locke's 
"complex ideas" or 'mtxed modes and relations' of simple ideas, based 
on degrees of sensation and reflection, which possess 'no other reality 
but what they have in the minds of men' (2.10.4). 
Black swans or gold are simple ideas or stereotypes, while ideas 
such as innocence, love or heroism are complex ideas or archetypes. 
Within the context of reference, if and when certain complex ideas or 
archetypes, existing since antiquity, recur in isolated cultures 
without any form of cross-cultural fertilization, it is then that one 
can possibly begin to define these ideas in Jung's sense of the word. 
However, we need only concern ourselves with the notion that works 
of art are yardsticks for understanding reality, and that they employ, 
explore or construct a currency of complex ideas or archetypes, which 
have no referential existence other than the individual or common 
mind. For this reason, some artistic endeavours have been judged to 
be important works of art because their value is such that they 
increase the wealth of an already existing body of knowledge, as well 
as broadening human understanding of its own nature and condition 
in the world. 
Simply put, a work of art is deemed important, or even great, 
because it is worth studying its treatment of specific values, or even 
its creation of "new" values. It is a view shared and practised by 
Furphy, for his novels allude to a diverse body of art in order to 
illuminate not only specific episodes in his own art, but also specific 
incidents in the reality of the Australian experience. Although the 
relationship between art and value is not a simple one, since any 
question of value in art is demarcated by ethical considerations, we 
can at least argue that the relationship between art and value in 
Furphy is based on the importance of uplifting and upbuilding a 
nation ethically. One could say that Furphy's main strategy in his 
art 'is to hold, as 'twere the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her 
own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the 
time his form and pressure' (Hamlet, 111.2.21-24). 
In this sense, the manner in which Furphy practises this view 
in terms of his own art, as well as "Australian" art generally, is the 
reason for inquiry in this section. While I will have more to say 
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about this in the following chapters, it is important to note now that 
national identity, like the concept of nation, is an archetype, an 
imaginary model and unit of measure that constitutes a reality where 
there formally was none. But it should not be overlooked that an 
archetype also employs specific things within an already understood 
reality in order to validate ostensively its right to belong amongst 
that which is already known. Without this quality, nationalist 
narratives will have little impact on the public domain and leave no 
lasting impression in that public domain. Furphy appears to take 
this as a matter-of-fact. However, what Furphy does strongly suggest 
is this. If one is endeavouring to uplift and upbuild a nation 
artistically, then one needs to pay attention to what one treats as a 
value, particularly with the national type. 
As Ernest Gellner explains, '[i]t is nationalism which 
engenders nations, and not the other way round. Admittedly, 
nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation 
of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, 
and it most often transforms them radically' (1983:55). Or, as Turner 
points out, '[i]t is wise not to underestimate the power of images, of 
the way in which the meaning of everyday life is constructed through 
representation' (1994:51). In this sense, Australian national identity 
and nationhood can be seen as the claim to be recognized, to be 
known and understood as a common currency, as one identity vts-a-
vis many others, and as a set of values among many other sets of 
values, particularly the British Empire. Consider the following telling 
comments by A.G. Stephens in his introduction to The Bullettn Story 
Book: 
... the stories and sketches which follow are usually the 
literary dreams of men of action, or the literary 
realisation of things seen by wanderers. Usually they 
are objective, episodic, detached- branches torn from 
the Tree of Life, trimmed and dressed with whatever 
skill the writers possess (which often is not 
inconsiderable). In most of them still throbs the keen 
vitality of the parent stem: many are absolute 
transcripts of the Fact, copied as faithfully as the 
resources of language will permit. Hence many of 
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them, remaining level with Nature, remain on the 
lower plane of Art- which at its highest is not 
imitative, but creative,- making anew the whole world 
in terms of its subject. What is desiderated is that 
these isolated impressions should be fused in 
consciousness, and re-visualized, re-presented with 
their universal reference made clear ... .ln other words, 
the branch should be shown growing upon the Tree, 
not severed from it: the Part should imply the Whole, 
and in a sense contain it, defying mathematics. Every 
story of a man or woman should be a microcosm of 
humanity; every vision of Nature should hold an 
imagination of the Universe ([ 1901] 1973:vi). 
It can be said that Stephens is pushing for the need between 
art and understanding in relation to the short sketches that the 
storybook has to offer. More than just making 'an interesting book', 
Stephens' aim is to show that a characteristically Australian 
narrative is starting to emerge, even though '(t]he literary work which 
is Australian in spirit, as well as in scene or incident, is only 
beginning to be written· ([ 1901] 1973:vi). Stephens' comment that 
'[t]he formal establishment of the Commonwealth has not yet 
crystallized the floating elements of national life' is rather applicable 
to Furphy's Rivertna, for readers see that 'Australia is still a suburb 
of Cosmopolis, where men from many lands perpetuate in a new 
environment the ideas and habits acquired far away' ((1901] 1973:vi-
vii). Despite the difference in years, Stephens' discussion of the early 
twentieth century and Furphy's representation of 1883-1884 shows 
that any progress in the nationalist cause was slow, eclectic and 
perhaps disappointing. 
It is important to bear in mind what Stephens has to say, for 
Stephens is a much more sophisticated thinker than most others of 
the nationalist cause. The narratives of nation and nationality, 
which he considered to be "Australian", had to be much more mature 
than that which the 1890s had to offer. According to Stephens, 'our 
most talented story-writers are still only clever students of the art of 
writing' ((190111973:vi). In this sense, '(o]nly here and there [do] we 
receive hints and portents of the Future', for 'Australian nationality 
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to-day is like an alchemist's crucible just before the gold-birth, with 
red fumes rising, and strange odours, and a dazzling gleam caught by 
moments through the bubble and seethe' ((1901) 1973:vii). The crux 
of Stephens' argument is to see 'our country ... through clear 
Australian eyes, not through bias-bleared English spectacles' ((1901) 
1973:ix. My italics). 
One must understand Australia through art, and the manner 
in which to do this is to remove the English spectacles, to create 
rather than imitate a way of seeing, and to respond to 'the local 
sense of local beauty' ([ 1901 J 1973:vii). More importantly, Stephens 
warns that '[i]t will be the fault of the writers, not of the land, if 
Australian literature does not by-and-by become memorable' ([ 1901) 
1973:ix). Nevertheless, Stephens does concede that '[t]hese counsels 
of perfection' may be 'easier to teach than to practise' ([1901) 
1973:vi), but he also points out that 'every year is teaching us 
wisdom' ([1901) 1973:viii). I find Stephens' comments rather 
illuminating when it comes to Furphy, for both men are of much the 
same mind set. Given that both men spent the best part of five years 
in a working relationship as author and editor of Such is Life, it is 
possible that each influenced the mind of the other. Stephens' ideas 
thematically reverberate throughout Furphy's views on art and life. 
But I am also of the view that Furphy took these ideas to 
greater heigh ts in an effort to show his readers the philosophical 
relationship between art and life within the context of "narrative" 
understanding. Perhaps this fundamental difference between the two 
men was one of the reasons why Stephens missed the complexity of 
Furphy's work, making the claim that '[n)o one but the proof-readers 
will ever read Such ts Life right through' (in Barnes, 1990:255; 
Franklin, 1944:125). As Furphy stated to Cecil Winter, 'A.G.S [is not] 
a perfect critic, according to my mind (though he may be nothing the 
worse for that). Too much reliance on models, and criteria, and the 
"unities", and so forth. But he is far from Bayldon, Myers and others. 
No critic, for instance, has ever done justice to Lawson's best work' 
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 168). 
Besides the formative influence of The Bulletin's house style, 
one wonders whether or not these ideas are partly expressive of a 
basic manifesto formulated by the short-lived "Society of 
Irresponsibles": a society 'which Stephens had formed with himself as 
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President' (Barnes, 1990:308) and a society to which Furphy 
belonged. As Furphy stated in a letter to his mother, Judith: 
... a society is being organized to place all Australian 
writers and artists on terms of personal acquaintance, 
without further introduction -the object being to 
further the interests of Australian literature and art 
(as distinguished from Anglo-Australian). The society 
was organized by my editor, A. G. Stephens, and ... he 
chooses to enlist all such purely Australian talent as 
may be available. It is called the Australian Society of 
Irresponsibles -signifying that no member is bound by 
any rules- and the secret sign and symbol is an 
inverted pewter- implying that the day of carousal is 
past, and the day of work has begun (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:102-103). 
Despite Croft's notion that 'the content of Furphy's text may 
be nationalist', but his 'language is not' (1991: 17), Furphy's 
affiliation with the society shows that he is as concerned with the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia as his hero, Tom Collins. If 
Croft means to say, as I think he does, that Furphy's nationalism is 
not, as Green argues, an 'aggressive Australianism' ( 1961 :633), then I 
do not disagree with him. One of the problems with Croft's (1991:14) 
notion is his basic premise that there is a difference between 
Furphy's text and Collins' "text". While this is not untrue, it does 
not necessarily follow that nationalism is not an issue in both texts. 
Collins may be 'an Australian nationalist' (Croft, 1991:171), but it 
would also be fair to say Collins is not aggressively nationalist. 
I think this is important, for aggressive nationalism or 
aggressive Australianism, in light of our previous discussion on the 
theme of ignorance shifting, has a tendency to justify a narrow-
minded attitude towards the concepts of nation and national 
identity. Rather than a radical closing-off, I think Furphy's text and 
Collins' "text" firmly push the overall view that the many concerns 
surrounding Australian national identity should be seen as universal 
concerns. As Miles Franklin explains, 'Joseph Furphy built in 
harmony with the contours and atmosphere of his own continent 
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and used as well much treasure from the universal storehouse of 
knowledge' (1944:4). In the words of Stephens, 'the branch should be 
shown growing on the Tree, not severed from it ([1901] 1973:vi). For 
this reason, I disagree with Croft's statement that 'deep within 
[Furphy] was the desire to be Judged against the civilized standard of 
the "home" culture, and not to create a form of art which would 
make its own terms and therefore be found wan ting' ( 1991: 1 7). Croft 
is closer to the truth in one of his earlier essays, when he states that 
'(alt the level of deeper interpretation, we might say that Furphy's 
desire was no so much for the restitution of a broken primal 
union, ... but a creation of something new from independent parts' 
(1989:19). 
To return to the Society of Irresponsibles, there is the claim 
that no member is bound by any rules, showing that, within the 
common expectations of what art should be, the Society was quite 
ready to break with conventional ways of seeing. Most contemporary 
readers are more or less acquainted with Stephens' ((1901] 1973:viii) 
view that early Australian literature is like early Australian art; both 
are vei:y much the products of English conventions and English ways 
of seeing. It is, therefore, interesting to note that Furphy's novels not 
only represent the emergence of an Australian art, but also 
themselves themati.cally deal with the move towards an unique 
Australian style a little more than a year before Tom Roberts 
returned to Australia, in 1885, from the Royal Academy and began 
his school of pleinair painting (Whitelaw, 1985:54). Indeed, the pletn 
air quality of Collins' artistic style, depicting a 'random selection' of 
1883-84 "life" in Riverina, seems to imply that Collins is the 
forerunner of an Australian aesthetic unveiled by the Impressionism 
of the 1890s Heidelberg school. Although there is no clear date as to 
when Collins sat down with his Lett's diaries to write his "extracts", 
it is not inconceivable to assume that he, like the Heidelberg artists, 
sets out to capture 'Nature in her Impressionist mood' (SiL, 65), 
thereby attempting to give the public the evidence of uniqueness, 
beauty and value that made the Australian experience worth 
understanding as both a local and universal series of concerns. 
Furphy's novels challenge the common notion that art is 
escapist or, as Plato argues in a later dialogue than Republic, that 
'artistic representation' can properly be classified as 'diversion' 
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because no work of art 'has a serious purpose; all are performed for 
pure amusement' (Statesman, 288c). If art is pure amusement and no 
one takes it seriously, then a work of art which deals seriously with 
the issues and experiences of nationalism is pure amusement and 
cannot be taken seriously. This is, of course, false, for the problem 
with the notion that art is escapist or pure amusement is that if it is 
not escapist nor pure amusement, it cannot be art. While this may 
be an acceptable judgment based on one's taste, it is not a judgment 
based on the facts about works of art which attempt to facilitate an 
understanding about the different kinds of experiences in the world. 
As I will discuss shortly, what Furphy called "romance" may be 
escapist or purely amusing as well as art, but it does not follow that 
what is neither "romance", escapist nor purely amusing cannot be 
called art. If that were the case, then Furphy's novels would have to 
be seen as artistic failures because his thematic preoccupations are 
far from escapist or purely amusing. 
As the philosopher John Dewey states, 
[i)t is mere ignorance that leads then to the 
supposition that [the) connection of art and esthetic 
perception With experience signifies a lowering of their 
significance and dignity. Experience in the degree that 
it is experience is heightened vitality. Instead of 
signifying being shut up within one's own private 
feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert 
commerce with the world.; at its height it signifies 
complete interpenetration of self and the world of 
objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender to 
caprice and disorder, it affords our sole demonstration 
of a stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic 
and developing. Because experience is the fulfilment of 
an organism in its struggles and achievements in a 
world of things, it is art in germ ([ 1934) 1958: 19). 
Dewey's observation is a good one, for rather than solely 
identifying a work of art as that which satisfies our personal whims 
or amusements, art is a legitimate way of understanding, in an 
ordered manner, the rhythms of the world. Art is active and alert 
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commerce with the world, and can afford to be taken properly as a 
yardstick for understanding the responses to life in the search for 
meaning. As Dewey explains, '(e)xperience is the result, the sign, and 
the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, 
when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into 
participation and communication' ([1934) 1958:22). In short, works 
of art are one important component in social participation and 
communication. And if we want to contemplate something about our 
world, our experiences, or if we engage ourselves in the search for 
meaning in our responses to life, then works of art can be important 
mediators of understanding. 
Furphy's novels, in terms of art and understanding or 
normative aesthetics, anticipate 'a number of things that twentieth-
century novelists were to explore' (Eagleson and Kramer, 1976:79). 
Indeed, 
[the novels examine] the relationship between fiction 
and actuality, between actual and literary experience, 
and between life and knowledge. Furphy wrestles with 
the problem as to how realistic dialogue, and the sense 
of life as it is lived, can be incorporated into a novel 
which nevertheless has a full contour and shape. He is 
up against the most difficult of all problems for the 
novelist: how to preserve the sensations of real life 
while at the same time giving real life the shape of 
fiction. It offers an actual dialectical representation of 
Riverina life in the 1880s in the context of a formal 
shape with elements of eighteenth- century picaresque 
fiction, and even the romantic novel which, through 
his references to Henry Kingsley, he pretends to 
despise (Eagleson and Kramer, 1976:79). 
Leaving aside the issue of the romance for the moment, it 
should be noted that the theoretical issues of "identity", "nation", 
"new world" and "old world", within the context of artistic 
representation, are also of primary concern to Furphy's novels. While 
Croft also points out that Furphy is 'very much a twentieth-century 
writer whose work is still relevant late in the century for which he 
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has such high hopes' (1991:276), I have some reseivations about the 
reasons that he gives. As I have argued earlier, I do not think that it 
is 'his cast of mind', nor would I exclusively attribute Furphy's 
"modem" style to 'his involuted uncertainties about art, identity, and 
purpose' (1991:276). What Croft seems to read in Furphy is the seed 
of some twentieth-century angst, which I think is rather 
inappropriate. 
Instead, one must not only see Furphy's work as a cultural 
creation, but also seek to understand his work as a cultural creation 
concerned with illuminating the complex processes of uplifting and 
upbuilding, and this includes the uncertainties and the 
contradictions in the text. As Dewey states, '[s]ince the artist cares 
in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union is 
achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and tension. He 
rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because of their 
potentialities, bringing to living consciousness an experience that is 
unified and total' ([ 1934) 1958: 15). One could say that Furphy's 
programme was twofold. Firstly, he wanted his readers to observe and 
think about that which occurs in the novels as a work of art. 
Secondly, he wanted his readers to understand that these works of 
art were deeply concerned with life, both locally and universally. 
In other words, art, identity and purpose are crucial factors in 
the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, and this applies to both 
Furphy's text and Collins' "text". According to Wilkes, 
[i]n the the work of Lawson, Furphy and Patterson, a 
deliberate emphasis is placed on the features of the 
Australian landscape least resembling the English 
countryside -the harsher aspects may even be 
especially prized- and at the same time a vernacular 
idiom is asserted against the cultivated modes of the 
period before. This third stage [in Australian literary 
history] takes the pattern beyond adjustment to 
environment: it invokes also a movement from the 
artiftcial to the genuine and from a state of exile and 
dislocation to a state of national pride and self-
reliance (1975: 142. My italics). 
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It must be said that Wilkes' comments are more or less 
applicable to Lawson, Furphy and Paterson in varying degrees, for it 
is a mistake to assume that these three writers form a neat little 
nationalist package. Indeed, while Lawson and Paterson respectively 
and unproblematically assert an Australian national identity, Furphy 
questions the validity of many contemporary assertions in light of 
what it means to uplift and upbuild. To put it another way, readers 
are constantly encouraged to think about what it means to move 
from the artificial to the genuine, rather than just accepting the 
existence of a particular type as being genuine. Thus, while Lawson 
and Paterson clearly render an Australian type in their art, Furphy 
and Collins put forth the much more credible view that 'the Coming 
Australian is a problem' (SIL, 144). According to Turner, '(t]he key 
issue in talking about the role and nature of the presence of 
nationalism in Australian narrative is thus not so much the range of 
meanings made available but the fact of the dominance of one set of 
terms, one body of myth or discourse, as the accepted mode of 
representation of the meaning of the nation' (1993: 109). 
Although Turner does not qualify Furphy's art with the 
capacity to isolate and question this dominant representation, 
preferring instead to place Furphy on an equal standing with 
Lawson, it is my contention that readers should see the tension 
between realism and romance, or fact and fiction, so frequently 
addressed by Collins, in light of uplifting and upbuilding the 
meaning and value of Australia. Once this is the case, it becomes 
equally possible to see that Furphy is not concerned simply with 
perpetuating the dominant representation of the Australian type, but 
challenging that representation with his own, namely the scholarly 
Tom Collins. To some degree, Furphy's investigation of the pros and 
cons of uplifting and upbuilding precedes some of the more modem 
theoretical concerns with nationalism, especially the art of nation 
and the view, as expressed by Benedict Anderson, that 'nationality', 
or 'nation-ness' and 'nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a 
particular kind' (1991:4). 
White states that '[t]he question of Australian identity has 
usually been seen as a tug-of-war between Australianness and 
Britishness, between the impulse to be distinctively Australian and 
the lingering sense of a British heritage' ( 1981:47). Readers can see 
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this recurring in Furphy's novels. But readers should also see that 
Furphy's novels, through Collins' preoccupations with artistic 
representation, foreground a tug-of-war between a number of values 
vying to be quintessentially Australian. What is important is not so 
much that there exists a difference of opinion, but the process where, 
as White explains, 'self-conscious nationalists began to exaggerate 
what was distinctive about Australia' (1981:47). In a letter to Cecil 
Winter, Furphy states, '[w)rite only of something which impresses 
you. Never draw wholly upon imagination; truth embellished is the 
idea. Attend well to details, without making them prominent. Let 
every sentence tell; let the yam go, from post to finish. Last and 
greatest -Be lucid; avoid obscurity as the worst literary sin' (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:146). 
Much can be said about this piece of authorial advice to 
Winter1 , but in the current context what interests us is this idea of 
"truth embellished". Indeed, Furphy is not opposed to exaggeration in 
uplifting and upbuilding, but he is opposed to an author who takes 
"truth embellished" to mean an artistic misrepresentation of norms. 
As Collins warns, '[ i]t will just show you how much the novelist has 
to answer for; following, as he does, the devices and desires of his 
own heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving 
untold the lies that he ought to have told' (SIL, 272. My italics). This 
is especially so if the narrative is written 'for full-grown people in the 
painfully simple manner so often affected in literature intended for 
the "masses"' (BBB, 88). Nevertheless, Furphy's notion of "truth 
embellished", when applied to uplifting and up building, does appear 
to indicate a rather modem awareness of the nation as 'an imagined 
political community' (Anderson, 1991:6). 
According to Anderson, the nation 'is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion' (1991:6). More importantly 
though, the nation is imagined because '[c)ommunities are to be 
distinguished, not by their falsity/ genuineness, but by the style in 
1 One could say, for example, that Furphy's attention to details, without making them prominent, 
naively anticipates that his readers will be observant readers, and he thus runs the risk of obscurity. If 
this is the case, then this may explain why public response was poor and Furphy's faith in Such is 
Life dwindled. It also might explain why 17ie B11l11-B11ln and The Brolga wac; written in a style that 
resembles the literature for the masses, while its themes are an extension of his previous novels. 
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which they are imagined' (Anderson, 1991:6. My italics). This point 
encapsulates much of what I have said about Furphy in relation to 
uplifting and upbuilding, as well as Wilkes' notion concerning the 
move from an artificial Australian experience to a genuine Australian 
experience in light of artistic representation and value. Indeed, it 
also says much about the formative processes of an Australian 
nation, for the style in which one imagines the nation will depend on 
its history in Ugh t of popularized versions of official ideological 
discourses. 
Because Australia was born in modem European history for a 
specific purpose, Australian nationalism must move fast to overturn 
the nation's tainted history, thereby challenging these popularized 
versions of official ideological discourses, especially the applicability 
of "sin" at a national level. Hughes states that '[f]rom England, the 
identity of these people looked simple: They were seen in a bald, one-
dimensional way as "the children of the conVicts," heirs of a depraved 
gene pool, from whom little good could be expected' (1987:355). As 
White points out, 'many Australians were not content simply to be 
proved worthy of the old stock: some were so bold as to suggest that 
the new type was in fact a decided improvement on the old' (1981:73). 
In this sense, 'the Virtues of the conVicts, their enterprise and self-
reliance, were said to have been passed on to the Australian type, 
while their faults had been bred out' (White, 1981 :75). Nevertheless, 
Anglo-Australianism dominated the celebrations on the first day of 
federation, as noted by Evans et al (1997:11-14), foregrounding the 
more pervasive belief that what is British is best. 
As Evans et al explain, 'even in the 1950s there were still 
Australians, born and bred in Australia, who called the British Isles 
"home"' (1997:185). Within this context, I find White's concept of 
"generational renewal" rather appropriate. Discussing such qualities 
as the anti-authoritarianism and the anti-intellectualism of 'The 
Coming Australian', White states that '[w]hat is surprising is how 
often these characteristics were seen as being peculiarly Australian 
when they can more properly be ascribed to the age-old dismay with 
which one generation greets the ascendancy of the next' (1981:77). 
According to White, '[t]he 1890s generation, predominantly native-
bom, felt more at home in the Australian environment and felt more 
need to promote an indigenous culture' (1981:87). We can take this a 
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step further and, keeping in mind the correlation between "nation" 
and "home", side with Anderson's notion that despite the 'fear and 
hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to 
remind ourselves that nations inspire love, often profoundly self-
sacrificing love' (1991:141). In this sense, there is another strong 
reason for the 1890s generation's promoting an indigenous culture, 
namely to challenge the deeply-ingrained notion that 'the word 
"Australian" was a term of abuse' (Hughes, 1987:325). 
Let us now consider Anderson's definition of the nation a little 
further, since it offers a good understanding of that curious 
phenomenon called nationalism. Besides being imagined as a 
political community, the nation is also 'imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign' (Anderson, 1991 :6). According to Anderson, 
'[t]he nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of 
them ... has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other 
nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind' 
(1991:7). Furthermore, the nation 'is imagined as sovereign because 
the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and 
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, 
hierarchical dynastic realm' (Anderson, 1991:7). But most 
importantly, the nation 'is imagined as a community, because, 
regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail 
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship' (Anderson, 1991 :7). 
Qualifying Anderson's view, Willis explains that '[b]esides 
being a political figuration, nation is a cultural construction, a 
concept in which large communities believe' (1993:19. My italics). As 
Anderson points out, one should treat nationalism 'as if it belonged 
with "kinship" and "religion", rather than with "liberalism" or 
"fascism"' (1991:5). Indeed, one needs to see nationalism as a 
concept that is inseparable from the meaning of "home". This is 
especially so if one is to realise that the true power of nationalism 
does not lie in an official policy, but in its 'existence', according to 
Ernest Renan, as 'a daily plebiscite'([ 18961 1979:81 ). Nowhere is this 
more affirmatively evident than in art, since art not only has the 
ability to give people a way of seeing and understanding nation, but 
it also has the capacity to foreground and further encourage, either 
positively or negatively, the creative response to the concept of nation 
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on a large scale, especially in the communal search for meaning. 
Although Homi Bhabha offers a post-structural and post-
colonial reading of the 'western nation as an obscure and ubiquitous 
form of living the local.tty of culture', his notion that 'the complex 
strategies of cultural identification and discursive address', 
functioning 'in the name of "the people" or "the nation"' and making 
'them the immanent subjects and objects of a range of social and 
literary narratives' (1990:292) is an equally appropriate observation 
for Furphy's novels. Putting post-structural and post-colonial 
readings of an already established culture aside, one can observe in 
these novels the symbiotic formation of national and cultural 
identity at both the outer margins of the Empire and the infant 
space and time of experiencing the local 'landscape as the inscape of 
national identity' (Bhabha, 1990:295). As Furphy states, '[t]he poet's 
eye must see everything that is to be seen; his ear must hear 
everything that is to be heard; and, finally, his pen must give to 
these things a local habitation and a name' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). 
In this sense, the creative response to the concept of nation in 
the communal search for meaning takes '[ t]he scraps, patches, and 
rags of daily life' and continually turns them 'into signs of a national 
culture' (Bhabha, 1990:297). These scraps, patches and rags are what 
Furphy, in his 1903 review, called 'the minutest details of National 
life' ( 1969: 129). When the creative act makes the nation visible in 
narrative, 'the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a 
growing circle of national subjects' (Bhabha, 1990:297). However, as 
Furphy's novels so rightly foreground, there are also '[c]ounter-
narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its 
totalizing boundaries', disturbing 'those ideological manoeuvres 
through which "imagined communities" are given essentialist 
identities' (Bhabha, 1990:300). Some of these counter-narratives are 
Furphy's novels themselves, for the complexity of Tom Collins is 
such that he strategically disturbs the national and cultural 
formation of a dominant Australian type in a large number of 
plebiscite narratives. 
The reason for this disturbance has much to do with value, 
since the dominant Australian type, according to Furphy, appears to 
be very much capable of perpetuating the ignorance, rivalry and 
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division that had repeatedly sabotaged federation, as well as making 
national life shrivel 'into provincialism', becoming 'contemptible; 
and, festering into the imperial-cum-provincial sentiment' that 
makes nationalism 'obscene' (1969:128}. To a certain extent, one 
could say that Furphy's writings on nationalism and his challenging 
of the dominant representation of the national type are marked by 
what Gellner calls '[n]ationalist sentiment', which 'is the feeling of 
anger aroused by the violation of a principle, or the feeling of 
satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment' (1983: 1). Rather than 
Bhabha's notion that '(b]eing obliged to forget becomes the basis for 
remembering the nation, peopling it anew, [and] imagining the 
possibility of other contending and liberating forms of cultural 
identification' (1990:311}, Furphy's novels suggest that nationalism 
is a process of strategic moves and countermoves in the plebiscite of 
identities, especially their artistic representations and their national 
identification. 
To reiterate Graham's point concerning art and understanding, 
'what ts in view here is human experience in its widest sense -visual, 
aural, tactile, emotional, mental. Works of art can supply the 
imaginative apprehension of experience in all these respects, and 
their value derives from the fact that we may ourselves be deficient in 
this regard. This is the sense in which art is a source of 
understanding' (Graham, 1997:58}. Or, as the philosopher A.L. 
Cothey explains, '(h]ow we act towards others is shaped by the 
understanding of people we gain from art. More generally, we see 
things through the eyes of art -and in a deeper sense than that we 
see them as works of art' (1990:187}. Thus, the object of art as a 
route to knowledge, like anything that we designate as knowledge, 'is 
to make our understanding of experience explicit and thereby to 
contribute to making our actions meaningful. The opposite of this ts 
a state of confusion and ignorance' (Cothey, 1990:188-189}. 
According to Cothey, there are '(s]ome artefacts [that] promote 
this [state of confusion and ignorance] by masquerading as art while 
in fact encouraging us to enjoy apprehending them for incidental 
reasons. In this sense false art -art that ts positively bad- ts a 
genuine possibility and a real danger' (1990: 189}. Although Cothey's 
argument is not free from problems, namely that troublesome 
distinction between good art and bad art, as well as true art vis-a-vis 
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false art, he nevertheless makes a very important point: there 
emerges from time to time works of art which jeopardise the attempt 
to arrive at a specific value in human understanding. In Furphy's 
view, this kind of art is the colonial romance. But what is it about 
the colonial romance that makes it such a threat that Furphy, as 
well as Collins, repeatedly attacks it? 
We can begin to answer this question with a comment by Miles 
Franklin. In her biography of Furphy, she states that 'Artist Time has 
been distilling atmosphere from crude local colour so that the 
Australian novel has advanced beyond the stage when it became such 
simply by the substitution of native fauna, flora and place names for 
those of other lands' (1944:2). In short, Australian literature has 
moved beyond the simple formula of a British ethos with an 
Australian nomenclature. Franklin's comment says much about the 
state of Australian literature in both the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, especially the steady move against those Anglo-
Australians who ·greeted with hosannas any clever or promising 
novel written in the expatriate spirit' (1944:2). It is fitting that 
Franklin should introduce Furphy in this way, for numerous letters 
to her by Furphy testify to his constant urging the vibrancy of the 
Australian experience. 
For this reason, it can be said that, besides challenging the 
dominant representation of the Australian type, Furphy opposed 'the 
centripetal movement towards the hub of Empire' which made 
'Australian writers yield to overseas predilections in choice of 
subject-matter and/ or in the interpretation of their own' (Franklin, 
1944:2). In his 1903 review, Furphy makes this quite clear when he 
stated that 
[t]he fictional literature of Australia -scanty at most, 
and uneven at best- has advanced by orderly gradation 
from Anglo-Australian, through Colonial, to National. 
The successional replacement of the immigrant, with 
his old-world ideals, by the impressionable 
representative of a new type has made such a 
transition inevitable. But the mass of our literature is 
British; and book-begotten sentiment dies hard, except 
amongst pioneers of opinion. Conventionality persists 
in viewing Australian characteristics and deviations as 
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more or less exotic; whilst to the fully-emancipated 
native-born, these stand as self-established units of 
comparison, as normal and legitimate phenomena 
(1969:128). 
Anglo-Australian "romance" recreates Australia in light of old 
world units of comparison, as well as British or European 
perceptions of normal and legitimate phenomena. A particularly good 
example of an Anglo-Australian concept and value, which perhaps 
forms the basis for many romance narratives, devaluing much of the 
Australian experience, is Major Mitchell's description of Victoria as 
'Australia Felix', for it sets Victoria at odds with 'the parched deserts 
of the interior countcy, where we had wandered so unprofitably, and 
so long' (in Poynter,1987:76. My italics). But, as Furphy points out, 
'tragedy, humour, pathos, [and] fancy, however indissolubly linked 
with human nature, must assume unhackneyed aspects in a 
continent which resembles Europe or North America only inasmuch 
as there is a river in both' (1969:128. My italics). In short, the 
Victorian landscape is not the sum total of legitimate phenomena in 
the Australian experience just because it resembles old-world social 
and economic values and can easily accommodate a British or 
European way of life. 
Armbruster (1991:30) and Henricksen (1985:18) each points 
out that the colonial romance follows a formula in which the hero, 
idealizing England and her values in Australia, generates a 
substantial fortune and, after having industriously reaped from the 
colonies what he could, returns to the comforts of "home". As Collins 
states, '[a] novelist is always able to bring forth out of his 
imagination the vecy thing required by the exigencies of his stocy -
just as he unmasks the villain at the critical moment, and, for the 
young hero's benefit, gently shifts the amiable old potterer to a better 
land in the vecy nick of time. Such is not life' (SiL, 269). In terms of 
narrative formulas, one is also reminded of a comment by Willoughby 
to Collins. Finding 'the colonies pretty rough', Willoughby states 
that '[e]ven in your cities I observe a feverish excitement, and a 
damnable race for what the Scriptures aptly call "filthy lucre'" (SiL, 
35). Indeed, Willoughby, championing Mitchell's "Australia Felix", 
states that '[i)n the near future, each of these shabby home-stations 
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will be replaced by a noble mansion, with its spacious park; and 
these bare plains will reward the toil of an industrious and contented 
tenantry' (SiL, 35). Willoughby's statement captures perfectly the 
flavour of Anglo-Australian rhetoric on British aristocracy. 
As Tiffin points out, 'Furphy's sense of Australian life is bound 
up in the detail of bush occupations so that he finds the vaguely 
conceived activity in the romance pattern ... not just irrelevant or silly 
but actively offensive' (1986:31). Furphy believed that, if this formula 
continued to dominate Australian artistic pursuits, allowing 
romance to recreate English ways of seeing and understanding, then 
Australia would never be understood on its own terms, nor for its 
own values in the world of knowledge. All values would thus be solely 
British or European and Australia's identity would be marked by an 
Empire of men whose plans for the colonies are industry and 
exploitation or exotic titillation. In short, any attempt to claim that 
a particular work of art illuminates a value of Australia for Australia, 
as well as contribu ttng to the sum of universal concerns and values, 
in whatever context, would be meaningless. In terms of offering a 
"truth embellished" narrative, Anglo-Australian depictions of the 
Australian experience misrepresent that experience or deny its value, 
its "normal and legitimate phenomena". Discussing the valuable 
horsemanship of 'Young Jack', a born and bred Australian at 
Runnymede station, Collins states that 
[y]our novelist, availing himself of his prerogative [to 
uplift and upbuild Australia], fancifully assigns this 
office [of great horsemanship] to the well-educated, 
well-nurtured, and, above all, colonial-experiencer, 
fresh from the English rectory. But I am a mere 
annalist, and a blunt, stolid, unimaginative one at 
that; therefore not entirely lost to all sense of the 
fitness of things (SiL, 278). 
One wonders if, to some extent, Furphy considered the Anglo-
Australian romance to be a catalyst in the perpetuation of ignorance, 
division and rivalry in Australia, as well as an over hasty attempt to 
redeem Australia from its penal origins by good citizenship and 'the 
crimson thread of kinship' (SiL, 5). I must agree with Henricksen's 
114. 
observation that 'Furphy's response to Anglo-Australian fiction was 
to treat their writing prtmarlly as a manifesto to be refuted, ignoring 
the exceptions and countering the generalities' (1985:29). Indeed, 
'Furphy was earnestly interested in the "naked truth", artistically 
reproduced. In colonial fiction, he did not find it' (Henricksen, 
1985:46). And, as Henricksen notes, 'Furphy's revolt against the 
school of Anglo-Australian writers derived from his interpretation of 
the social function of literature, as reforming rather than entertaining' 
(1985:55. My italics). According to Partington, '[e]ven before location 
and personae are made known, [Such is Life's] first paragraphs 
introduce the idea that fiction or romance and strict chronicle offer 
alternative and conflicting accounts of the suchness of things' 
( 1993:238). In short, Furphy's attack on Anglo-Australian narrative 
is an ethical one, for he appears to take to task any writer whose 
work could have disastrous consequences for the uplifting and 
upbuilding of Australia, or the values one can derive from art and 
understanding. 
But, as Barnes notes, '[t]he "realism" at which Furphy aimed 
was qualified and in part defined by the "romance" to which he 
opposed it' ( 1990:228. My italics). To some extent this is true, since 
readers often find Tom engaged in a perspective on "life" worthy of 
romantic pulp fiction, as is the case when Collins, having read 
Ouida, comes to Warrtgal Alfs assistance. But Collins states that 'I 
object to being regarded as a mere romancist, or even as a dead-head 
spectator, or dilettante reporter, of the drama of life' (RR, xvii). 
Collins declares that 'I am no romancist. I repudiate shifts, and 
stand or fall by the naked truth' (SiL, 113). One should not confuse 
"romance" and "romanticism" simply because they share the same 
adjective. I must disagree, therefore, with Knight's notion that 
'Collins rejects romanticism in general' (1969:243). When I speak of 
Collins' "romantic" orientations, I mean the kind which are 
thematically similar to Emerson's focus on nation-building, the 
creative power of art, the season in Nature and the new world 
experience as an environment of rights and self-reliance. Like 
Emerson, Furphy appears to believe rather strongly that '(e]ach age, 
it is found, must write its own books; or rather, each generation for 
the next succeeding. The books of an older period will not flt this' 
([ 1837] 1985:87-88). 
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In the introduction to 'Nature', Emerson addresses these basic 
principles of "man's" position in the new world vts-a-vts the old: 
Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the 
fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism. 
The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face 
to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we 
also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why 
should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight 
and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, 
and not the history of theirs? Em bosomed for a season 
in nature, whose floods of life stream around and 
through us, and invite us, by the powers they supply, 
to action proportioned to nature, why should we grope 
among the dry bones of the past, or put the living 
generation into masquerade out of its faded wardrobe? 
The sun shines to-day also. There is more wool and 
flax in the fields. There are new lands, new men, new 
though ts. Let us demand our own works and laws and 
worship ([ 1836] 1985:35). 
When this happens, according to Emerson, there is 'creative 
reading as well as creative writing' ([ 1837] 1985:90). In short, '[w]hen 
the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book 
we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is 
doubly significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the 
world' (Emerson, [ 1837] 1985:90). Romance, on the other hand, is 
parodied by Furphy and Collins to foreground not just the creative 
power of the narrative act, but to show how influentially misleading 
a narrative can be in terms of narrowly seeing and depicting the 
values of the new world. Perhaps romance does not have 'coincidence 
and cross purposes, sometimes too intricate' (Furphy, ( 1903] 
1969: 130). According to Lever, 'Furphy's objection that they [romance 
novels l create an alluring imaginary world apart from class struggle 
still has some force' (1996-97:154). Although Lever's observation is 
astute because of the preoccupation with rights and self-reliance, an 
absence of class struggle is not the only reason for Furphy's and 
Collins' objecting to the colonial romance. Collins' denial that he is 
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a romancer is based on the fundamental notion that the romancer, 
by the elaborate contrivances of plot, does not tell the tale of 
national life as it is and as it ought to be. 
Romance, like colonial art, merely perpetuates an old-world 
way of seeing. In opposition to this, one can argue that the 
Heidelberg way of seeing is a romanticist way of seeing, and this 
newness of the impressionist "vision splendid" is crucial to 
understanding Furphy's and Collins' narrative strategies. Collins' 
affectations for realism commit him to the responsibility of reporting 
on life in Riverina. But, as he says, one must not take him as a 
dead-head spectator or dilettante reporter. Why is this so? In my 
view, the answer lies in Furphy's remark about uplifting and 
upbuilding. Collins, turning his 'mind loose for a roll in the dust of 
Memory, and a cavort round the paddock of Imagination' (BBB, 
1948:3. My italics), elevates the realism of the narrative to the status 
of "vision splendid". In light of the ethics of uplifting and up building, 
Memory and Imagination can be seen as two necessary faculties in the 
creation of a "truth embellished" narrative. 
In this sense, I disagree with Barnes' notion that '[i]n his 
fiction, Furphy was not consciously innovative in relation to his 
contemporaries in England and America -and Australia, for that 
matter' (1990:228). Nor do I agree with Brady that 'Furphy is a man 
divided against himself, so inwardly unsure that he dare not take 
risks but must cling to what he knows' (1981:62). As Eagleson and 
Kramer note, 'Such is Life is a highly experimental novel for its period 
(1976:79). This is especially so with selfhood or subjectivity, nation 
and narration, and the recognition of the power of language in the 
construction of a reality. Like Whitman, to whom Collins refers in 
his narrative strategies, Furphy was first and foremost preoccupied 
with nation. When Furphy stated that his hero was involved in the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, one could say that this 
thematic involvement in uplifting and upbuilding was equally 
applicable to Furphy, as the letters to Miles Franklin testify. Thus, I 
find it rather strange that Barnes should state that Furphy 'was 
not ... responding to what was new in the fiction of the 1880s and 
1890s' (1990:228). 
Nor do I think that Barnes is justified in stating that '[t)he act 
of writing was itself a release, a fulfilment, and a vindication for a 
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lonely man aware that the world regarded him as a failure' 
(1990:228). Furphy did not play with language or narrative on the 
basis that he considered it personally cathartic. Nor do I think that 
the act of writing was solely related to Furphy's economic failures. 
Furphy, the currency lad, considered himself to be personally involved 
in the social and cultural aspect of history, as well as being involved 
in the history of ideas. In short, I think Furphy saw himself holding 
·an independent diploma as one of the architects of our Social 
System, with a commission to use my own judgment, and take my 
own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). Like Emerson, 
Furphy may have 'read with some joy ... the auspicious signs of the 
coming days, as they glimmer already through poetry and art, 
through philosophy and science, through church and state' ([ 1837) 
1985:101). 
In a comparative discussion of Such is Life and Don Quixote, 
Suarez-Lafuente states that '[b)oth texts record the inevitable 
breakage of a social construct and a given national type that had 
exhausted their historical possibilities' (1994:39). Indeed, 'Furphy 
and Cervantes take into consideration the possibilities of reality as it 
is perceived and the reaction of individual characters to the space 
they find themselves in; these individualities, Tom Collins and Don 
Quixote, effect a mapping of their world and link it to their own 
personal values and to a system of meaning that proves to be new 
because it is built upon new premises' (Suarez-Lafuente, 1994:39). 
However, I would like to modify this proposition slightly, for what the 
Australian experience shows is that new premises are more inclined 
to be re-evaluations rather than clean breaks from "old" premises 
about what reality "was", "is" and "will" or "should be". In short, the 
Australian experience diversifies our understanding that is derived 
from inductive knowledge2 • 
Furthermore, Suarez-Lafuente states that 
[s]tarting from the fact that the concept of reality is 
always elusive, that there is no such thing as a 
reality .. .it can be stated that reality in itself is 
construing insofar as its prescribed immutability 
changes with every wink of the eye. Understood 
2 I will have more to say about induction in the next chapter. 
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otherwise, reality becomes a false construct. Furphy 
undermines the notion of reality in the very choice of a 
name for his hero, Tom Collins {1994:41-42). 
Although I do not disagree with her notion that reality cannot 
be reduced to a singularly immutable concept, the problem with her 
concluding statement is that we are meant to see no difference 
between the Tom Collins of an oral folklore and the Tom Collins of 
the novel. This is a dangerous mistake, leading perhaps to a critical 
devaluation of Furphy's statement that Collins is concerned with the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia in a manner that is far from 
mere comedy. While it is true that the use of .. Tom Collins" allows us 
to understand reality as a plurality of meaning, it is not true that 
"Tom Collins" foregrounds a reality that changes with every wink of 
the eye. What the etymological implications of .. Tom Collins" make 
clear is the intricate game of narration and representation in the 
response to life and the search for meaning. That Furphy chose .. Tom 
Collins" as the vehicle for his ideas comes as no surprise in light of 
the novels' preoccupations with the power of art to generate and 
direct meaning and understanding. 
Indeed, it can be said that "Tom Collins", as both a novelistic 
persona and an expression of 1890s popular culture, has left a 
powerful impression on later generations. If we are asked to isolate a 
common element between the Tom Collins of oral folklore and the 
Tom Collins of the novel, then we could say that both personas tell 
their stories with a design in mind. However, this is where important 
differences come into play. As noted by Barnes {1990:21), Croft 
{1991:85), Franklin {1944:42) and Wilkes {1990:86), the Tom Collins 
of the oral tradition is seen to tell his stories or idle rumours for the 
sole but frivolous purpose of character assassination, giving the 
actual teller of the story a loophole from having to claim 
responsibility for the damaging content of the "yarn". But, a "Tom 
Collins" is only an idle rumour or tall story after the event. At the 
time of delivery, it is meant to function as truth and its purpose is to 
make one think about the content and truth of the message. 
The Tom Collins of the novel, on the other hand, assassinates 
some characters in a manner that can be seen as strategic rather 
than frivolous, for the message of his narrative is a call to uplift and 
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upbuild vis-a-vis tearing down and destroying that which is seen to be 
unsuitable, as is the case with the romance novelist. Readers should 
be aware, therefore, of the shift in meaning and purpose of "Tom 
Collins" when considering the etymology of the name. It pays to bear 
in mind that, in the novel, the meaning of Tom Collins is dependent 
on the meaning of "currency lad". And, as such, the linguistic game 
that Furphy plays with "Tom Collins" is a game based on the ethics 
of representation insofar as representation is intimately related to 
the communication of values and the promotion of understanding. 
Discussing Collins' "authorship" in the 1903 review, Furphy stated 
that '(t)here is interest, if not relevancy, in every sentence' 
(1969:129). Or, as Douglas notes, '(Collins] voices a response to life, 
based on serious assumptions, possessing serious implications, 
which must be taken into account in any interpretation of the book' 
(1978:24). 
In this sense, Suarez-Lafuente is correct to state that '[a)fter 
Don Quixote and Tom Collins have roamed La Mancha and the 
bush, ... both spaces will offer, if not a new "reality", at least a new 
image, new possibilities for the individual and for a different 
approach to a geography that has to be considered with a new 
outlook, as different as has to be a new attitude towards history' 
(1994:43-44). As Bernard O'Dowd's poem 'Australia' (in Cantrell, ed, 
1977:86) implies, there must be more to the future of Australia than 
just a perpetuation of Old World evils, for its manifest destiny cannot 
just be the dual status of antipodean prison and colonial settlement. 
And it must be capable of more than just copying or perpetuating old 
world ignorance and evils. Ideally speaking, it must have the same 
options and capabilities as 'America'. History in Furphy's novels not 
only involves the facts of a unique Australian experience, as 
demanded by the chronicle style, but also an evaluation of one's 
narrative strategies as found in the realm of fiction. 
We might say that, although Furphy considered nationalism or 
the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia to be "truth embellished", 
he was also aware that 'the distinction between the fact and fiction 
of nation cannot be made with such certainty' (Willis, 1993:14). 
Recalling Anderson's (1991 :6) notion that style is not concerned with 
the hard distinction between what is false and what is genuine in 
narratives about the nation, one should not approach Collins' 
120. 
narrative with the intent of trying to distinguish what is false about 
him and what is genuine. If one were to maintain such a distinction, 
foregoing the clue that Collins is concerned with the uplifting and 
upbuilding of Australia, then one risks misunderstanding the power 
and wealth of the nationalist spirit made flesh. This, in turn, will 
severely limit the reader's appreciation of Collins' creative response 
to the concept of nation, as well as limit the reader's understanding 
of the value of narratives to promote further the "truth embellished" 
nation. 
Furphy's point is this: the manner in which an author or artist 
represents a pre-national community in art will shape the manner in 
which the nation is understood, since art has the capacity to 
illuminate, either positively or negatively, a particular human 
condition or experience vts-a-vts universal concerns. Furphy's 
concerns are thematically similar to Plato's concept of censorship in 
Republic, for the latter states that 
our first business is to supervise the production of 
stories, and choose only those we think suitable, and 
reject the rest. We shall persuade mothers and nurses 
to tell our chosen stories to their children, and by 
means of them to mould their minds and characters 
which are more important than their bodies. The 
greater part of the stories current today we shall have 
to reject (bk.2.377b-e). 
At this stage of the discussion, it can be said that what I have 
investigated within the context of uplifting and upbuilding can be 
subsumed under a single concept, namely aesthetic well-being. This 
concept is a particularly good clarification of why uplifting and 
upbuilding occur and why this process is intimately related to art, 
making art a key object in the determination of value and 
understanding. It cannot be stressed too often that Furphy's designs 
for his novels cannot be valued merely within the context of "a good 
yarn", for that overestimates the pleasure and escapist quality one 
can get from the narratives. One of the most basic issues in Furphy's 
writing is a nationalist's concern for the well-being of a federated 
nation. In short, Furphy took to task the damaging aspect of 
121. 
ignorance, division and rivahy in the search for meaning and the 
response to Australian life. 
If we recall that the nation is both a community and a daily 
plebiscite, then we can easily see why Furphy considered it important 
to promote or create artistically those values which contribute to 
communal and individual well-being. This is, of course, a veiy 
complicated matter, and, it is for this reason that Furphy used .. Tom 
Collins" to exemplify the complex symbiosis between art and 
personal and national well-being. To recall Graham's notion that one 
'should think of artistic creations not as stereotypes but as 
archetypes' (1997: 128-129), it is more than likely that Furphy would 
have wanted his readers to observe and perhaps emulate Collins' 
most basic qualities and values. In this sense, I disagree with Croft's 
notion that 
Tom is an anti-hero. He expresses in himself, and in 
his role as narrator, those unresolved divisions which 
were deep within Joseph Furphy's personality. Unlike 
the hero of the epics -the nation builders, the 
saviours- Tom does not bring about unity or 
redemption; instead, he leaves us with paradoxes. 
Perhaps Furphy used him as a way of dealing with 
those aspects of Furphy's own character which he 
found ridiculous -his pedantic learning, his recidivistic 
conservatism, his love of abstract thought (1991:274). 
If we were to attribute some basic qualities and values to 
Collins' character, then, bearing in mind the recent discussion on 
the etymology of .. Tom Collins", as well as the consistent focus on 
ignorance-shifting, I consider the following three to be most 
important. First and foremost, readers should see .. Tom Collins" as 
being expressive of the creative possibilities of language towards the 
formulation of an identity between .. self' and .. other", especially 
within the context of the personal and the national. This is what 
Furphy meant when he stressed that '[a]ll creative Art -as 
distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession. Man, in 
this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own 
image' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 137). Secondly, readers 
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should see Collins as a strategic agency in the determination of 
semantic value in accordance with the arbitracy nature of signs, the 
conventions of a sign-system, and the demands of a particular 
context. This is what I mean when I use the term "articulation". 
Finally, readers should see Collins as a speaker not just within an 
established system of signs, but also as a speaker who can contend a 
sign's meaning in light of its emotional and intellectual value, 
especially with the handing down of signs from an old world context 
to a new world experience. This is what I mean when I use the term 
"orientation". 
The purpose of outlining these three values now is to frame the 
direction of the next section. Having discussed why Collins is 
concerned with uplifting and upbuilding, I will now focus on how 
Collins can uplift and upbuild. Again, I do not wish to conclude that 
"Furphy's text is simply a text about nationalism", for such a 
conclusion does little justice to the rich complexity of Furphy's art. 
Readers should not over-emphasize the nationalist dimension of the 
novels in the sense that Furphy is drawn as a radical nationalist or 
an advocate of 'aggressive Australianism' (Green, 1961:633). Nor 
should readers underestimate the nationalist dimension. Furphy is 
radical, but his radicalism ethically concerns itself more with the art 
of nation than an ideologically exclusive blind faith or a microcosmic 
depiction of all things Australian. One should see the nationalist 
aspect of the novels, or the notion that Collins is concerned with the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, as a key which can facilitate 
one's understanding of how and why one artistically uplifts and 
upbuilds something. As Dewey points out, 
[art] is proof that man uses the materials and energies 
of nature with intent to expand his own life, and that 
he does so in accord with the structure of his 
organism -brain, sense-organs, and muscular system. 
Art is the living and concrete proof that man is 
capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the 
plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse 
and action characteristic of the live creature. The 
intervention of consciousness adds regulation, power 
of selection, and redisposition. Thus it varies the arts 
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in ways without end. But its intervention also leads to 
the idea of art as a conscious idea -the greatest 
intellectual achievement in the history of humanity 
([1934) 1958:25). 
2.2. Social Architecture and the Theory of the Controlling 
Alternatives. 
At the close of Such ts Life, Collins gives the following warning 
to his readers; 
Now I had to enact the Cynic philosopher to Moriarty 
and Butler, and the aristocratic man with a 'past' to 
Mrs. Beaudesart; with the satisfaction of knowing that 
each of these was acting a part to me. Such is life, my 
fellow-mummers -just like a poor player, that bluffs 
and feints his hour upon the stage, and then cheapens 
down to mere nonentity. But let me not hear any small 
witticism to the further effect that its story ts a tale told 
by a vulgarian, full of slang and blanky, signifying -
nothing (StL, 297. My italics). 
As Macbeth declares, one's life, or one's identity is 'but a 
walking shadow, a poor player/ That struts and frets his hour upon 
the stage,/ And then is heard no more' (Macbeth, V. 5. 23-25). 
However, unlike Macbeth's declaration, one's life is not 'a tale/ Told 
by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing' (Macbeth, V. 
5. 25-27). This warning from Collins stands rather opposed to the 
general critical consensus on the preoccupation with role-playing in 
the novels. I disagree with Barnes' notion that '[t)he tone of this 
[paragraph) leaves one uncertain what weight it is meant to have' 
(1981 :xxii). Yet Barnes is correct in observing that the novel's final 
paragraph ·carries some disturbing implications about life and its 
possibilities' (1981 :xxii). Although Croft rightly notes the 'very 
Shakespearean end to the book' (1991:215), I do not agree with his 
final assertion. According to Croft, the novel's ending is '[o)ne in 
which the fool addresses the audience and asks them to dismiss the 
shades (the actors) and return to their own lives. Lives which are 
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stories too, and some of them like his [Collins'] vulgarian's tale "full 
of slang and blanky, stgnlfylng-nothing"' (1991:215). 
And yet Croft states that '[b]efore Tom disappears, however, he 
will not let us make this conclusion, believe it though we may. This ls 
a diary. It ls life. It ls truth, and it ls not told by a vulgarian' 
(1991:215. My italics). This ls despite Collins' clear warning to his 
audience that his tale does not signify nothing. On the whole, I find 
the critical responses to the novel's final paragraph, even though 
they express very salient views about role playing, unnecessarily 
confusing. Let us consider a sample. Henricksen argues that 
'Furphy's fiction bristles with references to the stage, primarily to put 
reality in doubt, and secondarily to make the reader aware that the 
actors in Such is Life are just that, each playing a wide variety of 
roles' (1985: 167). While I share Henrlcksen's view that the strong 
focus on role-playing suggests that each character plays, or acts, a 
role, I disagree with his notion that the focus on role-playing puts 
reality in doubt. I am more inclined to think that role-playing reifles 
a version of reality, and that certain roles chosen by particular 
individuals promote certain ways of seeing and responding to life. 
As Barnes notes, '[t]hroughout the novel Collins takes on 
different roles, and acting becomes a metaphor for life as Collins 
(and Furphy) conceives of it' (1981:xxt). Indeed, '[t]he role a man 
plays ls how he chooses to let himself be seen by his fellows' (Barnes, 
1981 :xxt-xxtl). But, though 'Collins ls something of a chameleon, 
taking on the appropriate colour according to occasion', Barnes 
claims that Collins ls 'always under the illusion that he ls in 
command of the circumstances' (1981:xxt-xxil). In Partlngton's view, 
'[e]nough of Collins' moral shortcomings have been detailed already 
to establish that, far from his being a reliable figure, he ls at best an 
lncorrtglble, although not consummately successful, role player, 
protean, or chameleon-like in his attempted transformations' 
(1993: 122). And, according to Hartley, Collins plays 'a long sequence 
of roles' in which he 'symbolically borrows, steals, loses, finds and 
swaps an assortment of clothes, pipes, horses, saddles' ( 1986: 167). 
Indeed, 
as narrator, [Collins] establishes himself as a mimic, 
who, with minor comic distortions, acts out in turn 
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the prose strategies of the lawyer, the offended 
socialist, the Aussie chronicler, the scientist, the 
fumbling country journalist, the philosopher, together 
with the romance and detective novelists and 
innumerable other literary styles, playing off the one 
against the other, and refusing, finally, to be identified 
with any of them (Hartley, 1986:167). 
To a certain extent, the preceding critical views have some 
validity, for Collins does state that '[i)n occupation, I change 
involuntarily, like the chameleon, according to my surroundings' (RR, 
15). But one should also remember that Collins' roles or identities 
are culturally created responses to life, in which he voluntartly plays 
off styles and images against each other in order to roll with the 
punches. Again, the plurality of roles played by Collins does not put 
reality in doubt; nor does it point to Collins' moral shortcomings and 
unreliability. Collins is not, as Brady argues, 'a parodic version of all 
of us who worship illusion' (1981:57). In light of the "truth 
embellished" narrative, illusion may play a central role in the 
response to life and the search for meaning, but it does not follow 
that a degree of illusion means one worships illusion in toto. As 
Collins states, '[a] lifelong education, directing the inherent loyalty 
of human nature, invests anything in the shape of national or 
associational bunting with a sacredness difficult to express in words' 
(SiL, 11 7). Indeed, 
[l)oyalty to something is an ingredient in our moral 
constitution; and the more vague the object, the more 
rabid will be our devotion to the symbol. Any badge is 
good enough to adore, provided the worshipper has in 
some way identified the fetish with himself -anything 
from the standard of St. George to the "forky pennon" 
of Lord Marmion; from the Star-spangled Banner to 
the Three Legs of the Isle of Man. 
Now, with insignia, as with everything else, it is 
deprivation only that gives a true sense of value ( SiL, 
117). 
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As Kiernan states, '[t]hrough Tom Collins we are presented 
with an image of the way in which a society "works", the network of 
relationships that exist within it, and the way these appear to an 
individual within the net' (197lb:145). Or, as Wilkes explains, '[i]t 
will be characteristic of Such ts Llf e as a whole to ponder the causes 
of things, to seek to fix responsibility, and to contemplate the 
administration of human affairs' ( 1985:3). In his biography of 
Furphy, Barnes notes that '[t]he "crawling Conservative" of the 
selection days had had plenty of time in the Riverina to think about 
the social system and how it operated' (1990:145). In a letter to A.G. 
Stephens, Furphy writes, '[f)or one thing, I was widely known as a 
crawling Conservative, till I met the Lord in the way to Damascus, 
and the usages of Riverina rasped the scales from my eyes' (Barnes 
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84-85). But Such ts Life also presents 
readers with an image of how the individual makes him or herself 
meaningful. More to the point, it is my contention that Furphy 
thought about the creative operation of identity and its orientations 
from the personal to the social and the national. 
In terms of a national image and nineteenth-century 
Australianism, deprivation of a type gives the community a true 
sense of the value of a type, and its absence makes the members of a 
community work towards its presence. MacKenzie's notion that 
Collins is 'a phantom identity' and 'a trickster' (1993:540) seems to 
me to be unsound. Nor do I agree with his main premise that Furphy 
is simply concerned 'with imposture' (MacKenzie, 1993:535). 
According to Kiernan, '[i)n judging Tom we become aware of the 
nature of interpersonal relationships: the way we react to others, 
how much we realize about them and the web of life in which we are 
enmeshed at any one time' (197lb:145). In light of my previous 
discussion on art and value, as well as chapter one's discussion of 
the Riverina in 1880s, we can see why Furphy depicted the Riverina 
as a geography of players. And, in the sense that 'identity in 
Australia is fundamentally controversial as a result of an old/ new 
double bind' (MacKenzie, 1993:534), the first of Collins' "roles" to 
which readers are introduced in this geography of players is the role 
of the social architect. 
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Unemployed at last! 
Scientifically, such a contingency can never have 
befallen of itself. According to one theory of the 
Universe, the momentum of Original Impress has been 
tending toward this far-off, divine event ever since a 
scrap of fire-mist flew from the solar centre to form 
our planet. Not this event alone, of course; but every 
occurrence, past and present, from the fall of captured 
Troy to the fall of a captured insect. According to 
another theory, I hold an independent diploma as one of 
the architects of our Social System, with a commission 
to use my own judgment, and take my own risks, like 
any other unit of humanity. This theory, unlike thejlrst, 
entails frequent hitches and cross-purposes; and to 
some malign operation of these I should owe my 
present holiday (StL, 1. My italics). 
In the postscript of a letter to A.G. Stephens, Furphy states 
that '[i]f the first 3 pars. of S. is L. compel the reader to think, their 
purpose is duly served' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). 
While I will discuss the important distinction between free will and 
determinism in a moment, I would like to consider now the relevancy 
of this opening paragraph to role playing, for the close of Such is Life 
asks readers to reconsider philosophically not just what they have 
read, but also to reconsider the themes and philosophical tone of the 
novel's opening paragraph. In a rather obtuse manner, Furphy wants 
his readers to synthesize the novel's opening emphasis on fact with 
the novel's closing comments on fiction, since both the beginning 
and the end of Such is Life rightly foreground that identity has facts 
and fictions. In other words, identity is "truth embellished". In this 
sense, readers should see that within the "truth embellished" 
narratives of identity, there is a core role in the variety of roles. 
Collins is not, as Croft argues, 'a man with no centre of identity' 
( 1996:218). 
For Collins, this core role is the role of the social architect, 
allowing him to orient and articulate his responses to the drama of 
the Rivertna just as an actor orients and articulates his or her role 
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to respond to the specifics of a drama. And, in order to comprehend 
further the centrality of the social architect's "role", it ts important 
to understand that Collins, a 'native' Australian born in 1849 (in 
Croft, 1991:86, 306), ls one of the new "Currency lads". As Hughes 
(1987:354-355) and Ramson (1993:171) point out, Currency was a 
popular emanctplst term used to describe the native born children, 
including those of convict parents, in whom the future of the 
Australian nation rested. One could say that the word and concept of 
"currency", as a sign handed down from one generation to the next, 
socially determines "the generational renewal", as White (1981: 77, 
87) suggested, whereby the 1880s and 1890s radical nationalists 
sought to define an Australian culture. 
But one should not underestimate the fact that each radical 
nationalist saw him or herself as holding 'an independent diploma', 
commissioned 'to use [their] own Judgment, and take [their] own 
risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). In this sense, the 
"truth embellished" narratives of identity, orchestrating numerous 
facts and fictions Within an identity, foreground the freedom of 
individual Will and creativity in the drama of cultural definition or 
redefinition. As Croft observes, 'unemployment in those famous 
opening paragraphs of the novel ls treated not as a personal or social 
disaster, but as a creative opportunity' (1996:214). But I do not agree 
with Croft's strange conclusion that '[f]or Tom Collins to be 
"unemployed at last" is to be away from a treadmill of lies and 
duplicities, to be free from responsibility, and to have enough time to 
write up the truth about work: that work has little to do with 
success, and has no bearing on our mana or our destiny' (1996:227). 
Nor do I agree With a similar view held by Barnes, who argues 
that 
[u]nlike Furphy, Collins has no family responsibilities 
and has no awareness of having made an irrevocable 
choice as far as his own life and happiness are 
concerned. He ts not seen in the roles of son (except 
for a minor reminiscence), husband or father. Hts Job 
ls so minimal in its demands as to hardly impinge 
upon his consciousness. He ts a free spirit as far as 
social and emotional ties are concerned, and despite 
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the strength of his religious and political convictions, 
he is not a participant in the conflicts that are 
portrayed in the novel (though his sympathies are with 
the bullockies) (1990:222). 
Collins may not have family responsibilities, but he is not a 
flippant character. Although Collins may not get directly involved in 
the minor conflicts portrayed in the novel, he is involved in the much 
greater conflict concerning the ethics of artistic representation and 
misrepresentation of an Australian experience and value. Through 
Tom Collins, Furphy appears to lay great stress not only on the work 
involved in uplifting and upbuilding, but also on the intimate 
relations between the images of identity, or the roles played, and an 
individual's creative choices and consequences in the historical order 
of things, hence the theory of the con trolling alternatives stressing 
informed choice vts-a-vts ignorant rivalry and division. I think this is 
important, for the original typescript of the novel began much 
differently. Gilding (1971:viii, 1967:96) states that the opening 
paragraphs to the typescript of Such ts Life contained no mention of a 
man's holding an independent diploma, nor did it refer to social 
architecture. Furthermore, Gilding (1967:95-96) points out that the 
theory of the controlling alternatives is not present in the surviving 
pages of the typescript. Indeed, the original opening paragraph reads 
as follows: 
Unemployed at last. 
Either the tendency of events during the last few 
days, weeks, months, years, centuries, (for we can't 
mark an arbitrary point on the line anywhere,) has 
been working toward this end, or my indomitable old 
Adversary has suddenly called to mind Dr.Watt's 
friendly hint respecting the easy enlistment of idle 
hands (in Barnes, 1990:400; in Gilding, 1971:viii, 
1967:96). 
In this earlier version of the opening paragraph, there is less 
emphasis on human agency and a greater appeal to chance. Barnes 
suggests that during his rewrite of the typescript, Furphy 'reflected 
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upon and drew out of the narrative the philosophical implications' 
(1990:243). According to Gilding, '[i]n the published version the 
possible categories in which one may think about life have been 
extended to include the possibility of independent choice and action' 
(1967:106). Croft may argue that the typescript 'was far more 
concerned with the notions of art, artifice, realism, and romance' 
(1991:61), but it can be said that the published version treats these 
same themes with more maturity, sophistication and purpose. In a 
letter to A.G. Stephens, Furphy wrote, '[a]s we agreed, contraction 
proper is impossible; the operation must be performed as if you 
would cut an ocean liner in two, then take a portion out of the 
centre, and deftly stick the ends together, making a tight, seaworthy 
brig' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:62). 
Without concerning ourselves too much with the exact nature 
of the changes that Furphy made to his seaworthy brig, it is clear 
that Such is Life became a much more complicated but focused 
narrative philosophically. Along with the initial emphasis on art and 
life, Furphy introduced the theory of the controlling alternatives and 
the issue of social architecture, or uplifting and upbuilding. Perhaps 
the most lucid example of this in light of role play and the currency 
status, thereby emphasizing the powerful nature of the "truth 
embellished" identity, is the following excerpt: 
I thereupon resolved myself into a committee of 
inquiry, and, applying the analytical system 
befitting these introspective investigations, 
discovered, in the first place, furtively underlying 
my philosophy, a latent ambition to be regarded as 
a final authority on things in general. Hitherto, 
this aspiration had fallen short, partly owing to 
the clinging sediment of my congenital ignorance, 
but more especially because I lacked, and knew I 
lacked, what is known as a 'presence'. Now, 
however, the high, drab belltopper and long alpaca 
coat, happily seconded by large, round glasses and 
a vast and scholarly pipe, seemed to get over the 
latter and greater difflculty .... There was something 
in presenting an academic-cum-capitalistic 
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appearance even to the sordid sheep ... and to the 
frivolous galahs .... But outside all possible 
research or divination lay the occult reason why 
my bosom's lord sat so lightly on his throne (SiL, 
278. My italics). 
In light of the prevailing ignorance, rivalry and division within 
the novel's many episodes, it is rather interesting that, towards the 
close of Such is Life, Collins presents an articulated identity to his 
readers that embodies many of his hitherto argued values. Indeed, I 
think it is important to note that this passage is the first of its kind 
in the novel where Collins willingly gives a physical description of 
himself to his readers. Prior to his stressing the need for a 
"presence", Collins had mainly shared with his readers a volley of 
knowledge, allowing readers to construct creatively a physical 
identity to match the intellectual identity to which they had been 
exposed. One could say that, while Collins' roleplaying had 
previously been open-ended, suiting many an occasion in terms of 
resourcefulness, it now manifests a much more stable image. Rather 
than being out of character, readers can see the artistic spirit of 
Collins made flesh, and can see the orientation and articulation, the 
content of an identity taking on form. And so far as Furphy's 
authorial designs are concerned, the values of his hero, which I 
discussed towards the close of the last section, are rendered visible, 
qualifying the power of the image-maker in social architecture. 
Although humorous, the main reason for Collins' description 
of himself in the above manner is to reify the qualities of authority. 
As Jack the Shellback states, '[y]ou'll do a bit o' killin' at the station, 
in that rig-out' (SiL, 272). Upon approaching Runnymede station, 
Collins' appearance has the desired effect. Jack Frost, or Young Jack, 
the station's chief horse breaker, proclaims his surprise: 'Well, I be 
dash! Didn't know you from a crow! Reckoned some member o' 
Parliament, or bishop, or somebody, had bin swappin' horses with 
you. You are comin' out!' (SiL, 282). Likewise, Toby, the station's 
rouse about, is equally surprised: 'Gosh, I didn't know you till I seen 
you side-on, when you was shuttin' the Red Gate .... l thought you 
was comin' to buy the station' (SiL, 283). And Moriarty, the station's 
storekeeper, 'respectfully rose to his feet': 'Well, I'll be dashed!. .. You 
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are coming out in blossom. Now you only want the upper half of your 
head shaved, and you could start a Loan and Discount bank, with a 
capital of half a million' (SiL, 284). 
Within the context of etymology, Barnes states that '[s]ocially 
[the] Tom Collins [of folklore] represented the lowest level' 
(1990:201). Indeed, the Collins of the novel is also from 'the Lower 
Orders' (SiL, 34). But, as I have already argued, one ought not to 
confuse the two. The Tom Collins of the novel moves progressively 
upward, and his value, with regard to uplifting and upbuilding, 
becomes increasingly more apparent as his role-playing takes on 
physically identifiable proportions. I would agree with Croft's notion 
that readers ought to see 'Tom Collins as a gentleman' (1991:88), but 
not in the aristocratic sense of landed gentry or social status. I think 
Collins is a gentleman in the modem sense of the word, namely a 
compliment that one is decent, honourable or kind. This is firmly in 
keeping with Collins' references to social architecture, uplifting and 
upbuilding, ignorance-shifting and reason, the controlling 
alternatives and his role as 'a Government official of the ninth class' 
(SiL, 4) or a public servant. If one recalls Collins' self-professed 
'academic-cum-capitalistic appearance' (SiL, 278), then it is possible 
to suggest that Collins' final and most appropriate image in the 
novel is in the mould of an Emersonian "American Scholar": 
resourceful, creative, native born, self-reliant, an authority on the 
new world experience and scholarly. 
Henricksen may point out that 'Furphy's recurrent motif is 
'that man himself is never an integrated whole, that he is a different 
person to every other that he meets' (1985:166-167). But I think this 
is a hasty mistake, for a man could not play different roles to every 
other that he meets if he did not have a sense of his own role playing 
capacity within an integrated, though "truth embellished", whole. In 
this sense, I disagree with Hartley's notion that 'Tom's own refusal to 
adopt a definitive narratological voice can thus be seen not as an 
abuse but a renunciation of authorial privilege or author-ity' 
(1986: 168). While 'the name "Tom Collins" marks the place of what is 
indeed an absence', I do not think Hartley is justified in claiming 
that it is 'an absence which refuses to endorse or prescribe in 
advance a hierarchy of interpretative or moral response' (1986:169). 
Collins does not redistribute 'the hermeneutic power of attorney 
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amongst his readership' (Hartley, 1986: 169) to such a degree that it 
compromises his own capacity for authority in the image-making 
process. 
Any theoretical approach toward the concept of absence in the 
novels must consider the concept as ethically meaning a lack of 
community and unity of purpose in the daily plebiscite of 
individuals, images and image-making vis-a-vis nation and 
federation. Readers should not evaluate the novels ahistorically. I 
think Collins, as well as Furphy, appeal somewhat to Emerson's 
notion that people must self-reliantly 'affront and reprimand the 
smooth mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times, and hurl 
in the face of custom and trade and office, the fact which is the 
upshot of all history, that there is a great responsible Thinker and 
Actor working wherever a man works; that a true man belongs to no 
other time or place, but is the centre of things· ([1841] 1985:185). As 
Emerson states, '[e]very true man is a cause, a country, and an 
age .... Let a man then know his worth, and keep things under his feet' 
([1841] 1985:185-186). One could say that Collins' drive towards 
authority in role-playing and image-making is a self-reliant 
determination to counteract the tremendous 'leakage of Energy in 
this world of ours' (RR, 49). 
I think Emerson's concept of self-reliance sums up Furphy's 
emphasis on the ethical need for role-playing and social architecture 
rather nicely, for he states that 
[i]f any man consider the present aspects of what is 
called by distinction society, he will see the need of 
these ethics. The sinew and heart of man seem to be 
drawn out, and we are become timorous, desponding 
whimperers. We are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune, 
afraid of death, and afraid of each other. Our age 
yields no great and perfect persons. We want men and 
women who shall renovate life and our social state, 
but we see that most natures are insolvent, cannot 
satisfy their own wants, have an ambition out of all 
proportion to their practical force and do lean and beg 
day and night continually. Our housekeeping is 
mendicant, our arts, our occupations, our marriages, 
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our religion we have not chosen, but society has 
chosen for us. We are parlor soldiers. We shun the 
rugged battle of fate, where strength is born ([ 1841] 
1985:194). 
This leads us to clarify what Furphy had in mind within the 
context of ethics. Although it is true that '[m]an's relationships. to 
the universe and his fellow men are the real concern of Such is Life' 
should we agree with Kiernan that 'the novel offers us Tom Collins' 
comic response to life rather than Furphy's "philosophy'"? 
(197lb:147-148). More to the point, do Furphy's novels expose the 
reader to a specific guide for ethical action and, if so, what is it? 
Furthermore, does the ethical dimension in Furphy's novels enhance 
the interpretation of the novels, supplying a key to unlocking the 
complexities of their meaning and so enriching our understanding 
and appreciation of their thematic treatment of "life"? In his view 
that art can enrich human understanding, the philosopher Gordon 
Graham states that 
[t]hough there are evident differences between art on 
the one hand and science or history on the other, the 
former, no less than the latter, can be seen to 
contribute significantly to human understanding. In 
appreciating how it does this, it is essential to see 
that works of art do not expound theories or consist 
in summaries of facts. They take the form of 
imaginative creations which can be brought to 
everyday experience as a way of ordering and 
illuminating it (1997:62). 
While I do not disagree with Graham's view for a vast majority 
of art, it is rather interesting to note that, as well as being 
imaginative creations, Furphy's novels are one of the few exceptions 
where art does consist in a summary of facts and the expounding of 
a theory. I have in mind, of course, the theory of the controlling 
alternatives (SiL, 68-71). The theory has been problematic to 
criticism on Furphy for a variety of reasons, with the most notable 
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problem being the credulity of its exponent, Tom Collins3 • Indeed, 
G .A. Wilkes thinks that the theory of the controlling alternatives 'is 
clearly another of the theories in the mind of Collins that ridicules 
itself as the action unfolds' (1969:41). And yet, in a much earlier 
essay, Wilkes rightly points out that 'Such is Life is memorable' 
because it is 'an exploration of the abiding problems of destiny and 
free will, moral responsibility, and the operation of chance in the 
universal scheme -problems which have engaged writers ... of all 
periods, and which are still in no imminent danger of solution' 
(1962:39). 
According to Osland, 'Tom's theory of the controlling 
alternatives is less a solution ... to the enigma of life than a 
demonstration of man's desire that there should be a solution -that 
life should be governed by laws, that man's actions should have some 
shape. that his suffering should be to some purpose' ( 1985:240). 
While it is not untrue that the theory may demonstrate man's desire 
for purpose within the context of human suffering, as many theories 
are apt to do, it seems strange to suggest that the theory ls less a 
solution to the enigma of life. I think it is important to distinguish 
between the meaning of "life" within the contexts of both nature and 
society. Even if the natural processes of life were enigmatic or if life 
was just simply chaotic, it does not follow that the social "life" of 
human actions does not have shape nor demonstrate some capacity 
for purpose. The theory of the controlling alternatives has little to do 
with "life" in the natural order of things. It is not a scientific theory 
of natural laws or a metaphysical attempt to solve the enigma of life. 
Nor is it one of Collins' intellectual whims. Instead, the theory 
should be properly seen as providing an ethical solution to the 
mismatched actions of human affairs within the human order of 
things, namely society or community. 
Influenced by the pipe, 'an ally of established efficiency in 
ethical emergencies' (SIL, 85), Collins had stated that 'there is 
nothing Utopian ... in the sunshiny Sermon on the Mount', for '(i]t is 
no fanciful conception of an intangible order of things, but a 
practical, workable code of daily life ... delivered ... by One who knew 
exactly the potentialities and aspirations of man' (SIL, 89). Collins 
3 The issue of Collins' status as unreliable narrator will be discussed at greater length in the next 
section. 
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indicates that the uplifting and upbuilding of an individual and his 
or her natural rights is equally and automatically an uplifting and 
upbuilding of civil rights, as suggested by the Sermon. Although 
there is a divine note to Collins' conclusion because he refers to the 
"One", I think it is much better, ethically speaking, to take Collins' 
message wholly within the context of utilitarianism, for 'no better 
name has been found (for this "One"] than the Will of God' (SIL, 90). 
As Collins states, '(c]ollective humanity holds the key to that 
Kingdom of God on earth, which clear-stghted prophets of all ages 
have pictured in colours that never fade' (SIL, 95. My italics). 
For this reason, '(t]he kingdom of God is within us; our all-
embracing duty is to give it form and effect, a local habitation and a 
name' (SIL, 95. My italics). In this sense, '(e]ach undertaking, great or 
small, of our lives has one con trolling alternative, and no more' ( SIL, 
68). and '(e]ach alternative brings into immediate play a fl.ash of 
Free-will, pure and simple, which instantly gives place -as far as that 
particular section of life is concerned- to the dominion of what we 
call Destiny' (SIL, 69. My italics). Again, '(w]hether there's a Divinity 
that afterwards shapes them, is a question each inquirer may decide 
for himself (SIL, 70. My italics). But, as Collins warns, 'if we decline a 
brotherhood of mutual blessing and honour, we alternatively accept 
one of mutual injury and ignominy' (SIL, 95). 
Collins' warning is clearly a warning that emphasizes the 
importance of choice and consequences, hence the validity of the 
theory of the con trolling alternatives as an ethic of utility to each 
undertaking in life, both in the personal sense and the communal 
sense of rights. It is in this way that readers ought to take the 
meaning of Collins' claim that '(a) Divine Idea points the way, clearly 
apparent to any vision not warped by interest or prejudice, nor 
darkened by ignorance; but the work is man's alone, and its period 
rests with man' (SIL, 95. My italics). As Collins states, '(i]nstead of 
remaining a self-sufficient lord of creation, whose house is thatched 
when his hat is on, you have become one of a Committee of ways and 
means -a committee of two, with power to add to your number' (SIL, 
71 ). Furphy seems to suggest that a community with a balanced view 
of common and individual purpose is the surest way of nullifying 
'history' as 'a mere record of blundering option, followed by iron 
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servitude to the irremediable suffering thereby entailed' (SiL, 71)4. 
In this sense, I find Brady's comments contradictory, for she 
argues that 'Tom's convoluted meditations on the question of 
predestination leave us with a sense of determinism tempered only by 
a vague hope that decent people making sensible choices can make 
some changes' (1981:51-52). While I do not disagree with this, Brady 
concludes with the notion that, '[d]espite the optimistic words he 
allows Tom about the future of Australia, Furphy offers no way to 
that future' (1981:61). It appears that any theory or scrap of 
knowledge articulated by Collins is unreliable because Collins is 
taken to be unreliable, even if it does offer promise for the future. 
When this is the case, Furphy's views are left to dangle precariously 
in an intellectual limbo simply because of the supposed unreliability 
of a hero and his theories. Perhaps much of Brady's misreadings of 
Furphy occur because she stresses the divinity of an ethic, 
ideologically clashing with Furphy's stress on the need for utility, 
hence her conclusion that 'Such is Life represents the failure of the 
secular Gospel' (1981:67). 
This leads us to consider another prominent interpretation of 
the controlling alternatives. Croft states that 'the theory of the 
controlling alternatives is ... the main [insight] we have into Tom's 
belief system' (1996:223). But, unlike Brady, Croft also states that 
the theory is part of Furphy's belief system, for 'Furphy could not 
break from the deterministic model of man and nature ... of European 
thought at the time' (1989:13). However, Croft's explanation of the 
theory as a gateway to Collins' and Furphy's belief systems is not the 
problem, whereas his view on determinism is. According to Croft, 
'Tom attempts to define by literary allusion ... ,parable, and allegory 
his notion that there is a teleological imperative, a determinism or 
destiny, within which are made the aggregate of human choices' 
(1996:223). Indeed, in his major study on Furphy, Croft's (1991) 
views on the theory and its determinist emphasis underpins his views 
in his last essay on Furphy's novels. 
4 Despite Furphy's utilitarian focus on ethics, it is interesting to note the Kantian flavour of this 
quotation and of Furphy's ethical view generally. Like Kant, Furphy appears to stress that one ought 
not to treat human beings as a means to one's own ends, but to treat human beings as ends in a 
system of ends. Perhaps Furphy's "Kantian" ethic was his chosen response to the flippant status quo 
of the federation debate. As Collins states, '[m]en thinking and acting in mass, do not...follow the 
line of least resistance' (SiL, 71). It seems that the line of least resistance was, for Furphy, a 
common-sense approach to unity or the unification of the colonies. 
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Likewise, Hartley states that 'in the confrontation between 
chance and design, design emerges as a clear winner' (1986: 156). 
Hartley does concede that the novel allows for 'a small air-pocket of 
free-will', but this free-will should be seen as 'a departure, or 
freedom, from the appearance of autonomy' because free-will calls 
'into question [the] decentralization of voice' ( 1986: 168). Again, 
Hartley reads Furphy post-structurally, claiming that hero and text 
generate 'an absence which refuses to endorse or prescribe in advance 
a hierarchy of interpretative or moral response' (1986:169). I do not 
think that this kind of reading is at all justified in light of the 
preceding discussion. Furthermore, neither Hartley nor Croft takes 
note of the stress on free will, or choice, in the first premise of the 
theory of the controlling alternatives: '[e]ach undertaking, great or 
small, of our lives has one controlling alternative, and no more' ( SiL, 
69. My italics). One cannot undertake something unless one is able 
to exercise one's will or choice. 
Although Collins employs the analogy of the locomotive, which 
suggests that he is from the determinist school of thought, readers 
ought to see the analogy as an equally steady treatment of free-will 
or choice. According to Collins, '[t]he misty expanse of Futurity is 
radiated with divergent lines of rigid steel; and along one of these 
lines, with diminishing carbon and sighing exhaust, you travel at 
schedule speed' (SiL, 70). And, '[a]t each junction, you switch left or 
right, and you go still, up or down the way of your own choosing. But 
there is no stopping or turning back ... except by voluntary 
catastrophe' (SiL, 70). Again, '[a]nother junction flashes into sight, 
and again your choice is made; negligently enough, perhaps, but still 
with a view to what you consider the greatest good, present or 
prospective' (SiL, 70). In an excellent discussion of nineteenth-
century realism and the determinist case, Larkin ( 1977: 1 76) 
discusses the trolley-bus school of thought and their stressing the 
mean between determinism and free-will through the analogy of the 
trolley-bus: a vehicle which not only depended on its environment 
but also had considerable room for movement. Although Furphy does 
not use the trolley-bus, he nevertheless emphasizes the same 
principle of moderation by showing that the rigidity of life's "tracks" 
is tempered by the "junctions" of choice. 
Douglas observes that '(t]he two poles of Collins' vision of life 
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are a sense of the arbitrariness of destiny and a compulsive desire to 
find in the workings of fate a retributive pattern' (1964:80). But I 
think the theory shows Furphy emphasizing not the desire to find a 
retributive pattern in the workings of fate or destiny. On the 
contrary, I think the theory emphasizes the desire to find a 
retributive pattern in the workings of choice by stressing the 
existence of consequences, for a consideration of the consequences of 
one's choice is equally a consideration of that which determines 
one's choice. In short, exercising one's choice is essentially a process 
of selection, which I will discuss later when I address the concept of 
authorship and creativity in Furphy's novels. For now, it can be said 
that being able to foresee the consequences of a bad choice is 
evidence of one's 'flash of Free-will' (SiL, 69), since one could then 
freely exercise one's will to avoid those consequences, or 'what we 
call Destiny' ( SiL, 69) by making another choice, and so opting for 
another set of consequences. As Partington notes, 'it proves possible 
to change track, although not to undo all the consequences of earlier 
wrong choices' (1993:97). 
In this sense, the importance of ignorance-shifting is apparent 
once more, for Furphy appears to place a heavy emphasis on both the 
recognition of one's "flash of Free-will" and the consequences that it 
will entail. We must not forget that Collins does not owe his 'present 
holiday' to 'the momentum of Original Impress', but to his holding 
'an independent diploma as one of the architects of our Social 
System, with a commission to use [his] own judgment, and take [his] 
own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). Wilkes states 
that '[t]he novel from this standpoint may be seen as an exploration 
of Destiny and Free-will' (1985:24). But, should readers take 
seriously Croft's notion that Furphy cannot escape the 'deterministic 
paradigm' (1989: 13) of nineteenth-century intellectualism? I think a 
question such as this touches the very heart of the problem, for 
artistic creativity and its themes cannot easily be explained by an 
exclusive appeal to determinism or free-will. Any conclusions based 
on such an exclusive appeal would suffer from false alternatives. 
It is true that Furphy cannot entirely rise above the century in 
which he lived and wrote, but this is not a strong enough reason to 
conclude that Furphy is wholly determined by the period into which 
he was born. Despite 'the momentum of Original Impress' ( SiL, 1 ), 
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the intellectual dimension of Furphy's novels step beyond the rigidly 
deterministic paradigm in a variety of ways. I think the most likely 
historical contender for the explanation of the theory of the 
controlling alternatives is not a nineteenth-century intellectualism 
but the stoicism of Antiquity, especially Aurelius' Meditations and 
Epictetus' Enchetrtdton5 • As Russell states, '[t]he main doctrines to 
which the [stoic) school remained constant throughout are 
concerned with cosmic determinism and human freedom' ([ 1946) 
1991: 261). It is, of course, impossible for me to deal with either of 
these two thinkers in great detail, but I think a sensitive overview of 
their ideas on determinism and free-will shall do much to clarify 
Furphy's and Collins' theory. 
In his introduction to Epictetus' Enchetrtdton, Mann ( 1990:323-
324) explains that, in their concept of the ruling principle and the 
virtuous life, the four main consequences of the stoic doctrine are: 
(1) rational man is part of the naturally rational 
universe, not separate from it; 
(ii) rational man is subject to the same 
prescriptive laws that underpin the naturally 
rational universe; 
(ill) man ought to live in accordance with nature, 
thus reason ought to dominate man's emotions 
and actions; 
(iv) man's existence as the manifestation of a 
naturally rational universe meant that man is 
strictly determined by the universe. 
This is the view that one finds in Aurelius' Meditations, who 
states that the 'Universal Nature's impulse was to create an orderly 
world. It follows, then, that everything now happening must follow a 
logical sequence; if it were not so, the prime purpose towards which 
the impulses of the World-Reason are directed would be an irrational 
one' (bk 7, 75). It is for this reason that man must aspire to 'the just 
5 According to Barnes (1990:179-182), Furphy gave copies of Aurelius and Epictetus to Kate Baker 
after an incident in which Leonie, Furphy's wife, due to a "love" letter written by Kate Baker while 
she suffered from fever, suspected that Furphy and Kate were having an affair. Indeed, she made her 
suspicions known to many members of the Furphy family. Furphy obviously considered these texts 
seriously enough, perhaps hoping that Kate would find the stoic code to life equally invaluable in 
difficult situations. 
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thought, the unselfish act, the tongue that utters no falsehood, the 
temper that greets each passing event as something predestined, 
expected, and emanating from the One source and origin' (bk 4, 33). 
These two meditations are some of the many examples in which 
Aurelius describes the necessity of a rationally proVidential universe 
of natural laws, or an "order of things", whereby man may achieve 
'freedom, self-respect, unselfishness, and obedience to the Will of 
God' (bk 7, 67). According to Ruf, '[t]he stoics turned to rationally 
necessaiy, universal laws of nature in order to free indiVidual persons 
from social oppression, but these same natural laws prescribe that 
everything which happens in the world to such indiViduals happens 
by rational necessity' (1987:56). In this sense, '[w)e are only free to 
accept what happens or to make ourselves miserable by cursing that 
over which we have no control' (Ruf, 1987:56). 
Aurelius' concept of free-Will is not very clear because he does 
not devote much time to it. What one finds instead is a concept of 
free-will subordinated to a clearly thought-out doctrine of 
determinism, for 'you cannot lay down rules until you have learnt to 
obey them' (bk 11, 29). Aurelius may state that he remains his 'own 
master, and none shall hinder me from doing what I choose', but his 
choice is already determined, for he 'is to live the life that nature 
enjoins for a reasonable member of a social community' (bk 5, 29). 
Quoting Epictetus, Aurelius may believe that '[t]he robber of your 
free-Will ... does not exist' (bk 11, 36), but his concept of free-will 
never strays beyond its ordained place in a rationally proVidential 
order of things. As Aurelius points out, 
[a]ll is well With a tool, instrument, or utensil when it 
serves the use for which it is made, though in this 
case its maker is not present. But With things formed 
by Nature, the power that fashions them is still Within 
them, and remains in them. All the more, then, should 
you have it in reverence, and be assured that if only 
you live and act accordingly to its Will, you have all 
things to your liking. That is the way in which the 
universe, too, has all things to its liking (bk 6, 40). 
And yet, 'one thing alone troubles me: the fear that I may do 
142. 
something which man's constitution disallows, or would wish to be 
done in some other way, or forbids till a future day' (Aurelius, bk 7, 
20). Despite the belief that man is the naturally rational 
manifestation of a naturally rational providence in nature, which 
ought to make living the virtuous life simple and clear, there is a 
hint of doubt, perhaps explaining why the concept of free-will needs 
to be subordinate to a belief in determinism. This would also explain 
the rather curious statement that '[t]he art of living is more like 
wrestling than dancing, in as much as it, too, demands a fl.rm and 
watchful stance against any unexpected onset' (Aurelius, bk 7, 61). 
But, then, there is always the equally problematic and contradictory 
meditation that '[a]ll of us are working together for the same 
end .... To one man fall this share of the task, to another that; indeed, 
no small part is performed by that very malcontent who does all he 
can to hinder and undo the course of events. The universe has need 
even of such as he. It remains for you, then, to consider with whom 
you will range yourself (bk 6, 42). 
The problem with Aurelius' views on determinism and free-will, 
common to most stoic doctrines, is best put forward by Russell, who 
states that 
[t]here are obvious difficulties about this doctrine. If 
virtue is really the sole good, a beneficent Providence 
must be solely concerned to cause virtue, yet the laws 
of Nature have produced an abundance of sinners. If 
virtue is the sole good, there can be no reason against 
cruelty and injustice, since, as the Stoics are never 
tired of pointing out, cruelty and injustice afford the 
sufferer the best opportunities for the exercise of 
virtue. If the world is completely deterministic, natural 
laws will decide whether I shall be virtuous or not. If I 
am wicked, Nature compels me to be wicked, and the 
freedom which virtue is supposed to give is not 
possible for me ([ 1946] 1991:262-263). 
I think Furphy borrowed much from Aurelius, especially in 
terms of a code of behaviour, the stress on community service and 
the stress on the importance of reason, but I do not think that he 
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places the same emphasis on a naturally rational order of things nor 
on its underlying providence. Again, in the words of Tom Collins, '[al 
Divine Idea points the way, clearly apparent to any vision not warped 
by interest or prejudice, nor darkened by ignorance; but the work is 
man's alone, and its period rests with man' (SiL, 95 ). While Aurelius 
explores the spiritually intimate relationship between man, virtue 
and the rational universe, Furphy's "stoic" doctrine is rationally 
pragmatic, stressing the need for a utilitarian concept of virtue. As 
the novels show, I do not think Furphy believed that '[w]hat does not 
corrupt a man himself cannot corrupt his life, nor do him any 
damage either outwardly or inwardly' (Aurelius, bk 4, 8). I think 
Furphy rejected the traditional cosmology of determinism and 
providence, still common in the nineteenth century. 
But he recognized also that one cannot wholly abandon the 
concept of determinism, particularly the idea that one is shaped by 
external factors. Perhaps Furphy's interest in the socialist ideas of 
his time is based on a reworking of those views, since nineteenth-
century socialism had a tendency to over-emphasize determinism, as 
is the case with Jefferson Rigby. There is, however, another 
possibility, which leads me to consider Epictetus' Encheiridion. 
According to Mann, 'the Stoics' insistence on the law-governed 
nature of the universe committed them to determinism' and, '[a]s 
their critics were quick to point out, this seemed to clash with their 
belief that humans are free, responsible agents' (1990:324). Within 
this context, 'Epictetus' Encheiridion, or "Handbook", ... besides giving 
a moving account of the Stoic view of life, attempts to resolve the 
contradiction between human freedom and determinism' (Mann, 
1990:324). Although Epictetus' handbook is not without its 
problems, it does offer a much more consistent and pragmatic 
reconciliation between determinism and free-will: a reconciliation 
which I think underpins Furphy's utilitarian theory of the controlling 
alternatives. 
According to Epictetus, 
[s]ome things are up to us and some are not up to us. 
Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, 
aversions -in short, whatever is our own doing. Our 
bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our 
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reputations, or our public offices, or, that ts, whatever 
ts not our own doing. The things that are up to us are 
by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; the things 
that are not up to us are weak, enslaved, hindered, not 
our own .... From the start, then, work on saying to 
each harsh appearance [phantasia], "You are an 
appearance, and not at all the thing that has the 
appearance." Then examine it and assess it by these 
yardsticks that you have, and first and foremost by 
whether it concerns the things that are up to us or the 
things that are not up to us. and if it ts about one of 
the things that ts not up to us, be ready to say, "You 
are nothing in relation to me" (1990:325). 
Essentially, Epictetus stresses the importance of analysing and 
judging what appears before one's eyes, for one ought not to judge a 
book by its cover nor allow oneself to be swayed by the appearance of 
something. As Epictetus states, 'try not to be carried away by 
appearances, since if you once gain time and delay you will control 
yourself more easily' ( 1990:329). In other words, the emphasis ts not 
so much on maintaining an air of indifference to all things because 
of their appearances, but to shift one's ignorance towards the thing's 
appearance in order to analyse the thing as rationally and objectively 
as possible, evaluating whether or not the thing concerns one's sense 
of self. It ts, in my opinion, a common-sense approach to the ethics 
of responding to life and maintaining one's fortitude. As Epictetus 
states, 'if you think that things naturally enslaved are free or that 
things not your own are your own, you will be thwarted, miserable, 
and upset, and will blame both gods and men' (1990:325). 
Although open to interpretation, it appears that what ts 
"naturally enslaved" ts determined and thus serves a purpose or 
exists in a manner that ts beyond one's control. Any attempt to 
exercise control will lead to frustration and despair, suggesting that 
one has ignorantly and wastefully exercised one's will. It ts in this 
sense that one should, '[alt each thing that happens to you, 
remember to turn to yourself and ask what capacity you have for 
dealing with it' because 'if you become used to this, you will not be 
carried away by appearances' (Epictetus, 1990:327). To all intents 
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and purposes, Epictetus' road to freedom is principally defined by 
'despising what is not up to us' (1990:329). This concept of despising 
what is not up to us is the most problematic aspect of an otherwise 
utilitarian view of virtue, free-will and determinism. Perhaps these 
problems arise chiefly through the stoic doctrine that 'nothing bad by 
nature happens in the world' (1990:331). Or the equally problematic 
notion that 'whoever wants to be free' should 'not want or avoid 
anything that is up to others. Otherwise he will necessarily be a 
slave' (1990:328). 
Nevertheless, the notion that free-will and determinism are 
defined by these concepts of "what is up to you" and "what is not" is 
important to Furphy's theory of the controlling alternatives, its 
notion of choice and consequence, and the uplifting and upbuilding 
of nation and identity. Furphy's reasons for including the theory in 
the rewritten version of Such is Life has much to do with the basic 
precepts of stoicism on the idea of Judgment, indicating that Furphy 
appeared to hold "attitudes" and "opinions" responsible for the 
needless ignorance, rivalry and division of nineteenth-century 
Australia. According to Epictetus, '[w]hat upsets people is not things 
themselves but their Judgments about things .... So when we are 
thwarted or upset or distressed, let us never blame someone else but 
rather ourselves, that is, our own Judgments' (1990:326). Indeed, 
what is your own is '[y]our way of dealing with appearances' and 
'whenever you are in accord with nature in your way of dealing with 
appearances ... then you are Joyful about a good of your own' 
(Epictetus, 1990:326). 
In an example of "what is up to you" and "what is not", 
Epictetus states that '[i]llness interferes with the body, not with 
one's faculty of choice, unless that faculty of choice wishes it to' 
(1990:327). One could apply this example of determinism and free-
will to one's attitude towards the Australian experience, saying that 
the appearance of the Australian environment is not up to one, 
whereas one's attitudes towards one's experiences within that 
environment are. But I do not think Furphy would have agreed with 
the notion that by asking what is up to and what is not, 'at each 
thing that happens to you ... you will find that it interferes with 
something else, not you' (Epictetus, 1990:327). I think Furphy 
considered this to be as erroneous to ethics as Aurelius' notion that 
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'[w]hat does not corrupt a man himself cannot corrupt his life, nor 
do him any damage either outwardly or inwardly' (bk 4, 8). As 
Furphy's depiction of the 1880s indicates, division, opportunism and 
rivahy may not corrupt a person, since a person can maintain his or 
her moral stature, as is the case with Stewart of Kooltoopa (SiL, 164-
167), but they do affect his or her life both outwardly and inwardly. 
Nor do I think that Furphy would agree entirely with Epictetus' 
notion that one must 'not seek to have events happen as you want 
them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and 
your life will go well' (1990:327). In one sense, this is true, for one 
could argue that one's wants and attitudes should be in accord with 
the manner in which the Australian experience occurs as an event 
and not with Anglo-Australian values. But there is also a sense in 
which Epictetus' notion is untrue, for there is a need to distinguish 
between naturally determined events and the events which occur 
through human choices and consequences. For example, if rivalry, 
ignorance and division are seen as events that happen as they are 
meant to happen, then one must not interfere. But one could just as 
easily say that rivahy, ignorance and division are appearances which 
are up to human beings and their attitudes, and thus are 
consequences of their attitudes and choices. In this sense, one must 
interfere, for these events are not naturally determined. 
Despite the problems with Encheirtdion, I think its basic 
precepts of "what is up to you" and "what is not" relate well to 
Furphy's concerns and the theory of the controlling alternatives. As 
Epictetus points out, 
[i]t shows lack of natural talent to spend time on what 
concerns the body, as in exercising a great deal, eating 
a great deal, drinking a great deal, moving one's 
bowels or copulating a great deal. Instead, you must 
do these things in passing, but turn your whole 
attention toward your faculty of judgment (1990:337). 
According to McLaren, 'Furphy's concern is ... with how ... we can 
ever produce a society in which justice will triumph over greed and 
ignorance' (1989:57). In this sense, I must disagree with Wallace-
Crabbe, who states that · Such is Life offers stoic humour as the only 
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response to an unpredictable fate and the terrible arbitrariness of 
personal decisions' (1962: 145). In light of the previous investigation, 
I do not think that Furphy saw fate as being wholly unpredictable 
nor human choice to be always terribly arbitrary in a negative way. 
Nor do I agree with Turner's notion that the theory shows that '[t]he 
individual is powerless to determine his own destiny' ( 1954: 1 73). 
Although the novels indicate that individuals cannot be in total 
command of their destinies, they do point out that, whatever the 
future may be, individuals exercise a great influence on that future. 
One could say, however, that the individual is powerless if he or she 
turns his or her attention away from their faculty of judgment, thus 
leading to ignorant choices and their consequences. 
In this sense, I agree with Gilding's notion 'that Tom 
Collins ... derives, at least partly, from the social frustration of the 
nineties and that the philosophy of the controlling alternative may 
be related to an easing of social and personal frustration' (1967:106). 
Barnes is rtght in noting that 'Collins' theory of the "controlling 
alternative" is an attempt at a positive statement about life in which 
free-will and determinism are reconciled in a theory of choice' 
( 1976: 167). Indeed, the theory points out that free-will and 
determinism should be seen as a matter of choice and consequence, 
not the straightforward cause and effect of popular opinion. 
Although Collins speaks of 'Cause (which is human Free-will) and 
Effect (which is Destiny)' (SIL, 70), it can be said that the popular 
notions of cause and effect tend to focus on determinism in an 
absolute sense, leading to a misunderstanding of the ethical 
dimension of the theory of the controlling alternatives. 
As Barnes explains, '[l]ife is full of moments of choice, and we 
do not know when we are faced with the decisive choice; having 
chosen, we cannot avoid the consequences which a "major 
alternative" entails' (1971:130-131. My italics). One could say, 
therefore, that Such ts Life attempts to educate its readers with the 
view that the uplifting and upbuilding of the nation is not only 
something which is up to us, but something that is a "major 
alternative", a choice with a series of consequences requiring one's 
faculty of judgment. In this sense, I think the novels foreground the 
recurring problem in nineteenth-century Australia: '[e]ach of us 
supported his argument with a wealth of illustrations and thus 
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fortified his own stubborn opinions to his own perfect satisfaction' 
(SiL, 48)6. Furthermore, the novels thematically incorporate the 
importance of self-reliance into this view, for it pushes the notion 
that neither uplifting nor upbuilding will be successful if individuals 
continue to be 'parlor soldiers' and 'shun the rugged battle of fate, 
where strength is born (Emerson, [1841] 1985:194). 
According to Wilkes, 'Collins may entertain the theory of the 
"controlling alternative", but that is no reason to make it the master 
theme of Such ts Life. In Rlgby'sRomance ... it is not mentioned, and it 
does not figure in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga or in Furphy's letters' 
(1985:25). What I am suggesting is that readers need to understand 
Furphy's novels as philosophical narratives which do not continually 
promote the theory of the controlling alternatives overtly inasmuch 
as their episodes are textual structures built on the theory. In this 
sense, I do not agree with the view held by Wilkes (1985:47) that the 
key to the novels does not lie in the theory of the controlling 
alternatives nor in any other unifying hypothesis. Again, readers 
need to bear in mind Furphy's emphasis on observant reading, for 
any readers hoping to find direct references to the theory will be 
disappointed on numerous occasions and be led to the natural 
conclusion that the theory is not crucial to an understanding of the 
novels. 
The function of the observant reader in this case is to 
understand the theory and constantly comprehend the operation of 
its prtnctples in the novels' human order of things. In this sense, I 
disagree with Barnes' notion that the theory is 'intended to explain 
events; it does not relate character and circumstance .... [for] there ts no 
central theme of human behaviour' (1971:131. My italics). Nor do I 
agree with Partington's notion that '[n]ot all the examples [in the 
novels I provide support for the con trolling alternatives thesis' 
(1993:97). According to Hamer, '[t]here are certain values that Such ls 
Life does consistently affirm' (1964:147). And, as Gilding points out, 
'[i]n terms of the action, there is a related attempt to construct a 
theory of the sequence of events ... Thus the theory, as an 
6 Perhaps this is why the phrase, "such is life," depending on the outcome of a choice, will be either 
intoned with a sense of victory, as Hartley argues (1986: 167), or failure, as pointed out by G. W. 
Turner (1971:vi). To agree with Osland (1985:232), the phrase generally tends to function as an 
assertion of Tom's record being true to Riverina life and that his responses to life are tempered by the 
precepts of stoicism. 
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interpretation of human action, is a simplification of Collins' 
reflections' (1967: 189). In short, the stress on choice and 
consequence is a major alternative not just in the alleviation of 
human ignorance, divisions and rivalries, but also in the actions 
that are the natural consequences of specifically articulated 
identities, of determined yet self-reliant roles played out in the 
Rivertna's geography of players. As Epictetus points out, 
[r]emember that you are an actor in a play, which is as 
the playwright wants it to be: short if he wants it 
short, long if he wants it long. If he wants you to play 
a beggar, play even this part skilfully, or a cripple, or a 
public official, or a private citizen. What is yours is to 
play the assigned part well. But to choose it belongs to 
someone else ( 1990:329). 
Epictetus' advice to his stoic disciples could equally be seen as 
Furphy's advice to the currency lads and lasses of nineteenth-century 
Australia, particularly when it comes to exercising one's creativity 
freely and responsibly to flesh out a cultural alternative to Anglo-
Australianism and its deterministic views of the convict taint. 
Within this context of currency, roleplay, rights, ignorance-shifting, 
judgment and the theory of the controlling alternatives, I shall leave 
the concluding words to Bhaskar, who states that, 
[i]n so far as an agent is interested in preserving or 
extending or deepening or gaining some freedom, this 
will always involve trying to understand, in the sense 
of explaining, the character of some social or socially 
conditioned or affectable entity, structure or thing -in 
order to maintain (reproduce} or change (reform} or 
otherwise dissolve or defuse, or to stimulate or release 
it. To become or remain 'free', in the simple sense of 
being 'unconstrained', always potentially involves both 
a theory of those constrain ts and, in so far as the 
freedom is feasible, a practice of liberation or liberty 
preservation. One may be free or desire freedom, in 
this sense, from any kind of thing (1991:75). 
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2.3. On Seeing Tom Collins as Implied Author and Hero. 
If we recall the postscript of the letter to Stephens mentioned 
earlier, Furphy had stated that '[i]f the first 3 pars. of S. is L. compel 
the reader to think, their purpose is duly served' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). I have already argued that what readers 
ought to think about are the following issues in relation to the 
theory of the controlling alternatives: role-play, social architecture, 
ethics, free-will, determinism, knowledge and ignorance, rights, and 
choices and consequences. Indeed, I stressed that readers ought to 
consider the theory of the controlling alternatives as a key to 
understanding Furphy's novels in light of their thematic 
preoccupation with the concept of uplifting and upbuilding Australia. 
However, I think the theory of the controlling alternatives has a 
much broader scope in the novels than just a utilitarian solution to 
economic or political problems in the human order of things. 
One can see that it is equally applicable to the concept of 
creativity, for the manner in which one chooses to represent a 
nation, or the way in which one chooses to express a newly-emerging 
cultural experience, depends on choices and consequences. I have 
already alluded to this somewhat in chapter one when I argued that 
Furphy considered the 1890s legend to be an ignorant celebration of 
an ignorance that perpetuated rivalry and division. It is important to 
bear in mind the success or failure of aesthetic well-being, for the 
manner in which an artist or artistic group exercises creative choice, 
appealing to popular sentiment in an over hasty fashion, influences 
the conventions of a particular cultural experience. In short, the way 
in which the bohemian artists saw "Australia" influenced the way in 
which Australia came to be seen by the popular majority both 
nationally and internationally. According to Furphy, this did little to 
inspire confidence in "Australia" and its "Australians". 
Perhaps this is what Furphy meant when he wrote to Cecil 
Winter that '[t]here is much in your suggestion respecting the causes 
of pessimism in the Out-back man (who is the real Australian); but, 
as you say, Ignorance is at the root of it' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, 
eds, 1995: 124. My italics). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the 
heavy preoccupation with artistic creativity and representation 
indicates that Furphy considered such creativity and representation 
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to be majoraltemattves, not to be taken lightly, 1n the uplifting and 
upbuildtng of Australia. If artists are seen as sowers, then Furphy 
saw the vast majority as sowing the wrong seeds on the fields of an 
Australian cultural imagtnation1 • If this ts the case, then it is 
interesting to look at Furphy's preoccupation with creativity and 
artistic representation within the context of authorship and the 
theory of the controlling alternatives. Indeed, a general glance at the 
structure of Such ls Life reveals that the so-called random selection 
of events ts, in fact, a highly crafted work which stresses the power of 
choices and consequences in ways of seeing and the production of 
meaning. 
Just as Barnes (1990:243) emphasized Furphy's drawing out 
the philosophical implications during the rewrite, Partington points 
out that '[i]t was during the rewriting th~t Furphy seems to have 
clarified in his own mind and then realized in the new text a richer 
and deeper conception of relationships between illusion and reality 
in literature and life' ( 1993: 1 7). But I disagree with Partington's 
( 1993: 1 7) strange notion that the greater emphasis on choice and 
consequence through the controlling alternatives decreased the 
preoccupation with fact and fiction. Croft is incorrect to claim that 
the 1898 typescript of Such ls Life 'was far more concerned with the 
notions of art, artifice, realism, and romance' ( 1991 :61 ). I think 
readers will agree that the focus on art and life, fact and fiction, or 
illusion and reality have become much more sophisticated and much 
more central with the published Such ts Life and the two later novels. 
When Hope stated that Such ls Life 'is a novel based on a 
theory of the novel', he is astutely correct, for 'the structure is 
determined rigorously by Furphy's philosophy of life' ( 1971: 109). But 
I disagree with key elements of his explanation of the theory. 
According to Hope, 
[e]ach of [Furphy's] characters, at any particular 
moment, makes an act of free-will, for the moment 
presents him with two and only two alternatives of 
action. Once made, the course of action ts determined 
by the force of a net of circumstances, geographical, 
,,..----------
7 For example, in several letters, to which I will refer in the next chapter when I investigate Furphy's 
and Collins' version of an Australian national type, Furphy considered Lawson's later works to be 
indicative of an unnecessarily self-indulgent pessimism and, presumably, ignorance. 
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physical, biological, social and psychological, so 
complex that the individual has no chance of 
comprehending it and no power to alter it; his choice 
is always a blind choice and the pattern of his own life 
is like that of a ship sailing in to an unknown port 
without a chart. The most trifling decision may lead to 
the most unforeseeable results as did Collins' decision 
to smoke while he crossed the river (1971: 110). 
Hope is right to draw our attention to the complex net of 
consequences that bind an individual to his or her choice. But I 
disagree with his reading blind choice in to the theory of the 
controlling alternatives. While it may be true that many choices are 
rashly made, leading perhaps to an unforeseeable and 
incomprehensible number of consequences, it is not true to claim 
that Furphy saw choice as sailing a ship to an unknown port 
without a chart. Choice is not always blind choice. To read this into 
the theory of the controlling alternatives is a grave error, for it 
ignores the strong emphasis on reason and ignorance-shifting in 
Furphy's work. Hope is right to claim that Furphy 'is putting forward 
an entirely new theory of the relation of literature to life' as well as 
'announcing a revolution in the nature of prose fiction' (1971:111). 
But he does not see that the theory concerns itself with the ethics of 
artistic creativity and representation. If one can say that the 
uplifting and upbuilding of the nation is a major alternative, subject 
to the conditions of the theory of the controlling alternatives, then 
one can lay the same stress on the concept of authorship. 
In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy states that '(a]ll creative Art 
-as distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession. 
Man, in this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in 
his own image· (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). In short, 
an artist can create works of art based on his or her own ignorance, 
thus confessing ignorance, as is the case with Anglo-Australian art. 
But an artist also has the potential to create artistic representations 
within the context of wisdom, hence the stress on ignorance-shifting, 
for this can be seen as a commitment to the research and expression 
of experiential values, leading to a proper consideration of art and 
well-being in the community. If we recall Collins' preoccupation with 
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the creation of a "presence" in order to reify an authority, we can see 
that the image Collins reiftes is dramatically opposed to the common 
production of cultural images, customs and traditions which 
constitute that which is now known as the Australian legend. 
Instead of a celebration of ignorance, or anti-intellectualism and 
anti-authoritarianism, Collins' new type of man is basically an 
extension, albeit a retranslated one, of current Western values for 
the sake of well-being. 
In this sense, Furphy's view on art's purpose is no different 
from similar views of the time. Emerson states that '[t]he poet is the 
sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is sovereign and stands 
on the centre .... Therefore the poet is not any permissive potentate, 
but is emperor in his own right' ([ 1844] 1985:262). Furthermore, 
'[t]he signs and credentials of the poet are that he announces that 
which no man foretold. He is the true and only doctor; he knows and 
tells; he is the only teller of news, for he was present and privy to the 
appearance which he describes. He is a beholder of ideas and an 
utterer of the necessary and the causal' ([1844] 1985:263). In much 
the same vein, Whitman states that '[o]f all mankind the great poet 
is the equable man .... Nothing out of its place is good and nothing in 
its place is bad. He bestows on every object or quality its flt 
proportions neither more nor less. He is the arbiter of the diverse and 
he is the key. He is the equalizer of his age and land ... he supplies 
what wants supplying and checks what wants checking' ([ 1855] 
1994:486-487)8 • 
In short, '[i]f [the poet] breathes into any thing that was before 
thought small it dilates with the grandeur and life of the universe. 
He is a seer ... he is individual ... he is complete in himself ... the others 
are as good as he, only he sees it and they do not' (Whitman, [ 1855] 
1994:488). Or, as Furphy stated, the creative capacity in man, rather 
than the imitative, makes him a god. One wonders if Furphy, as well 
as Emerson or Whitman, was acquainted with Sidney's A Defence of 
Poetry. According to Sidney, '[t]here is no art [or discipline] delivered 
to mankind that hath not the works of nature for his principal 
object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so 
depend, as they become actors and players, as it were, of what nature 
8 In Rigby's Romance, Collins refers to 'any poem of Walt Whitman's' as part of his canonic 'ten 
masterpieces of poetry' (53) by which one can attain a thorough education, even going so far as to say 
that Whitman's poetry is 'an acquired taste' (240). 
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will have set forth' ([ 1595] 1966:23). However, '[o]nly the poet, 
disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour 
of his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature, in making 
things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms 
such as never were in nature' (Sidney [ 1595] 1966:23). 
Simply put, the poet, or any artist for that matter, has an 
aptitude or a privileged talent and a freedom of creativity to match 
because he knows and sees what the common person does not. 
Equally, the poet or artist can create the vision splendid, for 
'[n]ature never set forth the earth in so rich a tapestry as divers poets 
have done' (Sidney [ 1595] 1966:24). It is for this reason that the poet 
or artist must equally comply with an ethics of representation, for 
'the poet is representative', standing 'among partial men for the 
complete man' and apprising 'us not of his wealth, but of the 
common wealth' (Emerson, [ 1844] 1985:260-261 ). Given our 
theoretical climate on art, we tend to think that such a view on the 
freedom of creativity is extreme, especially within the context of 
authorship. Instead, we tend to focus on the complex web of social, 
cultural and historical processes that make a work of art the product 
of a time rather than the expression of an elevated state of 
awareness or divine genius, namely the author. Our modem view is, 
and will perhaps always be, best expressed by Roland Barthes: 
a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many 
cultures and entering into mutual relations of 
dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place 
where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the 
reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The 
reader is the space on which all the quotations that 
make up a writing are inscribed without any of them 
being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be 
personal: the reader is without history, biography, 
psychology; he is simply that someone who holds 
together in a single field all the traces by which the 
written text is constituted ( 1977: 148). 
Barthes places heavy emphasis on the grooves of culture (Kress, 
155. 
1988:12-13). According to Barthes, 'we know that to give writing its 
future, it ts necessary to overthrow the myth', for 'the birth of the 
reader must be at the cost of the death of the author' (1977:148). 
Barthes' view ts simply a strategy for reading, for it does not prove 
that the concept of authorship ts dead. Indeed, Barthes' reader ts a 
sociological ideal rather than a sociological fact, being the product of 
a countermove that is as extreme as the view it challenges. In short, 
Barthes pits a version of social determinism against the more 
traditional view of an unbridled freedom of creativity. But the social 
determtntst view does not have the capacity to explain adequately the 
concept of artistic creativity and its relationship to individual free-
will. Of the four views on creative free-will already discussed, it ts 
only Sidney who suggests that the poet is not tied to an object or set 
of conventions, for he ts 'lifted up with the vigour of his own 
invention', thus 'making things either better than nature bringeth 
forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature' (Sidney 
[ 1595) 1966:23). 
Neither Emerson, Furphy nor Whitman suggests that the poet 
is free to create what he or she desires without any recourse to 
society or culture. In each of these three artists, the origin of the 
work is as important as its destination. In Furphy's views, an artist 
may be a god by his or her creative capacity, but even the creative 
power of a god is tied to the well-being of his or her community in a 
deeply responsible way. In this sense, the notions of authorship and 
creativity must strike a balance between freedom of invention and 
social determinism: a balance which Furphy achieves by the 
introduction of the theory of the controlling alternatives to Such ts 
Life. Again, I do not think that Furphy aligned himself artistically to 
a common currency on art on the basis of cultural insecurity. 
Rather, I think Furphy saw a truth and value in this currency which 
needed to be promoted in the Australian literary scene, hence his 
discussion of authorship with Cecil Winter, who wrote under the 
nom de plume of "Rivertna". In the spirit of A.G. Stephens, 'the 
branch should be shown growing upon the Tree, not severed from it' 
([ 19011 1973:vi). 
According to Heseltine, 'Such ts Life ts nothing less than an 
attempt to use the resources qfthe self as the means of celebrating a 
nation as yet unstoried, artless, unenhanced' ( 1986:8. My italics). 
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One should not forget Furphy's emphasis on the "truth embellished" 
nature of artistic creativity. But, if we consider Barnes' (1981:xxi-
xxii) notion that Collins' chameleon-like role-playing only generates 
the illusion of control, then one could also argue that Collins' 
identity, or Collins' many colours, is the effect of an eclectic 
pastiche, rather than a creation in one's own image. In short, Collins 
could be seen as nothing more than an identity that is shaped by the 
grooves or conventions of society and culture, revealing that the 
resources of the self are actually the resources of culture and society. 
One can also take note of both Barnes' (1990:57-62, 81, 96) and 
Franklin's (1944:10-22) biographical information on Furphy's 
stylistic flair for literary parody and say that Furphy's 'literary' 
identity and his sense of "self' are marked by the self-same processes. 
This, then, leads us to consider an important problem: how 
can one create an original or distinct image in one's own image when 
one's identity is based on parody or imitation? In other words, how 
can one create in one's own image when one's identity is permeated 
through and through by otherness? Is identity or selfhood an act of 
creative or imitative art? In short, can someone, whether a literary 
figure or not, create from one's own image when that image is 
determined and directed by the grooves of society and culture? This 
has particularly severe implications for nation and national identity, 
for it follows that the pursuit of the self-image called Australian 
national identity cannot occur independently from that "otherness" 
which determines and directs it, namely the British Empire. Thus, 
Furphy's notion of creating in one's own image is an artistic fallacy, 
for one's creativity and one's image are determined and directed by an 
otherness which makes imitation supreme. Barnes' notion of the 
illusory nature of control is, in this sense, quite valid. 
But to take such a hard view is to miss the point, for Furphy's 
meaning of creative art is fleshed out by the concept of the 
confession. Again, according to Furphy, '[a)ll creative Art -as 
distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession. Man, in 
this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own 
image· (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). Indeed, observant 
readers of the novels will agree that Furphy does not write nor create 
his "art" in a vacuum. Nor does he undertake his artistic endeavours 
in ignorance of the greater cosmopolis, for Furphy brings a wealth of 
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experience and understanding to his work, which possibly accounts 
for the mature style of his narratives. There is a rather interesting 
truth in Furphy's predicating the confession to creative art that does 
indeed make art potentially creative rather than imitative. How is 
this so? Graham states that '[a]ny depiction of nature that tries just 
to copy must fail, partly because every "copy" must involve seeing 
selectively, and partly because the work must reflect the 
representational resources available to the [artist]' (1997:89. My 
italics). 
Indeed, Graham (1997:88-92) discusses the difference between 
representation in art and representationalism, the latter being 
concerned with seeing the mimetic value of art in terms of its ability 
to create a direct copy of reality. According to Graham, 'thinking 
about mimesis must eventually lead us to reject representationalism' 
as 'naive' (1997:89), for such a view rejects any work of art that does 
not offer a direct copy of reality. Representation in art and creativity 
means evaluating a work of art for the things it directs the viewer or 
reader to see and understand, especially that which is often 
overlooked in the day-to-day world. Furphy's style is one of creative 
representation, rather than a purely imitative representationalism. 
Furphy recreates or imitates the conventions or grooves of "reality" 
only insofar that he can direct the reader to think further about his 
or her reality. In this sense, it should be noted that Furphy's mimetic 
style, rather than copying reality or imitating a set of ready-made 
conventions, such as Anglo-Australian romance, employs specific 
resources of self, society and culture in order to create a sense of self, 
society and culture within the context of aesthetic well-being. 
In this manner, Furphy foregrounds the fact that art and "life" 
are a process of selective seeing, of exercising control and using the 
confessional and representational resources of the self as a point of 
origin in order to control and direct a reader's attention to the 
purpose of a text and its destination. This is most important to bear 
in mind, for it is the key to gauging the value of Tom Collins and his 
artistic designs. As G.W. Turner explains, '[t]o be a chronicler [like 
Collins] is to be objective, a "camera" .... Even a camera, however, 
focuses on particular details and points in chosen directions' 
( 1990:41 ). Although Anderson speaks of communities, it can just as 
easily be said that the creative freedom of identities, both personally 
158. 
and nationally, 'are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/ 
genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined' ( 1991 :6). 
According to Smolicz, identity, whether personal or national, 'can 
only be understood by reference to individuals involved in cultural 
renewal, interaction and further development' (1991:51). This is 
similar to White's (1981:77, 87) concept of "generational renewal" 
discussed earlier. Furthermore, 
Man, 
(i]t is initiated through individual members who 
construct their personal cultural systems by re-
interpreting and modifying the herttage(s) that have 
been transmitted to them by the home, school and 
other social agencies. This modification may be the 
result of members' own scientific and/ or artistic 
creativity, as well as cultural inputs from outside 
sources, including the heritages of ethnic groups other 
than their own (Smollcz, 1991:51). 
Or, as the philosopher Ernst Cassirer concludes in An Essay on 
(m]an cannot find himself, he cannot become aware of 
his individuality, save through the medium of social 
life. But to him this medium signifies more than an 
external determining force. Man, like animals, submits 
to the rules of society but, in addition, he has an 
active share in bringing about, and an active power to 
change, the forms of social life ( 1944:223). 
This brings us back to a consideration of the concepts of free-
will and determinism, or choices and consequences, within the 
context of creativity and authorship. In short, the theory of the 
controlling alternatives, besides being an ethical guide for conduct in 
daily affairs, stresses that authorship and creativity are equally a 
major alternative, especially if an author is concerned with the 
uplifting and upbuilding of cultural identity, or a nation and a 
community. Indeed, the emphasis on choices and consequences lends 
itself quite readily to the concept of seeing selectively, for the manner 
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in which an author chooses to represent the self, society and culture 
in art can influence the way in which readers think about the value 
of their identities and the way in which they can continue the 
process of cultural creativity. What the theory of the controlling 
alternatives brings to the concepts of authorship and creativity is, 
therefore, the concept of selection. 
According to Furphy's views, the "truth embellished" narrative 
of personal and national identity must, at the point of origin, give 
due consideration to what one ought to represent in terms of the 
narrative's destination9 • In other words, one ought not to leave 
'untold the lies that (one] ought to have told' in order to tell 'the lies 
[one] ought not to have told' (SIL, 272). Without mentioning the 
theory of the controlling alternatives, Partington explains that 
Furphy wished to establish that no narration is simply 
a statement of unambiguous facts, since some selection 
must take place ... and that there must therefore be 
some criteria of significance or interest at work to 
guide, explicitly or implicitly, that selection ( 1993:248-
249. My italics). 
Speaking of his narrative strategy in Rtgby's Romance, Collins 
states that '[i]n recounting the event here, I am merely adjusting, not 
jumbling, the order of things -transposing and grouping my 
occurrences, after the manner of some more famous, if less faithful, 
historians' (216). According to Lever, '[Furphy's] ethic of equality 
cannot rest with a conventional realist novel of ordered narrative and 
stable character. So Such ts Life adopts realist techniques at the 
same time that it questions their validity' ( 1996-97: 158). Lever's 
observations are good, but it must be said that Furphy questions the 
validity of certain realist techniques only insofar as he questions 
their validity of representation. All narratives employ some realist 
techniques in order to communicate a message or value. Without a 
dose of realism, no narrative could reconcile its messages or values 
with the world of readers, which is its origin and destination. 
Philosophically, Furphy understood that '[i)t is in literature -
9 In response to Barthes' concept of an ahistorical reader, one could state the following: if authors 
create selectively, readers read selectively, for it is only in this manner that the destination of a text 
can have any importance. 
160. 
poems, plays, novels- that our self-images are fashioned with the 
greatest complexity and where exploration of the constitutive images 
of moral and social life is most obvious. This is one of literature's 
peculiar powers and gives it, in this respect, pre-eminence among the 
arts' (Graham, 1997:129). It is an understanding that can be equally 
applied to Collins. Given that Furphy gave much consideration to 
the link between the controlling alternatives and authorship, as well 
as Tom Collins' concerns with uplifting and upbuilding Australia 
through a novel based on selected observations from pocket diaries, 
it is important to note that Collins is meant to be seen not simply as 
a product of Furphy's authoring, but should be seen distinctly as an 
author himself. 
To make this more clear, we must tum to Wayne Booth's 
Rhetoric Qf Fiction, since it is his distinction between implied author 
and unreliable narrator that implicitly underpins past critical 
discussion of Furphy and Collins' relationship. According to Booth, 
'[o]ur sense of the implied author includes not only the extractable 
meanings but also the moral and emotional content of each bit of 
action and suffering of all of the characters' (1983:73). Furthermore, 
'[i]t includes ... the intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic 
whole; the chief value to which this implied author is committed, 
regardless of what party his creator belongs to in real life, is that 
which is expressed by the total form' (Booth, 1983:73-74). In 
accordance with Booth's distinctions, Furphy has traditionally been 
identified as both the real and implied author, while Collins has 
been identified as an unreliable narrator. 
Although Furphy is the real author of the novels, he is not the 
implied author. As I will show in a moment, critical opinion in the 
past has not adequately made this distinction, and has lead to 
inaccurate judgments about Tom Collins. In short, Collins ts '[t]he 
"implied author"' because he 'chooses, consciously or unconsciously, 
what we read; we infer him as an ideal, literary, created version of 
the real man; he is the sum of his own choices' (Booth, 1983:74-75. My 
italics). This is particularly so if we conceive of authorship as a skill, 
craft or work, as a process or labour of selection, of creativity and 
representation with choices and consequences. As Raphael states, 
'the free creativity of an artist .... is clearly a process of causation, of 
making, and it does not cease to be a process of causation when we 
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think of it as a series of free choices' (1994:110). Likewise, the 
process of free creativity or free choice does not cease to be free 
simply because it can be seen as a series of causations. Consider the 
following confession of our implied author, Tom Collins: 
[t]he reader, however unruly under weaker 
management, is by this time made aware of a power, 
beyond his own likes and dislikes, controlling the 
selection and treatment of these informal annals. That 
power, in the nature of things, resides napoleonically 
with myself, and has, I trust, been exercised toward 
the information and edification of the few who fall 
under its jurisdiction -suggesting, as it does, Tom 
Hood's idea of perfect rule: An angel from heaven, and 
a despotism (SiL, 263). 
Speaking of the multiple levels of theory in Such is Life, both 
Brian Kiernan (197lb:135) and G.A. Wilkes (1985:39) argue that 
Furphy controls the theorising process and, in this manner, invites 
readers to respond to Collins at every stage of the narrative, thus 
making the novel a collaborative effort. This is undoubtedly true, for 
Furphy is the real author. But, because Collins is the implied 
author, one must be aware of the textual fact that it is Collins who 
invites us to respond to "Collins", since the reader's very first 
acquaintance with him, in the opening paragraphs of Such is Life, is 
primarily an acquaintance between reader and implied author, not 
reader and hero. As Kiernan notes, '[b ]ehind the rambling, punning, 
self-mocking, self-condoning train of thought which renders 
[Collins'] responses is Furphy's "placing" Collins' idealization of 
himself (1964:138). This is Furphy's artistic game, for he had wanted 
to see 'Tom Collins severely slated for his pedantry, literary 
arrogance, and general offensiveness' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995:139). But there is a strategy to this game which does not simply 
involve categorizing Collins as unreliable. In a letter to Kate Baker, 
Furphy states that 
I have arranged with Grant Hervey to write a scorching 
criticism of S. is L., as soon as the book is out, 
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accusing T. Collins of copying Miss Franklin ... 
whereupon I shall retort, with some rancour. In the 
end, it will be demonstrated that the testimony of two 
men is true, and that the pseudo-Australian authors, 
whom you have been taking as your guides, don't know 
as much about the countiy as they pretend (in Barnes 
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 100). 
The structure of Such is Life is such that readers are meant to 
take Collins as the implied author who knows much about the 
countxy and has a vision for her future. This is particularly so if one 
considers the opening commentaxy to each chapter in Such is Life, as 
well as the proem to Rtgby's Romance, for it is there that Collins 
alludes to the ethically creative relationship between individual 
choice and consequence, and the process of selection that occurs 
with artistic representation or misrepresentation 10 • But, once the 
initial opening paragraphs to Such is Life come to their conclusion, 
the relationship between reader and implied author shifts to reader 
and hero, and Collins becomes the central character in the narrative 
world of the Riverina. In short, one could say that each chapter in 
Such is Life has two beginnings. The first beginning presents Collins 
in the creative capacity and skill of the implied author, controlling 
the uplifting and upbuilding process. The second beginning, which 
fleshes out the world of the Riverina on carefully selected dates, 
depicts Collins as a hero who is, like any other hero, subject to the 
consequences of rivalxy and division, the consequences of creative 
choice, as well as the consequences of particularly damaging versions 
of an Australian cultural identity. 
Besides the importance of an historically social and cultural 
background to the novel, Such ts Life demonstrates that readers are 
not absolutely free to interpret what they like, for they are under an 
implied authorial jurisdiction, or a monopoly of selected choices and 
consequences. This implied authorial jurisdiction does not lie with 
Furphy, but with Collins. As the real author, Furphy is a vexy clever 
10 In The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, Collins claims that he has 'no desire to make myself the hero of 
my own story' ( 14). This is true. Yet it can be said that this is but one of many examples of an 
authorial speech act whereby Collins practises the skill of authorship to make readers focus on Fred 
Falkland-Pritchard, Barefooted Bob and Lillian Falkland Pritchard as heroes. Furphy's last novel deals 
with Collins' authorial strategies in a much more subtly sophisticated manner. 
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strategist. In this sense, the view that Collins should be seen as an 
implied author challenges the traditional view that Collins is an 
unreliable narrator, since, according to Booth (1983:159), a narrator 
can only be unreliable if he or she is consistently inconsistent with 
the values or norms of the implied author and the text. Upon close 
examination of the central concern of the novels, namely the ideas of 
uplifting and upbullding Australia, it can be said that the actions of 
Collins, as hero, are in no way inconsistent with the values and 
norms espoused by Collins, the implied author. Collins may lie from 
time to time and deceive other characters through role-playing, or he 
may not make clear connections between characters and events, but 
it is my contention that Collins' untraditional characterisation is 
not inconsistent with the value he places on obseivant reading as an 
implied author. 
Booth (1983: 159) points out that deception or lying do not 
necessarily indicate unreliability. Indeed, Booth argues that '[a] great 
work establishes the "sincerity" of its implied author, regardless of 
how grossly the man who created that author may belie in his other 
forms of conduct the values embodied in his work' (1983:75). Since 
Collins is both implied author and hero, it is simply illogical to 
maintain the view that his narrating is unreliable. It is better to say 
that Collins is not reliable in the traditionally expected sense, and 
that readers need to take his advice to read obseivantly in the same 
way that one needs to obseive "life" observantl.y. In light of this, it is 
time to sample some of the critical views on Collins as an unreliable 
narrator. Clancy, in his book, A Reader's Guide to Australian Fiction, 
states that 
[t]he narrator Tom Collins ... undertakes to select 
entries from his diary and lay them before the reader. 
Only after a while does the 'obseivant reader' realize 
what Collins himself early admits -that the selection of 
en tries is highly purposeful and that an ironic gulf has 
developed between Collins the narrator and Furphy the 
author(l992:34. My italics). 
Firstly, Clancy makes the mistake of ignoring Collins' status 
as implied author by attributing authorship to Furphy. Secondly, if 
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one pays close attention to Clancy's words, then one begins to realize 
that what he states is contradictory. If Collins, as a narrator, has 
the power to craft a narrative selectively from his diaries, then 
Collins is an implied author, not simply a narrator. To say that 
'Collins either fails to see [the significance of the carefully planted 
narratives] altogether, or sees it only partially' (1992:34) seems to me 
to be illogical. Because the diaries can be seen as notebooks from 
which Collins creates the novelistic narrative, readers assume that 
Collins possesses 'the more sterling, if less ornamental qualities of 
the chronicler' SIL, 1). Yet, as the opening commentary to each 
chapter in Such ts Life indicates, this assumption is quickly 
overturned, for Collins purposefully brings to the skill or craft of 
chronicling the skill or craft of authorship. Collins may warn readers 
·against any expectation of plot or denouement', thereby securing 
them ·against disappointment' (SIL, 52). But it is interesting to note 
Collins' claim that 'sometimes an under-current of plot, running 
parallel with the main action, emerges from its murky depths, and 
causes a transient eddy in the interminable stream of events' (SIL, 
199). 
This indicates that Collins possesses an implied author's 
knowledge of the existence of a plot. Indeed, the fact that Collins 
admits to several acts of censorship in the presentation of his diaries 
ought to make the reader doubly aware that Collins is an implied 
author, just as he is the hero of the novels. Rather than observing a 
manufactured distance between Collins and Furphy, readers should 
equally be aware of a manufactured distance between Collins as an 
implied author and Collins as hero. In this sense, Croft's notion that 
'[T]om denies any plot in his rigorously empirical and aleatory record' 
yet 'unconsciously presents the alert reader with the plot' (1986:158) 
seems to me to be untenable. It might be better to say that by 
claiming there is no emphasis on plot, and then pointing out that 
one emerges, Collins consciously desires to make readers obseive and 
think about what they are reading. Collins is quick to counteract the 
potential view that his narratives are purely ornamental or escapist, 
as with Anglo-Australian romance, requiring little or no thought, or 
that his narratives are not directly concerned with social 
architecture, or the uplifting and upbuilding of a nation and its 
identity. 
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These are all big issues for a character who is generally 
considered to be unreliable. As I will discuss shortly, Collins' implied 
authorship is an integral part of the strategic game Furphy is 
playing. Nevertheless, the view that Collins is an unreliable narrator 
has persisted without adequate rational ground. Despite the fact 
that G.W. Turner discussed Collins' chronicling within the context of 
photography and selection, he states that '[w]e are in the hands of 
an "unreliable narrator"', for '[w]e must accept the factual part of the 
narrative, but the writer's analysis of the facts and theorizing about 
them must be suspect' ( 1990:50). To be suspicious of Collins' 
theoretical analysis of the accepted facts is a matter of analytical 
disagreement, not unreliability. Another odd evaluation is Douglas' 
notion that 'Collins the narrator ... tries to come to grtps with what 
has happened to him, and Furphy the author, who knows more than 
Collins ever can, works very subtly' to show that 'Collins gropes 
through the blind alleys and deceptive ways of life' in an attempt to 
master '[t)he overall vision of Furphy's' (1978:22). 
In a somewhat similar fashion, Zeller writes that Furphy 'set 
up an implied author with whom the appreciative reader can 
collaborate in creating meaning about life in the Rivertna (and life 
generally)' (1988:44). But Collins is still 'a notoriously unreliable 
narrator' and 'the business of storytelling should serve as a warning 
to the reader of Such ts Life not to approach the book as dogmatically 
as Collins approaches most subjects' (Zeller,1988:48). Indeed, '[w]e 
(the expert Australian readers whom Furphy has created) sit outside 
Collins' Rivertna world and understand things better than he does', 
and yet 'it is the job of the yamer to do more than just entertain; he 
must also enlighten' (Zeller, 1988:48). Zeller's yamer is presumably 
not Collins, but Furphy, despite the fact that he claims Collins to be 
the novel's implied author. Furthermore, it is also strange that he 
does not see that Collins sits outside the world of the Rivertna by 
virtue of his being the implied author, or that Collins, as hero, acts 
in accordance with the values and norms of the novels. As Booth had 
stated, 'I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for or acts in 
accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied 
author's norms)' (1983:158). 
Equally bizarre is Oliver's notion that 'Furphy uses Collins 
much as Conrad uses Marlowe, not only to gather the facts but also 
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to guarantee them' (1944:17). It is bizarre because Oliver claims that 
'Furphy needs to establish the character of Collins very carefully, 
since his narrator is not only to interpret the enclosed story for us; he 
is also to misinterpret it' (1944:16-17. My italics). Barnes makes 
much the same claim, for he states that 'Furphy intends that the 
reader should discover the inadequacies of the nominal narrator as 
an interpreter of the circumstances he records' (1976: 153). In Barnes' 
View, '[w]hen Collins is "afflicted" [by the roles he plays or a labyrinth 
of thought] ... he ceases to be a reliable narrator, and the observant 
reader must become his own interpreter' (1976: 159). What both 
Barnes and Oliver seem to miss is the fact that Collins is as much 
an implied author of the circumstances he records as he is the hero. 
In this sense, if the reader must rely on his own interpretative 
capacities, then he must also rely on Collins for direction. 
According to Gilding, 'Tom Collins is Furphy's key method of 
givtng unity to the "yams"' (1967:85). Interestingly enough, Gilding 
(1967:152) is quite prepared to claim that Collins is the controlling 
consciousness of The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, but not Such ts Life. 
And yet Gilding maintains the standard View that 'Collins is a "mere 
annalist" who is temporarily incapable of recording his fact 
objectively', for 'he is deceived in his cherished belief that he is 
always objective' (1967:26). Indeed, 'Tom is a philosopher who never 
arrives at the right conclusion and whose complicated reasonings 
are, for the most part, merely manifestations of vanity' (Gilding, 
1967:84). On a similar note, Devlin-Glass states that 'Tom is an 
unreliable philosopher, although a stimulating and comic one; he is 
dramatically conceived as a clownish figure and continually satirised 
by Furphy' (1974:84. My italics). Furthermore, '[Tom's] weakness as a 
thinker is his tendency to reach firm conclusions on the scantiest of 
evtdence', even though '[t]here is often a modicum of good sense and 
Justice in what Tom proposes' (1974:84). 
Croft thinks that '[t]he reasons for Tom's blindness are his 
intellectual rigidity and his reluctance to change a hypothesis to flt 
the facts' (1991:87). Thus, '[w]hen the reader has a clear idea of Just 
who and what Tom Collins is, she is then in a position to sift the 
clues from certain "extracts from the diary of Tom Collins" and to 
rearrange them into the novel created by Joseph Furphy' (Croft, 
1991:87). Croft's proposal is both pointless and strange, since the 
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reader is already presented with a novel created by Joseph Furphy. 
Equally, Partington states that 'Collins sometimes sees more than 
those around him, but on other occasions he sees less .... Clues rain 
thick and fast [and] Tom possesses none of the three attributes of 
intuition, veracity and memory to which he lays claim and he 
constantly displays the very failures in understanding he castigates 
in others' (1993:61). However, on the preceding page, Partington 
claims that 'Collins himself seems to have adequate credentials in 
both spheres' of 'practical knowledge based on direct experience and 
theoretical knowledge based on vicarious experience' (1993:60). 
Which is it to be? 
More confusing, however, is Henricksen's (1985:43) view that 
Furphy's novels do not have heroes nor villains; rather they have 
anti-heroes. Henricksen's view is taken directly from Kiernan, who 
argues that 'Collins is the anti-hero as author, and his role as the 
anti-hero could be defined as his consciousness of his failure to live 
up to what he imagines the expectations of the reader of fiction to 
be' (197la:6). In other words, Collins is an author who knows that 
he is unreliable because he cannot write for the masses, nor can he 
gauge his market. This is despite the fact that Collins does not want 
to write 'in the painfully simple manner so often affected in literature 
attended for the "masses'" (BBB, 88). As Collins states, 'I have one 
style of narrative -take it or leave it' (RR, 249). Nevertheless, the 
commonly accepted view seems to be that Collins is unreliable, and 
readers must follow the clues given by Furphy, the implied author, in 
order to see the truth of Collins' errors. 
But, critics who maintain that Furphy is the implied author 
oversimplify their appreciation of the novels, and err in their 
evaluation of Collins. Indeed, it is important to understand Collins' 
following confession, from Rtgby's Romance, about his narrative 
strategies, for this best explains what occurs in Such ts Life and The 
Buln-Buln and the Brolga: 
[i]n recounting the event here, I am merely adjusting, 
not jumbling, the order of things -transposing and 
grouping my occurrences, after the manner of some 
more famous, if less faithful, historians (RR, 216). 
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Within the context of Collins' confession, one is reminded of 
Manning Clark's concept of the historian: 
[e)very historian, like every writer, must accept his fate 
as a Merlin, a man in whom there is both an innocent 
child and a devil, a creator and a destroyer. Such a 
man has no difficulty in accepting the etymology of the 
word 'historian'. The htstor was the wtse man who told 
a story about the past, vouched for the accuracy of the 
events he described, and used those events to 
communicate to his readers or his listeners his vision 
of life. The htstor must be able to entertain his readers 
or audience -that is, hold them. He must have 
something to tell them about their world -that is to 
say, he is the true psychedelic or mind expander. He 
shows them clearly something of which they had been 
but vaguely and dimly aware. The histor must choose a 
subject which touches men deeply, write about things 
that matter .... Above all, history must be told in the 
same way as all great stories have been told ..... That is 
to say, the writer must do three things: create a time, 
place, and people .... Happily, for the historian there is 
a source- of inspiration. There is Clio, the muse of 
history .... Now the word Clio comes from a Greek verb 
which means to celebrate. I mention this to remind 
you that every historian must preserve a balance, a 
harmony between his duty as an artist to celebrate life 
as it is, and a duty as a moralist to show how the 
world can be improved (1980:32-33). 
Clark's "historian" brings much scope to Collins' confession 
that his authoring and chronicling represents 'Tom Hood's idea of 
perfect rule', namely '[a]n angel from heaven, and a despotism' (StL, 
263). Equally, it does much justice to a proper appreciation of 
Furphy's claim that Gollins is concerned with the uplifting and 
upbuildtng of Australia. Despite his predominantly post-structural 
reading of the novel, and his not classifying Collins as an implied 
author, I must agree With Hartley's notion that 
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[i]f we accept that Collins is responsible for every word 
of Such is Life, and within the framework that the 
novel constructs itself we have no other choice, as far 
as I can see, then we must recognise that Collins 
himself -as is certainly apparent in many sections, if 
not all- is a very erudite and capable character, with a 
penchant for irony, a finely-honed perceptual capacity 
that can hunt out the mystery behind the horse-and-
saddle incident, and a highly sophisticated sense of 
play ( 1986: 166-167). 
In Hartley's words, Collins is 'one of the most complex and 
finely-wrought characters in Australian literature' and to maintain 
that he is an unreliable narrator 'is a reduction of Furphy's full 
artistic achievement' ( 1986: 166 ). This artistic achievement is the veiy 
fact that 'Collins ... acts as a double to Furphy as author' (lndyk, 
1986:307). As Arthur states, 'the reader is presented with a pseudo-
autobiographical chronotope ... .Its time is, or purports to be, the time 
of the writing of the novel; its place, the place of writing' (1987:55). 
Indeed, Arthur notes that 'there are two poised pens and two 
autobiographical chronotopes, that of the ortginal diarist and that of 
the later chronicler/editor who selectedfrom the diaries' (1987:54. My 
italics). But in each chronotope exists the skill or craft of an implied 
author who not only selects from life anecdotes for his diaries, but 
also selects from those diaries specific anecdotes for works of fiction 
with a purpose. 
What, then, are we to make of the critical opinion that Collins' 
ego perverts any sense of objective reliability? Devlin-Glass states 
that 'Tom's ability to interpret personalities is extremely defective 
because his own ego interferes, protesting its own ever-imposing 
needs' (1974:78). Similarly, Osland claims that '[a] philosopher can 
only be as good as the faithfulness of his observation of the facts of 
life, and Tom's observation of life, and hence his observations on life, 
are distorted by the reflection of his own ego .... The ego that distorts 
Tom's observations also leaves its mark on his philosophy' 
(1985:233). Perhaps this is what G. W. Turner meant when he stated 
that '[t]hough a misguided philosopher [such as Collins] represents 
only a particular philosophy, his exposure is apt to implicate 
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philosophy in general' (1990:50). One can say this about any 
philosopher, scholar or artist who exerts some influence on their 
respective disciplines, whether they tum out to be misguided or not. 
Mitchell is closer to the truth: '[e]very man, using whatever 
powers of perception and reasoning he possesses, tries to find a 
hypothesis which will explain his own experiences and those of 
others. He brings to the test of his experiences hypotheses which 
claim to offer a satisfying solution. Furphy makes it increasingly 
clear that no single hypothesis of which he knows will explain more 
than part of the complex pattern of experience as he observes it' 
(1967:150-151). This is a good explanation of the ego's relationship 
to the world, tying in nicely with Furphy's emphasis on ignorance-
shifting and knowledge. Indeed, Collins' view that 'truth is relative' 
and 'not absolute' (BBB, 8) is a surprisingly modern and astute 
observation of an ego's relation to the world, and an ego's desire to 
make sense of the world. Furthermore, the fact that an ego interferes 
with the world, serving up a selected vision, does not necessarily 
endanger the road from ignorance to wisdom. Nor does it dictate that 
the ego is unreliable. 
The view that Collins is an unreliable narrator is the greatest 
red herring in critical studies on Furphy. But where did this view 
originate? I think the answer to this question can be found in 
Furphy's 1903 review. In this fascinating piece of Australian 
literature, Furphy wrote that 
[ o ]riginality is a characteristic of Such ts Life; and this 
is attained, to begin with, in the simplicity of the 
scheme. Setting out with an unpremeditated purpose 
of amplifying the diary-memoranda of one week -the 
book naturally falls into seven chapters. The first date 
is taken at hazard, from a series of filled-up pocket 
diartes .... Then for sufficient reasons, the diary-records 
cease to be consecutive, and are henceforth separated 
by monthly intervals .... Underneath this obvious 
dislocation of anything resembling continuous 
narrative, run several undercurrents of plot, manifest 
to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the 
author (1969:130. My italics). 
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Within the framework of an implied author in Such is Life, this 
last point is simply illogical. How is an author able 'to mask 
coincidence and cross purposes, sometimes too intricate' (1969:130) 
if he cannot notice several undercurrents of plot in his own 
narrative? Indeed, how can readers notice an ostensibly unnoticed 
undercurrent of plot while the implied author cannot? Is it not better 
to say that the implied author's masking intricate coincidences and 
cross purposes within the narrative must necessarily result in an 
.ostensibly unnoticed plot, since masking implies no direct intention to 
show things overtly to the reader, including plot? Would this not 
determine the way in which Collins depicts himself within the 
narrative world of the Rivertna? 
A.A. Phillips is incorrect to say that '[w]e do not see through 
Tom's eyes, for we often know more than he does .... Moreover, the 
reader sees Tom himself, and sees him not at all as Tom does' ([ 1958] 
1980:39). How is it that the reader can see more of Collins than 
Collins himself when the reader must rely on Collins as the implied 
author? Is it not fair to say that the masking of coincidence and 
cross purposes necessarily indicates both a breadth of vision and a 
crafting of plot, which is a knowledge? The vast majority of critics 
have taken Furphy at face value, without giving due regard to an 
observant reading of the review he wrote. It must be mentioned that 
Furphy wrote the review as a reviewer, making no mention of his 
being either the implied or real author of Such ts Life, and readily 
attributing authorship to Collins several times. 
To say that there are several undercurrents of plot ostensibly 
unnoticed by the author indicates that the author, whether real or 
implied, either pretends not to notice the undercurrents of plot or 
has no intention of foregrounding these undercurrents to his readers 
in the traditionally expected sense. Because this is the case, Collins 
is oot an unreliable narrator in Booth's sense of the term. But, 
Collins is not a reliable narrator in the traditional sense of overtly 
guiding the reader through the finer details of plot or character 
development. Furthermore, Collins is not a reliable author in the 
traditional sense of overtly guiding the reader through the twists and 
turns of his narratives. Either of these two views runs contrary to 
the stress placed on observant reading. Despite his traditional 
reading of the novels, Croft's idea of 'Tom's ... cunning concealment' 
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(1991:36) offers an excellent insight into Collins' strategies as 
implied author and hero. 
What, then, is Furphy trying to achieve wtth the review? The 
review is a brilliant narrative strategy, designed to alert readers to 
several important factors in the novel and encouraging them to read 
observantly. In short, Furphy was diplomatically trying to direct his 
readers to observe certain clues. It is quite plausible that he 
strategically hid his disappointment in the fact that not even the 
man he saw as his intellectual equal, namely William Cathels, had 
read the novel observantly. Although Cathels' letter to Furphy on 
Such is Life, reproduced in Barnes' biography (1990:263-265), has 
much positive commentacy about the novel, there is nevertheless an 
uncertainty in Cathels' observations, as if he were trying to be 
cautious about a novel he neither liked nor understood. As Croft 
explains, 'Furphy's friend, Cathels ... praised Joe [Furphy] for his 
skills as a chronicler, and found justifications for his ornate style, 
while never sensing anywhere in the book that there might be a plot 
or any unifying principle at all' (1991:49). 
Indeed, the scenario is much the same with A.G. Stephens, for 
he did not 'seem to pay any attention to Furphy's letter in May about 
the cunning use of a by-play in the plot', since 'Stephens thought of 
the work [not] as a novel [nor] as having a plot, nor of the narrator 
as being involved in any by-play' (Croft, 1991:48-49) 11 • Stephens 
considered Such ts Life simply as ·a record of Australian life' (Croft, 
1991:49). Equally, '[j]ust as Stephens had not followed up the lead 
given him in Furphy's letter when he read the manuscript, Cathels 
either did not remember, or failed to take the hint' (Croft, 1991:49). 
Barnes states that 'Stephens was a recognized literacy authority' and 
that, 'in Furphy's personal universe, Cathels also was an authority, 
and one whose opinion of [Furphy's] writing mattered greatly' 
(1990:267). I think the unobservant reading of these two important 
figures in Furphy's life amply justifies Furphy's strategy, for it seems 
strange that Furphy should send Stephens a review of his own novel 
when the latter asked for a synopsis, unless Furphy pragmatically 
wanted to show something, as well as curb any future misreadings or 
misunderstandings. 
11 In a letter to Stephens dated May 2, 1897, Furphy wrote, 'you will notice that a certain by-play in 
plot and eclaircissement is hidden from the philosophical narrator, however apparent to the matter-of-
f act reader' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:29). 
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By placing the blame on Tom Collins' inability to "notice" the 
clues, he thereby solved the potential problem of having to rewrite 
the narrative so that Collins did supply the clues, which would 
effectively change the style of the novel, turning it into the kind of 
literature for the masses Furphy so despised. However, he equally 
opened up an opportunity for critics to create that rather fallacious 
issue of the unreliable narrator in Such is Life. I believe Furphy did 
not expect the current consequences to arise, since he seems to 
think that his obseivant reader, once properly prompted, would not 
see Collins as flawed, but as an implied author who masks 
coincidence and cross-purposes, including the by-play of plot, in 
order to challenge the conventions of popular literature. Furphy tried 
to correct contemporary and future misreadings in a diplomatic 
manner. The reason for this diplomacy is best explained by Collins, 
who states that 'no person except the systematic and successful 
hypocrite has too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can 
get himself hated, 1f he goes the rtght way to work; but the game was 
never yet worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SiL, 162). 
Given the rivalry and division in colonial Australia, this is also 
an excellent justification by Collins for his own diplomatic selections 
or censorship, as is the following: 
[b]uilt into the moral structure of each earthly 
probationer is a thermometer, graduated 
independently; and it is never safe to heat the 
individual to the boiling-point of his register. You 
never know how far up the scale this point is, unless 
you are very familiar with the particular thermometer 
under expertment .... Nations, kindreds, and peoples are 
individuals in mass; and here the existence of an 
overlooked boiling-point is the one thing that makes 
history interesting (SiL, 240). 
Most readers are aware of the fact that Collins selects the most 
discerning narratives of his experiences because, whenever selections 
appear too risque, Tom strategically changes tack in accordance with 
the emphasis on choices and consequences, or selection and the 
controlling alternatives. Much of chapter three in Such ls Life is a 
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fuller and more carefully overt working-out of this principle. As 
Colllns states, '(t]n the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, 
reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' (SIL, 215. My italics). 
Kiernan states that 'Tom not only presents an image of himself to 
the characters in the book, but also attempts to present a flattering 
image to us' (1964:137). If we recall Croft's (1991:88) proposition, we 
must agree with him about seeing Tom Collins as a gentleman. 
Collins strives to be the hero and labours to maintain that tmage. 
But Collins does not simply labour to gtve his readers a well-
groomed, artstocrattc image of himself. Instead, Collins labours to 
create the rtght qualities for the newly-emerging national type. As 
Collins freely confesses, the 'foolish reader will be instructed' and 
'the integrity of narrative preserved' (SIL, 113). 
Collins is not only quick to censor an incident, but also very 
particular about making his reader aware of a strategic need for such 
censorship. When Jack the Shellback tells Collins the tale of the 
penguin and the man-o' -war hawk, Collins states that 'he gave me 
such a description of this afflicted bird as, in the interests of science, 
I have pleasure in laying before the intelligent public. I must, 
however, use my own language. Jack's rhetoric, though lucid and 
forcible, would look so bad on paper that the police mtght interfere 
with its publication' (SIL, 275). This ts one of many authorial 
comments by which Collins justifies his selections ethically. Indeed, 
the self-same reason ts gtven in the authorial commentary of chapter 
two, where Collins states that 'anyone who has listened for four 
hours to the conversation of a group of sheep drovers ... wtll agree 
with me as to the impossibility of getting the dialogue of such 
dramatts personae into anything like printable form' (SIL, 52). And, in 
the authorial comments of chapter seven, Colllns observes that 
(t]he routine record of March 9 ts not a desirable text. 
It would merely recall forth from fitting oblivion the 
lambing-down of two stalwart fencers by a pimply old 
shanty-keeper; and you know this sort of thing has 
been described ad sickenum by other pens, less proper 
than mine -described, in fact, till you would think 
that, in the back-country, drinking took the place of 
Conduct, as three-fourths of life; whilst the remaining 
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fourth consisted of fighting (SiL, 263). 
But, according to Collins, 'outside the shearing season, you 
might travel a hundred miles, calling at five shanties, without seeing 
a man the worse for drink; and you would still be likely to go a 
thousand miles, calling at fifty shanties, without seeing any 
indication of a fight' (SiL, 263). Through these examples, readers can 
see that Collins' selections are ethically justified within the context 
of artistic representation and uplifting and upbuilding, particularly 
in light of the prevailing rivahy and division in nineteenth-century 
Australia. Equally, it can be said that Collins writes for the widest 
possible readership, indicating that the craft or skill of authorship is 
one which takes into consideration the origin and destination of a 
narrative. Again, 'no person except the systematic and successful 
hypocrite has too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can 
get himself hated, if he goes the rtght way to work; but the game was 
never yet worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SiL, 162). In 
selecting, crafting or censoring "life", there is an appeal to an ethical 
strategy and wisdom in matters of artistic representation and 
cultural production for the sake of an aesthetic well-being within the 
individual and the community. 
We could say that Collins, as the implied author, uses an 
heroic image of himself to present himself as the ground for the 
newly-emerging national type. But we must also say that Collins, 
within the skill or craft of authorship, understands such a 
presentation to be strategically possible but never absolute. This is 
because Collins has, like so many currency lads or lasses, 'a 
commission to use [his] own judgment, and take [his] own risks, like 
any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). In this sense, one can 
understand why Collins has 'Collins' state, '[l]et each of us keep 
himself behind the spikes on this question of restricted capability' 
(SiL, 32. My italics). Or that '[t]ruth may be relative, not absolute' 
(BBB, 8). What is important to realize is this. If one were editorially 
to remove all the passages where Collins addresses his reader 
personally about his narrative strategies, then one could argue that 
Collins would become the narrator of a narrative which generates the 
illusion of an accurate representation of life. In this sense, events 
could occur of which Collins would be completely unaware. 
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As it stands, however, Collins quite openly confesses to the 
reader that his random selections are subject to his capacity to 
censor that which he deems unsuitable. In short, he acts in the 
capacity of an author with his notebooks, generating illusions and 
crafting a narrative with a particular design in mind, namely the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. In terms of Furphy's artistic 
designs, readers ought to keep in mind that the content of Such is 
Life has been placed there by Collins as an implied author. It is a 
choice that Furphy made both willingly and strategically. This 
illustrates quite neatly the immense scope which the theocy of the 
controlling alternatives has for Furphy in both an artistic and a 
personal sense. As Gilding notes, but does not pursue further, 
'behind the philosophy of the controlling alternative lies an 
awareness of the complexity of human experience; and behind the 
conception of Collins the philosopher lies a Collins who responds in 
a conststent way to this experience' (1967:97). 
2.4. Uplgting and Upbuilding the Antipodes: concluding rem.arks 
on Authorship. 
At a particular stage of the narrative strategies in Such is Life, 
Collins refers to 'Joe Collins' (93). This is interesting, for it generates 
the question as to how far apart Furphy and Collins are in the real 
and implied author relationship. At times, both share a remarkably 
close biographical affinity, which Barnes (1990) and Croft (1991) 
note. Indeed, Furphy states that 'I write only of what I know' (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). And in a letter to Miles 
Franklin, Furphy wrote, 'I find it best to take some actual occurrence 
as a bed-log, and build thereon -telling the stocy, not as it did 
happen, but as it should have done' (Barnes and Hoffmann, 
1995: 177). Artistically, Furphy places great e~phasis on the "truth 
embellished" technique. Furthermore, it is Collins who also lays 
claim to this artistcy when he states that '[ i)t will just show you how 
much the novelist has to answer for; following, as he does, the 
devices and desires of his own heart; telling the lies he ought not to 
have told, and leaving untold the lies that he ought to have told' (StL, 
272. My italics). 
In an earlier essay, Barnes states that 'Collins can hardly be 
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separated from hiS creator, stylistically, although one must say that, 
when Furphy writes as Collins, he writes as a man with a license to 
display his wit and learning, but he does not always judge vei:y 
happily what the reader will recognize' (1981::xxiii). To a certain 
extent, this is true, for Furphy's emphasis on observant reading, of 
piecing together a series of scattered clues, runs the risk of veiling 
his strategy and designs too deeply under the guise of formlessness. 
Nevertheless, by using the character and nom de plume of Tom 
Collins, as well as the emphasiS on observant reading, Furphy is able 
to give his novels not only the capacity for social commentai:y, but 
also the quality of a philosophical investigation into the artistic 
nature of personal and national identity. Concerning Such is Life, 
Hartley states that identity is synonymous with 'plot,' becoming 'as 
much a matter of exclusion, or concealment, as of inclusion, or 
mapping-out' (1986:156). 
One can extend this rather apt observation to both Rtgby's 
Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. Although Hartley does 
not make the connection, his emphasis on inclusion and exclusion 
principally captures the concepts of authorship and selection, of 
choices and consequences in the theoi:y of the controlling 
alternatives. In this sense, I diSagree with Croft, who states that '[i]t 
is often assumed by readers of the three major works that Tom 
Collins' opinions are those of Joseph Furphy, and that they express 
the same socialistic idealism that is evident in some of his letters. 
That iS far from the truth. Tom's ideas on political economy are often 
thoroughly conservative' (1991:94). This is problematic, for I think 
both Furphy and Collins express an interest in socialist ideas, as I 
have already argued, but they are not socialists. Again, it is my 
contention that both are Philosophes who express their faith in an 
enlightened new world and its type. 
Nor is it entirely clear just what Croft means by claiming that 
Collins is thoroughly conservative, for Collins iS concerned with the 
creation and dissemination of a way of seeing and responding to life 
in Australia that challenges the more conservative ideology of Anglo-
Australianism. Although Croft rightly makes a distinction between 
Joseph Furphy and Tom Collins, it is unfair and problematic to 
suggest that Collins' radicalism and philosophizing is simply a guise 
for his 'conservative leanings' (1991:95) and desire to amass capital. 
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What one finds in the relationship between real author and implied 
author, or Furphy and Collins, is a carefully woven tapestry of 
affinities and distances, for Collins represents the chosen other 
whereby Furphy sought to fathom the value of his experiences in the 
Riverina and to communicate the meaning of that value in light of 
uplifting and upbuilding. Furphy himself had said that '[a]s T.C. I 
can make myself objectionable with better grace' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84). 
In terms of the value of Tom Collins, this is the crucial link 
between Furphy and his implied author, for uplifting and upbuilding 
in the daily plebiscite cannot be separated from the concepts of 
authorship and selection. Nor can uplifting and upbuilding be 
separated from the ethics of representation in art, for Furphy and 
Collins stress that the production of stories in a newly-emerging 
social and cultural identity must consider the well-being of the 
individual and the community, as is evident in Furphy's use of the 
adjective "truth embellished". For this reason, I must disagree with 
Barnes' notion that '[i]n Collins's narrative we see a man acting in 
ignorance of how his actions in the present will affect not only his 
own future but that of others' (1979: 19). To have an awareness of the 
ethics of representation, of what the self ought to do in art and life, 
is to have an awareness of how that articulation strategically, as a 
response to life, can have an impact on the human order of things. 
This is an important aspect of the wonderfully complex relationship 
of values between Furphy and Collins as real author and implied 
author. 
According to Barnes, '[h]e [Collins] is a version of Furphy 
himself, or, to put it another way, he is Furphy playing a role, and I 
am inclined to think that this role was necessary to Furphy as a 
writer' (1979: 12). But, readers are meant to see that Collins is also 
"Collins" on his own terms and with his own resources of self proper 
to him, hence his articulation of the theory of the controlling 
alternatives and his engagement with the concepts of authorship, 
selection, "truth embellished" representation, "presence" and role-
play. Croft (1991:265) points out that Furphy's book of collected 
poems, edited by Kate Baker and first published in 1916, was the 
first work by Furphy to have authorship accredited to him. During 
his lifetime, Furphy refused to drop his nom de plume, stating to 
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Stephens that '[t]here is one thing I hate; yea, two that I abhor; and 
these three things are celebrity, fame, renown, and reputation; also 
there are five things that my soul lusteth after; and these be 
obscurity and privacy' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84). 
Besides privacy, I think Furphy knew that public recognition of his 
being the author of Such is Life would spoil what he sought to 
achieve with Tom Collins. 
In this sense, Croft's notion that, '[f]or Joseph Furphy, Tom 
Collins' writings are lies' and, 'for Tom Collins, romances, such as 
those which form the basis of Furphy's three novels, are also lies' 
(1991:51) is much too problematic12 • Croft may point out that Such ts 
Life has 'two authors: one fictional and one real' (1991:85), but he 
devalues Furphy's designs for Collins by remaining with the concept 
of an unreliable narrator due to the etymological origin of "Tom 
Collins". Whether or not Collins actually exists in the normal sense 
readers attribute to an author does not matter. Tom Collins' 
fictionality in no way negates the more important issue of why 
Collins exists and how art, especially through the intimacy between 
language and literature, is a crucial element in expressing the 
fundamentals of that existence in the world. As I have already 
argued, readers ought to see both a similarity and a difference 
between the "Tom Collins" of Australian folklore and the "Tom 
Collins" of the novels. The meaning and value of both "Tom 
Collinses" is intimately related to yarning or the tall story, but each 
yams or tells tall tales for different reasons. 
Unlike the practical Joker of Australian folklore, readers are 
meant to see, through the Collins of the novels, an intimate 
relationship between identity, well-being and narrative strategy in 
the world outside literature. As Furphy had stated to Stephens, 'the 
usages of Riverina rasped the scales from my eyes' (Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). Indeed, on many occasions in Such is Life, 
Collins takes great care in communicating the look and feel of the 
Rivertna through his expositions of the environment. This, I think, is 
important, for the Riverina is meant to be seen as the quintessential 
environment where colonial society, both rural and urban, strives to 
establish a cultural value in the Australian experience. As an 
12 I will discuss the issue of lying more fully in the next chapter when I examine its thematic 
predominance in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga in light of uplifting and upbuilding a national type or 
"identity". 
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analogy, the Rivertna is an expansive space and time of events where 
the act of recognizing an event and seeing that event as it unfolds 
leads to the phenomena in which the self qualifies the environment 
with value and meaning. It can be said that the Riverina is a 
geography of players, where the self-other relationship predominates 
because of colonial rivalry and divisions and a strong presence of 
international identities. 
Although Collins, as implied author, uses himself, as a hero, 
to fill this space and time with value, he also stylistically employs 
the Rivertna itself, drawing the reader's attention to that curious 
event and phenomenon known as the mirage. In the opening 
authorial commentary to chapter four of Such ts Life, Collins states 
that 
[t]he mirage is one of Nature's obscure and cheerless 
Jokes; and in this instance, as in some few others, she 
is beyond Art. She even assists the illusion by a very 
slight depression of the plain in the right place. In 
fact, an artist's picture of a mirage would be his 
picture of a level-brimmed, unruffled lake; also, the 
most skilful word-painter, in attempting to contrast 
the appearance of water with that of its fac-simile 
(sic), would become as confused and hazy as any 
clergyman taxed to dfff erenttate hts creed from that of 
the mollah running the opposition. And Nature, in 
taking this mirthless rise out of the spectator, never 
repeats herself in the particulars of distance, area, or 
configuration of her simulacre (StL, 129-130. My 
italics). 
Nature is beyond art because "she" is beyond man's control. 
Yet nature's mirage makes man aware of the possibility of art by 
stimulating man's interest in geographically specific optical illusions. 
But the qualities generally associated with mirages or simulacra in 
nature also indicate that what one can create in art may not be 
easily distinguished from the artistic production of values from 
another social and cultural landscape or geography. Although the 
mirage in art has a much more stable existence than the mirage in 
nature, because the former is a phenomenon rather than an event, 
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Collins strongly suggests that artistic images, despite the skill or 
craft of the author or artist, are not wholly exempt from generating 
the same eventful qualities. One could take Colltns' commentary on 
the mirage as a parable for the need to establish control over 
selection tn artistic creativity, especially with the uplifting and 
upbuildtng of a national identity and the production of an 
appropriate cultural creed for the Australian experience. If left to the 
choice of another, such as Anglo-Australiantsm, then the consequent 
images and experiences which can selectively define an Australian 
identity and creed will suffer. 
Indeed, the facsimiles that are called Australiana will be hard 
to differentiate from British values and ways of seeing. This, then, 
leads us to a consideration of the concept of the .. Antipodes", for one 
can say that national identity or the national type, tn much the 
same manner as the mirage, ts an optical illusion generated by 
specific features in an environment and the way in which people 
respond to those features. More importantly, the optical illusion of a 
national type depends on ways of seeing and attributing value, or an 
attitude. As Elliot (1966:51) indicates, the most persistent attitude, 
through which Australia and Australlana has been seen, ts that of 
the Antipodes, or the land of topsy-turvydom. According to Elliot, 
this Northern European notion was bound up with the idea that, 
'[tin the new world, the slate was clean, perfection was in [man's] 
grasp, and [he] was yet agatn to prove his quality' (1966:52). In short, 
new worlds 'always presented themselves tn terms of an expanding 
human happiness' (1966:52). This ts interesting, for the value of the 
Antipodes, as an attitude, ts intimately tied to a European concept of 
well-being 1n an exotically new, yet strangely famtllar, landscape. 
In this sense, according to Elliot, Australia did not quite make 
the grade: 
[a) man must arrange his mind according to his 
inherited dispositions. This seems to have been even 
more difficult, and therefore in many respects a slower 
process, in Australia than tn America. The 
environment itself was stranger; the landscape made 
greater demands. There were far fewer natural 
similarities than the settler had discovered 1n America; 
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it was inevitable that there should be much reluctance 
to accept and become identified with a landscape and 
conditions of life in which so many of the articles were 
novel and unfamiliar. It was the antipodes, the land of 
opposites; the landscape, the plants, the birds, the 
animals, all held a strangeness that kept the notion of 
anomalousness before the mind. Moreover, in practical 
life not only did the seeker after the lost paradise 
discover that labour in this vineyard could be heavier, 
and nature more uncertain in her rewards, than in the 
old land; but the freedom for the spirit promised in the 
new country, if it really existed -and in some real 
senses it did- was purchased dear at the cost of a 
forbidding isolation. To be lived in at all, the 
Australian environment demanded imperatively a far 
from gentle reorganization of the whole of a man's 
habits and attitudes (1966:54. My italics). 
In short, Australia was more antipodean than any other 
"Antipodes". It was, in terms of "identifiable" values, a land of 
mirages. But, while the landscape 13 was different, indicating that the 
production of stories about the environment would communicate 
this difference, it is equally fair to say that writing the Australian 
experience cannot be totally severed from a universally acceptable 
manner of producing meaning and value in the western cultural 
tradition. Collins is aware of this, and his invoking of the parable of 
the mirage also indicates that environmentally specific cultural 
productions have both differences and family resemblances, or 
particulars and universals. Readers should see Collins' Rivertna as 
an environment which not only emphasises the need for ethics in 
matters of artistic representation, but also as an environment which 
shows that certain selections in the cultural production of a 
common identity or type have, or can have, family resemblances with 
an already existing body of national or cultural productions. 
As Furphy stated in his 1903 review, '[t]he corresponding 
penalty of [al National consciousness is a certain narrowness of 
13 I will discuss landscape in more detail in the next chapter when I investigate Furphy's and Collins' 
version of an Australian national type. 
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outlook, a spontaneous impression that the sun rises over the 
Barrier Reef, and sets behind the Leeuwin' ( 1969: 128). In Furphy's 
view, as well as Collins', this kind of narrow awareness or 
spontaneous impression is the direct result of an unnecessarily 
ignorant rejection of Western culture and, more importantly, 
Australia's place in the Western cultural canon. When Collins claims 
that 'the coming Australian is a problem' (SIL, 144), or that a single 
type is a problem because, 'lacking generations of development' like 
the squatter, 'there are a thousand types' (SiL, 164), he strongly 
suggests that the Australian branch cannot be severed from the 
western tree. Historically, therefore, one ought to see the concept of 
the Antipodes and its focus on national identity as a tug-of-war 
between "Australian" and Anglo-Australian attitudes. 
It might be said that what Anglo-Australians despised, 
"Australians" celebrated, and vice-versa. If one considers the Boer 
War. for example, one can see this conflict of attitudes emerge in the 
opposing concepts of Anglo-Australian "jingoism" and Australian 
"larrikinism". According to Evans et al, 'young larrtkin males (and to 
some degree, their female companions) had come to be typified as the 
epitome of disorderliness' while' [y]oung men who volunteered to 
fight in the South African war ... were usually viewed as upstanding 
examples of loyal. well-disciplined manhood' ( 1997:78). Indeed, 
Docker ( 1986:52-53) draws an interesting comparison between the 
"Australian" antipodes, or the world-upside-down, and Bakhtin's 
concept of the carnival. suggesting that larrikinism was the popular 
means by which "Australians" expressed their dislike of Anglo-
Australian cultural imperialism. According to Kunzle, '[t]he 
broadsheet theme of the World Upside Down ... .lent itself historically 
to a variety of interpretations, and was capable of fulfilling diverse 
and even contrary social and psychological needs'( 1978:39-40). 
But the staple diet of this broadsheet theme was the conflict of 
attitudes between two opposing groups, respectively holding 
dominant and subordinate social positions, who were each devalued 
by the other's use of '[t]he principle of inversion' (Kunzle, 1978:41). 
This conflict of attitudes appears to irk Furphy, for he sees the 
"Australian" antipodean attitude, fostered by the Bulletin school and 
its celebration of difference and uniqueness of identity, as an 
unnecessary rejection of the western cultural canon and so an 
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unnecessacy celebration of ignorance. Again, Furphy had stated to 
Cecil Winter that '(t]here is much in your suggestion respecting the 
causes of pessimism in the Out-back man (who is the real 
Australian); but, as you say, Ignorance is at the root of it' (in Barnes 
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124. My italics). Despite the fact that '(t]he 
Empire was an emotional necessity and a source of national security 
and political stability' (Stewart, 1996:5), I do not think that Furphy 
nor Collins wanted Australia to follow, in a jingoistic manner, 'the 
English drumbeat' (SiL, 139). In the authoring of an identity or the 
creation of a national optical illusion, both Furphy and Collins 
emphasise that the concept of the Antipodes, or the world-upside-
down, rather than remaining caught in the grip of two opposing 
views, ought to come under the same ethical emphasis as any other 
artistic process of selection and representation. 
Indeed, what one finds With Collins is a synthesis of these two 
extreme views, indicating that Collins, as an implied author, 
presents his readers With an image of an emerging Australian type 
different from the articulated images of the time. Without my 
referring to specific episodes, readers ought to see this design in the 
novels, especially with the contrast between Collins and the 
bullockies, as well as other masculine identities in the novelistic 
world of the Riverina. Furthermore, this design of providing an 
alternative direction for the newly-emerging type can be found in the 
numerous references to the Australian woman and her values. By 
utilising the concept of the Antipodes in a positive manner, and by 
employing Collins as both an implied author and a hero, Furphy 
negotiates his way through the ignorant extremes of Australianism 
and Anglo-Australianism to show that an aesthetic well-being is 
possible because an arbitration between these two views is possible. 
In short, the novels indicate that the theme of a world upside 
down, or the Australian antipodean attitude, can add greater scope 
to an already existing body of values in the western cultural canon 14. 
I think Furphy would have sided With Walt Whitman's opening lines 
in the 1855 preface to Leaves of Grass: 'America does not repel the 
past or what it has produced under its forms or amid other politics 
or the idea of castes or the old religions', for America 'accepts the 
14 Because Collins is a currency lad, it is interesting to see the novels and the issues I have been 
discussing as advice to the currency lads and lasses of the 1880s and 1890s, especially in matters of 
authorship and artistic representation in the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. 
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lessons with calmness' (1994:383). Indeed, it is my contention that 
Furphy wanted to see the self-same "antipodean" attitude take firm 
root in Australia. In short, the antipodean attitude is, for Furphy, 
the act of seeing value in the new world, an emphasis on ethics and 
selection, and an awareness of the controlling alternatives in light of 
past errors15 • The manner in which Furphy expresses this belief will 
be the focus of investigation in the next chapter, where I will discuss 
Tom Collins' relationship, as both an implied author and hero, to 
the newly-emerging type and the role of the self-other relationship in 
the production of an identity. 
15 To a certain degree, Furphy's relationship with the "past" is much more secure than that other 
Australian nationalist who was influenced by Whitman, namely Bernard O'Dowd. Indeed, in 
O'Dowd's poem "Australia", there is an uncertainty towards the past that makes it "the fatal nest", 
rather than a series of lessons from which Australia can learn. 
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3. Man and Identity: new worlds, guardianship and the 
antipodean type. 
About the time when Fred went to England, Steve 
Thompson and I, confident that we were men of the 
time, departed from our homes in different directions, 
to fulfil, severally, our great destinies. Our efforts, by 
the way, have been rewarded by a measure of success. 
-The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, 1948:39-
3.1. Reading and Weaving a Nation: morality and the loosely 
federated yarns. 
Collins reminds his reader that, '[w]hen I undertook the 
pleasant task of writing out these reminiscences, I engaged, you will 
remember, to amplify the record of one week; Judging that a rigidly 
faithful analysis of that sample would disclose the approximate 
percentage of happiness, virtue &c., in Life' (StL, 52. My italics). But 
there are many incidents in the narrative where Collins considers 
censorship to be necessary. Reiterating his commitment to the reader 
at a later stage in the novel, Collins states, '[o]f course, I am 
committed to any narration imposed by my random election of dates; 
but Just notice that perversity, that untowardness, that cussedness 
in the affairs of men' (StL, 204). Because of this, the changes made 
by Collins indicate a strong, ethical concern for the idea of 
authorship. This is particularly so with Anglo-Australian romance 
and its use of a system of values that 'persists in viewing Australian 
characteristics and deviations as more or less exotic' (Furphy, 
1969: 128). Equally, there is opposition to 'the fully-emancipated 
native born', whose values create a 'National consciousness' with a 
'certain narrowness of outlook' (Furphy, 1969: 128). 
Barnes points out that, '[a]long with Lawson and Paterson, 
Furphy was creating an image of the Australian type' ( 1979:36). 
However, there are problems with Barnes' statement, particularly if 
readers think of placing Furphy in the same school of thought as 
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either Lawson or Paterson. This mistake is made by Vance Palmer, 
who concludes The Legend of the Nineties by claiming that Furphy, 
Lawson and Paterson 'established the type -the Joe Wilsons, the 
Clancys, and the Tom Collinses- and at the same time they fixed the 
habit of regarding it as a literary norm' (1963:170). But Palmer's 
view, as Cantrell (1977:xxvi) suggests, is much more indicative of a 
nationalist mind set in the twentieth century than a truth about the 
1890s nationalist period. Indeed, the 1892 debate between Paterson 
and Lawson, as discussed in detail by Bruce Nesbitt (1971), or more 
recently by Mark Horgan and Michael Sharkey (1996), points to the 
inconclusiveness of the debate, as well as the strategies used by 
many nationalist writers to prop up their versions of bush life rather 
than engage with the issue of realism set down by Lawson 1 • 
Setting aside the complexity of the debate itself, it is important 
to be aware of the debate's significance to Furphy and Tom Collins. 
Although nationalism was an influential factor, the Lawson and 
Paterson debate was not directly concerned with an emerging 
national type. Rather, it was concerned with 'the bush as an 
important source of artistic inspiration' (Horgan and Sharkey, 
1996:66). As Cantrell explains, although Paterson 'seemed to suggest 
that Lawson was merely being pessimistic about the bush, .... what 
was at stake, for Lawson at least, was the whole notion of the 
relationship of a writer to his society' (1977:xxi). In short, '[s]hould 
the writer attempt to fabricate and idealise his experience in the 
interests of a national ideal? Or should he try to depict the world as 
he saw it, in spite of the hurt to himself and his readers?' (Cantrell, 
1977:xxi). Although it is not a clear-cut argument, it is nevertheless 
an ethical one. And it is an ethical argument in which Furphy 
participated. According to Partington, 
[i]f some experiences are more likely than others to 
foster Absolute Truth or greater relative truths, 
relationships with the land are often thought to be an 
especially vital element. One of the most celebrated 
----------
, Of further interest is the notion that, according to Paterson, the debate was deliberately staged and had 
initially been prompted by Lawson's suggesting that he and Paterson would profit by it (in Horgan 
and Sharkey, 1996:69. See also Cantrell, 1971: 138 and Nesbitt, 1971:4). One wonders if Lawson had 
wanted to use Paterson and his style as a vehicle for his own ideas concerning realism in art, and that 
the debate, although staged, culminated into what Paterson later called 'the "undignified affair"' (in 
Nesbitt, 1971:3). 
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literary controversies during the period in which 
Furphy was conceiving the original Such ts Life was 
between Banjo Paterson and Henry Lawson as to 
whether the Bush was at heart beneficent or 
malevolent. Although Furphy is not a lyrical writer, 
his descriptions of the vast open plains of the Rivertna 
are powerfully evocative .... Yet he is on the side of 
Lawson against Paterson and pours scorn on arcadian 
notions of a benign AustraltaFeltx (1993:167-168). 
While there is validity to Partington's claim, I do not think he 
"pours scorn" on Paterson as a show of support for Lawson's anti-
arcadian polemic. Furphy's relationship to Lawson and Paterson is of 
a much more subtle complexity than Partington states. In a letter to 
Cecil Winter, dated the 28th of July, 1904, Furphy (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 169) admired the poetry of both men, although 
he believed Lawson to be the greater poet. However, in a letter to 
Winter, written six months earlier, Furphy (in Barnes and Hoffmann, 
eds, 1995:147) mourns the loss of Lawson's poetic genius to drink 
and self-indulgence. Furphy did not admire Lawson's prose, 
considering it to be pessimistic and as detrimental to the artistic 
uplifting and upbuilding of a true sense of community in Australia as 
Anglo-Australian romance. When discussing the causal relationship 
between pessimism and ignorance 'in the Out-back man' a year 
earlier, Furphy had written to Winter that 'the pessimist is simply a 
man who errs in his interpretation of Nature' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). 
According. to Nesbitt, 'Furphy was actually challenging 
Lawson's major premise, not defending it' (1971:12). Furphy's letters 
give us much more information about his views on Lawson than on 
Paterson, yet I am inclined to think that Furphy saw some validity to 
both sides of the debate. Ethically speaking, there is no difference 
between Paterson's and Lawson's position in the debate, for both are 
ultimately concerned with individual and communal well-being. Both 
stress the importance of understanding the land and one's 
relationship to it and within it, yet they do so from two opposing 
styles. In this sense, the Lawson and Paterson debate offers nothing 
more than an artistic stalemate. If one romanticises the land and its 
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people, then one misunderstands one's relationship to the Australian 
environment and one's chance of success in it. Yet, if one depicts the 
grtm reality of that environment, constantly stressing struggle or 
battle, then one undermines the human capacity to accept 
challenges and to hope, which are two important things that a 
romantic perspective can offer in the face of adversity. 
Furphy appears to be aware of this dilemma, offering an 
alternative way of seeing and responding. I think the following 
passage from Such is Llf e is an indirect yet revealing reference to the 
debate: 
[i]t is not in our cities or townships, it is not in our 
agricultural or mining areas, that the Australian 
attains full consciousness of his own nationality; it is 
in places like this [Rtvertna], and as clearly here as at 
the centre of the continent. To me the monotonous 
variety of this interminable scrub has a charm of its 
own; so grave, so subdued, self-centred; so alien to the 
genial appeal of more winsome landscape, or the 
assertive grandeur of mountain and gorge. To me, this 
wayward diversity of spontaneous plant life bespeaks 
an unconfined, ungauged potentiality of resource; it 
unveils the ideographic prophecy, painted by Nature in 
her Impressionistic mood, to be deciphered aright only 
by those willing to discern through the crudeness of a 
dawn a promise of majestic day (SIL, 65. My italics). 
Readers ought to note the style of the language, for it 
oscillates between realism and romanticism. Throughout the three 
novels, Collins' style is a moderation of realist and romanticist 
principles, namely an emphasis on depicting the way things are, as 
well as an emphasis on a way of seeing and responding where man 
does not sink into pessimistic resignation. It is my contention that 
Furphy wanted to present Tom Collins, in terms of character, as a 
hybrid between a Joe Wilson and a Clancy, and that the debate 
between Lawson and Paterson ought to be considered as an 
important factor in gauging the value of Collins. Of further interest, 
readers ought to see that Collins, through his status as implied 
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author, indicates quite cleverly that realism, or chronicling, does not 
faithfully depict what is there, but is a case of 'seeing selectively' 
(Graham. 1997:89) and cannot avoid a degree of romanticising. As 
Furphy points out in his 1903 review of Tom Collins' novel, 
[w]hen ... reinforced by acute obseivation, and cast into 
literary form, [the National consciousness] invests 
with interest the minutest details of National life. Add 
humour, sympathy, and felicity of phrase, together 
with that rarest of mental qualities, initiative, and the 
subtle touch of nature is achieved. Such fiction may be 
truer than truth itself, since the latter, often 
anomalous and untypical, is always part-hidden from 
view. But here a new light of significance is flashed on 
the commonplace; a shade of actuality softens the 
bizarre; and each scene, action or colloquy, carrying 
authenticity on its face, becomes an indispensable 
accessory to the completed work. This describes Tom 
Collins -at his best (1969:128-129). 
If one recalls Furphy's stressing a truth embellished style to 
Cecil Winter, then one ought to see that this idea is a mean between 
the two styles set forth by Paterson and Lawson2 • According to 
Horgan and Sharkey, '[t]he melancholy interpretation of the outback 
had become as hackneyed as the golden age connotations against 
which Lawson launched his attack' (1996:91). Because the opposing 
realist and romantic styles had such sway in Australian narratives, I 
think Furphy considered them to be false alternatives, for they 
maintained a division and rivalry that affected the uplifting and 
upbuilding of Australia. In terms of representing a way of seeing and 
2 I think it is important to note that, of the three writers, Furphy is the eldest, while his implied 
author, Tom Collins, is roughly the same age as Lawson and Paterson. For this reason, as well as his 
fervour for The Australian Society of Irresponsibles, I tend to think that Furphy saw himself 
artistically not only as a promoter, but also as a teacher of Australian art. In a letter to Cecil Winter, 
Furphy writes that '[y]esterday a young swell cove of 25 (stranger to me) called on me at the shop to 
ask the loan of "S'L." for a week, as he had arranged to contribute an evening's address to a local 
Literary Ass. on Aus. Lit....This young fellow, I found, knew as much of Aus. Lit. as I know of 
Chinese ... so I took pity on him. By arrangement, I collected all the Aus. Lit. available, which I am 
to place in his hands tomorrow' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 169). Furthermore, it is quite 
likely that he was, through Such is Life, attempting to educate Australian writers in matters of artistic 
representation. 
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responding to life which is beneficial to individual and communal 
well-being, Furphy seems to suggest quite strongly that both Lawson 
and Paterson respectively followed 'the devices and desires of his own 
heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving untold 
the lies that he ought to have told' (SiL, 272. My italics). 
With such destgns underpinning Furphy's novels, we ought to 
see the value he places on observant reading, and consider Steve 
Thompson's comments from the lost child episode in chapter five of 
Such ts Life: 
I compare tracking to reading a letter written in a good 
business hand. You mustn't look at what's under your 
eye; you must see a lot at once, and keep a general 
grasp of what's on ahead, besides spotting each track 
as you pass. Otherwise, you'll be always turning back 
for a fresh race at it. And you must no more confine 
yourself to actual tracks than you would expect to find 
each letter correctly formed. You must just lift the 
general meaning as you go. Of course, our everyday 
tracking is not tracking at all (SiL, 189). 
Firstly, the lost child to whom Thompson's comments refer is 
Mary O'Halloran, the 'perfect Young-Australian' (SiL, 73). Keogh 
(1989:61) and Scheckter (1981:69) note that Mary O'Halloran 
functions as a symbol of the nation's future, and it is fitting to see 
Thompson's comments as stressing the need for observant reading 
and truth embellishment in light of tracking the national future. 
This is particularly the case, as Furphy suggests, when it comes to 
serving up the 'details of National life' (1969: 129). However, because 
of the Lawson-Paterson debate, Furphy adds another dimension to 
this state of affairs, and that is an ethical emphasis on the moral 
ramifications of a particular genre and its articulation of life. Furphy 
makes clear that the way in which an author imagines the 
community or the landscape, through a chosen genre, will affect the 
way people respond to life and the way the idea of nation is seen, for 
these 'imaginary models ... constitute the only reality that there is' 
(Graham, 1995: 129). 
In short, Furphy's three novels express the modern view that 
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the novel itself is a powerful medium in which the idea of nation can 
be observantly read and tracked. According to Benedict Anderson, 
'the novel and the newspaper .... provided the technical means for "re-
presenting" the kind of imagined community that is the nation' 
(1991:25). This view can be extended to art generally. Yet Anderson is 
correct to point out that the novel has the greater ability to 
construct 'societies' as 'sociological entitles of such firm and stable 
reality that their members ... can even be described as passing each 
other on the street, without ever becoming acquainted, and still be 
connected' (1991:25). As Brennan explains, '[r]ead in isolation, the 
novel was nevertheless a mass ceremony; one could read alone with 
the conviction that millions of others were doing the same, at the 
same time' (1990:52). Bearing in mind the notion that the novel has 
the capacity to imagine the unity of nation, it is now time to 
consider what Furphy may have meant by his idea of a loose 
federation. 
In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy wrote, 'I made a point of 
loosely federating these yams (if you understand me); till by-and-by 
the scheme of "S'Life" suggested itself. Then I selected and altered 
and largely rewrote 7 of these stories, until they came out as you see' 
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 125. My italics). Barnes is 
perhaps the first to propose an investigation on the effect of the 
loosely-federated structure in Such ts Life. He argues that '[t)hrough 
the diary plan and the interlocking narratives Furphy gives an 
impression of the seeming shapelessness and uncertain 
consequences of events of everyday life' (1971:130). Again, in his 
monograph on Furphy, Barnes repeats these conclusions, adding 
that 'Such ts Life tends to be an accumulation, an aggregation of 
parts, rather than an organic unity' (1979:28-29). As Barnes later 
states in his biography of Furphy, 'though he apparently talked of 
writing a novel long before Such ts Life took shape, it is unlikely that 
he began with a clear intention of writing a single prose work' 
(1990:170). Barnes makes it sound as if great authors produce great 
works, or that great works must necessarily have an unmistakable 
organic unity from their initial conception to the final draft. 
Perhaps one is now in a better position to understand Barnes' 
notion that 'Furphy had "federated" or organised his stories around a 
central idea which he illustrates: the book shows us the inexplicable 
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irony of circumstance, but it does not, as Hardy's Tess of the 
d'Urbervilles, imply a Vision of man in the universe' (1971:131). 
Rather than an inexplicable irony of circumstance, Furphy's novel, 
through Tom Collins, does imply a Vision of man in the universe, 
although it may not necessarily be the same as Hardy's. This vision 
of man has much to do with his need to express his sense of self and 
community, and to uplift and upbuild this need artistically if there is 
something morally wanting in the existing narratives on human 
experience. Speaking of the 'loose federation' of episodic 'yarns' and 
Furphy's 'craftsmanship,' A.A. Phillips states that '[t]o judge the 
gaps, to devise a convincing means to make the additional revelation, 
must have demanded a most determined energy of invention' ([1958] 
1980:39). Phillips ([ 1958] 1980:39) further argues that this aspect of 
Furphy's craftsmanship reflects the manner in which our knowledge 
of others in society is constituted: a point with which I agree, 
although I would also extend this to the knowledge of selfhood. 
Barnes touches on this aspect of the novel when he explains 
that, '[b]y 1893 Furphy was committed to Tom Collins and a series of 
'loosely federated' narratives in which Collins's presence and mental 
habtts provlded the basic connection between separate actions' 
(1990:221. My italics). According to Croft, '[t]he very experience of 
reading Such ts Life is indeed that of dealing with a "loose federation" 
in which the federated pieces slip and slide in their hierarchy, but 
never lose their federal identity' ( 1989: 1 7). This is one of the main 
reasons why I think Collins ethically lays claim to 'a generally hap-
hazard economy With poetical justice' (SiL, 52). With its "random" 
acts of selection, as well as the theory of the controlling alternatives, 
the idea of a loose federation is significant to the novels' View of 
identity or "character". I will return to this in a moment. For now, we 
need to look more closely at the idea of guardianship because it 
further clarifies the relationship between morality, the national type 
and Furphy's belief in a purpose. As I have cited in chapter one, 
Furphy had stated the following to Cecil Winter: 
Now, a man doesn't need to be a psalm-singing sneak 
to admit that beyond the material elements of life, 
beyond the minerals, plants and animals, beyond the 
changing seasons, and so forth, there lies a purpose. 
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We don't know definitely what this purpose may be; 
but I don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric · banking 
accounts. Same time, I believe it is fulfilled by the 
production of men and women of high moral standard, 
calm courage, and clear intellect (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124. My italics). 
Or, as Furphy had written in a letter to Cathels, it seems 'to 
me that the purpose of our life was to make this world somewhat less 
of a disgrace to its alleged Creator' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995:49). According to Collins, 'may not the Ultimate Happiness of 
the Moral Universe be in some way consistent with the cross-
purposes of human life?' (RR, 260). But, as Collins also explains, 
'[t)here is Joy amongst us over one blackleg of maximum ability and 
minimum integrity' (RR, 227). Within this context of high moral 
standards, calm courage and clear intellect, one is reminded of 
Plato's idea of the Just man, namely harmony between reason, 
courage and desire in the individual. It is important to note that 
Plato's idea of Justice in the individual is crucial to his idea of Justice 
in society, and, in this sense, it is also the key factor in his idea of 
social guardianship, or the Guardians. As Plato makes clear, 'our 
properly good guardian will have the following characteristics: a 
philosophic disposition, high spirits, speed and strength' (Rep. 
bk2.376c)3 • 
Plato's idea of the Guardians is important to the idea of 
uplifting and upbuilding the nation in Furphy's novels, especially 
since there is a close relationship between artistic representation, a 
national type or guardian-image and well-being in the community. 
Discussing the education of the Guardians, Plato (Rep. bk2 .376c-
377 c) stresses the value of first impressions that leave permanent 
marks, suggesting that the education of their minds must begin with 
stories of a fictional, or .. truth-embellished" nature. It is interesting 
3 For those who are not familiar with Republic, it is important to note that 449a-457b, in book five, 
deals extensively with equality between the sexes, concluding that the only valid difference between 
men and women is a woman's capacity to bear children. Other than that, Plato sees no reason to 
exclude women from the same occupations as men, including guardianship, if their aptitude for the 
position deems them properly fit to fulfil the role. For this reason, the use of "man" in the phrase 
"the just man" is generic, not gender specific. I think this idea underpins Furphy's emphasis on "the 
production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect", as cited 
above. Equally, this idea underpins Collins' emphasis on the Australienne in Such is Life. This issue 
will be discussed more fully in the third section of this chapter. 
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to see 'the magnificent myth' (Rep. bk3.414b-415d) and 'The Myth of 
Er' (Rep. bkl0.614a-62ld) as truth-embellished stories, and that 
their first impressions are meant to leave permanent marks on the 
minds of the young. The result of such a move ts to provide solid 
ground for justice in the individual and well-being in the community. 
For this reason, Plato concludes that 'our first business is to 
supervise the production of stories, and choose only those we think 
suitable, and reject the rest' (Rep. bk2.377c). 
To return to Furphy, this is important, for the uplifting and 
upbuildtng of Australia must begin with its stories. And, since the 
first impressions of stories leave permanent marks, it is fair to say 
that the qualities necessary to successful guardianship must begin 
with the correct representation of a type. Furphy's stress on the three 
elements indicates the importance of artistically considering a 
guardian-type which assists in 'the production of men and women of 
high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes 
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). 
Clearly, the guardian-type in art is intimately related to 
identity, roleplay, censorship and well-being. This is equally so for 
Plato, who suggests that '[i]f [our Guardians] do take part in 
dramatic or other representations, they must from their earliest years 
act the part only of characters suitable to them -men of courage, 
self-control, piety, freedom of spirit and similar qualities' (Rep. 
bk3.395c). In short, the Guardians 'should neither do a mean action, 
nor be clever at acting a mean or otherwise disgraceful part on the 
stage for fear of catching the infection in real life. For ... dramatic and 
similar representations, if indulgence in them is prolonged into adult 
life, establish habits of physical poise, intonation and thought which 
become second nature' (Rep. bk3.395c-d). Leaving aside the finer 
details of Plato's rather problematic theory of art in book ten of 
Republic, as well as the relationship between Plato's theory and 
Furphy's own ideas on art, it is fair to say Furphy supported Plato's 
views on the need for censorship because certain 'representations 
definitely harm the minds of their audiences, unless they're 
inoculated against them by knowing their real nature' (Rep. 
bk10.595b). This view applies equally to Collins. 
But Furphy also agreed with Plato's notion that literature 
needs 'defenders' who can prove 'in prose ... that she doesn't only gtve 
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pleasure but brings lasting benefit to human life and human society' 
{Rep. bkl0.607d). To a certain extent, one ought to see Furphy's 
novels as a defence in prose of a great variety of literature, just as 
one ought to see Collins, with his 'ten masterpieces of poetiy' {RR, 
53), as their chief defender. If Such ts Life is not 'a formless slab' 
{Green, 1930: 127) or a narrative built by 'magpie-like greed for 
information' {Green, 1961:613), then what ts the purpose of the 
many and varied literacy allusions? As I have already discussed in 
chapter one, and as noted by Partington {1993:147, 208), G. W. 
Turner {1986:173) and Henricksen {1985:127), Furphy sees an 
amalgamation of an emerging Australian culture with the European 
tradition as beneficial to human life and society in Australia. As 
suggested in the 1903 review, an Australian literature which offers 
little more than an 'insular survey' is 'contemptible' and 'obscene' 
{Furphy, 1969: 128). 
The idea of seeing Collins as a defender of literature is quite 
fruitful when it comes to understanding his 'affected mannerisms': a 
term used by Furphy to make 'the casual reader' aware of the profuse 
number of 'more or less apt ... quotations and inferences' {Furphy, 
1969: 129. My italics). Gilding ts correct in stating that 'the 
mannerism' reinforces 'a sense of Collins' character' {1967:210). But I 
disagree with his notion that Collins' affected mannerism 'deflates 
both Collins and the unrealistic way in which "poetic" notions are 
entertained' {1967:210). One ought to investigate Collins' affected 
mannerism within the uplifting and upbuildtng of an identity, the 
theory of the controlling alternatives and the idea of a loose 
federation. However, according to Hartley, '[n]ot only does literature, 
and more pertinently fiction, pe,vade [Collins'] speech, but it invades 
his perception' {1986:161). Employing old world literature or fiction 
to see and respond to life ts not an uncontrollable phenomenon, as 
suggested by Hartley's use of the verb "invade", but a loosely-
federated and politically finite "fabric" woven by Collins. Nor do I 
agree with Partington, who claims that Collins 'can cite the Bible, 
classical myths and literature ... [as well as] a range of contemporary 
political and anthropological commentators ... but [he] is rarely able 
to draw an appropriate lesson from these to illustrate his argument 
or to illuminate a problem' {1992: 147). 
Collins' affected mannerism, being an extension of his status 
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as implied author, strategically mines the serviceable material of the 
European tradition in order to help weave together the value of the 
unique Australian experience. For example, R.S. White notes that 
'the Shakespearean element ts by no means incidental or merely a 
matter of a display of learning', for '[m]any of the quotations have an 
tntrtnstc connection with the situations Collins ts describing' while 
'others are used to create a network of ltterary echoes and 
connections that bear upon the moment' (1989: 10). In this sense, 
intertextuallty ts both a political and interpretative tool in the moral 
strategy of uplifting and upbuildtng the idea of nation. And it ts for 
this moral strategy that otherness ts used selectively to establish a 
thematically beneflctal all1ance between old and new. Even though I 
have used the term "intertextuallty", which it undoubtedly ts, there 
ts a much more appropriate idea for this technique: an idea with 
which Furphy may have been familtar, gtven the theological interests 
of his family generally. That idea ts mtdrash. 
Deist and Burden explain that mtdrash ts a method whereby 
one 'makes use of the so-called method of strtngtng of pearls of the 
rabbis' so that one supports one's 'argument' by cttlng 'one after the 
other a whole series of Old Testament texts' (1980:61 ). The reason for 
this ts simply that 'these texts contain references to the idea which 
[one] ts arguing about' (Deist and Burden,1980:62). According to 
Jacobs, mtdrash ts '(t]he method by which the ancient Rabbis 
investigated Scripture in order to make it yield laws and teachings 
not apparent tn a surface reading' (1995:345). It ts a point equally 
made by Deist and Burden, who add that mtdrash, as a form of 
exegesis, 'quite simply means "interpretation" or "investigation"' 
(1980:62). As Boyartn makes clear, '[m]uch of rntdrash presents itself 
in the form of a paraphrase of the Btbltcal text 1n which verses and 
parts of verses from many places in the canon are combined into a 
new discourse' (1987:539-540). Boyartn states that 'mtdrashtc 
reading recogntses the scope of a verse beyond tts initial context 'by 
inscribing or grafting it into other [syntagmatic] chains' or contexts: 
a process he calls 'recontexting' (1987:543). 
Boyartn suggests that rntdrash ts basically a strategic tool for 
keeping allve a cultural tradition within a troubled status quo: 
the rabbis, faced with the disruption of their times, 
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the destruction of the Temple and Jewish autonomy in 
Palestine and with the necessity for appropriation of 
Scripture for their times, found the creation of a 
radically intertextual literature the ideal interpretative 
and reconstructive tool, which preserved the privileged 
position of the Biblical text by releasing it from its 
position of immobilised totality .... The midrash reaches 
its goal via a hermeneutic of recombining pieces of the 
canonized exemplar into a new discourse. We thus see 
how its intertextuality seroed both the revolutionary 
and conservative periods of the midrash and its 
authors, preserving the old wine by pouring it into new 
bottles (1987:555. My italics). 
Both Furphy and Collins are keen to pour old wine into new 
bottles, striving to keep alive the more salient laws and teachings of 
a cultural tradition by working pieces of the old canon into a new 
discourse supporting rights and the new world experience. The 
purpose of this is to educate an Australian readership in matters of 
judgment, conduct and responsibility, and to expose them to a 
cultural insight or wisdom which Furphy and Collins believe holds 
true regardless of socio-economic structures or historical change in 
western civilization. Partington argues that 'Furphy is somewhat 
selective in quotation, since his main objectives are to attack all 
forms of hierarchy and advance egalitarian principles' (1993: 151). 
While Furphy and his implied author are selective about which wine 
to pour, it is not true to say that they attack all forms of hierarchy, 
since the main objective is to overturn the idea of aristocracy and to 
advance both the idea of rights and right judgment. If and when 
Furphy and Collins advance egalitarian principles, then they do so 
because such principles are judged to be concurrent with both 
natural and civil rights in light of uplifting and upbuilding. 
Bearing in mind Collins' affected mannerism, the loosely-
federated structure, and the emphasis on national character and type 
through the moral idea of guardianship, we ought to now readdress 
the idea of 'the observant reader' (SLL, 2). Barnes states that '[t]he 
"observant reader" comes to see that Such ts Life does show how life 
has "presented itself' to a very observant and exact chronicler (which 
199. 
is what Collins claims to be), who does not always grasp the 
significance of what he is chronicling' (1976:153). This indicates that 
the observant reader must 'assume part of the responsibility 
normally carried by the narrator in a work of prose fiction' (Barnes, 
1976:153). While I do not disagree with this allusion to reader-
response theory, I do disagree with Barnes' notion that the issue of 
the observant reader is simply concerned with the exposure of 
Collins' 'inadequacies' (1976:153). In my opinion, Barnes makes the 
mistake of observing Collins simply as a narrator, ignoring the 
latter's claim 'to have enough money ... to purchase the few requisites 
of authorship' (SIL, 1 ). 
The question of Collins' inadequacy or unreliability is best 
explained by Collins' own confession to the reader that, '[i]n the race 
of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the 
tactical moment' (SIL, 215. My italics). If one were to ask what must 
the observant reader observe of Collins' 'fair picture of Life, as that 
engaging problem has presented itself to [him]' (SIL, 2), then I would 
argue that he or she must chiefly observe Collins' reasons for 
censoring and his cunning articulation of the aesthetic 
representation, or Collins' truth-embellished strands of national life. 
On this note, it is useful to refresh ourselves with Collins' notion 
that 'no person except the systematic and successful hypocrite has 
too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can get himself 
hated, if he goes the right way to work; but the game was never yet 
worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SIL, 162). As Croft suggests, 
'Tom's unreliability does not come from obtuseness, but from cunning 
concealment' ll991:36. My italics), although Croft seems to think 
that this is only applicable to the Andy Glover episode. 
Put simply, one must observe Collins' dual status of implied 
author and hero, and his ability to harness the mldrashlc power of 
literature and its storehouse of ideas for the purpose of reconciling a 
penai colony With the idea of nation, as well as challenging the value 
of contemporary stereotypes, both Anglo-Australian and Australian, 
which fuel division and rivarly. Collins' intellect is not, as Croft 
states, like the 'soft sofa' that 'takes' on 'the impression of whomever 
sat on it last' (1991:155). This statement is undermined by his earlier 
and more valuable notion of Collins' cunning concealment. 
One must take heed of Collins' confession that '[t]he 
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reader ... is ... made aware of a power, beyond his own likes and 
dislikes, controlling the selection and treatment of these informal 
annals' and that '[t]hat power, in the nature of things, resides 
napoleonically with myself (SIL, 263). For this reason, I disagree with 
Barnes' notion that the loosely-federated structure 'turns life into a 
matter of accident,· or that '[m]an has free will at moments, but he 
can only exercise it blindly; he ts essentially passive, being acted upon 
by circumstances' (1979:20. My italics). Although Collins ts shown to 
be passive to some of the circumstances of life, his theory of the 
controlling alternatives equally shows that life's loosely-federated 
circumstances are actively authored, or modelled and censored, as a 
means to an end. 
Using the sign of the currency lad to harness the power of 
language and ideas, Collins articulates "Collins" to weave an 
epistemologically and morally rich environment for the community 
and the idea of nation, as well as weaving together certain qualities 
or crtterta for the · national type as a loosely federated idea. Collins 
suggests that the national type, as an ethically manufactured image, 
must be, to some extent, a loose federation so that the type inspires 
loyalty to the community and its cultural experiences. According to 
Collins, '[l]oyalty to something is an ingredient in our moral 
constitution; and the more vague the object, the more rabid will be 
our devotion to the symbol' (SIL, 117). But the novels also express 
urgency in devotion to the rtght kind of symbol. As Collins shrewdiy 
states, '[i]nstead of remaining a self-sufficient lord of creation, whose 
house is thatched when his hat is on, you have become one of a 
Committee of Ways and Means -a committee of two, with power to 
add to your number' (SIL, 71). 
Despite his recurring concern with morality, many readers have 
telt that Collins has a dubious moral constitution because of the 
outcome of the Andy Glover episode, but I would like to point out 
that Collins frequently extends his civility and follows a number of 
"bush" customs throughout the novels. This is evident when Collins 
comes across the stranger during the sandstorm known as the 
Wilcannia shower, and gives him 'half a pint of water' from his 
already low supply, as well as tobacco and an offer to lend him 'five 
bob' (SIL, 267). The stranger accepts Collins' offerings with the 
exception of the money, stating 'I've got a couple or three notes left; 
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and even if I hadn't, I'd think twice before I touched your money. 
Money's a peculiar thing' (SIL, 267). The observant reader ought to 
bear in mind Willoughby's noting the 'feverish excitement and ... 
demnable race for what the Scriptures aptly call "filthy lucre"' (SIL, 
35). Or his noting that, '[l]ike most things in this countcy, it appears 
to be a matter of £ s. d.' (SIL, 29). One can add to this the 
opportunism of a great variety of characters in Such ts Life and 
Rtgby's Romance, or the actions of Barefooted Bob in The Buln-Buln 
and the Brolga, as well as the observations on human nature in some 
of Furphy's letters. 
The Wilcannia shower episode, like so many other episodes in 
the three novels, evolves around the crucial issue of justice. Firstly, I 
agree with Wilson's (1979:128) sharp observation that justice is the 
staple theme of the very comic chapter three in Such ts Life, of which 
the Glover episode is a part. However, I would like to add that the 
idea of duty is equally important. Chapter three is interesting not 
because the reader sees the naked Collins strategically trying to 
obtain clothes, but because he encounters a lack of justice and duty 
in a variety of situations, particularly in regards to Andy Glover. 
With the Glover episode, it is frequently pointed out by critics that 
Collins has money while Glover has none, and that Collins ignores 
the ethical meditation on poverty "delivered" by his own mighty 
meerschaum (SIL, 85-91). This leads Croft to state that Collins is 
'too mean to share' (1991:156), a conclusion which is more or less 
restated in Croft's (1996:224) last essay on Furphy. 
Yet the meditation on poverty is not so much a meditation on 
poverty, but an attack on the Church's disregard for 'earthly justice' 
vis-a-vis their 'conception of heavenly justice', which 'is found in the 
concession of equal spiritual birthright, based on the broad charter 
of common humanity, and forfeitable only by individual 
worthlessness or deliberate refusal' (SIL, 88). To all intents and 
purposes, Collins does not tgnore his duty to Glover, nor does he do 
him an injustice simply because 'purse-pride' and 'a sort of moral 
laziness, together with our artificial, yet not unpraiseworthy, 
repugnance to offering a money gift, had brought me out rather a 
Levite than a Samaritan' (SIL, 95). Again, the Wilcannia shower 
episode, as well as Willoughby's observations on the pious zest for 
money in the colonies, gives the reader the necessary information 
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that money is seen as a peculiar thing, and that justice is much 
better extended through gifts of food, tobacco and tea or water. One 
could argue that without money, even if one does view it as the root 
of all evil, one could not afford to offer gifts to a 'worn and weary 
brother' (SIL, 266) such as the Wilcannia stranger, or a 'bent and 
haggard wreck' (SIL, 91) like Andrew Glover. 
As the episode clearly shows, Collins' act of supplying Glover 
with 'damper[,] ... a large wedge of leathery cheese, a sheath-knife, and 
the quart pot and pannikin' (SIL, 91), as well as 'a plug of ... tobacco' 
(SIL, 93), does not make him a mean individual or morally dubious 
because he consciously withholds his money. Furthermore, the 
Glover episode is not just confined to this short encounter, for it 
recurs on several occasions and, in each case, the issue of justice 
and duty in human relations comes to the fore with much scope. 
This is particularly the case with the "run-in" between Quarterman, 
the local Justice of the Peace, and Glover with regard to the burning 
of the farmer's haystack. There are several important points which 
readers need to observe. Firstly, it pays to observe Quarterman's 
character closely, since the outcome of the Glover episode depends 
on him, not Collins. During an encounter with another swagman, to 
whom he gives 'the usual civilities' of 'a pannikin of tea, some fried 
fish, and the slice of the edge of a damper' (SIL, 121 ). Collins is 
informed of Quarterman's character and the mood in the district: 
[The swagman) followed fishing and duck-shooting for 
a living; but there was so many informers about these 
times that a man had to keep his weather-eye open if 
he wanted to use a net or a punt-gun. People needn't 
be so particular, for there was ale Q- had been warning 
and threatening him yesterday, and here was the two 
young Q-s out this morning at the skreek of daylight, 
falling red-gum spars to build a big shed, and the ale 
(man) out on horseback, picking the best saplings on 
the river. Ole Q- was a J. P. His place was just across 
the flat, with ,a garden reaching down to the lagoon. 
Q- himself was the two ends and the bight of a 
sanguinary dog' (SIL, 121). 
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Collins goes to see Quarterman in order to enquire after Pup, 
who had gone missing while Collins was busy stealing clothes from 
the latter's washing line. Collins finds Quarterman 'dining in solitary 
grandeur', and asks him if he has seen 'a big blue kangaroo dog' (SIL, 
122). Quarterman's attitude is arrogant: Tm not thinking about your 
dog. You and your dogt I'm thinking about a valuable stack of hay I 
had burnt this morning; and you've given me a clue to the 
incendiary' (SIL, 123). This is interesting, for Collins had given 
Quarterman no clue whatsoever in regards to the perpetrator who 
burnt his haystack. Collins' playful description of his 'informer' (SIL, 
122) are answers to Quarterman's questions concerning just how 
Collins came to know that Pup was on his property. In other words, 
Quarterman simply assumes that Collins' informer is the same man 
who burnt his haystack. What is even more interesting is 
Quarterman's own aptitude for knowledge. From a textual point of 
view, the interview between Collins and Quarterman unfolds over 
three pages, and the observant reader can safely assume that the 
interview lasts approximately ten to fifteen minutes. 
During this time, Collins is subjected to a variety of name 
changes. At the beginning of the interview, Collins introduces 
himself and, contrary to Barnes' (1976:165) opinion, he does not gtve 
an alias nor does he play a role. Quarterman acknowledges Collins' 
name, using it three times only. From the fourth time onwards, 
Collins is addressed by the following names respectively: 'Mr. 
Connell', 'Mr. O'Connell', 'Mr. O'Conner', 'Mr. Connor' (SIL, 123), 
'Mr. Connelly', 'Mr. Conway' (SIL, 124), 'Mr. Connellan', and 'Mr. 
Collingwood' (SIL, 125). This is despite the fact that Collins, shortly 
after being addressed as Mr. Conway, is asked by Quarterman for his 
'address' (SIL, 124). Collins informs his reader that 'I wrote my name 
and official title, giving our departmental office in Sydney as a fine 
loose postal address, and laid the paper beside the magnate' (SIL, 
124. My italics). Collins authorially shows that the Justice of the 
Peace is careless with any evidence given to him. Glover's 
incarceration for burning the hay stack does not happen because 
Collins had purposely implicated Glover with the crime. 
Addressing Quarterman diplomatically, Collins confesses that 
'I can't help taking a certain interest in this matter. Would it be 
impertinent in me to ask who the person was that saw the suspected 
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incendiary up the river on yesterday afternoon?' (SiL, 124). 
Quarterman replies that his informant is 'Mr. Arthur H-', who is a 
'[v]ery respectable man, having personal knowledge of the incendiary' 
(SiL, 124). Once agatn, Quarterman is careless in matters of criminal 
inquiry, since observant readers know that Collins is the incendiary 
for whom the Justice of the Peace is looking. Collins himself tries to 
point this out: 'I think you will agree with me that a successful 
criminal prosecution is a Pyrrhic victory at best. At worst- that ts, if 
you fail to prove your case; and, mind you, it's no easy matter to 
prove a case agatnst a well-informed man by circumstantial evidence 
alone- if you fail to prove your case; then it's his tum, for malicious 
prosecution; and you can't expect any mercy from him' (SiL, 124). 
Collins reiterates his point: '[y]ou may be morally certain of 
the identity of the scoundrel, but your proofs require to be legally 
impregnable' (SiL, 125). Collins cites the Johnson case, where '[t]he 
scoundrel...got at Johnson for false imprisonment', stating that 
'[y]ou hold the incentive in reserve, I think you said?' but '[p]ardon 
me- is it a sufficient one?' (SiL, 125). According to the angry 
Quarterman, '[i]t don't take much incentive to be sufficient for a 
vagabond without a shirt to his back!' (SiL, 125). Collins continues 
to press home his point: '[t]rue ... but "Seek whom the crime profits", 
says Machiavelli. What profit would it be to such a scoundrel to do 
you an injury, Mr. Q-?' (SiL, 125). Quarterman's answer is indicative 
of the division and rivalry between currency and Anglo-
Australianism: '[t]he propertied classes is at the mercy of the 
thriftless classes' (SiL, 125). It is for this reason alone that the 
Justice of the Peace is determined to bring the incendiary 'to the 
book', making 'an example of him' and to 'make him smoke for it' 
(SiL, 123). 
Quarterman backs down from arguing 'the matter' any further 
with 'Mr. Collingwood', noting from the written information Collins 
gave him that '[y]our business keeps you on the move' and that he 
ought to see his daughter, 'Miss Jemima, and tell her I authorise her 
to gtve you the dog. And a very fine dog he ts' (SiL, 125). To all 
intents and purposes, Quartennan's moral stance is ftnnly based on 
a customary prejudice, which has probably been strengthened by his 
being the victim of arson 'at Ballarat' (SiL, 123), and his role as 
Justice of the Peace appears to do nothing more than perpetuate the 
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ignorance and injustice of the ongoing division and rivalry in the 
colonies. This conclusion is further supported by the evidence 
surrounding the haystack itself. When Collins sees Jemima 
Quarterman, she tells him that 
[f]ather's not himself to-day .... He blames us for 
burning an old straw-stack; and I'm sure we never 
done it. Mother's been at him to burn it out of the way 
this years back, for it was right between the house and 
the road; and it was '78 straw, rotten with rust. But 
I'm glad we didn't take on us to burn it, for father's 
vowing vengeance on whoever done it; and he's awful 
at finding out things' (SiL, 126). 
Collins tries to convince Jemima that the fire could have been 
started in a variety of possible ways. According to Jemima, '[i)t seems 
very reasonable, sir .... Anyway, I'm glad the old stack's out of the 
road. The place looks a lot cleaner' (SiL, 127). From the information 
given, the valuable haystack is not so valuable after all. But 
Quarterman's desire to prosecute the vagabonds and thriftless 
classes puts Glover in an awkward position. As Quarterman states to 
Collins, whom he calls Mr. O'Conner, 'I been the instigation of 
bringing more offenders, and vagabonds, and that class of people, to 
justice than anybody else in this district. If I'd my way, I'd stamp out 
the lawless elements in society' (SiL, 123). One wonders how many of 
these "offenders" suffered much injustice through the prejudices of 
men like Quarterman. Also, the fact that Glover suffers from both 
opthalmia and deafness makes him unable to defend himself against 
the quick and clever prosecution of the Justice of the Peace, and one 
further wonders just how Just Quarterman is by taking advantage of 
Glover and, perhaps, others like him. 
It is after the retelling of this episode (SiL, 294-296) that 
Collins extends his duty and a sense of justice to Glover once more, 
by giving him his opthalmia glasses which had lent an air of 
authority to his scholarly guardian-type. I agree with Croft 
( 1991:201) that Collins understands his role in the incarceration of 
Andy Glover, but I do not think that the incarceration itself is the 
surprise which leads Collins to censor his recognition of Glover. Nor 
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do I agree with Indyk (1986:314-315), who suggests that Glover is 
Collins' double, and that the return of the swagman towards the 
close of Such is Life makes Collins unwillingly accountable for his 
earlier actions, which had led to Glover's imprisonment. As I have 
discussed, Collins does not attempt to escape the issue of justice or 
duty, since it is fundamental to his concerns with uplifting and 
upbuilding. Collins' cunning concealment of his identity is part and 
parcel of avoiding the wrath of Glover's mate, Terrible Tommy 
Armstrong, who is 'one of your practical, decided, cocksure men; 
guided by unweighed, unanalysed phenomena, and governed by 
conviction alone- the latter being based simply, though solidly, upon 
itself {SIL, 296-297). 
Terrible Tommy Armstrong is no different from Quarterman 
and it is more than likely that Collins would prefer to wait for a 
tactical moment. Agreeing with Barnes { 1993:46), I find that much of 
the confusion in this issue is the result of misreading Collins' role in 
the episodes involving Andy Glover. But I would equally extend this 
observation to Collins' role in the novels. According to Richters, 
'Such is Life chronicles the moral history of its narrator and 
culminates in his fall from ... grace at the moment when he fails or 
refuses to acknowledge even to himself the identity of the swagman 
[Glover)' (1979:246). Because of this, Richters concludes that 'the 
central and possibly the unifying subject of Such is Life ... is the 
history of Tom Collins' moral decline' { 1979:246). In support of this 
conclusion, Richters states that Furphy, as an author, is concerned 
with 'the problem of man's "fallen" nature ... through the actions as 
well as the theories of his narrator' (1979:257. My italics). Indeed, 
Richters writes that 'Furphy grapples with the further paradox not 
only of a recalcitrant reality but of a recalcitrant philosopher whose 
very philosophizing puts his humanity at risk' {1979:257J. 
I do not follow Richters' point, since many episodes in the 
three novels show Collins actively involved in the promotion of 
humanity within the context of equality, liberty, fraternity and the 
idea of happiness. Although Indyk notes that '[t]here seems to be 
nothing about himself that he isn't prepared to alter if the situation 
demands it', I have problems. with his notion that Collins' 
'pragmatism lends itself so well to the evasion of responsibility that 
it must raise the question as to whether there can really be any 
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morality in his attitude at all' (1986:314). It is true that Collins is 
pragmatic, executing suitable roles for certain situations, but he 
does not have a morally vacant attitude. Indyk seems to indicate this 
when he concludes that '[t]he diversity of his social "parts" allows no 
escape from the claims of social equality and moral responsibility' 
(1986:315). Whenever Collins does play a role, deceiving a particular 
character, he does so for a specific moral purpose. For example, 
Collins deceives Glover's mate and Avondale's boundary-rider, 
Terrible Tommy Armstrong, into believing that he is a fellow Scot, 
but the purpose of this deception is to find a safe-haven for Warrtgal 
Alfs bullocks until Alf recovers from his illness (SIL, 160). 
Nor do I agree with Croft's notion that '[t]he progress of the 
novel [Such ts Life] shows the gradual deterioration of Tom from the 
energetic and charitable being of the first chapters, to the dandified 
conservative of the last chapter, whose callous but necessarily selfish 
treatment of Andy Glover is the final glimpse we are given of him in 
this novel' (1996:218). If Collins' treatment of Glover is necessarily 
selfish, then why bother to discuss Collins' gradual deterioration or 
moral decline? Would it not be better to investigate the idea that 
Collins is cruel to Glover in order to be kind? And, if this were the 
case, what purpose would it serve? Nevertheless, Croft believes that 
'[c]lothes are the stgns of this deterioration' because Collins, having 
'accumulated a bell-topper', semtotically shifts from an egalitarian 
image to a 'symbol of the bloated plutocrat' ( 1996:218). Since Collins 
never describes it, how does Croft know Collins' manner of dress in 
the initial stages of the novel? Rather than a bloated plutocrat, 
these clothes, along with the mighty meerschaum pipe, are meant to 
symbolize scholarly presence and authority. 
Contrary to Croft's notion, Collins does not 'forget his simple 
duty to give alms and relieve the suffering of a fellow human being' 
(1996:225). Besides the Glover and Wilcannia shower episodes, 
readers ought to note that Collins helps Rory O'Halloran by giving 
him money, as well as his 'Shakespear as a keepsake, with a billy 
and pannikin, and a few days' rations' (SIL, 63), or the convivial way 
in which he shares tobacco with Willoughby (SIL, 34). And readers 
ought to bear in mind Collins' calm courage, clear intellect and high 
moral standard during Warrtgal Alf s illness, particularly with the 
rescue of Alfs bullocks from impoundment at Yoongoolee station. 
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This is despite the fact that Warrtgal Alf is first introduced as an 'evil 
natured beggar' (SIL, 6) by Mosey, and that his reputation with the 
rest of the bullockies is no different, particularly William Cooper. 
Collins is not, as Suarez-Lafuente argues, 'a theorist' who is 'too 
slow and irresolute for action' (1994:45). Nor is Croft rtght to say 
that 'Tom is the epitome of that Wesleyan ethic which Rigby 
attacked, and which Joseph's elder brother John, epitomised -a 
committed Christian who nevertheless is quite happy to accumulate 
while others starve' ( 1996:225). 
But this leads us to consider what kind of moral Justice and 
duty the novels put forth. Given the relationship between Glover and 
Quarterman, it is fair to say that the idea of justice in the novels is 
shaped by an informed proportionalism, rather than actions based 
on hearsay or ignorant speculation. Also, because Justice requires 
action, it pays to bear in mind Collins' theory of the controlling 
alternatives, since any course of action must be decided on the basis 
of its ethical consequences. In short, the novels shape the idea of 
Justice in light of consequentialism. The interesting thing to bear in 
mind, though, is the equally strong emphasis on duty, or deontology, 
whereby any action must be carried out within a given framework of 
customary moral imperatives, as suggested by the idea of a national 
type. Although consequentialism and deontology stand opposed, it 
appears Furphy believed that neither can escape the requirements of 
the other, and that morality is best served by a proportional appeal 
to law, custom and situational ethics. Such a view is concurrent 
with the rest of his thought, particularly his emphasis on natural 
and civil rtghts in the 'practical, workable code of daily life' of the 
'Sermon on the Mount' (SIL, 89). 
3.2. Half Bushman and Half Bookworm: identity, well-being and 
the guardian-type. 
That Collins, as implied author, is preoccupied with the 
aforementioned issues is perhaps what Furphy, writing to Stephens, 
meant by 'the plan of the book is not like any other that I know of, -
at least I trust not' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:29). In a 
letter to Franklin on the subject of My Brilliant Career, Furphy wrote 
that 'our Joint yet independent record ought to demonstrate the 
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existence of a bush-born type somewhat different from the crude 
little semi-savage of conventional Australian fiction' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:148). I think readers are meant to see Collins 
not only as this bush-born type, but also as the ground for the 
national type. Furthermore, I think Furphy believed that the self-
same observation could be made about Franklin's Sybylla Melvin, 
and it is interesting to bear her in mind when investigating Collins' 
artistic rendering of the Australienne. Bearing in mind Plato's 
comments about first impressions and permanent marks through 
fiction, it ts my contention that Collins, as the implied author, 
creates and articulates a truth-embellished image of hts self in order 
to flesh out artistically the right qualities of an Australian type. 
Because Collins ts concerned with guardianship, readers ought to see 
him as a personification of Furphy's belief in the relationship 
between a 'purpose' and 'men' with 'high moral standard, calm 
courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995: 124.). 
Collins should be seen as an artistic rendering of Plato's three 
elements in the individual, demonstrating the need for their balance 
in order to achieve just actions toward people and society. It ts 
interesting to note that Collins refers to himself as 'Plato' (BBB, 121, 
125), and that he clings 'to Plato's beautiful thought ... that no soul 
misses truth willingly' (SlL, 87). What ts this truth? Given that 
Collins' thematic concerns take their cue from similar themes in 
Republic, thiS truth can be defined by the undeniably damaging effect 
of Ignorance, division and rivalry. For this reason, Collins stresses 
the importance of education because it teaches one the skills to 
judge justly for well-being, both socially and individually. Nowhere ts 
thts more pertinent in both the novels and Republic than the first 
impressions and permanent marks of arttstic representation in light 
of guardianship. The truth that no soul will miss willingly is to 
safeguard the right way of seeing life and responding to life for well-
being. 
As Socrates makes clear, this argument 'ts not a trivial one', 
for 'our whole way of life ... ts at Issue' (Rep. bk. l.352d). With thts in 
mind, Collins' notion that 'we always think in words' (RR, 137) ts a 
rather revealing one, as ts his statement that '[w]e are not such stuff 
as dreams are made on, but precisely the reverse' (RR, 261). For thts 
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reason, to know that one thinks in words is as important as knowing 
how to judge the impact of one's thought within the context of 
natural and civil rights. As Collins states, nothing is 'worse than a 
locally-seated and curable ignorance which makes men eager to 
subvert a human equality, self-evident as human variety, and 
impregnable as any mathematical axiom' (SiL, 87). Insofar as Collins' 
intellectualism is concerned, I think Furphy would have agreed with 
Milner's view that '[t]he function of the radical intellectual was to 
connect immediate objective to long-term ideal, in a rhetoric that 
could inspire both idealism and practical action' (1988:263). In a 
discussion on the psychological bases of national identity, William 
Scott states that identity and identification 'is a definition of self in 
terms of group membership', and that 'national identity may be 
represented as a [geometrical] congruence between self-concept and 
nation-concept' (1991:33). 
But he is quick to point out 'that there are degrees of 
identification' (1991:34). While it is fair to say that 'judged 
characteristics of the nation may be incorporated into the self, it is 
equally important to note that 'judged characteristics of the self may 
be projected onto the nation' (Scott, 1991:34). For Scott, this kind of 
'identification seives primarily to strengthen the ego against a hostile 
world by associating the self with a powerful other' (1991:34). 
Bearing in mind Collins' affected mannerisms, Scott's comments are 
beneficial to an understanding of Collins' uplifting and upbuilding in 
the novels' order of things. However, in Collins' case, there is also a 
greater awareness of one's impact on individuals and society, 
particularly with what one sees, weaves and projects onto the wider 
community through narrative. Readers should not see Collins' 
articulating his self, as ground for a national type, merely as an 
egoistic defence against a hostile world. Instead, readers ought to see 
that the self he projects onto the national type is one which 
emphasizes a high moral standard, calm courage and clear intellect. 
Any hostility is reseived for all forms of ignorance which undermine 
these qualities in guardianship. 
Overall, the image of the national type supported by the novels 
is best explained through Furphy's own description of himself, 
namely '(h]alf bushman and half bookworm' (in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:156). Defending his own learned style to the 
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reader, Collins states that 'this habit of mine was acquired early in 
life, when my chief ambition was to emulate, or even excel, 
Macaulay's erudite "schoolboy'" (BBB, 89). More importantly, 
any genial pedant that casually assumes you to know 
who Oliver Cromwell was -when, in point of fact, you 
neither know nor want to know- is an angel of light 
compared with the transparent prig who, in simple 
sentences and words of one syllable contends (as in a 
book lying before me now) that the landlord is the 
greatest of all benefactors, seeing that to him the 
tenant owes his hovel, his pig-sty, his hen-house -in a 
word, his foot-hold on the crust of this planet. 
Distrust the presumptuous snob who avowedly writes 
down to an implied standard of adult information or 
intelligence, thus adding the insult of condescension 
to the injury of sinister purpose (BBB, 89). 
The value of education has little to do with education for its 
own sake, but with a strategic need to foreground democracy and 
rights. For this reason, it is important to note that Collins' use of 
the term philosophy, or philosopher, should be seen within the 
context of a way of life, not simply a focus on academic argument or 
logic. Even though Plato's and Furphy's views on democracy differ, 
this view parallels Republic, where Socrates is presented as the 
embodiment of a moral and intellectual style of life towards the good. 
As Trevor Saunders explains, '"Platonic justice" is an internal, 
psychological state, the condition of functional harmony between the 
rational, spirited and appetitive "parts" of the soul, a harmony 
crucially characterized by the domination exercised by reason and 
knowledge' (1987:26-27). Indeed, the idea of supervising the 
production of stories, as well as Plato's theory of art, strongly 
supports this kind of interpretation, for censorship suggests that the 
value of first impressions is wholly dependent on the idea of 
permanent marks in light of the good, which is the effect first 
impressions have on well-being. 
To return to the novels, Plato's idea of the good, as an 
emphasis on well-being, contributes to their central theme, further 
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qualifying the idea of u pllftlng and u pbuilding within the context of 
democracy and rights, as well as clarifying the reason for a concern 
with the ethics of artistic representation, truth-embellishment, 
guardianship and the national type. Whether or not he was aware of 
the term, Furphy's novels show a deep concern for the Socratic idea 
of eudatmonta. According to Saunders, "'[h]apptness" ts the 
conventional but somewhat misleading translation of eudatmonta. It 
ts not primarily afeeltng, a warm glow of serenity and contentment; 
it is rather an objective state of affairs, something like "achievement 
and success in living"' (1987:25). As Saunders explains, 'Socrates' 
view of the world was fundamentally teleologtcal. He saw it as a 
rationally ordered structure, in which men, like many other things, 
have a function. That function ts to fit in with the whole; that ts 
what man ts, in some sense.for' (1987:25). Furphy's view of the world 
seems to be similarly teleological, gtven the consistent use in the 
novels of the phrase "such ts life", as well as the phrase "the order of 
things". 
In this sense, '[t]o fit in, to fulfil one's function, ts presumably 
advantageous and leads to happiness [eudatmonta]' and '[m]oral 
knowledge ts, therefore, knowledge of that function' in light of 
knowtng 'what will bring good and what will bring evil' (Saunders, 
1987:25). With this in mind, it pays to recall Collins' notion that 
'[a]lternate sunshine and rain is the law of Nature; alternate smiles 
and tears ts the law of human life; and this rhythmic reaction ts as 
necessary to healthy moral being as the tide to the sea, or the wind 
to the atmosphere' tBBB, 23). Since the novels are concerned with 
eudatmonta, it ts fruitful to bear in mind the general view of the 
national type in the 1890s. As White has already noted, 'many 
Australians were not content simply to be proved worthy of the old 
stock: some were so bold as to suggest that the new type was in fact 
a decided improvement on the old' (1981:73). Indeed, 'the virtues of 
the convicts, their enterprise and self-reliance, were said to have 
been passed on to the Australian type, while their faults had been 
bred out' (White, 1981 :75). 
In an age preoccupied with eugenics, White states that 'the 
idea of a national type reinforced ideas about the importance of 
"character" in the lives of men and women', for 'national prosperity, 
morality, and so on were thought to result from national character' 
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(1981:65). Bearing in mind Scott's (1991:33-34) views on the degrees 
of identification between self and nation, the novels stress that the 
national type must be a symbiosis of self-qualities and other-
qualities, and not simply a narrow provincialism. Discussing the 
notion that 'almost any serious writer' aims to make 'his reader a 
different person from what he was before', Northrop Frye states that 
'[t]wo forms of identity are involved in studying a work of literature. 
There is identity as, which is a basis of ordinary knowledge, and is a 
matter of fitting individuals [or things] into classes' (1990:77). And, 
'[t]here is also identity with, which has several dimensions' (Frye, 
1990:78). According to Frye, '(a] metaphor of the "A is B" type 
expresses an identity with that is not found in ordinary experience', 
so that '(i]dentity in this context means unity with variety' (1990:78). 
Frye's views are quite applicable to Furphy's authorial 
intentions for two reasons. Firstly, the midrashic style of the novels, 
through Collins as the implied author, treats the national type as a 
categorically intertextual and recontextual process. Secondly, the 
educational dimension of the novels, through Collins' heroic self, 
approaches the national type as a vehicle for well-being, or a 
metaphorical identity-with the idea of the good. Although he does not 
connect Collins to the idea of authorship, preferring to approach him 
as a character and narrator, Wilson does obseive that 'Tom creates 
himself out of his diary entries', for 'both his clarities and opacities, 
his sharpness and obtuseness, are self-bestowed' ( 1979: 135. My 
italics). Discussing the closing paragraph, which is concerned with 
roleplay, Wilson states that '[t)he last sentences are important. They 
indicate the most difficult task of all in an anatomy of how (and 
what) men know: the problem of knowledge has both an outside and 
an inside; thus everyone must be an object of knowledge to himself 
(1979:142). But, given the focus on individual and communal well-
being, this view needs to be qualified, for the value of the self as an 
object of knowledge cannot be divorced from eudaim.onta. 
For this reason, I must disagree with Partington, who states 
that 'Furphy clearly believed that personal identity was already 
highly ambiguous in the Riverina. Collins' chameleon-like character 
may be a portent of a future in which the emancipated self can 
assume almost any role or point of view and possess very little other-
directed social content and social identity' (1993: 145). Partington's 
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comment is problematic, since identity, as the novels indicate, 
cannot be divorced from its social context, nor from the social idea of 
the good or well-being. But one should not take this to mean that 
iden tlty is wholly determined by the social, for the idea of 
authorship, along with the theocy of controlling alternatives, stresses 
the complexity of individually articulated roles throughout "life". As 
Wilson notes, '(a]ll (characters) play roles, and all imply more than 
they tell' (1979:142). In short, '(r)ole-playing is not limited to 
Tom ... but pervades the novel in multiple instances' (Wilson, 
1979: 142). Because of the nature of the discussion, it is important to 
consider the followlng, if somewhat lengthy, declaration by Collins: 
And, 
0. W. Holmes remarks that each of us is the totting-
up of two columns of figures -paternal and maternal. 
This is true of the vecy small baby; it is not true of the 
adult. The latter is the totting-up of one column, 
namely, his own self-discipline -headed, to be sure, by 
Holmes's twofold total as a single item .... Certainly, 
self-discipline is vecy largely directed and limited by 
extraneous conditions (BBB, 7). 
lilt is an axiom of mine -and in no way clashing with 
what I said just now touching the column of figures, 
headed by Holmes's twofold total- that a man, if not 
trimmed, espaliered, and pot-bound, by routine 
systems of education or social conventionalities, 
naturally burgeons into a specialist. I would go so far 
as to say that, not only is each individual designed to 
do something well, but he is fashioned by Nature to do 
that something better than anybody else. Man, though 
born in a state of deplorable helplessness and sottish 
ignorance, is inherently dowered with certain 
rudimentacy talents. These, reaching the dignity of 
joey-faculties, are developed, this way or that way, by 
the operation of a Will, which (never forget) is in tum 
moulded by outward conditions. And there being no 
215. 
such thing in Nature as uniformity of power, the 
strongest of these faculties -circumstances being 
favourable- dominates and dwarfs the rest .... Under 
present conditions, we find one man who can do 
nothing but cheat; another who can do nothing but 
show off; another who can do nothing but loaf; 
another who can do nothing but toil. And so on (BBB. 
15-16). 
Given its emphasis on the shaping of character and identity, 
readers ought to be aware of three very pertinent elements in the 
passage, name]y education, experience and aptitude or talent. In the 
prelimtnacy discussion to the idea of Justice, society and 
guardianship, Socrates states that 'no two of us are born exactly 
alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which flt us for different 
Jobs' (Rep. bk.2.370b). More importantly, it ls 'better to exercise one 
skill [techne]' than 'to try to practise several', Just as '[l]t ts fatal in 
any Job to miss the right moment for action' (Rep. bk.2.370b). One 
could say that Collins' aptitude for roleplay ls naturally suited to the 
skills of authorship and, With an educated awareness of matters 
regarding eudatmonta. he chooses the rtght moment to weave together 
a truth-embellished and loosely-federated national image, hence his 
Joy at being unemployed. As Socrates states, '(q]uantity and quality 
are therefore more easily produced when a man specializes 
appropriately on a single Job for which he ts naturally fitted, and 
neglects all others' (Rep. bk.2.370c). 
For this reason, Socrates concludes that 'we should make it 
our business, if we can, to choose men With suitable natural 
aptitudes for the defence of our state' (Rep. bk.2.374e). According to 
Socrates, '[i]n other cases this does not matter much -the 
community suffers nothing very terrible if its cobblers are bad and 
become degenerate and pretentious; but if the Guardians of the laws 
and state, who alone have the opportunity to bring it good 
government and prosperity, become a mere sham, then clearly it ts 
complete]y ruined' (Rep. bk.4.42 la). Although he would not disagree 
With these points, especially With the poor examples set by the 
colonial governments in the federation debate, I think Furphy 
believes that the degeneration of skills and moral principles in the 
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community does harm the community. Given the many episodes 
where Collins either sets or makes a moral example, the novels 
strongly suggest that 1t ts important to safeguard aptitude, skills and 
eudaim.onl.a at all levels of human interaction, especially 1f one 
desires to achieve and maintain a national community. 
Yet Plato ts aware of this fact, for he has Socrates state that 
'cohesion' ts 'the result of common feelings of pleasure and pain 
which you get when all the members of a society are glad or sony at 
the same successes and failures' (Rep. bk.5.462b). His solution ls to 
make words which denote possession a communal idea, rather than 
an individual one, so that '[o]ur citizens, then, are devoted to a 
common interest, which they call my own; and in consequence 
entirely share each other's feelings of joy and sorrow' (Rep. 
bk.5.464a). Despite his sharing Plato's belief in the need for a 
common good, Furphy shows this to be very problematic, given the 
sheer complexity of life in the daily plebiscite and peoples' tendencies 
to privilege natural rtghts over civil rtghts in light of desire. One only 
needs to look to the first chapter of Such ts Life to see that some of 
the bullockies' opportunism undermines any true sense of 
community because of degenerated skills and moral principles. This, 
in turn, affects their identity or roleplay, their opinions of others and 
other's opinions of them, which ultimately find a voice and a value 
in thP. much grander narratives of Australian national identity and 
experience. 
Given the novels' concerns with eudatmonta, it ls interesting to 
note that the idea of the good finds equal voice in the thought of 
Epictetus, whom Furphy called 'that grand old stoic' because he 
made 'the path of self respect ... so plain, so attractive, and so 
practicable' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147). However, 
unlike Plato's exclusive concern with a guardian class, Epictetus 
seeks to make the principles of eudatmonta applicable to all. In a 
discourse entitled 'What Is The True Nature Of The Good?', Epictetus 
states that 1t ls 'the power to understand how [to] deal 
with .. .impresstons' (Dts. bk.2.8.6). Elsewhere, he states that '(t]he 
~!')f'riflr m:::itP.rtal that the good and noble man works upon is his own 
governing faculty ... and it ls the function of the good man to deal 
with his impressions in accordance with nature' (Dis. bk.3.3.1). And, 
in an earlier discourse, Epictetus states that 'if you ask me what is 
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the good of man, I can only reply to you that it consists in a certain 
dlspostti.on of our choice' (Dis. bk.1.8.16. My italics). For this reason, 
'it is the task of the educated man to form a rtght judgment in 
all ... cases', for 'whatever the difficulty that afflicts us, we must bring 
forward, the appropriate aid against it' (Dis. bk.1.27.2). 
As the first passage of Enchetridion strongly implies, eudatmonta 
is knowing that '[s]ome things are up to us and some are not up to 
us' (1990:325). If we recall Enchetrtdion's emphasis on roleplay, 
especially its claim that your choice 'is to play the assigned part well' 
because the choice of the role 'belongs to someone else' (1990:329), 
then it is important to see that one's identity is based on the rtght 
judgment of certain impressions in light of the good, or well-being. 
Bearing in mind Collins' concern with authoring and censoring 
certain impressions, chiefly those of characters or identities who 
upset or have the potential to upset the uplifting and upbuilding of 
an Australian identity, the idea of personal and national identity in 
the novels is conceived no differently from Plato's concern with 
aptitude, skills and eudatmonta, nor Epictetus' concern with 
impressions, disposition and judgment. Collins' discussion of the 
theory of the controlling alternatives uses Shakespearean identities 
to look at the results of certain choices and consequences, due to 
certain aptitudes and judgments, within the context of the good or 
well-being. With Hamlet as the first example, Collins states that 
up to a certain point of time, the Prince governs his 
own destiny -at least, as far as the Ghost's 
commission is concerned, and this covers the whole 
drama. He is master and umpire of his circumstances, 
so that when two or more lines of action, or a line of 
action and a line of inaction, appear equally 
efficacious, he can select the one which appears to be 
of least resistance. But subsequent to that point of 
time, he is no longer the arbiter of his own situation, 
but rather the puppet of circumstances. There are no 
more divergent roads; if he desires to leave the one he 
has chosen, he must break blindly through a hedge of 
moral antagonisms. His alternatives have become so 
lopsided that practically there is only one course open. 
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The initial exercise of judgment was not merely an 
antecedent to later developments of the plot; it was a 
Rubicon-crossing, which has committed the hero to a 
system of interlaced contingencies; and the tendency of 
this system bears him away, half-conscious of his own 
impotence, to where the rest is silence. The turning 
point is where Hamlet engages the Players to enact the 
Murder of Gonzago (SIL, 69). 
Referring to Othello's question, '"Who can control his fate?"', 
Collins replies, '[n)o one indeed. But every one controls his options, 
chooses his alternative. Othello himself had independently evolved 
the decision which fixed his fate, recognising it as such an 
alternative' (SIL, 69). To return to the issue of identity, or roleplay, 
one can say that its articulation, or the art of playing, is an option 
which, as a major or minor alternative, fixes one's fate toward a 
certain direction. This seems to be the case with Macbeth, for Collins 
states that '(t)he interest of the play centres on the poise of incentive 
between action and non-action, and the absolute free will of election. 
But that election once made, we see -and the hero himself 
acknowledges- a practical inevitableness in all succeeding atrocities 
which mark his career as king' (SIL, 69). 
This observation is applicable to Collins' use of the other two 
key Shakespearean identities. In other words, the articulation of an 
identity is central to the issue of choice and consequence, as well as 
the issue of judging one's first impressions correctly, particularly in 
light of eudalmonia. Illustrating the point that numerous judgments 
concerning impressions or aptitudes are made unwisely, Collins 
states, 'how often do we accept a major-alternative, whilst innocently 
oblivious to its gravity!' (SIL, 69). According to R.S. White, '(lit seems 
perfectly valid -and quite helpful- to argue that each of Shakespeare's 
tragic heroes makes a profoundly important decision which turns out 
to be either misguided (in the case of Othello), or compulsive 
(Macbeth), or wilful (Lear), or conscientious (Hamlet) -and that none 
of these decisions is initially contemplated solely on a moral level' 
(1989:20). 
But, while 'Macbeth and Hamlet do indeed debate the moral 
nature of their future conduct', I must disagree with R.S. White's 
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notion that 'they can be seen as just as "irresponsible" in their own 
ways as Collins' (1989:21. My italics). Regardless of how one sees 
Hamlet, Othello or Macbeth, Collins is far from morally 
irresponsible. Nevertheless, for R.S. White, 
Collins' theory ... can steer us away from what I regard 
as the two great dead-ends of Shakespearean criticism: 
the notion of the "flawed hero", which becomes fairly 
irrelevant, and the notion that Shakespeare is 
somehow mystically interested in morality as an 
abstract philosophical issue rather than as embedded 
in the impetuous actions of men and women played 
upon the stage in gripping narratives. It also 
encourages us not to accept the "heroes" at their own 
estimate but instead to focus attention on their 
actions and the consequences for others in the play 
(1989:21) 
Although R.S. White's observations concerning the net result 
of Collins' theory are very astute, I must disagree with his notion 
that the theory makes the issue of a tragic flaw irrelevant. It is more 
than likely that Furphy was familiar with the idea of the tragic flaw, 
and he may have taken it to mean an ill-judgment based on aptitude 
and impulse in light of a major alternative of choices and 
consequences. I do not think one should take this to mean, as 
Partington does, that 'fatal decisions are the result of basic character 
defects in great minds' (1993:212). This is an oversimplification, for it 
suggests that tragic consequences are unavoidably determined, 
thereby nullifying the issue of choice. If one considers the tragic flaw 
within the context of natural aptitude or disposition, remembering 
that Collins' concern with uplifting and upbuilding shows him 
equally concerned with impressions and judgment, then one could 
say that Shakespeare's tragic heroes serve to illustrate the complex 
relationship between one's aptitude, one's choice and the 
consequences of one's identity and action on others in light of 
eudaimonia. 
Given the nature of the discussion so far, I must also disagree 
with Barnes' notion that '[t]he central character, Tom Collins, is 
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fully established as a personality, but we do not receive the 
experience through his mind' {1971:118-119). Nor does Furphy, 
according to Barnes, 'attempt to record the movement of the human 
mind' ( 1971: 119). Opposing Furphy to Vtrgtnta Woolf, Barnes 
explains that 'his concern is with the pattern of events, not the 
human consciousness', and so '[h]e creates characters from the 
outside, as they appear to the observer', revealing 'them mainly 
through their speech' (1971:118). While this last point ls not untrue, 
I find Barnes' claims to be a good illustration of an incorrect use of 
intertextuality as an interpretative tool. The assumption that Woolfs 
style is t:he style for mapping the movement of the human 
consciousness, and the conclusion that Furphy's style, because it is 
not like Woolf s, does not concern itself with the mind, are simply 
fallacious. 
More than any other quality, readers identify with Collins 
through his mind. More importantly, the development of "his" novels, 
because of uplifting and upbuilding, concern themselves chiefly with 
the many aspects of the mind's movement through time and space, 
namely first impressions and permanent marks, aptitude, education, 
judgment, choice and consequence, and eud.atmonta. Barnes may be 
correct in saying that '[a]s a writer, he [Furphy) has more in common 
with the comic novelists of the eighteenth century than with the 
psychological realists of his own time' (1979:35), but this does not 
mean that 'Furphy ls no explorer of feelings' because 'he shies away 
from the region of private experience', or that the novel has an 'inner 
emptiness' {Barnes, 1979:24). Beartng in mind my contention that 
Collins is a phUosophe, one ought to see his inner life as an inner 
Enlightenment, whereby the aforementioned issues concerning the 
mind and eudatmonta are passionately addressed to his observant 
reader, his philosophical confidant. Nowhere is this more prevalent 
than the various meditations in the three novels. 
Given the importance of artistic representation, guardianship 
and the national type in the novels, the meditations illustrate 
Collins' fundamental belief in the self-evident truth of rights, 
education and rational judgment to the uplifting and upbuildtng of 
Australia and its national type. As Collins states, '[e)rudition, even 
in the humblest sphere of life, is the sweetest solace, the unfailing 
refuge, of the restless mind; but if the bearer thereof be not able to 
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do something well enough to make a living by it, his education is 
simply outclassed, overborne, and crushed by his own superior 
ignorance' (SIL, 34). Furthermore, this situation is equally the case 
for Furphy, as the many letters discussing ignorance-shifting and the 
essay on world federation testify. More importantly, each meditation 
tackles a particular issue in order to stress the universal value of fine 
tuning one's judgment for amendments in knowledge and artistic 
representation, thereby foregrounding the role of the mind and inner 
life to achieve eudaimonta. No example from Such ts Life better 
illustrates this need for the fine tuning of judgment than Collins' 
meditation on gentlemen (SIL, 31-34), which is the first to occur in 
the novel, as noted by Wilkes (1985:4-5). 
Taking pity on Willoughby's struggles, Collins states that '[h]e 
was a type -and, by reason of his happy temperament, an exceedingly 
favourable type- of the "gentleman," shifting for himself under 
normal conditions of back-country life' (SIL, 32). Because of this, 
Collins launches his attack: 
Urbane address, faultless syntax, even that good part 
which shall not be taken away, namely, the calm 
consciousness of inherent superiority, are of little use 
here. And yet your Australian novelist finds no 
inconsistency in placing the bookish student, or the 
city dandy, many degrees above the bushman, or the 
digger, or the pioneer, in vocations which have been 
the life-work of the latter (SIL, 32). 
Using Willoughby, Collins' point is to illustrate that outdated 
or inappropriate values in art, within the context of first impressions 
and permanent marks, lead to ill-judgment and unnecessary struggle: 
Without doubt, it is easier to acquire gentlemanly 
deportment than axe-man's muscle; easier to criticise 
an opera than to identify a beast seen casually twelve 
months before; easier to dress becomingly than to 
make a bee-line straight as the sighting of a theodilite, 
across strange country in foggy weather; easier to 
recognise the various costly vintages than to live 
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contendly on the smell of an oil rag. When you take 
this back elevation of the question, the inconsistency 
becomes apparent. And the longa of Art, viewed with 
the brevts of Life, makes it at least reasonable that 
when a man has faithfully served one exclusive 
apprenticeship, he will find it too late in the day to 
serve a second. Moreover, there are few advantages in 
training which do not, according to present social 
arrangements, involve corresponding penalties (SIL, 
32). 
Collins' attacks on the idea of gentleman should be seen 
within the context of judgment, aptitude, skill and eudatmonta. 
Discussing the dangers of 'ignorance' in '[ e]ach sphere of life' (SIL, 
32), Collins does not reject the idea of gentleman entirely, but seeks 
to recontextualize it in light of the idea of rights, as well as the 
aptitudes and skills naturally suited to life in the back-country. 
Despite the fact that an actual gentleman, who 'was brought up so 
utterly and aristocratically useless', ts deemed to be 'mentally and 
physically ... fit for anything', 
Indeed, 
(o]ur subject is not the "gentleman" of actual life. He 
ts an unknown and elusive quantity, merging 
insensibly into saint or scoundrel, sage or fool, man or 
blackleg. He runs in all shapes, and in all degrees of 
definiteness. Our subject is that insult to common 
sense, that childish slap in the face of honest 
manhood, the "gentleman" of fiction, and of 
Australian fiction pre-eminently (SIL, 32-33). 
it ts surely time to notice the three-penny braggadocio 
of caste which makes the languid Captain Vernon de 
Vere (or words to that effect) an overmatch for half-a-
dozen hard-muscled white savages, any one of whom 
would take his lordship by the ankles, and wipe the 
battlefield with his patrician visage; which makes the 
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pale, elegant aristocrat punch Beezlebub out of Big 
Mick, the hod-man, who, in unpleasant reality, would 
feel the kick of a horse less than his antagonist would 
the wind of heaven, visiting his face too roughly; 
which makes a party of resourceful bushman stand 
helpless in the presence of flood or fire, till marshalled 
by some hero of the croquet lawn; above all, which 
makes the isocratic and irreverent Australian fawn on 
the "gentleman," for no imaginable reason except that 
the latter says "deuced" instead of "sanguinary," and 
"Jove" instead of "by sheol." Go to; I'll no more on 't; it 
hath made me mad (SLL, 33). 
Collins suggests that if Australian art does not change its 
attitudes or values to the idea of gentleman, then its first 
impressions and permanent marks will leave too many in an ill-
prepared state, making grave misjudgments about their aptitude and 
skill to survive in the back-country. In short, Anglo-Australian art 
perpetuates a mindset where too many will struggle like Willoughby, 
for the environment will quickly level the utterly and artistocratically 
useless man: 
And don't fall back upon the musty subterfuge which, 
by a shifting of value of the term, represents 
.. gentleman" as simply signifying a man of honour, 
probity, education, and taste; for, by immemorial 
usage, by current application, and by every rule which 
gives definite meaning to words, the man with a shovel 
in his hand, a rule in his pocket, an axe on his 
shoulder, a leather apron on his abdomen, or any 
other badge of manual labour about him -his virtues 
else be they as pure as grace, as infinite as man may 
undergo- is carefully contradistinguished from the 
"gentleman". The "gentleman" may be a drunkard, a 
gambler, a debauchee, a parasite, a helpless potterer; 
he may be a man of spotless life, able and honest; but 
he must on no account be a man with broad palms, a 
workman amongst workmen. The "gentleman" is not 
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necessarily gentle; but he is necessarily genteel. 
Etymology is not at fault here; gentility, and gentility 
alone, is the qualification of the ·gentleman' (SIL, 33). 
According to Croft, '(Collins] does, it is true, indulge in a 
number of attacks on the concept of a gentleman, but we should be 
sensitive to his inconsistencies and contradictions' (1991:88). There 
is neither inconsistency nor contradiction in the attacks. Instead, 
one ought to see Collins' meditation as an attack launched by a 
gentleman and a phnosophe against an aristocratic idea of gentleman, 
which keeps 'the Lower Orders' (SIL, 34) from self-evident rights such 
as the uplifting and upbuilding of their personal and national 
identity. Collins does not attack the idea of gentleman in order to 
nullify it entirely, for he is 'no more inclined to decry social culture 
than moral principle; but (Collins acknowledges] no aristocracy 
except one of service and self-sacrifice, in which he that is chief shall 
be servant, and he that is greatest of all, servant of all' (SIL, 33. My 
italics). 
One only needs to re-examine the dialogue between Willoughby 
and Collins after his first meditation to note that the issue of 
sharing tobacco is designed to foreground the importance of social 
welfare between men of the Rivertna (SIL, 34). In this sense, it is 
important to note that the transaction occurs between two 'types' of 
gentlemen, namely Collins and Willoughby, against a background of 
heroes who indulge more in opportunism than egalitarianism. 
Barnes is rtght to note that Willoughby is 'an anti-heroic version of 
the English gentleman' (1990:218). But, rather than an attack on 
Willoughby's own character, the meditation on gentleman is, for 
Collins, the first of many meditations where he strategically attacks 
the aristocratic principles of Anglo-Australianism in both art and 
life. Again, I shall appeal to Croft who argues that '(m]any readers 
will disagree violently with the notion of Tom Collins as a gentleman, 
but I would ask them to look carefully at what we see of Tom in 
Furphy's works' (1991:88). But Collins' idea of the new world 
gentleman does not involve an acceptance of old world attitudes. 
Dutton is wrong to conclude that 'Tom Collins, complete with 
ragbag of disorganised knowledge and Shakespearean quotations, (is] 
lost somewhere between the gentleman and the bullock-driver, and 
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belonging to neither species' (1965:15. My italics). Collins is far from 
lost. Like Willoughby, Collins wants to make himself 'mutually 
agreeable' so that 'the natural result is a grace and refinement' ( SIL, 
35) of character. However, this should not be seen as a pandering to 
Anglo-Australian custom or values. Instead, Collins' idea of a 
gentleman is not aristocratic, but defined by the principles of the 
Rights of Man, which he considers to be fundamental to the uplifting 
and upbuilding of the Australian nation and its type. For this 
reason, Willoughby's notion that such a measure of grace and 
refinement can only be achieved through 'inherited wealth' (SIL, 35) 
is overturned by the consistent stress on equality, education and 
rational Judgment in light of the good or well-being. As Collins 
states, 
[t)o be sure, there are men of social culture who 
gallantly and conspicuously maintain an all-round 
superiority in the society to which I myself hereditarily 
belong, namely the Lower Orders; but their 
appearances are like angel's visits -in the obvious, as 
well as in the conventional but remoter sense. I can 
count no less than three men of this stamp among my 
ten thousand acquaintances. When the twofold 
excellence of such ambidexters is not stultified by 
selfishness, you have in them a realised ideal upon 
which their Creator might pronounce the Judgment 
that it is very good. Move heaven and earth, then, to 
multiply that ideal by the number of the population. 
The thing is, at least, theoretically possible; for it is in 
no way necessary that the manual worker should be 
rude and illiterate; shut out from his rightful heirship 
of all the ages. Nor is it any more necessary that the 
social aristocrat -ostentatiously useless, as he 
generally is- should hold virtual monopoly of the 
elegancies of life (SIL, 34). 
As I have discussed several times throughout this thesis, the 
contrast between the old and the new is a strategy of equal force in 
the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. One can say that Emerson is 
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also concerned with guardianship, and that his guardian-type is best 
articulated in 'The American Scholar'. On an Epictetian note, 
Emerson states that '(t]he office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, 
and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances. He 
plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation' (( 18371 
1985:95). Furthermore, 
[t]he scholar is that man who must take up into 
himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions 
of the past, all the hopes of the future. He must be an 
university of knowledges. If there be one lesson more 
than another which should pierce his ear, it is, The 
world is nothing, the man is all; in yourself is the law 
of all nature, and you know not yet how a globule of 
sap ascends; in yourself slumbers the whole of Reason; 
it is for you to know all; it is for you to dare all 
(Emerson, (1837] 1985:103-104). 
Emerson argues that '(l]ife is our dictionary. Years are well 
spent in country labors; in town; in the insight into trades and 
manufactures; in frank intercourse with many men and women; in 
science; in art; to the one end of mastering in all their facts a 
language by which to illustrate and embody our perceptions' ([ 18371 
1985:93). As Collins states, 'there is something well worth study in 
the spectacle of a man' (RR, 227). According to Emerson, '(c]olleges 
and books only copy the language which the field and the work-yard 
make' (11837] 1985:94). And, in this sense, 'Man Thinking must not 
be subdued by his instruments. Books are for the scholar's idle 
times' (Emerson, (183711985:89). But, from reading Furphy, one gets 
the impression that books do more than Just "copy" the language of 
the "field" and "work-yard". They creatively give shape to life. Perhaps 
it might be said that the book which thematically treats life is more 
important than life itself. This is because the book unifies the 
experiences of life and embeds those experiences with a purpose. 
Emerson makes clear that '(e]ach age, it is found, must write 
its own books; or rather, each generation for the next succeeding. 
The books of an older period will not flt this' (118371 1985:87-88). If 
and when this occurs, then there is 'creative reading as well as 
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creative writing' (Emerson, (1837] 1985:90). In short, '[w]hen the 
mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we 
read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is 
doubly stgnifl.cant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the 
world' (Emerson, [ 1837] 1985:90). Barnes argues that '[Furphy] did 
not want to accept the generally pessimistic forecasts of the evolving 
Australian type' ( 1990: 233). Indeed, 'the character of Tom Collins 
himself is a denial of the commonly accepted view of Australians as 
having no interests in things of the mind, and the whole work 
implicitly denies that English society provides a norm against which 
the Australians will be found wanting· (Barnes, 1990:233). As 
Emerson explains, 
[t]he main enterprise of the world for splendor, for 
extent, is the upbuUdtng of a man. Here are the 
materials strewn along the ground. The private life of 
one man shall be a more illustrious monarchy, more 
formidable to its enemy, more sweet and serene in its 
influence to its friend, than any kingdom in history. 
For a man, rightly viewed, comprehendeth the 
particular natures of all men. Each philosopher, each 
bard, each actor has only done for me, as by a 
delegate, what one day I can do for myself ([ 1837] 
1985:99-100. My italics). 
Because Collins is meant to be seen as the Australian scholar, I 
must disagree with Barnes' notion that '[t]he fictional world of Such 
ts Life is notable for its "absences". Collins is a man on his own: his 
background is suggested only in the vaguest way, and no clear sense 
of his biography emerges from the narrative' (1990:222). Collins' 
background is marked purposefully by a multiplicity of occupations 
rather than vagueness. Among others, he is seen as a civil servant 
(25, 37) and ex-bullock-driver (46) in Such is Life, as a drover (xviii) 
and a swagman (249) in Rtgby's Romance, and a mechanical expert 
( 1) in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. Because readers first see him as 
a 'Deputy-Assistant-Sub-Inspector' (SiL, 94) and 'an official of the 
ninth class' (SiL, 37), it is interesting to bear in mind the idea of the 
public or civil servant and compare Collins with his superior, 
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Rudolph Winterbottom. 
The result of such a comparison is quite fruitful, for 
Winterbottom's only merit for securing his official position appears 
to be his place in an Anglo-Australian aristocracy. As Willoughby 
states, 'I scarcely think Mr. Rudolph Winterbottom holds any 
Government situation. His private fortune is fully sufficient for all 
demands of even good society. Ah! now I have it! His son Rudy -his 
third or fourth son- holds some appointment' (SiL, 38). Within the 
context of the national type as a scholarly guardian-image and the 
novels' aforementioned concerns, as well as Collins' own scholarly 
aptitude and skills, Rudolph Winterbottom hardly seems fit to hold a 
position which is superior to Collins. Despite his Anglo-Australian 
paternalism, Winterbottom is artistocratically useless, and Collins 
unveils this fact by showing his readers Winterbottom's letter, in 
which Collins is given his official orders with 'child-like penmanship' 
and 'chance-like orthography' (SiL, 131). To all intents and purposes, 
the comparison between .. Collins" and Winterbottom allows Collins, 
as implied author, to foreground the injustice to the idea of rights. 
More importantly, Collins' numerous occupations and roles 
foreground the scholar's various connections to the "system", 
suggesting that he is out to neutralise rivalries and is himself an 
emerging sign of the national type in all its complexity and loosely-
federated diversity. Like Whitman, whose relevance I will discuss a 
little more in a moment, Collins lays claim to his "self' as being 
'large' and containing 'multitudes' (Leaves of Grass, 79). And, like 
Emerson, who originally expressed this synthesis of the one and the 
many in the character of the American Scholar, Collins wishes to 
make clear that 'Man is not a farmer, or a professor, or an engineer, 
but he is all. Man is priest, and scholar, and statesman, and 
producer, and soldier .... Man is thus metamorphosed into a thing, 
into many things' ([1837] 1985:84). For this reason I must disagree 
with H.P. Heseltine, who states that 
... the intricate complexities of plot create an enormous 
gap between the ultimate purpose of the novel and the 
stuff of which it was made. By a tremendous effort of 
the will and imagination Furphy bridged that gap 
through the very artifice of his plotting, an effort 
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which for once allowed a nineteenth-century novelist 
almost to escape the tyranny of an uncertain self 
( 1986:8. My italics). 
There is actually no gap between the ultimate purpose of the 
novel and the stuff of which it was made, for the loosely federated 
sketches of National life focus the reader's attention on the need for 
an imagined community through the uplifting and upbuilding of 
Australia. Collins may claim that '[w]e know what we are, but we 
know not what we shall be' (SIL, 70). But this should not be seen as 
a confession of uncertainty. Instead, this claim ought be seen within 
the context of Collins' capacity as scholar and teacher for both the 
bullockies and his readers. In other words, rather than an uncertain 
self, one ought to see a preoccupation in the novels with the truth-
embellished self. And, given the issues discussed in this section, one 
can say that Collins attempts to teach an appropriate way of seeing 
and responding to life for the sake of eudaimonta. In a letter to Kate 
Baker, placing great value on her vocation as a teacher, Furphy 
writes '[y]our work will never perish. Your contribution to the sum of 
human progress is definite and genuine' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, 
eds, 1995:99). 
Given Furphy's emphasis on the importance of creating a 
eudatmontcally truth-embellished self, it is interesting to compare 
Collins to Whitman. Collins makes several important allusions to 
Whitman. In Such ts Life, Collins states that 'whatever else a man 
sings, he always sings himself. But you must know how to interpret' 
(258). In Rtgby's Romance, the allusion is more direct, for Thompson 
reminds Collins of the 'ten masterpieces of poetry' the latter had told 
him about 'at Deniliquin in the spring of [ 18]72' (53). Included in the 
'ten masterpieces' is 'any poem of Walt Whitman's' (53), which 
suggest that Leaves of Grass itself may be one of the ten 
masterpieces. 
Of further interest is Collins' notion that Pup, his kangaroo-
dog, is 'a law unto himself (RR, 240): a phrase used by Whitman, in 
his poem, 'For Him I Sing', to express his intent to awaken the 
natural self-reliance of the new world Man or American Adam, which 
I will discuss more in a moment. Although Pup's antics throughout 
the novels suggests that to be 'a law unto himself means to be 
230. 
unruly, I do not think that this is entirely the case. The phrase also 
foregrounds Pup's natural self-reliance, and it ts this idea of a 
natural self-reliance, tempered by a moral consciousness, which 
readers need to bear in mind when dealing with Collins. I think this 
is what Furphy meant when he wrote to Cathels, asking him for 
information on Kingsley's novel, that 'Tom C., like Pup, is a law unto 
himself (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42). However, Pup ls 
self-reliant or "a law unto htmself' in a natural order of things, while 
Collins is self-reliant or "a law unto himself' within the moral 
constraints of a human order. 
Besides Furphy, another strong supporter of Whitman was the 
Australian poet, Bernard O'Dowd, whom Furphy described to Cecil 
Winter as 'an ideal democrat -able and scholarly, strong and 
sympathetic, temperate and uncompromising, absolutely without fear 
and without reproach' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:132). 
According to McLeod (in McLeod, ed, 1964:9-17), O'Dowd addressed 
many groups, including The Australeum and the Australian Natives' 
Association on the spirit of Whitman and democracy. Indeed, when 
one reads the letters O'Dowd wrote to Whitman (in McLeod, ed, 
1964:18-39), one becomes aware of the great zeal the former had for 
his "teacher". Perhaps Furphy had had personal discussions with 
O'Dowd or had listened to him g1v1ng a public address on Whitman 
and democracy, since '[h]ls son Sam was a member of the Australian 
Natives Association for a short while in the 1890s' (Barnes, 
1990:156). 
Setting aside Whitman's status as real author, one of the first 
observations that can be made about Whitman's Leaves of Grass is 
its rendering of Whitman as both implied author and hero, or creator 
and created. Indeed, the ideas of truth-embellishment and well-being 
are key themes throughout the work. As Whitman wrote in 'Song of 
Myself, '[lJong enough have you dream'd contemptible dreams,/ Now 
I wash the gum from your eyes' (LG, 75). For this reason, one can say 
that Whitman is also a teacher of a way of seeing and responding to 
life which is conducive to eudatmonta. In other words, Whitman is 
concerned with the uplifting and upbuildtng of America. 
Furthermore, considering that the self-same themes exist in both 
Leaves of Grass and the three novels, readers ought to note that 
Collins and Whitman, within the idea of authorship, write from an 
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enlightened belief in equality, liberty and fraternity, creating a truth-
embellished, heroic self as full expression of these beliefs. 
Collins' 'Riverina' and Whitman's 'America' represent the 
genesis of a nation and the means by which a new people shall rise. 
As R.W.B. Lewis explains, '[i]n the case of Whitman, the type of 
extreme Adamtc romantic, the metaphor gains its power from a 
proximity to the literal, as though Whitman really were engaged in 
the stupendous task of building a world that had not been there 
before the first words of his poem' (1962:114). Speaking of the 
mystical dimension of 'Song of Myself, Miller Jr explains that '[t)he 
traditional mystic attempted to annihilate himself and mortify the 
senses in preparation for absorption into the Transcendent' while 
'Whitman magnifies the self and glortfi.es the senses in his progress 
toward Union' (1962:93). Or, as Lewis notes, 'Whitman acted on the 
hopeful conviction that the new Adam started from himself; having 
created himself, he must next create a home' (1962: 115). In this 
sense, 'the Adamic personality .... had to become the maker of his own 
conditions -if he were to have any conditions or any achieved 
personality at all' (Lewis, 1962: 115). 
In his poem, 'For Him I Sing', Whitman declares, 
For him I sing, 
I raise the present on the past, 
(As some perennial tree out of its roots, the present on 
the past,) 
With time and space I dilate and fuse the immortal 
laws, 
To make himself by them the law unto himself. 
(LG, 1994:9. My italics). 
What is implied by this 'law unto himself? Firstly, that a man 
can be made a law unto himself is the staple theme of Leaves of 
Grass. In this sense, 'For Him I Sing', as well as 'One's-Self I Sing', 
function as a prelude to the artistic uplifting and upbuilding of man 
by way of the self-evident, natural and civil rights of all men and 
women, which were established by the French National Assembly and 
its Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens in 1789, 
supported by Paine ([ 1791 J 1995) and asserted by Jefferson's 
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Declaration of Independence. Regarding these prefatory poems, 
Middlebrook states that they establish 'the identity of .. Myself," or 
"the Real Me," as a fiction -the personification of an act of 
imagination' (1974:27). I think Whitman's style is a perfect example 
of Furphy's idea of truth-embellishment, for identity in Leaves of 
Grass is more than simply an imaginative act or fiction. Rather, 
Whitman's style employs the new world to create the new world, 
telling the lies he ought to have told. In this sense, identity is an act 
of eudatmontc creativity which attempts to establish the justice of 
'self and 'nation' through man's self-evident rights, or his being a 
law unto himself. 
As Collins had stated, 'human equality' is as 'self-evident as 
human variety, and impregnable as any mathematical axiom' (SlL, 
87). In short, '[t)he principle of being a law unto one's self means 
self-reliance' (Briggs, 1968:213. My italics). Or, in the words of 
Emerson, who coined the term, 
[t)here is a time in every man's education when he 
arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that 
imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for 
better for worse as his portion; that though the wide 
universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing com 
can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that 
plot of ground which is given to him to till ( 1985 
[ 1841 ): 176). 
Whitman, as both the implied author and hero, is the prophet 
of a nation with the new covenant or gospel, Leaves of Grass, under 
his arm. He is prepared to assert his new-found identity through an 
act of self-reliance and 'tum the bridegroom out of bed and stay with 
the bride myself (LG, 59). As Briggs notes, '[Whitman) maintained 
that nature and the cosmos or God are not significant but for the 
soul of man. Man gives meaning to the universe' (1968:66). According 
to Whitman, 'I hear and behold God in every object, yet understand 
God not in the least' (LG, 77). In this sense, '[t)he reality of God for 
Whitman is in man, not either theism or pantheism or deism or 
atheism' (Briggs, 1968:86). Nor is the reality of God evident in an old 
world order of kingship, divine rtght and aristocracy, as indicated by 
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the injustices of George III against the American colonies. 
Paine, arguing against Burke's theological 'catalogue of 
barriers ... between man and his Maker', asserts that '[t]he Mosaic 
account of the creation' fully expresses 'the unity or equality of man', 
which 'places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether 
to his Creator, or to the creation, of which he is a part' ([ 1791] 
1995:118). Briggs explains that 'Whitman made a synthesis of en-
masse and individual, which was his conception of true democracy', 
emphasizing 'the independent indMdual worth of every man and the 
necessity for self-reliant individuals under the protection and 
encouragement of just law and free government' (1968:213). But 
Whitman's synthesis of individual and en-masse must be seen within 
its proper context, namely the idea of self-reliance and the God-given 
natural and civil rights for all men and women. 
From Collins' frequent meditations to Whitman's loafing with 
'a spear of summer grass' (LG, 27), one can argue that Collins' 
novels. like Whitman's Leaves of Grass, are a 'gift', reserved 'for some 
hero, speaker or general,/ One who should serve the good old cause, 
the great idea, the progress and freedom of the race' (LG, 11 ). One 
could also imagine Collins singing to his novels the words Whitman 
had sung to his volume of poems: 'falter not O book, fulfil your 
destiny' (LG, 4). Like Whitman, Collins thinks he is 'no 
sentimentalist, no stander above men and women or apart from 
them' (LG, 47). And, like Whitman's 1855 Preface, Collins similarly 
believes that the '[g]reat genius and the people of these states must 
never be demeaned to romances' (LG, 497. My italics). Whitman 
states that '[a]s soon as histories are properly told there is no more 
need of romances' (LG, 497): a statement which can greatly assist the 
reader's understanding of the designs in Collins' truth-embellished 
diary. 
In 'By Blue Ontario's Shore', Whitman speaks of '[a) nation 
announcing itself in which he shall 'reject none, accept all, then 
reproduce all in my own forms' (LG, 297). Whitman's "self' sets out 
to become the national image of redemption and, in his 1855 preface 
to Leaves of Grass, Whitman's Emersonian spirit proclaims that 
'America does not repel the past or what it has produced under its 
forms or amid other politics or the idea of castes or of the old 
religions .... [America) accepts the lessons with calmness .. .' (LG, 483). 
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ThiS seems to be a direct defence of the Declaration of Independence 
and its stress on self-evident rights, for Whitman argues that 
'Americans of all nations at any time upon the earth have probably 
the fullest poetical nature' and 'the United States themselves are 
essentially the greatest poem' (LG, 483). But, according to Whitman, 
America is great not just because America accepts the lessons of 
history with calmness, but because America 'is ... a teeming nation of 
nations' (LG, 483). 
Joseph Jones (1976) notes that the American nineteenth-
century nationalist movement is an influential index for the shaping 
of Australian nationalism. However, despite the influence on some 
Australian writers of Paine, Jefferson's Declaration, Emerson and 
Whitman, Jones does not link Furphy to this line of thought. 
Bearing in mind the rich diversity of nationalities in the Rivertna, 
the novels imply that Australia has the potential to be great because 
she too can be a teeming nation of nations. Nevertheless, Jones is 
content to leave the American influence on Furphy with Bellamy's 
Looking Backward, thus categorizing Furphy's work, especially 
Rtgby's Romance, as primarily socialist and Furphy as a 
'workingman's apostle' or 'the spokesman of labour' (1976:101). 
Thus, ·rugby's views are Furphy's' while 'the narrator "Tom Collins" 
opposes him as a conservative counterfoil' or simply 'plays the fool' 
(1976:102). In an article written eleven years later on American and 
Australian literary connections and disconnections, Kiernan ( 1987) 
cites Jones' conclusions, maintaining much the same attitude 
towards Furphy and Collins as Jones. 
But, rather than socialist, one ought to see the concern with 
labour and labouring classes in the novels as humanist. This 
humanism is a direct result of the right to equality, liberty and 
fraternity for all men and women, not just the aristocracy. As Barnes 
notes, '[t]hose who have taken Tom Collins to be a representative of 
the Bush Legend have seldom acknowledged just what an oddity he 
is' (1990:204). Contrary to Barnes' (1990:157) earlier notion, this 
observation must equally be extended to include both Furphy's and 
Collins' relationship to socialism. To illustrate the point, let us look 
at how Collins does not flt comfortably into the "either/ or" 
categories of Kate Schaffer's list concerning "the typical Australian": 
a list much more suited to Lawson or the Bulletin's journalistic style. 
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Typical Australian 
('me') 
practical 
rough and ready manners 
natural/ common man 
lmprovisor / original 
'near enough' standards 
laid back 
skeptical of 
religion 
intellectual/ cultural 
pursuits 
Jack/ egalitarian 
fiercely independent 
a mate 
swears/ gambles/ drinks 
freedom 
Other 
(not-me) 
theoretical 
polished manners 
affected/ civilized man 
planner/ derivative 
exacting standards 
hard working 
believer in 
religion 
intellectual/ cultural 
pursuits 
master/ elitist 
officious authority 
an individual 
controls swearing, 
gambling. drinking 
containment 
(Schaffer, 1988: 19-20). 
One can say that Collins, as both implied author and hero, 
purposefully conflates this "self-other" list at most points, 
challenging only the issues of swearing, gambling and drinking. 
Although Collins had made a bet with Moriarty, one needs to 
remember that even Moriarty had noted Collins' opposition to 
gambling (SiL, 225). In other words, Collins' wants to see the typical 
Australian as a manifestation of both sides of the list, with the 
exception of certain qualities which jeopardise eudatmonta. This is 
more than likely the case, for Thompson, stressing his acquaintance 
with Collins since their youth, states that, regardless of what they 
did, 'lilt was always his way' (SiL, 24). Yet, in the words of Thompson 
-words which can be connected authorially to Collins- Tom Collins 
[ c Jomes as near the blackfellow as it's possible for a 
white man to get. And you couldn't kill him with an 
axe. Then start him at any civilized work -such as 
splicing a loop on a wool rope, or making a yoke, or 
236. 
wedging a loose box in a wheel- and he has the best 
hands in the country. At the same time, it's plain to 
be seen that he has been brought up in a class of 
society that sticks a napkin, in a bone rtng, alongside 
your dinner plate (SiL, 25). 
Within the context of an ethically proper representation of the 
Australian type in literature, Thompson's speech applauds the all-
round achievements of Collins' identity vts-a-vts the other bullockies' 
scathing comments, including his own earlier comment that Collins' 
'philosophy mostly consists in thinking he knows everything, and 
other people know nothing' (SIL, 24). But, whether or not Collins' 
abilities are true is not the issue. It is more than likely that Collins, 
as the implied author who controls the content of the bullockies' 
dialogue, is serving up a truth-embellished, heroic self-hood. But it 
is truth-embellishment in keeping with guardianship, with uplifting 
and upbuilding for eudaimonla. Collins' identity cannot be studied 
without obseivantly reading the many issues surrounding uplifting 
and upbuilding. Although Wilson is right to note that Tom's 'identity 
is far more elusive than the simple judgments of the first chapter 
permit' (1979:141), Collins gives ample clues to his own heroic 
identity as a half bushman and half bookworm. 
Because this is the case, it interesting to note the role of the 
bullockies. The importance of this matter is tied directly to the way 
in which Collins orients and articulates his self-image as the ground 
for the national type within the uplifting and upbuilding of the 
nation. This is especially apparent in his inquiries on the "Coming 
Australian" and the "Australienne". Croft may conclude that 'the 
agents of redemption in Furphy's novels are women' (1991:272), but 
the image of man is also stylistically drawn to be an agent of 
redemption. As I will discuss more fully in the next section, it is fair 
to say that only some images of women in the three novels are agents 
of redemption, for the character of Maud Beaudesart is neither an 
agent of redemption in Collins' novels nor in Furphy's novels. But 
before we can come to this issue, we must explore the redemptive 
potentiality of men in the narratives, since it is crucial to the 
masculine image of the scholarly guardian-type presented by Collins. 
If, for Furphy. the real Australian is 'the Out-back man' (in 
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Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124), then one can see that 
Furphy's rendition of the bullockies is a depiction of a "raw" social 
system which can uplift and upbuild Australia. But, while issues 
such as the duffing of grass and the drought foreground the rivalry 
and struggle between 'the Lower Orders' (StL, 34) and an 'Australian 
aristocracy' (StL, 26), the novels also foreground an opportunistic 
rivalry in the Lower Orders that circumvents any attempt at 
communal purpose. One is reminded of Furphy's earlier comment 
that life's 'purpose' will never be 'fulfilled by plethoric banking 
accounts' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). For example, 
Collins indicates that the newly arrived Scot, 'Tom [Armstrong] had 
acquired, without any severe wrench of his finer feelings, the 
boundary man's hostility to the bullock driver' (SlL, 159). Given 
Collins' views, this customary hostility is unnecessary. Nor is it 
necessary that, generally speaking, '[e]ach of us supported his 
argument with a wealth of illustrations and thus fortified his own 
stubborn opinions to his own perfect satisfaction' (SiL, 48). 
Nevertheless, the bullockies ought to be seen as part of the raw 
material for nationhood, since they represent the social class for 
whom the Rights of Man were written. Consider the following 
exchange between Collins and Lushington in Rtgby's Romance: 
"It takes my breath away," murmured Lushington. 
"I've been strangely misinformed respecting the 
erudition of bullock drivers. Latin and Milton. Are they 
all like this?" 
"Certainly not. Other branches of knowledge are 
no less ably represented. They excel chiefly as 
linguists" (RR, 121). 
Although Lushington, a man educated in law (RR, 120) is 
impressed by Thompson's commitment to memory of Milton's verse, 
the emphasis is not on the bullockies' ability to learn or swear, but 
their reasons for learning. As Collins tells his readers, Thompson 
'told me that he had committed to memory this particular passage, 
thinking it might come in handy for courting purposes' (RR, 121). 
Equally, Dixon's commitment to learn Latin from Willoughby was 
not an acquisition of knowledge for the sake of ignorance-shifting or 
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the upbuilding of man, but a desire to possess a knowledge by which 
to beat one's rivals. As Dixon states, '[w]hen you git into an 
argument with a feller, you can jist watch yer (adj.) slant an' lay the 
opponent over with a sort o' bull's-eye phrase, an' he ain't got a word 
to say. What the (sheol) can he say?' (RR, 37). Dixon's learning 
simply perpetuates rivalries between men because he has the 
potential to frustrate hiS opponent with 'edicated words' (RR, 37). As 
Collins replies, '[y]es, it gives you an unmerciful purchase .... But a 
man should spread his studies a bit' (RR, 37)4. 
While the bullockles' aptitudes and skills show promise, the 
raw material needs to be shaped, hence the focus on the value of 
judgment, education and ignorance shifting in the novels. Both 
Furphy and Collins believe that education would smooth over the 
division, rivalry and opportunism which pitted man against man, 
colony against colony and the colonies against federation. 
Furthermore, it seems evident that Furphy wanted to counteract the 
apathy and fear of bushmen towards their own ignorance. As Collins 
explains, '[a]mongst well-bred bushman, lack of information is 
always carried off by august indifference; otherwise there would be 
derogation of dignity. Of course, in cases where assistance can be 
rendered or advice given, a certain chastened interest is even 
justifiable, but this interest must be purely objective, and entirely 
foreign to anything like curiosity or solicitude' (RR, 241-242). But, 
while '[t)he bushman must know all that may become a man', 
Furphy, as well as Collins, work to remedy the general notion that 
·anything that [the bushman] doesn't know ... isn't worth knowing' 
(RR, 242). 
Old Price's notion that Thompson's curse 'was invidiously 
owin' to yer own (adj.) misjudgment' (S#L, 19) is significant, as 
regards the following excerpt from a dialogue between Rigby and 
Thompson: 
" ... Steve! I have known and respected your father for 
five-and-twenty years- Will you promise to carefully 
read the Enchetrtdlon of Epictetus, if I give you the 
4 Of further interest, Thompson states that 'though they couldn't improve one another, they infected 
one another. Willoughby took Dixon's style of swearing with him for a keepsake, and left Dixon his 
style of slapping Latin in people's faces. Hanged if I know which habit is the worst' (RR, 73). And, 
according to Thompson, Willoughby, armed with Dixon's "habit", has found work in a Sydney 
insurance office. 
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book to-morrow?" 
"No, I'll swear I won't!" replied Thompson, in quick 
alarm. "The name's quite enough for me. I can find 
enough worry in knocking out a living, without any 
help from that class of people. Bad thing to know too 
much" (RR, 268). 
Firstly, this dialogue unveils an interesting paradox, namely 
that members of a society value education, yet show a tremendous 
aversion to being educated in matters of judgment. Furthermore, the 
curse can be seen as Thompson's aversion to using his intellect, 
courage and desire, or the three elements which make an indMdual 
just in a balanced way for his own well-being. He fails to realize that, 
within the context of the controlling alternatives, his curse is the 
result of his own misjudgment, and thereby fails to recognize that 
his misfortunes are the consequence of his own ignorant choices. 
And, within the context of articulating an identity, one can say that 
Thompson's curse is equally a failure to tell the right lies, or an 
inadequate truth-embellishment of one's identity within the context 
of eud.aimonta and roleplay. As a case-study, Thompson demonstrates 
that the bullockies have an aptitude for learning and a strong sense 
of judgment in accordance with their skills, which is their means of 
survival. But, in a moral sense, readers ought to observe that their 
three elements are not balanced, and that any knowledge they 
possess is devalued in light of eud.almonta. 
3.3. The Coming Austmlian Debate: landscape, gender and the 
Australienne. 
According to Tiffin, '[ d)ichotomies of many types helped to 
frame the ideas of what nineteenth-century Australia and its 
inhabitants were', most notably 'the development in attitude to 
landscape, climate and environment' (1987:60). Indeed, '[e]arlier 
speculation about genetic mutation gave way to ideas and models of 
social response' wherein 'the landscape's essential weirdness' was 
compared to 'climatic norms elsewhere' until '[i)t was largely replaced 
by an attitude which foregrounded the practical difficulties of life in 
the bush' (Tiffin, 1987:60). In short, climate and landscape are 
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crucial when it comes to imagining national type or identity in the 
antipodes, particularly with either an evolutionary degeneration or 
regeneration of the Anglo-Saxon species5 • White (1981:81-83) 
explains that the Coming Australian debate was part of a more 
widespread, Anglo-Saxon debate on The Coming Man, with white-
male supremacy utmost on the racial agenda, and that the image 
itself was an intellectual product derived from popular literature 
concerned with men of empire and action. 
Several Bulletin articles tackle these issues either separately or 
often confusingly together. According to an article vis-a-vis Clarke's 
views on the 10th of November, '(r]ace-quality is not altogether a 
matter of food and climate. In any historical comparison, much must 
be allowed for racial heredity; much for difference in complexity of 
civilisation; much for the constant evolution of humanity' ( 1894:6). 
Yet the self-same article stresses that '(t]he Bulletin asks its 
correspondents all over Australia to forward information of 
characteristic national developments as foreshadowed in individuals, 
or classes, or localities, always providing that they be chronicled with 
brevity and brains' ( 1894:6). Another article, published on the 29th of 
December, suggests that '(i]t would be a good thing for Australians if 
the average temperature of their continent could be reduced 10 
degrees all round', since '(t]he quick change from childhood to adult 
age (due to climate) tends to weaken the national physique' (1894:6)0 • 
However, in an interesting about-face, the article equally 
argues that '(t]he bush, giving health and strength not to be found in 
alleys and factories, dowers manhood and womanhood with 
dignity .... Theirs is a stoic philosophy; that of the coast is gay and 
epicurean' (1894:6). Furthermore, '(t]here is a note of feminine 
frivolity about Australian cities; a tinge of masculine harshness 
about the Australian bush' whereby '(t)he cities judge intuitively; the 
bush reasons logically' (1894:6). Indeed, an article published on the 
27th of October, 1894, gets to the heart of the matter. According to 
5 In The Annotated Such is Life ( 1991 :467-470), there is an extensive summary of the opinions held 
by Clarke, Trollope, Froude, O'Rell, Shaw and Adams concerning the debate of the Coming 
Australian in the 1890s. Equally, one can look at the Bulletin article on page 6, Saturday, the 27th of 
October, 1894, for an overview of the debate. 
8 One can turn to Dr. H. Marten's two essays, published respectively in the Bulletin on the 28th of 
July and the 11th of August, 1900, for a greater scientific discussion of climate and premature aging. 
Marten's views come from a paper delivered to the South Australian branch of British Medical 
Association, and was originally published in The Australasian Medical Gazene, July 1900. 
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the writer, 
[i]t is in our power by politic government to alter many 
of the conditions of national life, and so to weaken, if 
we cannot withstand, the currents of deterioration in 
our national character. If observers and thinkers can 
but determine the nature and force of those currents, 
and statesmen can erect a barrier to their influence, 
the Republic of Australia will long live to amuse its 
children with the prophecy of Marcus Clarke [ that the 
Australian race will be extinct in five-hundred years I 
(1894:6). 
This self-same programme underpins the comments in the 
following article on Federation, written by Ernest Favenc and 
published on the 19th of January, 1895, 
[the Murray] is the Nile of Australia .... The bond of 
union, then, between [New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia] may be said to be 
based upon the one great river system .... The 
unification of the four provinces, whose life-blood may 
be said to be the Murray and its host of tributaries, 
must eventually lead to the reclamation of the whole 
continent for purpose of close settlement .... With all 
the new science of the world within our grasp, and the 
hereditaiy pioneer spirit in our hearts, the foundation 
of a great nation that will people Australia from end to 
end should be now laid in the eastern half and, by the 
natural and irresistible progress of expansion, 
gradually embrace the continent (1895:6). 
Where does Furphy stand in this debate? To all intents and 
purposes, I think Furphy understood that the debate had much to do 
with a search for meaning and the need for eudaimonic certainty. He 
also saw the Coming Australian debate as something which stems 
from a human order of things rather than a natural one. As Furphy 
had stated to Stephens, 'I am a Biological Agnostic because 
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Darwinism is unduly boomed' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 
1995:95). This is not to say that climate or landscape do not play a 
part in national types, but they are not the sole factor, as the debate 
indicates. Like Collins, I think Furphy thought the views in the 
debate to be nothing more than 'Nankin palaces of porcelain theory, 
which will fall in splinters before the first cannon-shot of 
unparleying fact' (SiL, 144). I also think the novels indicate that the 
Coming Australian is not subject to biological or racial deterioration, 
but socio-cultural reevaluation, since pioneer societies will always 
forego some of the customs which established societies deem 
"civilized" and necessary. In short, '[t]he Coming Australian is a 
problem' (SiL, 144) because '[c]onfused identity seemed to be in the 
air' (SiL, 292). And, for Furphy, confused identity was in the air 
because of ill-judgments in light of eudaimonta. 
For this reason, I must disagree with Barnes' notion that, 
lacking 'the strength of the emotional link he feels' for the landscape, 
which 'is intellectualised to the point of abstraction', Furphy 'does 
not try to give concrete form and substance to his hopes, he does not 
try to visualize the future in relation to the particular landscape' 
(1986:101). Furphy's landscape ts intellectualised precisely because 
the future relationship between "Australians" and their environment 
depends on judgment, controlling alternatives and knowing what is 
up to you and what is not. Perhaps the emotional element is 
downplayed because, as Elliott points out, '[t]he element of surprise 
is quite gone, the attachment complete' and, for Furphy, 'it is never a 
question of explaining an improbable vista or justifying a grotesque 
one', since '[t]he naturalness of nature no longer calls for apology' 
( 1966:66). Furphy seems to indicate that no matter what the 
credentials of the writer, any view on the Coming Australian is 
subject to authorship. Some views are better than others, but all 
must bear in mind the impact they will have on the reading public, 
especially when it comes to their seeing and responding to life. 
Because of Furphy's emphasis on judgment, roleplay and the 
ethics of truth-embellishment, I disagree with Johnson's (1965) hasty 
generalization that Australian fiction, unlike American fiction, offers 
no road out, or no option for its heroes to cross the frontier and 
evade the social structures and responsibilities which society 
dictates. The falsity of this view is equally foregrounded by Paterson's 
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verse, which offers a road out through the city-bush dichotomy, or 
Lawson's earlier verse on unionism, democracy and Republicanism. 
To all intents and purposes, the road out of one society is the road 
into another. Johnson (1965:24-25) rightly suggests that the 
Australian interior places the Australian hero face to face with 
death, but this is no different from the American hero, despite 
differences in geography. Simply put, the frontier is not just a 
physical space. It is also a mental and social space, or a way of 
seeing and responding to life whereby an error of judgment can lead 
to catastrophe. For this reason, I must disagree with Croft's notion 
that 'the realistic world of Riverina' is, in fact, 'a distorted world' 
which 'a theologian might call Hell' (1986:160. My italics). Rather 
than seeing and responding to the bush as hell, Collins lays claim to 
the '[tline open country we have in the interior' (BBB, 65). 
This leads me to question Vincent Buckley's notion that 
'Furphy's characters do not experience Australia as a source-country; 
nor does any of them give much sign that he thinks of himself as 
having a destiny, to be gladly affirmed and lived out' (1979:84). 
According to Buckley, '[w]hen a country is a source-country, it ts 
already potential to poetry' (1979:78). Buckley provides a list of 
criteria that enables a country to become a source-country, which 
includes 
* habits of perception pregnant with the language 
which presents them; 
* images, natural objects and events, places and their 
conformations, tending towards archetype or towards 
some importance in history; 
* place-names, proper names. Perceived systems of 
genealogy and of the relation of families to places; 
* historical events, especially those which are linked 
with legend and/ or poetry, or which changed the 
fortunes, or rulership, or ownership, and hence the 
psychic processes, of the race. such as emigration, 
famine, dispossession, land wars. 
* a language, if retained. 
the traces in emotion of a language, if lost; 
* patterns of family life; 
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* legends, adaptations of still earlier myths, 
imaginative manners of controlling both the hot 
human and cold inhuman sea: 
* folklore, Fairy raths. Sacred trees. Hearth-customs. 
Significance of days, wells, rocks, gestures, paths. 
These separated out for purposes of .. belief' and also 
merged with the day-to-day life of the people. 
* an accent, a pace, a pitch, a rhythm of speech. 
* a political imagination and need 
(1979:78). 
Buckley argues that '[m)ost of these things could not be 
brought to Australia. What remained was the ache of their absence' 
(1979:78). Comparing Australia to America, he believes 'that America, 
faced with the same contradictions as ourselves made persiStent and 
even programmatic attempts to overcome them -to become, in short, 
a source-country' while the Australian project suffered under 
'laconicism' (1979:85). I cannot but reject Buckley's proposition. 
Furphy's novels may not encompass all the above criteria, but they 
certainly do encompass some. Perhaps the strongest criteria for 
enabling a country as source-country is a political imagination and 
need, a move towards a national type, habits of perception or generic 
ways of seeing, and the accent, pace, pitch or rhythms of speech. 
Whether one sees them as Collins' or Furphy's, the novels possess all 
these criteria, for the Riverina enables Australia as a source-country, 
as a teeming nation of nations. Interestingly enough, Buckley, in an 
essay published six years later, states that 'Furphy identified himself 
as all-embracing Australian', calling him, 'if the comparison be not 
too bizarre, the Walt Whitman of his time and place' (1986:42). 
I would now like to address some main points by Kay Schaffer, 
especially her notion that '(t)he bush against which [the masculine 
Australian character) forms a sense of identity is represented as a 
feminine other' (1988:42). Given Collins' referring to Australia as the 
'virgin continent' who has 'long ... tarried her bridal day!' (SiL, 65), it 
is true that the land, or bush, in Furphy's fiction, is representatively 
feminine, as feminist critics, writing about Furphy, agree. But his 
depiction of this .. otherness" of the land is not in the manner that 
Schaffer argues as being representative of the 1890s nationalist 
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tradition. Schaffer's ( 1988) findings on the construction of 
Australian national identity are based on her notion of Lawson as 
the founding father of a masculine tradition: a tradition which sees 
the feminine "other" from an entirely negative perspective. Because of 
this, Schaffer states that 
[i)n Lawson's fiction the bush is an evocative presence. 
It can be awesome, endless and enduring. Yet it is also 
harsh and unforgiving. It forms a constant, silent and 
ultimately unconquerable backdrop for the 
bushman .... The bushman resolves neither his struggle 
for survival against the landscape nor his battle for 
authority against the British civilization. Like his 
digger counterpart, he often ends his days in bitter 
resignation -dazed by the bush, crazed by drink or 
dead in the struggle. The struggle with the land-as-
other determines the nature of this character, the 
Australian character (1988:42). 
While this may be an appropriate reading for Lawson, as well 
as other authors Schaffer cites, it is an unsuitable reading of the 
Australian character and landscape in Furphy's novels. As I have . 
already discussed, Furphy was not entirely satisfied with Lawson's 
grim realism. For Furphy, Lawson's crowning achievement was the 
optimistic depiction of young Australia in his verse. Thus, Schaffer's 
notion that the Australian national identity is marked by a 
masculine struggle with the land-as-other, or 'the bush as cruel 
mother' (1988:22), often ending in bitter resignation, is problematic 
when it comes to Furphy. Schaffer's discussion of Francis Adams' 
1890s article on the death of Burke and Wills is particularly 
interesting here. She writes that '[Adams'] use of the term 
"absorption" suggests the power of the bush, like the fantasy of the 
primal mother, to suck up its inhabitants, assimilating them into its 
contours and robbing them of a separate identity' (1988:52). 
According to Schaffer, '[t)his is a powerful fantasy in Australia' 
(1988:52). Readers of Such ts Life will be aware of the fact that the 
aristocratic Burke and Wills are not national heroes. As Mosey 
states, 'Wills was a pore harmless weed, so he kin pass' but Burke 
246. 
I. 
': 
'died for want of his sherry an' biscakes' (SIL, 26). It is only 
Willoughby, the aristocrat, who argues that Burke and Wills are 
·gentlemen ... who have exhibited in a marked degree the qualities of 
the pioneer' (SIL, 26). According to Mosey and the other bullockies, 
'there ain't a drover, nor yet a bullock driver, nor yet a stock-keeper, 
frome 'ere to 'ell that couldn't 'a' bossed that expegition straight 
through to the Gulf, an' back agen, an' never turned a hair -with 
sich a season as Burke had. Don't sicken a man with yer Burke. He 
burked that expegition, right enough' (SIL, 26). Burke and Wills' 
death had nothing to do with the "absorptive" power of the bush. 
Instead, their deaths are marked by Burke's incompetence. 
Furphy, like Schaffer, sees "absorption" into the bush as a 
powerful fantasy in Australian Writing rather than an actual fact. 
This is consistent with his focus on the ethics of representation. 
Schaffer (1988:17, 29) is remarkably quiet on Furphy, subordinating 
him to her masculine nationalist tradition epitomised by Lawson. In 
order to maintain her feminist critique of the manly Australian 
national identity, she focuses on Barbara Baynton 'as a dissident in 
her radical resistance to the social and political consensus regarding 
woman's place within the Australian tradition' (1988: 169). But one 
should be equally aware of a similar dissidence in Furphy. As Devlin-
Glass notes, while Furphy cannot 'be exculpated entirely of sexism', 
his 'attitudes to gender are complex and multi-layered' (1991:39). She 
argues that 'he critiques gender construction' in the sense that his 
novels are an 'examination of male ratiocination' ( 1991 :39). 
Devlin-Glass' notion is problematic, since Furphy sees 
ratiocination as a crucial tool in the uplifting and upbuilding of 
individuals, communities and nation. Nevertheless, Devlin-Glass 
rightly indicates that 
Furphy's ... construction of the land is significantly 
different from the one considered normative by the 
constructors of the radical nationalist tradition, for 
whom the bush is either a "vision splendid" or harsh, 
destructive, and synonymous with failure, a threat to 
identity and sanity .... [H]e is not driven by the 
imperative to conquer and to master, or to the brink of 
madness. Although he, like his contemporaries, 
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unconsciously sexuallses the landscape, his approach 
is not phallocentrtc. Rather, he sees the relationship 
between man and the land as interactive (1991:40). 
But, as Devlin-Glass states, '[i]f she is a virgin, awaiting 
consummation, a metaphor which ... had much currency in the 
period, then it is on her terms, and the suitor must prove his 
worthiness' (1991:41). This notion of proving one's worthiness on 
"her" terms shows that 'the concept of a contract between man and 
nature is crucial' (Devlin-Glass, 1991:41). According to Devlin-Glass, 
'Furphy often depicts failed or failing small selectors and instead of 
finding the land itself responsible ... he seeks human agency' 
(1991:42). Again, Furphy seeks the source of failure in errors of 
judgment, as the Epictetian flavour of the theocy of the controlling 
alternatives indicates. As Keogh states, 
[ t]he Australian land renders meaningless attempts to 
see it from a European perspective, with a 
corresponding failure and sterility in attempts to 
impose upon it a too strictly European landscape. This 
is also symbolized by the treatment of women and 
sexual relationships in the text. Despite a strongly 
pessimistic undertone, the outlook is not totally bleak. 
There are some signs of hope, a suggestion that a 
fusion of the two conflicting elements, land and 
landscape, is possible (1989:55. My italics). 
The land is feminine, while landscape, as explained by Keogh 
(1989:55), signifies the man-made physical or mental environment, 
or the masculine way of seeing. In this sense, the emergence and 
survival of the "Australian" depends not only on a masculinity which 
can tum the land into a landscape, but also on a femininity which 
reads the land and "her" 'ungauged potentiality of resource' (SIL, 65). 
As Collins suggests, "she" -both Woman and land- must be 
'[f]aithfully and lovingly interpreted' in order to unveil her 'latent 
meaning' (SIL, 65). In other words, '[w]hen "landscape" arises directly 
from the conditions of the natural environment, life will be fruitful, 
peaceful, fair and just. The opposition between land and landscape is 
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used in [Such is Life] to examine not Just economic struggle, but the 
whole ideological basis of the future Australia' (Keogh, 1989:63). 
Martin thinks that this 'suggests a bush invested with female and 
male attributes or aspects' (1992:73). 
Devlin-Glass argues that '(t]he land's destructive mode was, for 
Furphy, able on some occasions to be circumvented by prudent bush-
wisdom, and, if not, ameliorated by men and women acting 
cooperatively' (1991:43). I must disagree, therefore, with Partlngton's 
notion that 'the centre of Furphy's interest, like that of Lawson, is 
men rather than women' (1993:107). Nor do I agree with Lever's 
conclusion that 'the novel's failure to address the "other half' of 
human experience is put before the reader as a failure of fiction' 
(1996-97:161). This is despite her noting that 'Furphy too deserves to 
be read in terms of feminist concerns', for 'his novels proclaim an 
interest in gender and gender representation, gendered writing and 
reading' ( 1996-97: 157). Given the complexity of his novels, Lever's 
evidence is rather limited, for her view is based on a reading of an 
excised portion 'from the original Such ls Life later published as 
"Rigby and the Authoress"' (1996-97:153). 
It is interesting to note that the novels' time period coincides 
With the early stages of the Australian suffrage movement, most 
notably, as discussed by Anne Summers (1994:396-397), the 
Women's Christian Temperance Union in New South Wales during 
1882 and the Women's Suffrage Society, founded by Harriet Dugdale 
and Annette Bear in Victoria during 1884. I think Furphy is pro-
femtnist, and the movement's campaigns in the 1890s either shaped 
or coincided with his own views on women's roles in society. Barnes 
points out that '[i]n the original Such is Life the theme of gender 
confusion was highlighted by Furphy's adoption of non-sexist 
pronouns -"se", "sim" and "sis"- which could be used to cover both 
male and female' ( 1990:227). Summers ( 1994:395-396), Sheridan 
(1988:29-30) and White (1981:77) note that the rise of Australian 
feminism cannot be separated from the rise of Australian 
nationalism. Discussing The Dawn, Sheridan (1988:38-40) and 
Docker (1991:3-25) respectively note that the magazine, although it 
had never been as piously nationalist as the Bulletin, was principally 
concerned With the uplifting and upbuilding of women because it saw 
them as the moral force in the regenerative evolution of an 
249. 
Australian society and culture, which, according to many feminists, 
was in a state of decay due to men and their immoral needs. 
According to Summers, 
[t]he feminists had identified as the two most 
important tasks of the modem family the socialization 
of children and the control and conflnemen t of 
sexuality. They argued that 'the family' was in danger 
of becoming ineffective because these two functions 
were being Jeopardized by the disjunction in the 
relationship between domestic and political life. Both 
functions were in need of reform, reinterpretation or 
reconfirmation and they saw women in their God's 
Police role as providing the linchpin to this social 
renovation. They saw that women needed avenues of 
political expression to be able to effect domestic 
reforms [ and, for thts reason, they lobbied for the vote 1 
(1994:414). 
As Docker notes, '[w]here the Bulletin considered men superior 
in evolution because of their possession of rationality, The Dawn 
assumed women's rationality and considered men inferior in 
evolution because of their lack of purity' (1991:52). This led to an 
intense and absurd attack by the Bulletin writers on feminism and 
the New Woman, as noted by Docker (1991:47-55), Sheridan 
(1988:34) and White (1981:83), for they felt that she would hamper 
the progress of the masculine national type and its programme of 
enlightened democracy in Australia. Yet Docker, in light of Sylvia 
Lawson's The Archibald Paradox, states that the Bulletin's attitude 
was 'ambivalent and varied', for 'they approved of the New Woman in 
so far as she was distant from puritanism, temperance, religion and 
didn't go around accusing men of molesting her' (1991:53). In short, 
they approved of her when she was rational. 
Although Furphy wrote for the Bulletin, he is not a Bulletin 
writer, as I pointed out earlier. His own concerns, as well as those of 
his implied author and hero, are not far removed from 1890s 
feminism, most notably 'the link between family and society' in 
which 'women were performing their du ties as citizens by producing 
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and educating children who could contribute actively to the 
development of the nation' (Summers, 1994:414-415). As he had 
stated to Winter, 'I believe [purpose] is fulfilled by the production of 
men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear 
intellect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). Besides 1890s 
feminism, this view is equally found in Republic (bk5.45lc-457b), 
where Socrates advances the view that women's equality and 
suitability for guardianship should be judged on aptitude rather than 
sexual difference. In light of Collins' uplifting and upbuilding, I 
would like to refute Croft's claim that '[w]hen we read the works as 
novels by Joseph Furphy, rather than as the diaries of Tom Collins, 
it is possible to see the women characters as being far more 
important than they appear to be for Tom' (1983:1). 
One does not have to appeal to Furphy's text to see the value 
of women, for such a possibility is equally recognizable in Tom's 
"text". This is especially so with 'the short, silky moustache which is 
the piquant trade-mark of our country-women' (SiL, 211-212). As 
Martin states, '(t]he moustache is, in Furphy, a signifier of a 
profound disruption of the division between the sexes' (1992:69). For 
Martin, the moustache-as-sign allows 'individual bodies [to] assert 
difference and avoid the stereotyping [normally associated with the 
fixing of gender]' (1992:75). This is because the moustache indicates 
that the "Australian" Woman reconstructs her gender role by 
appropriating customary masculine values, indicating that gender is 
not a fixed and natural set of attributes, but a truth-embellished 
construction subject to personal, historical and environmental 
change in light of eud.atmonta. In this sense, I disagree with Lever's 
notion that '(t]he sexual stereotypes on which the novel [Such ts Life] 
seems to operate are proven time and again to be unreliable guides to 
the physical identity of characters' (1996-97:159). 
Nor do I agree with Croft's (1983:10) notion that Collins is 
blind to the positive value of Australian women because all he can 
see is their moustache. Collins may see Jemima Quarterman initially 
as a gender oddity, but he is not repulsed by her masculine and 
feminine qualities. He may state that he was' horror-stricken' 
because '" Jim" was a magnificent young woman, riding barebacked, a 
la clothes-peg', but 'she was' also 'a phantom of delight' (SiL, 115). 
Collins' initial 'revulsion of feeling' quickly turns into 'the quickest 
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and fullest' passion he had 'ever experienced' (SiL, 115). Indeed, 'it 
was some minutes before' Collins became 'his own philosophic self 
again' (SiL, 115), seizing the chance to use her as evidence of a 
particular "Australian" type, for he states that '[e)ven in the distance, 
I fancied her attitude was that of a girl who had imprudently set in 
motion a thing that she was powerless to stop' (SiL, 115). 
In his first letter to Miles Franklin, Furphy 'desired to draw 
[her] attention to some striking parallelisms in My Brilliant Career 
and [his] own book Such ts Life', especially the 'remarkable' parallel 
between 'the bush-born girl' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 148), 
namely Sybylla Melvin and Jemima Quarterman. Furphy praises 
Franklin's My Brilliant Career because 'no book yet published 
contains so many echoes of my own literary ideas and avowals as 
yours does' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 153). Contrary to the 
letters Furphy wrote to Cathels, he is less concerned with knowledge, 
preferring to discuss the Australian experience. Lever notes that 
Furphy praised 'Franklin as the true bush girl who offered a feminine 
expression of the experience of Australia which was so dear to him' 
(1996-97:156). More than this, I think Furphy had found in Franklin 
and Sybylla Melvyn the clear intellect, calm courage and high moral 
standard necessary to the "Australian" type. 
Spender notes that 'much of [Australian] women's literature 
embodies a search for':.!ndividual and communal identity' (1988:xv). 
Discussing My Brilliant Career, Spender states that 
Miles remained well within the traditions of literary 
women's concern with love and marriage, but she 
didn't merely ask questions -she rebelled, and with 
great gusto. In almost swashbuckling manner, she 
scoffed at some of the conventions that were supposed 
to be sacred in women's lives: the heroine Sybylla 
Melvyn rejects romance -and suitors- and determines 
to lead an independent, full and creative life 
(1988:274). 
Equally, but in the context of the drama, Docker explains that 
'[t]he Australian heroine, the vigorous and independent currency 
lass, was made of altogether sterner stuff, as she strode the 
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nineteenth-century stage, cowering villains and rendering pale its 
male heroes' ( 1991 :xxvU). It is this independence of character, of 
making 'no apologies for being egotistical', as well as the writing of 'a 
yam' rather than 'a romance' (Franklin, [1901) 1990:1), which made 
Furphy personally admire Franklin. Indeed, her introduction to My 
Brilliant Career maps out much the same concerns with the ethics of 
representation as Furphy's novels. For example, Furphy wrote that 
I like your portrait [in My Brilliant Career] exceedingly 
well. It bespeaks frankness, courage, generosity, 
surpassing sweetness of disposition, and mental 
capacity of the highest order. Above all, it conveys to 
me the conception of value -womanly value; and this 
is idea that I would wish to impress upon yourself. 
You are an exceptional girl. Don't hold yourself 
cheap .... If you knew me as well (through reading my 
book) as I know you (through reading yours), you 
would perceive that there is no need for ceremony 
between us. We have much in common. Though 
doubtless many people know even more of bush life 
than we do, I question -with all modesty- whether any 
can depict it as well. Let this be our point of contact 
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 153). 
According to Barnes and Hoffmann, '[o]ut of his fascination 
with [Miles Franklin] came a series of deeply-felt and deeply-
considered letters in which [Furphy] gave of his best' (1995:27). As 
Furphy argued to Franklin, attempting to dissuade her from 
becoming an expatriate, 
[t]here is variety enough here; between the seething 
Pandemonium of the cities and the hallowed solitudes 
of the Out-back; between the serrated profile of the 
Great Divide and the long, long levels of Rivertna. And 
literature has hardly yet touched the fringe of 
Australian life-conditions. Practically nothing has 
been exploited but the amenities of the Home-station, 
the hardships of the Selection, and the most unlikely 
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nugget found by the reduced gentleman. Stay among 
the eucalypti, Miles, and earn the adoration of your 
countcymen by translating the hosannas and elegies of 
the Bush into vernacular phrase {in Barnes and 
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:166). 
In light of this, I dispute Croft's notion that, '[h]aving failed in 
the male world of materialism, [Furphy] constructed a world of 
metaphor and spirit which he associated with the female' {1983: 10). 
It is not 'a deep sense of failure' which led Furphy to construct 'his 
two-layered novels where women show heroic, positive values' {Croft, 
1983:10), but an emphasis on ignorance-shifting and better judgment 
towards men and women in the "Australian" experience. Barnes 
argues that '[t]he world Furphy creates is a world of masculine 
values, in which the experiences of wives and mothers are treated 
only marginally' {1990:222). Given the immense scope that uplifting 
and upbuilding entails, Barnes' statement is problematic. What one 
needs to consider is why the focus on specific women is what it is, 
for Collins claims that 'I always make a point of believing the best 
where women are concerned' (SIL, 118). Furphy himself had declared 
to Miles Franklin that he had an 'unbounded faith in the Australian 
woman in general, and the meteoric Miles in particular' {in Barnes 
and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 182). 
In order to see more clearly the novels' attitude to women, one 
ought to begin with an analysis of the aristocratic woman, Maud 
Beaudesart, and the American woman, Kate Vanderdecken. In a 
letter to Cathels, Furphy {in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42) 
points out that Maud Beaudesart is the daughter of Kingsley's hero. 
Sam Buckley. According to Furphy, 'this is a breach of literary 
etiquette', but '[t]he author of Geoj. Hamlyn deseives no courtesy' {in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42). Martin states that 'Mrs 
Beaudesart, the most sinister female, is after all centred in the home 
and amongst the pastoralists, while Alf [Molly Cooper] and Jim 
[Jemima Quarterman] have a free range of the landscape and gender 
possibilities' {1992:75). Towards Jemima Quarterman, the romantic 
descriptions of her beauty {SIL, 132) say more about her value as 
Currency lass than a perpetuation of the traditionally 'stereotyped 
woman of the male literary imagination' {Croft, 1983:3). But, towards 
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Beaudesart, the aristocratic woman, Collins exercises his cunning 
concealment, for she is 'the archetype of the fatal woman' (Croft, 
1983:3), representing danger for the Australienne. One can see this 
in Beaudesart's sharp treatment of Ida (SIL, 211-214), another 
Currency lass. As Collins states, 
Levites, tribesmen, and Gentiles alike, used to poke 
fun at me over Mrs. Beaudesart; but the fact that they 
thought they knew my real standing, whereas they 
didn't, seemed to weigh so much in my favour as to 
make their banter anything but provoking. Yet my 
relations with the gentlewoman were painful enough 
(SIL, 210). 
Beaudesart's crusty values run contrary to Collins' interests in 
the Lower Orders. As Collins explains to his reader, Maud 
Beaudesart had been 'a singularly handsome young lady' but 'became 
a veritable heroine of romance' (SIL, 209). Furthermore, her nuptial 
interests in him make Collins feel that he is 'a done man' (SIL, 228), 
as is evident in the following exchange between Moriarty and Collins: 
"You don't want to marry her, then, after all?" 
"How long do you suppose I would last?" 
"Well, don't marry her" (SIL, 228). 
One must remember that Beaudesart, before her interest in 
Collins, had already been widowed three times (SIL, 209-210, RR, 87), 
and this prompts Collins, towards the close of Such ts Life, to 
fabricate a scandal involving himself in order to escape Beaudesart's 
interest in him. As Collins states, 'I must help her to keep up the 
grisly fraud of feminine reluctance' for 'I have the dubious 
satisfaction of knowing that the enterprise brings me a good many 
days march nearer home' (SIL, 228). The plan fails, for the scandal 
only increases Maud's interest in her "Tom Collins", whom 
Montgomery, the squatter, had introduced as 'the last lineal 
descendant of Commander David Collins, R.N.' (SIL, 210). Because of 
this, it is incorrect to conclude, as Brady does, that 'Collins prefers 
erotic daydreams to real women' and a misreading to suggest that 
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'[t]he "tawny-hatred tigress with slumberous dark eyes" he dreams of 
ts always submissive and makes no claims on him' (1981:64. My 
italics). 
Nor is it correct for Barnes to state that '[t]he farcical plot 
involving Mrs Beaudesart presents [Collins] as the male ego 
threatened by the possibility of marrtage and domesticity' (1990:222). 
As Collins remarks about Beaudesart, the novels' dangerous tigress, 
'if [she] assumes -if she merely takes for granted- that I'm going to 
many her, I must do it, to keep her in countenance .... Of course, she 
had no business to accept me unawares' (SiL, 228). The Ou1d1an 
tawney-hatred tigress is anything but submissive or passive, as noted 
by Knight's (1969:248-250) discussion of Collins' reading of Ouida's 
Strathmore. She ls quite capable of making claims on men, for her 
exotic sexuality appeals directly to male desire. As Collins states, 
'what a sweet, spicy, piquant thing it must be to be lured to 
destruction by a tawny-hatred tigress with slumberous dark eyes' 
(SiL, 130). More importantly, the dangers of the aristocratic femme 
fatale indicate the need for the new world woman with her clear 
intellect, calm courage and high moral standard. 
With this in mind, let us consider Kate Vanderdecken. In a 
letter to Kate Baker, Furphy, working on Rtgby's Romance, writes 
I think there is something beautiful (don't you?) in the 
picture of the ever-faithful woman [Kate Vanderdecken] 
making her long over-sea pilgrtmage to find that her 
demigod [J(efferson Rigby] has absolutely forgotten that 
she ever existed. A lesser genius than the present 
scribe would make Rigby an unworthy person; but here 
we find him enthroned as a man humanly perfect in 
intellect and principle, besides being gentle, brave and 
chivalrous. Now this ls the true tragedy -the tragedy of 
the heart. None of your adultery or manslaughter 
business. Red paint is too cheap for the present artist 
(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:75). 
To most Furphy critics, Kate Baker's response is well known. 
Recalling a conversation with Furphy, she had stated, 
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I didn't [see the tragedy]; that was a man's view. I 
couldn't see any woman of spirit tailing over a 
continent to look for a man who had never made a 
move to find whether she was alive or not. The best 
part in Kate Vanderdecken was where she "hoist sail 
and away" and "left the lord lamenting". 
Rigby deserves shooting! Despite Tom Collins's 
efforts to get him to make some sort of amends to 
Kate, Rigby doesn't make even an attempt. Brave? 
Chivalrous? Brrrr! 
The story, however, serves for a peg on which 
Joseph Furphy can hang hiS Ethico-cum-philosophic 
pedantcy (in Franklin, 1944:165-166). 
Franklin's view of Rigby is 'that he remains a wooden figure' 
and '[l]ike Kate Vanderdecken he is described but never comes alive' 
(1944: 165). According to Franklin, '[i]n Kate Vanderdecken, Furphy's 
discernment of womanliness versus femininity collapses into 
masculine sentimentality over feminine graces' (1944: 157). This is in 
direct opposition to her notion that, in Such is Life, '[s]ome of 
Furphy's studies of women are as excellent as his observations of 
men or horses' especially 'with unattractive women, or those past 
nubility' (1944:157). But, several years after the conversation with 
Kate Baker, Furphy had written, in a letter to Cecil Winter, that 
'[t]he "romance" -remotely founded on fact- was [just] written in a 
leisurely and wanton frame of mind, and the accessories filled 
themselves in, so to speak, up to the desired size of the book' (in 
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147). Between such an initially 
strong expression of an intention and a later, casual allusion to the 
Kate and Rigby romance, what was Furphy tcytng to achieve with 
these two heroes? 
Did he seriously reconsider their roles after Kate Baker's 
retort? Or were his initial intentions less than serious? Questions 
such as these are not easily answered, but the pu bltshed version of 
the novel does not subordinate the character of Kate Vanderdecken 
to Jefferson Rigby. The title, Rigby's Romance, suggests more of a pun 
on rugby's actual romance with state socialism than with his old 
flame, Kate Vanderdecken. As Croft states, 'Furphy's ideal male is 
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beyond the lure of the sirens, in love with a set of ideals rather than 
a real woman' (1991 :242). Or, as Gilding notes, 'Rigby has romance 
in his life -but it is not directed at Kate. Rigby is in love with the 
political cause he espouses, which is almost to say, with argument 
itself (1967:29). Rigby is not Furphy's ideal male hero, for Kate's 
character cuts much too strong an imprint on the reader's mind. She 
does not wait for Rigby, and one gets the impression that her leaving 
indicates a pragmatic character rather than a heroine of romance 
who dotes on a supposedly ideal man or "demigod". 
One ought to see the value of Kate Vanderdecken in contrast 
to Mrs. Beaudesart. As Collins states, '[t]he women were in no way 
alike, save that both were attractive to the eye, and both bore 
evidence of that social cultivation which is every women's birthright; 
and would be every woman's inheritance if men in name were men in 
reality' (RR, 87). Franklin, noting this comparison, states that 'Mrs. 
Beaudesart and Kate Vanderdecken, his most extended portraits of 
women, are both out of plumb with reality' (1944: 157-158). As we 
already know, Beaudesart represents an aristocratic, stock-in-trade 
literary character. Yet Franklin rightly indicates that Kate 
Vanderdecken is also a stock-in-trade literary character, but I 
disagree with her notion that she 'belongs to Victorian stock female 
roles' (1944: 159). While Collins' sympathies do not lie with 
Beaudesart, they are 'centred on Miss Vanderdecken' (RR, 22). Why is 
this so? According to his own 'twenty-three years' contemplation' 
(RR, 22) of her image, Kate had the 'figure of a beautiful, though 
somewhat mynheer [ manly or masculine, RD I looking, sheaf of 
contradictions' with 'unavailing remorse ... on her damask cheek' (RR, 
19). 
It would seem that Collins, as implied author, has his heroic 
self sympathise with a stock-in-trade victim of romance. But her. 
masculinity is also noted through his use of the Dutch "mynheer". It 
is in this sense that the novel resumes the contrasts between old 
world types and new world types begun in Such ts Life. And, if the old 
world type of woman, such as Beaudesart, makes herself known by a 
fatal and unrelenting expression of interest in a potential lover, then 
the new world type of woman, such as Kate, is prepared to be 
pragmatic rather than traditional. Kate will not pursue nor make 
claims on Rigby in the same manner as Beaudesart pursues and 
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makes claims on Collins. As Croft notes, 'Kate compromises neither 
her dignity nor her independence to accomplish her ends' (1991:226). 
The new world type is clearly meant to be seen as more desirable in 
terms of the self-evident right to self-definition and self-expression. 
In terms of the strategic value of Kate Vanderdecken, I would 
have to disagree with Croft, who argues that 'the stocy of the 
complementacy half of Rigby's romance, Kate Vanderdecken, is never 
articulated properly by Tom and only partly understood by him. That 
is also the case with the two main female characters [Molly Cooper 
andLtUtanFalkland-Pritchard] in his other major works' (1983:1). The 
issue of Tom's only partly understanding the value of Molly Cooper 
and Lillian Falkland-Pritchard will be dealt with a little later, but it 
is obvious that Tom's status as both implied author and hero 
severely problematises Croft's claim. According to Collins, Kate 
is,'[b]y the foot, American', for 'the foot of the American woman is a 
badge as distinctive as the moustache of the Australienne' (RR, 5-6). 
Collins also states that 'there was a good expression in the foot now 
under notice; it was a generous, loyal, judicious foot, yet replete with 
idealism and soulfulness' (RR, 6). 
The "foot" actually alludes to a sense of stateliness or 
surefootedness in nation and direction. Thus, the presence of Kate, 
as a national type of post-civil war America, suggests that Collins is 
alluding to the potential for unity amid diversity, especially rivalcy. 
One can infer that Collins, as well as Furphy, conceives of a similar 
future for "Australia", and that the surest sign of this future is the 
mustachioed Woman. One should approach Collins' theocy of 'sex-
charm' and 'sex-value' (RR, 10-11) with this in mind. Defining the 
two terms, Collins states that '[t]he former conveys passion; the 
latter adoration. The former sees femininity; the latter, womanhood. 
And these are the two extremes' (RR, 11 ). Furthermore, 
... it is worthy of note that, where the controlling 
masculine minds are moved or biased by the sex-
influence, the force is exercised by a woman, not by a 
female. And not till the peach-bloom of youth is gone 
can the woman dominate the female and her 
personality reach its maximum angel-loveliness or its 
most formidable devil-beauty. 
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... the world is swayed by women, not by females. And 
each man, be he king or beggar, is a little world of his 
own. If he be swayed by a female, as kings and beggars 
frequently are, he is an extremely little world. 
But don't misapprehend me as identifying or 
confounding femininity with youth, and womanhood 
with maturity. Just as many a man, having outlived 
the boy's enthusiasm and ingenuousness, retains the 
boys uselessness and self-conceit, so, in the other sex, 
mere femininity too often accompanies maturity. 
When this occurs -in fact, when the case is one of 
incorrigible femininity- the subject is good for two 
things only: to suckle fools and chronicle small beer 
(RR, 11). 
Although Croft discusses Collins' theory, arguing that it is a 
development of 'Rory O'Halloran's A Pleafor Women in Such is Life' 
and noting that 'Kate ... belongs to the second category' (1991:225, 
226), he does not explore it any further within the context of a 
comparison between Beaudesart and Kate. A Plea For Woman (SIL, 
75-77) argues for the sex-value of women, challenging the biblical 
notion that women have 'a preternatural bias toward sin in a general 
way' by contrasting the evil of 'the Solomon-woman' with the 
goodness of the modern 'Shakespear-woman' (SIL, 76). While 
Beaudesart is, through her sex-charm, the sinister aristocrat or 
Solomon-woman, Kate Vanderdecken, as the American type of new 
world Woman, is the manifestation of sex-value, possessing dignity, 
surefootedness and independence. She is the embodiment of the 
Shakespeare-woman, possessing clear intellect, calm courage and 
high moral standard. Kate may be 'a stock female role', but she is 
not 'Victorian', as Franklin cla1ms (1944: 159). Although Kate recedes 
into the background during the sermon on the Murray, perhaps 
justifying to some extent Franklin's notions, she returns in full force 
in Collins' allusion to the powerful and versatile image of "Kate" in 
Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew (RR, 236). 
Rigby may think that Kate is 'petulant and quarrelsome' as 
well as 'frivolous and heartless' (RR, 17), but he is no Petruccio. As 
Croft explains, Rigby is 'a small-souled, over-bearing, and essentially 
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heartless man, who hides his deficiencies under a cloak of idealism' 
(1991:245). The value of Kate exceeds that of Rigby, simply because 
'Shakespeare's Kate would have been more than a match for Rigby' 
(Croft, 1991 :222). In this sense, the comparison between Kate 
Vanderdecken and Shakespeare's .. Kate" is very appropriate to the 
new world type of Man, since the play explores the idea of love and 
friendship ... Kate" is quite prepared to live with Petruccio so long as 
it does not mean sacriflcing her spirit, her 'loyal' and 'lofty nature' 
(RR, 17). nor her rights. Collins is alluding to the Shakespearean 
.. Kate" not just in Kate Vanderdecken, but also in the .. Australienne", 
since both are seen to possess the very masculine traits of self-
deflnition, vitality and independence of identity necessary to nation-
building and eudaimonia. 
3.4. Men, Women and Marriage: the imagined community 
through the Australian romance. 
According to Barnes, '[w]hen [Furphy] introduced Rory 
O'Halloran and his wife [Deborah] into the revised version of Such ts 
Life, he came closer to his own marital situation [to Leonie] than 
anywhere else, but not in a way that invited any identification' 
(1990:221). Or, as Partington notes, 'Furphy's portrayal of the 
ongoing hostility between Rory O'Halloran and his wife can be seen 
as a reflection of his own miserable marriage, which neither party 
ever made any move to terminate' (1993:96). Much can be said about 
the marriage of Rory and Deborah O'Halloran in light of Furphy's 
marriage to Leonie. But I think one should approach the O'Halloran 
episode as a parable of Young Australia's future, especially since the 
narrative is woven tightly around the theme of sectarian rivalry. Both 
Keogh (1989:61) and Scheckter (1981:69) note that the child, Mary 
O'Halloran, functions as a symbol of the nation's future and that 
the success of her future is jeopardised by her parents' sectarianism. 
Collins introduces Rory as 'a Catholic of the Catholics' (SlL, 
54) and Deborah as 'a red hot Protestant', strategically pointing out 
that 'she didn't want Dan [Rory], and Dan didn't want her, but 
somehow they were married before they came to an understanding' 
(SlL, 56). Given the stress on judgment in light of the controlling 
alternatives, Collins points to the dogma which underpins this 
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rivalry in two ways. Firstly, he states that 'I tried, in a friendly way 
and confidential way, to draw him out respecting certain of his 
Church's usages and tenets, which I knew to be garbled and falsified 
by Protestant bigotry' (SlL, 57). Secondly, Collins dedicates a 
significant portion of his narrative to elucidate to his readers the 
finer points of this rivalry in the old world (SlL, 57-61). As Croft 
notes, Collins' 'long digression on the history of sectarianism in 
Northern Ireland' is 'to prove the point that the division was not the 
product of theological difference, but was engineered by the landed-
class of Ulster to divide and rule the peasantry' (1991:141). 
One could equally look to Hughes (1987:182-183) for an 
account of the social engineering that divided Ireland, legally 
privileging Irish Protestants over and above the Irish Catholics and 
literally stripping the latter of all their entitlements. Through Mary 
O'Halloran's death, this engineered sectarianism is shown to have 
devastating consequences for the future of Young Australia. As 
Collins states, 'a clearer-sighted Jeremiah could never have 
prophesied the deliberate introduction of hydrophobia for dogs, 
glanders for horses, or Orangeism for men. Yet the latter enterprise 
has been carried out' (SlL, 58). In short, '[s]omeone has carried his 
congenial virus half-way round the globe, and tainted a young 
nation' (SlL, 58). As Evans et al note, 
[r)eligious antagonism and violence flared periodically 
in nineteenth and early twentieth century Australia 
between English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish Protestants 
and Irish Roman Catholics. Religious differences were 
sharpened by ethnic rivalries as old world struggles 
between Anglo-Saxon colonisers and colonised Irish 
Celts were transported with these migrants into 
Australia. In these conflicts, the Irish, who were 
roughly one-quarter of the colonial population, were 
usually the underdogs. As citizens, they were, on 
average, poorer, less well placed, more excluded and 
less powerful than many Protestants were. They were 
at various times the subjects of prejudice, suspicion 
and occasional assault. This did not mean, however, 
that Irish Catholics did not, at other times, also 
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initiate trouble and disturbance (1997:80). 
According to Collins, '[l]t was a vital and personal fact to 
[Rory], though only a historical truth to me, that this hereditary war 
of the Btg-endlans and Llttle-endlans had been conducted by our 
own immediate forefathers' (SiL, 60). Indeed, 'Rory couldn't get away 
from the strong probablllty that my grandfather had overpowered his 
own contemporary ancestor in the name of the Glorious, Pious and 
Immortal Memory, and had chopped his head off with a spade' (SiL, 
60). This ls despite the fact that Rory had freely migrated to Australia 
approximately 'thirteen years before' (SiL, 56), staking his 'future on 
the prosperity of Australia' (SiL, 57). But Rory does not arrive in 
Australia to make a clean start, preferring instead to perpetuate Old 
World history, legends and myths. As Collins notes, Rory was 
'dreamy, idealistic' and 'born of a legend-loving race' (SiL, 61), 
implying that this, rather than reason, formed the basis of his 
judgment, choices and consequences. 
According to Hughes, 
the story of English oppression and Irish resistance 
did not evaporate in Australia. On the contrary, it 
survived most tenaciously as one of the primary 
images of working-class culture, flourishing long after 
the [Convict) System itself had receded from memory. 
The Irish stuck to one another. They were clannish 
and had long memories .... They always felt they were 
being punished, not for their crimes, but for being 
Irish. In Australia, as in Ireland, each act of 
oppression contributed to a common fund of memory; 
fact might waver into legend, but the essential content 
did not change. By the 1880s, when the Protestant 
majority in Australia had all but sublimated the 
"hated stain" of convlctry, the Irish still kept the 
memory of the System alive (1987:194-195). 
Readers of Such ts Life are now in a better position to 
appreciate Collins' attack on the 'Catholic and Protestant slaves of 
dogma', and Furphy's own views in the strategically written line, 
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'[s]mall sympathy have ye from this Josephus' (SfL, 60). Franklin may 
note that 'Mrs. O'Halloran is introduced in bare outline only' 
(1944:161), but she does not see that Deborah's dogmatism is, like 
Rory's, strategically designed to foreground the sectarian rivalry 
which will lead to the tragedy of Mary's death (SfL, 187-192). Croft 
states that '[g]iven such a background it ts not surprising that Mary/ 
Young Australia should go astray and lose her bearings even in the 
Utopia paddock, tom as she is between a seductive patriarchy and a 
punitive matriarchy, between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism' 
(1991:141). As Keogh (1989:62) and Scheckter (1981:68) note, Mary's 
landing on her head in the bilby-hole and her dying by suffocation 
symbolically seems to indicate that mental attitudes caused her 
downfall as Young Australia. 
From the sectarian rivalry of the O'Hallorans, readers 
encounter the next debilitating mental attitude towards Young 
Australia in the marriage of the Vivtans, or the "Sollickers". The 
Vivian/ Solllcker episode cunningly alludes to Anglo-Australianism, 
or "Britishness" in 1890s' Australia. On first meeting, Collins, 'the 
Irresistible', encounters Edward Vivian, or Sollicker, 'the Immovable' 
(SfL, 137). Croft states that '[t]o Tom, Sollicker appears [as] the 
immovable object of the old feudal order, while he himself is the 
irresistible new order for whom compassion and individual rights are 
more important than property' (1991:166). In short, old world 
attitudes meet the new, and 
[w]hen a collision of this kind takes place, it 
sometimes happens that the Irresistible bounces off in 
a more or less damaged state; at other times, the 
Immovable ts scattered to the four winds of heaven in 
the form of scrap, while the Irresistible, slightly 
checked, perhaps, in speed, sails on its way. But you 
can never tell (SlL, 137). 
In terms of uplifting and upbuildtng, the Vivian/ Solllcker 
episode is one of mixed blessings. Collins manages to save Warrtgal 
Alfs bullocks from impoundment at Yoongoolee by Edward Vivian, 
the station's boundary rider, as well as secure the medicine needed to 
help Warrigal Alf. Croft notes that '(t]he only way Tom can tum 
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Sollicker around is to appeal to his feudal notion of chivahy and to 
the idea that an Englishman would not impound an invalid's 
working bullocks' (1991:166). But, despite Collins' strategic victory, 
this is also the episode where Collins specifically concedes that 'the 
Coming Australian is a problem' (SIL, 144). Why is this so? In order 
to answer this question, it is best to clarify some of the important 
details of the episode. 
As well as meeting Edward Vivian, Collins also meets his wife, 
Helenar Vivian. According to Collins, she was '[a] tall, slight, 
sunburnt, and decidedly handsome young woman, with a brown 
moustache' (SIL, 143). From these details, the evidence of the 
"Australienne" remains intact. But, unlike Jemima Quarterman, 
Helenar Vivian does not, strictly speaking, display what Collins 
would call sex-value. Observant readers will note that she leans more 
towards sex-charm. Helenar Vivian has an 'ill-concealed vainglory', a 
'sunny laugh' and a 'comely face, over flowing with merriment' (SIL, 
143). Readers will also recall that, when Edward Vivian commented 
on her flirtatious manner towards Collins, 'an inch of Helenar's 
tongue shot momentarily into view' (SIL, 143). Or, when Collins 
prepares to return to Alf with the medicine, Helenar personally saw 
him off, 'testing with her finger and thumb the integument on 
[ Collins' J near flank' ( SIL, 144 ). As Croft notes, 'Tom's interview with 
Mrs. Vivian is fraught with sexual undertones .... [and] it is also 
apparent that she is a lively, open woman with an independent and 
cheeky nature' (1991: 166). 
But, I disagree with his notion that '[a]t no time do we sense 
that she is being condemned for her past actions, nor that she feels 
badly about them' (Croft, 1991:166). Helenar Vivian's past actions 
are important, for they concern the paternity of the bush born child, 
Roderick Vivian. Although Collins does not spell it out, the correct 
details of Roderick's familial relations are nevertheless apparent. 
This is particularly evident with the discrepancies between the length 
of time the Vivians have been married (SIL, 142) and Roderick's age 
(SIL, 143). In other words, Helenar was pregnant for four months at 
Yoongoolee before she married Edward: a marriage requested by their 
employer. Furthermore, the young Vivian's Christian-name, 'in 
honour of Muster M'Intyre' (SIL, 142), as well as his 'comically 
Scottish ... features' (SIL, 144), indicate that he is the true son of 
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Roderick M'Intyre, the owner of Yoongoolee station, where 'there was 
nothing ... but Highland pride, and Highland eczema and hunger' (SIL, 
153). 
When Collins, referring to Roderick's Currency lad status, 
proclaims to Edward that 'you're an Englishman, and you're proud of 
your country; but I tell you we're going to have a race of people in 
these provinces such as the world has never seen before' ( SIL, 143), 
Edward, the Immovable, firmly disagrees. But even Edward is 
perplexed by the physical qualities of his "son", for he states that 
'[c]limate plays ole Goozeb'ry wi' heverythink hout 'ere' (SIL, 144). 
Thinking that Roderick ts his son, Edward believes that colonial 
Australia wreaks havoc upon the otherwise stately qualities of the 
English type. As Edward states to Collins, pointing to both himself 
and his "son", '[c)'lonians bea n't got noo chest, n' mo'n a greyhound' 
(SIL, 144). Edward's belief about the effects of the climate 
foregrounds his ignorance concerning Roderick's true paternity. But, 
Edward's beliefs also leads Collins to doubt the emerging national 
character, for he states that 'the Coming Australian is a problem' 
(SIL, 144). When Collins returns to Alf, he 'contemplated the 
unconscious outlaw', noting that 
AIL.was a decidely noble-looking man, of the so-called 
Anglo-Saxon type, modified by sixty or etghty years of 
Australian deterioration. His grandfather had probably 
been something like Sollicker; and the apprehensions 
of that discomfortable cousin were being fulfilled only 
too ruthlessly. The climate had played Old Gooseberry 
with the fine primordial stock. Physically, the Suffolk 
Punch had degenerated into the steeplechaser; 
psychologically, the chasm between the stolid English 
peasant and the saturnine, sensitive Australian had 
been spanned with . that facilis which marks the 
descensus Averni (SIL, 161. My italics). 
Are we meant to take Collins seriously? I think we are, but not 
because he himself is swayed by a causal link between climate, 
landscape and 'racial degeneracy' (SIL, 161), nor with any similar 
view suggesting the emergence of some rugged heroic type. Given the 
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consistent emphasis on judgment and the Epictetian controlling 
alternatives, as well as the ideas of truth-embellishment and the 
ethics of representation, the Coming Australian is a problem because 
of unsound judgments based on climate and type. Although Roderick 
will not suffer the same fate as that other Young Australian, Mary 
O'Halloran, his potentiality to create Young Australia is curbed 
because of "Britishness". One could say that Roderick the Irresistible 
has met Edward the Immovable. The Vivian marriage, unlike the 
O'Halloran marriage, works, but it will not inspire a positive, new 
world type. Collins, as well as Furphy, strategically indicates that 
Roderick Vivian will share the same outlook as other British-
Australians who, in the 1890s, believed that 'Britishness was genetic 
-a racial and familial bond- the bond of an offspring to a parent, of a 
devoted son and daughter to their "dear old Mother"' (Evans et al, 
1997:24). 
In other words, Collins hints that Roderick Vivian 'will define 
himself nationally only in a secondary way', forsaking the creation of 
'self-images which emphasised their [Australian] distinctiveness from 
the people of the British Isles' (Evans et al, 1997:25). This is what 
readers of Such ts Life should bear in mind when they are confronted 
with the use of the word "Sollicker" for the Vivians. Wilkes 
(1990:306, 1996:19), as well as "The Annotations" (1991:460), define 
the term within the context of words like "big", "good", "great", 
"whopper" or "force". For this reason, I think "Sollicker" alludes to a 
subject of the Empire, and that his being nicknamed "the 
Immovable" by Collins further supports this. Since Collins would 
rather build an Australia for Australians, creating a distinct self-
image vts-a-vts other nationalist images, the term "Sollicker", as a 
sign indicating a British or jingoistic attitude, poses a distinct 
problem for "the Coming Australian". In short, a "Sollicker", like the 
Anglo-Australian romance novelist, will tell the wrong lies, hand 
down the wrong identity, and be the cause of much ill-judgment in 
light of eudatmonia and the Australian experience. 
Bearing in mind Roderick Vivian, we must turn our attention 
to that other illegitimate son in Furphy's novels, namely Fred 
Falkland-Pritchard. Like Roderick Vivian, Fred ought to be seen as 
an illegitimate son of the Empire. Indeed, the theme of illegitimacy, 
in the Pritchard paternity, is introduced when Fred's "father" had 
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told Collins' father that he 'was the illegitimate son of an illegitimate 
son of George IV (BBB, 5). Further in the novel, when Collins tells 
his reader that Fred's "father" had 'died of some unpronouncable 
scientific term signifying internal haemorrhage of irascibility and 
malevolence' (BBB, 37), the details of Fred's illegitimate status are 
revealed in a series of clues for the observant reader to piece together 
(BBB, 38-39). I will not go into the full details of Fred's illegitimate 
status, except to say that he is the son of Sir William Falkland and 
Miss Kirkham, the 'seventh daughter of the Rev. Clarence Kirkham, 
incumbent of Thorpe Mullock, a parish contiguous to Falkland 
Lodge' (BBB, 38). 
Readers ought to bear in mind the familial relations between 
the "Sollickers" and M'Intyre at Yoongoolee, for Miss Kirkham was 
married off to Fred's "father". Sylvester Pritchard, at the 
encouragement of Sir William, in the same manner as M'Intyre 
encouraged the marriage between Helenar and Edward. Evidence in 
the novel suggests that Sylvester Pritchard, a 'road contractor' in 
Victoria and a man who 'could always manage to boss half a dozen 
men, picked for servility and cheapness' (BBB, 5), was employed at 
the Falkland estate in England, having a similarly immovable mental 
attitude as Edward Vivian. Furthermore, both natural fathers of the 
bastard sons have substantial fortunes and are already married, 
suggesting that while they are concerned with the welfare of their 
illegitimate sons, they are also concerned with the outbreak of a 
scandal. And finally, Just as Roderick Vivian had been named 'in 
honour of Muster M'Intyre' (SiL, 142), a textual clue to his true 
paternal relations, Fred also carries the truth of his illegitimacy in 
his patronymic. As Collins cleverly indicates, '[t]hese family 
entanglements [between the Falklands and the Prttchards] seem to 
afford a clue to the origin of hyphenated names' (BBB, 39). 
I use the term "cleverly" because Collins' authorial articulation 
of Fred's details direct the observant reader to see that hyphenated 
names afford a clue to such family entanglements, especially 
illegitimacy. Like Gilding (1967:167, 1971:xvi), one might be tempted 
to say that Furphy, rather than Collins, is directing his reader's 
attention to Fred's true status. But this can only be done at the 
expense of seeing Collins purely as a hero. Barnes is correct in 
noting that Collins is 'now only a shadow of the original', but he is 
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not 'a mannerism' (1990:365). Collins steps back from centre stage 
because it is taken by Fred Falkland-Pritchard. In other words, 
Collins, as Croft ( 1991 :250) notes, acts in the capacity of verifying 
the "truths" of Fred's elaborate yarns. Yet this act of verification is 
not to expose Fred as just 'a skilful liar' of 'pathetic fantasies' (Croft, 
1991:250), but to show the function of the lie in the art of nation 
and identity. 
For this reason, I disagree with Croft's notion that Collins' 
status in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga is simply that of 'a realist' 
(1991:250). Devlin-Glass also sees Collins as a realist or rationalist 
who cannot accept romance, arguing instead that it is Furphy who 
'enlarged upon the positive value of the romantic lie' (1974:88). This 
is true but problematic. Besides ignoring Collins' authorial status 
and truth-embellished style, Devlin-Glass makes no distinction 
between romance and romanticism when she uses the adjective 
"romantic". Nor does she make a distinction between the customs of 
Anglo-Australlanism and Currency in regards to the positive value of 
romance and marriage. In this sense, I am not sure what to make of 
Devlin-Glass' notion that '[t]he romantic/ realistic dichotomy reveals 
itself as increasingly untenable and artificial as Furphy's 
examination of lying proceeds' (1974:88). Despite this, Devlin-Glass 
(1974:75) is right to note that The Buln-Buln and the Brolga is a much 
more thematically tidy piece of writing, continuing with patterns of 
thought set out in the previous novels. 
Gilding is astute in observing that 'The Buln-Buln and the 
Brolga is the result of Furphy's full recognition that reality is like the 
novel in that reality and social structures are constructions of the 
wills and imaginations of the minds who inhabit, who in fact create, 
them' (1971:xiv). But I cannot agree with his claim that 'the point of 
attack [in the novel] is ebullient Australian nationalism, in particular 
the city dweller's exaltation of the bush' (1967: 172). Like the previous 
novels, the distinction between realism and romanticism, or Lawson's 
and Paterson's styles, is merged, since the national type must be 
strategically truth-embellished and loosely-federated in order to make 
its eudatmontc value appealing to all. As Collins states towards the 
close of his narrative, 
[t]here must ... be something in Fred, after all -some 
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magnetic property, enabling him to draw from the 
heterogeneous mixture of society such a finely-
tempered bit of steel. And, beyond controversy, there 
was only one thing in Fred. Therein, as a matter of 
mere necessity, his magnetism must lie (lie is good). 
Moreover, this magnet-metaphor may serve to throw 
light upon many of the conjugal successes and 
disasters that have puzzled philosophers (BBB, 141). 
Although Fred is an illegitimate son of the Empire, he is, as 
Collins explains, 'eligible for membership in the Australian Natives' 
Association' (BBB, 39) because he was, like Roderick Vivian, born in 
Australia. As I have already discussed, Roderick Vivian's creativity is, 
as Currency lad, curbed by the "sollicker" mental attitude. But, the 
question generated by this juxtapositioning of familial relations is 
whether or not the same mental attitude will influence Fred 
Falkland-Pritchard. Or will he, like Collins, be concerned with the 
uplifting and upbuilding of Australia? Although The Buln-Buln and 
the Brolga thematically returns to familiar ground, its thematic 
tidiness, or cohesion, centres around an exploration of a principal 
theme, and that is the value of lying. Collins states that '[l]ying 
commends itself to the juvenile mind as being easy, inexpensive, and 
convenient; and in course of time the habit becomes fixed' (BBB, 8). 
Also, '[l]ying is, of all the arts, the most popular and cosmopolitan' 
(BBB, 8). 
From this, Collins proceeds to discuss historical examples 
related to the liar's paradox, stating that 'of all the accusations of 
mendacity which from time immemorial have primed our atmosphere, 
probably not one has been groundless -except, perhaps when some 
Chinaman, after a few hours patient controversy, has applied the 
epithet to his jibbing horse' (BBB, 8). The liar's paradox, with the 
exception of its inapplicability to certain contexts, transgresses the 
notion that something must be either true or not true, as is the case 
with Collins' statement that 'truth is relative, not absolute' (BBB, 8). 
According to Von Wright, 
[t]he antinomies of logic have puzzled people ever 
since they were discovered -and will probably continue 
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to puzzle us for ever. We should, I think, not regard 
them as much as problems awaiting a solution, but 
rather as providing a perpetual-raw material for 
thinking. They are important, because thinking about 
them challenges the ultimate questions of all logic -
and therefore of all thinking (1983:25). 
For Von Wright, the liar's paradox is an example of 'an 
antinomy' because 'the conclusion of the argument ... is a 
contradiction' (1983:27). Von Wright's approach to the liar's paradox 
is very fruitful for the novels, since it allows us to take two wonderful 
antinomies from the novels as raw material for further thinking 
about the novels. Firstly, the notion that the novels are not fiction, 
as often stated by Collins. And secondly, the notion that the novels 
are not fact, as implied by Collins' claim to authorship and 
censorship. It would be futile, as Von Wright suggests, to try and 
solve these two antinomies logically. To attempt to do so would mean 
missing the point of the liar's paradox. Because of the contradictory 
outcome of true and not true, the liar's paradox blurs the distinction 
between fact and fiction. The value of the liar's paradox for the 
novels rests with thinking about, or seeing and responding to the 
idea of truth-embellishment in light of the ethics of representation, 
thus challenging the idea that all forms of lying are morally 
reprehensible. 
Despite his earlier claim that Collins verifies the truth behind 
Fred's stories, I find it strange for Croft to say that 'there are no 
hidden stories which might make Fred's fantasies real' (1991:253). 
Firstly, Collins only verifies some of the truths from which Fred 
builds his fantasies. As Collins states, 'I knew him to tell the truth 
three times' (BBB, 9), and Collins proceeds to relate the three 
episodes to his reader (BBB, 9-37). Rather than verifying the reality 
of Fred's fantasies, which is a logical contradiction, Collins uses the 
truth about Fred to foreground the truth-embellished style, which 
Fred uses to refashion heroically both the three episodes and his self 
later in the novel. Within the context of the liar's paradox as a 
narrative technique, Partington states that '[o]ne possible solution is 
that Furphy wished to establish that no narration is simply a 
statement of unambiguous facts, since some selection must take 
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place' (1993:248). As Zeller explains, '(w]hat we learn about the 
yarn ... is that it is something more than simply a well-formed tale. It 
is a story in which the teller has invested not only something of 
himself, but also something of the life around him' ( 1988:48). 
For this reason, Croft's notion that '[t]he skilful fabulist can 
corrupt the world of the real, and substitute for it the illusions of 
fiction' (1991:257) seems rather perplexing. The novels indicate that 
the dangers of fiction, chiefly romance, are everpresent, but since 
reality is constantly permeated by fiction, it does not necessarily 
follow that fiction corrupts reality. Although the potential is readily 
there, yarning, or lying is not always about corrupting reality, it is 
also about being well-deceived in light of eudatmonta. As Collins 
states, '[o]ld Dr Johnson says that the greatest sublunary happiness 
consists in being well deceived -well deceived' (BBB, 20). Or, as 
Collins later points out, '[l]et a man devoutly and constantly believe 
in himself, and he will find a multitude of others to believe in him 
also' (BBB, 74). In this sense, I do not agree with Barnes' claim that 
'The Buln-Buln and the Brolga [has] less intellectual weight', even 
though it displays 'both a fascination with the techniques of 
narration and a confidence in handling them' (1990:365). 
Bearing in mind the principal concern with lying, the first 
theme to which the reader is introduced is the notion 'that no man 
is a hero to his vally-de-sham' (BBB, 4). There are several reasons for 
this. Firstly, Collins has Just received a letter from Fred, who has 
informed him that he has a '(w]ife and three (3) children' (BBB, 2) 
and is on his way to Echuca. Secondly, Collins' encounters with the 
O'Halloran and Vivian marriages, as well as the unfruitful romances 
in Rtgby's Romance and the stories of infidelity told by Warrtgal Alf in 
Such ts Life, lend strength to Collins' notion since it appears that 
male and female relations, in Rivertna, have little or no success. And 
thirdly, it serves as an introduction to Fred Falkland-Pritchard, 
whose aptitude for lying seems to indicate no more success with 
women than the other male heroes. As Collins states, '[Fred's] one 
positive quality was mendacity' while '(h]is negative qualities spread 
out in an old man plain of comprehensive incapability, in the centre 
of which, his solitary characteristic reared its awful form above the 
clouds and midway left the storm' (BBB, 4). 
Indeed, '[y]ou could sit down and rest in the cool shade of one 
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of his fabrications. Tasteful, audacious and adroit in his one art, he 
was limp and washy and generally inadequate outside that speciality' 
(BBB, 4). All in all, Collins seems to have much evidence in favour of 
his 'theory that women do not love their husbands' (BBB, 40). 
further suggesting that the .. Coming Australian" seems to have very 
little hope. As Zeller states, '[f]rom his theory Collins reasons that 
Mrs. Pritchard must indeed hate her husband because he is good at 
nothing but lying; once she sees how little truth there is in Fred's 
yam's, their marriage is doomed' (1988:45). According to Collins, 
'[w]omen's love is romantic, and flows like the Solway in romantic 
atmosphere, but ebbs like its tide when a more intimate knowledge 
has resolved that atmosphere into its prosaic components' (BBB, 43). 
In short, 'the hero vanishes' when 'the scare-crow truth of 
masculinity, the incorrigible he-ness of the he-feller, comes out only 
too brightly under the penetrating rays of Hymen's slush-lamp' (BBB, 
42). 
Despite the bitter tone, one should not jump to the conclusion 
that Collins is sexist, for it foregrounds his disappointment with 
both the pervasiveness of sex-charm over sex-value and his past 
encounters with marriages. As Barnes states, 'nowhere in his fiction 
does Furphy portray marrtage as a fulfilling relationship' ( 1990: 188). 
That is, of course, until readers encounter the Falkland-Pritchard 
marriage. Thus, while Collins has much evidence in favour of his 
theory, it is not rock-solid. Nor is it meant to be. As Collins 
confesses, 'my theory of the feminine vally-de-sham ought to be 
stated as subject to certain exceptions' (BBB, 74-75). Indeed, the 
theory is a strategy, and the authorial Collins uses Fred and his 
abilities to overturn the notion that 'no man is up to the husband-
ideal of a loving woman' (BBB, 44-45). In terms of lying, Fred may be 
'the over-indulger' (BBB, 8), but the point is made: marriage requires 
the same eudaimonic principles needed for uplifting and upbuilding a 
nation, namely correct judgment, truth-embellishment, an 
understanding of one's controlling alternatives and guardianship. As 
Collins states, '[t]he fact is, that authority or precedence, however 
ridiculous, being once accepted and enthroned, is apt to paralyse 
judgment' (BBB, 85), hence the emphasis on telling the rtght lies. 
For this reason, one must be wary of Croft's notion that 
Collins does not 'understand married love and what we must callfolie 
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a deux' (1983:9). According to Croft, 'Furphy's main interest in this 
short novel is the relationship of man and wife, and how marriage 
can only work if there is a shared delusion. Marriage, he seems to be 
saying, has to be based on illusion rather than reality' ( 1991 :248). It 
is a view shared by Partington, who states that '[w]hen a marriage 
is ... happy, as with Fred ... and his wife, the main reason seems to be 
that one party is mistaken about the character of the other' 
(1993:97). Unfortunately, neither Croft nor Partington takes into 
account the idea of truth-embellishment and the consistent focus on 
the ethics of representation in all three novels. To all intents and 
purposes, it can be said that Collins' preoccupation with uplifting 
and upbuilding is also applicable to Fred. 
From being an initially 'pusillanimous' young Australian, who 
spent his 'juvenile days' as a 'scapegoat' for 'the bad boys of the 
generation' (BBB, 4), Fred emerges as the hero of the Franco-German 
War, selected 'out of 180 000 men' by the Emperor of France to 
perform a service that [the Emperor] would trust to no man but an 
Australian' (BBB, 111. My italics). Fred's importance to the War effort 
is such that, when Fred is wounded, the Emperor sends for 
'Dupong ... the cleverest surgeon in the world -a man wearing thirteen 
Continental orders on his breast' (BBB, 114). It is this man who 
proudly proclaims that nothing can kill Fred, for '[h]e has the 
Australian constitution -the constitution of a horse!' (BBB, 114). 
Fred celebrates his truth-embellished identity, telling the right lies 
and turning the old world on its head with the kind of antipodean 
heroics worthy of the "Coming Australian". This process enhances 
the Falkland-Pritchard marriage and, subsequently, enhances Young 
Australia, for Fred the Currency Lad has given heroism and legend to 
his children, who will presumably create and narrate the Australian 
experience in a grand manner. 
Within this context, the reader needs to remember the details 
of the relationship between Roiy and his daughter, Macy O'Halloran, 
'the perfect Young-Australian' (StL, 73). Roiy, the Irish Catholic, was 
'born of a legend-loving race' (StL, 61) and, according to Collins, 
was [Macy's) guide, philosopher, and crony. He was her 
overwhelming ideal of power, wisdom, and goodness; 
he was her help in ages past, her hope for years to 
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come (no irreverence intended here; quite the reverse, 
for if true family life existed, we should better 
apprehend the meaning of .. Our Father, who art in 
heaven"); he was her Ancient of Days; her shield, and 
her exceedingly great reward (SiL, 74). 
It is interesting to note that the first marriage encountered in 
the three novels raises the question of .. true family life" and asks the 
reader to consider the meaning of .. Our Father, who art in heaven". 
Apart from the obvious biblical reference within the context of 
sectarian rivahy, there is also a clever pun on Rory's heroic status in 
the eyes of Mary, and the sense that Rory's ability to yarn could lead 
to an Australia legend .. if true family life existed" in light of uplifting 
and upbuilding. Despite the fact that the O'Halloran episode leads to 
tragedy, the relationship that Rory has with his daughter is a 
strategic forerunner to Fred's relationship with his children. 
Stylistically, the Falkland-Pritchard marriage indicates .. true family 
life", but the paradox to this truth is the necessity of embellishment. 
What, then, does this say about Lillian Falkland-Pritchard? As I have 
pointed out earlier, the previous encounters with marriage or 
romance lead readers to expect a sorry state of affairs for the 
Falkland-Pritchard marriage and anticipate a rather unsavoury 
quality to Fred's wife. According to Collins' theory, 
Fred's antithetical complement ... would carry a stern, 
practical, masterful look; also the poor woman would 
be sour in temper and repellent in manner, through 
continual brooding over her grand mistake (BBB, 66). 
From this, Collins, acting as the ·gushing novelist' (BBB, 66), 
gives his readers a nomenologically detailed account of her features 
in accordance with her unsavoury character. But, one should not 
take this at all seriously, for Collins has already pointed out that 
nomenology is a science which 'sometimes runs crank' (BBB, 66). 
Gilding states that, in his description of Lillian, Collins 'himself 
departs far from actuality' (1971:xvi). While this is true, I think 
Collins is strategically leading his readers to the value of Lillian to 
the Falkland-Pritchard marriage in light of a .. true family life" for 
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Young Australia. Once confronted with Lillian, Collins states 
immediately that '[n]omenology ... was at fault once more' (BBB, 68. 
My italics}, indicating that Collins is completely aware of its 
fallaciousness from past experiences. 
In face and figure she was beyond criticism; not only 
negatively perfect, but almost aggressively attractive. 
Analysed, this attractiveness was of the kind that 
faithfully indexes a true woman's temperament -which 
implies much, and nothing but good. Owing to many 
co-operate causes, the Australian woman of the best 
type has probably no equal on earth; and Fred's wife 
was a satisfactory illustration of our country's possible 
achievement in the most momentous and far-reaching 
of all national commissions. In no respect was she like 
her picture; indeed, I noticed with a touch of chagrin 
that even her moustache was golden brown instead of 
rusty black (BBB, 68). 
Not only does Lillian have sex-charm, she is also the shining 
example of sex-value evident in the "Australienne". Croft argues that 
'Mrs Falkland-Pritchard is all that a novelist could ask for in a 
heroine' (1991:255). But, to approach Lillian as the novelist's perfect 
heroine is to overemphasise her sex-charm in light of her sex-value. I 
think Lillian Falkland-Pritchard represents the high moral standard, 
calm courage and clear intellect which Furphy thought so important. 
Croft is correct in noting that 'Mrs Falkland-Pritchard and Tom 
share common intellectual interests' (1991:250), for there are many 
instances in the novel where Lillian can be said to represent sex-
value for Collins. However, there is one instance where a dialogue 
between Collins and Lillian foregrounds an important aspect of her 
sex-value, and that is a woman's influence on 'the controlling 
masculine [mind]' of her husband, who, 'be he a king or a beggar, is a 
little world of his own' (RR, 11): 
"Tell me, Mr Collins, do you find much change in 
him since you were boys together? 
"No change," I replied, with my habitual 
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truthfulness. "Only the ripened fulfilment of his early 
promise. I may tell you that, in the olden days, we 
simply recognised his superiority and let it go at that. 
In fact, he's gifted with a power that I've never 
equalled." 
"I'm glad to hear you say so," rejoined Mrs 
Pritchard, evidently relieved. "I do admire a 
magnanimous spirit. But -speaking confidentially-
doesn't it seem strange to you that the world, against 
its own interests, passes by men like Fred, and 
lavishes place and power on mere nobodies?" 
"Not more strange than true, however," I replied, 
veiling my bewilderment under a sympathetic air. "And 
-apart from the injustice perpetrated- society, in so 
doing, sustains a loss." 
"Yes; but, you see, Mr Collins, the sin of society, 
in this case, ls visited on the victim, as well as on 
society itself. I should like to see society suffer the 
whole penalty. Of course, you can reason the question 
out dispassionately, while I feel the injustice day by 
day, as I see condemned to inaction hands that the 
rod of empire might have swayed." 
"Or waked to ecstasy the living lyre," I rejoined 
thoughtfully; and I maintain, even now, that my 
quotation was the more apt of the two -heartless, 
maybe, but just a desperate grip at something tangible 
in this chaotic situation {BBB, 72-73). 
According to Croft {1983:10, 1991:272) readers ought to see 
Lillian as the hero of the The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. While this ls 
not untrue, one should not negate Fred's status as hero. Rather, 
readers ought to bear in mind Franklin's notion that Furphy 
observed 'what every woman knows, but what few men have moral 
courage to admit; that men's creative work needs to be nurtured by 
women' {1944:38). Whether or not 'Lillian Pritchard' sees 'through 
(Fred's) lies' or 'accepts them as fact' {Zeller, 1988:45) ls not the 
issue. What ls important ls her capacity to nurture Fred's creative 
potential in accordance with the high moral standard, calm courage 
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and clear intellect of her sex-value. She completes the family's sense 
of purpose and is relieved to hear that Collins equally appreciates the 
power of Fred's magnanimous spirit. Collins may do 'his best to be 
cultured and civilised ... even to the point of agreeing with the wife's 
inflated opinion of her husband' (Croft, 1991:256), but one should 
recall Collins' recognition of Fred's ability 'to draw from the 
heterogeneous mixture of society such a finely-tempered bit of steel' 
(BBB, 141). 
Again, the novel's preoccupation with lying, through the liar's 
paradox, challenges the notion that all forms of lying are morally 
reprehensible. Fred's lies seive to uplift and upbuild, and, in light of 
the ethics of representation, it is worth noting that his 'power ... lay 
largely in the quality of compatability and congruity' (BBB, 103). As 
Collins explains, '[y]ou would never hear him say, like your first-
person singular novelist-liar, "my blood ran cold" -"I was unneived 
with terror" -"I never was so frightened in my life" -or words to 
similar purport' (BBB, 103). In accordance with Collins' views, such 
lies are morally reprehensible. Indeed, '[Fred] could see the 
inconsistency' and, '[w]ith the instinct of genius, he perceived that 
the genuine hero, relating his little adventure, never descends to that 
sort of palaver, simply because attested courage neither knows nor 
needs any such paltry foil' (BBB, 103). 
Despite the style of his last novel, one wonders whether or not 
Furphy used Fred Falkland-Pritchard to point out that the uplifting 
and upbuilding of Australia, or the art of nationhood, is not Just a 
process of Federation, but also "Frederation". Also, one wonders if 
Fred's truth-embellished character, as the heroic Coming Australian, 
is meant to be seen as a guide to the value of Tom Collins. If this is 
the case, then one is faced with reconciling Collins' scholarly 
philosophical type with Fred's swashbuckling hero. Perhaps Furphy 
hoped that the reading public would take to Fred's truth-embellished 
character more than they had done to Tom Collins, and that Fred's 
popular image, in conjunction with Collins' commentary on Fred's 
aptitude and skills, would spark public interest in the issues first 
articulated by Collins in Such is Life, namely that uplifting and 
upbuilding Young Australia depends not just on the art of nation-
building, but also on clear intellect, calm courage and high moral 
standards. 
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With this in mind, it is the romance plot which is most in 
need of reassessment, of observant reading and thinking within the 
context of Collins' preoccupation with uplifting and upbuilding. 
Croft states that 'Molly's and Alfs story is the core of Such ts Life' 
because 'the thread which runs through [ chapters one, four. six and 
seven] is the story of the Coopers and the Morrises, of Molly and Alf 
(1991: 112). But Croft also proposes the following perplexing 
question: '[i]f the Molly/ Alf story is the core of Such ts Life, why is it 
hidden?' (1991: 113). According to Croft, '[t]here are no simple 
answers to this question, because they lie deep in Furphy's own 
nature, and deep in the ideas of the time' (1991:113). I am not 
entirely satisfied with Croft's observations. It is true that the Molly/ 
Alf romance is an important aspect of the novel, but I do not think it 
is the core. The romance plot is but one more treatment of the idea 
of uplifting and upbuilding, which is the most likely candidate for 
the "core" of Such ts Life, as well as the other two novels. 
According to Nina Knight, 'the story of Molly and Alf is the 
longest and the most intricate, and it has contributed largely 
towards establishing Such ts Life as an elaborately structured work of 
:fiction' (1969:245). This is certainly true, but to read Such ts Life 
through the romance plot alone leads to some very problematic 
conclusions about Collins. Although many critics have given their 
interpretation, I find their views unsatisfactory. I think this is largely 
due to three factors. Firstly, the idea of uplifting and upbuilding has 
largely been ignored. Secondly, no critic has fully considered Furphy's 
idea of authorship nor Collins' status as the implied author. And 
thirdly, the issue of Collins' induction has not been satisfactorily 
investigated. It is this last point to which I want to draw my reader's 
attention. No reading of the romance plot will do justice to Such ts 
L!f e so long as it ignores the philosophical idea of induction 1 • Indeed, 
the intricacy of the romance plot turns on this form of epistemology. 
As Collins states to Stewart of Kooltoopa, 'my information [about 
Warrtgal Alf] is derived from no random hearsay, but is obtained by 
an intransmissible power of induction, rare in our times' (SIL, 170). 
7 Although there is no hard evidence, it seems likely that Furphy had been exposed to some of Hume's 
ideas. Barnes (1990:57) notes that the Furphy family knew the Scotsman, James Hutcheson, who was 
self-educated and well-read in British philosophy. Barnes (1990:57) points out that Hutcheson was 
both a leading public figure in Kyneton and John Furphy' s master when he was an apprentice. It is 
also quite possible that Furphy had read many works of British philosophy for himself at either The 
Mechanics Institute in Shepparton, or the public library in Melbourne. 
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What does induction mean? Hospers (1990:188) explains that 
induction infers conclusions about a future event from a sample of 
like events in the past. Using the example of throwing a stone up 
into the air, he states that '[w)e can't validly deduce "It will fall to 
the ground" from "It has always done so," but we consider that it has 
always done so as evidence that it will do so in the future' 
(1990:188). As Hume originally wrote in his An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, 'I shall allow ... that the one proposition may 
justly be inferred from the other; I know, in fact, that it is always 
inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of [a 
priori) reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning' ([ 1777) 
1990:799). According to Hume, '(t)hat there are no demonstrative [or 
a priori or deductive) arguments in [matters of fact and existence) 
seems evident, since it implies no contradiction that the course of 
nature may change and that an object, seemingly like those we have 
experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects' (Enq. 
[ 1777) 1990:799). 
And, '[t)o say that it is experimental is begging the question. 
For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that 
the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be 
conjoined with similar sensible qualities· (Enq. [ 1777) 1990:). In this 
sense, Hume states that '[i)f there be any suspicion that the course 
of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the 
future, all experience [as demonstrative or a priori evidence) becomes 
useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion' (Enq. (1777) 
1990:800-80lt. Hospers (1990:190) explains that inductive reasoning 
can never be deductively valid because conclusions are not inferred 
with certainty from the premise. This view is held by Russell, who 
states that 
[i)t is to be observed that all such expectations are 
only probable; th us we have not to seek for a proof 
that they must be fulfilled, but only for some reason in 
favour of the view that they are likely to be fulfilled .... 
8 For Hume, a priori or demonstrative reasoning, as opposed to 'moral reasoning' or a posteriori 
reasoning concerning 'matters of fact', are 'the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic' (Enq. 
[1777] 1990:794). Because this is so, one cannot demonstrate the relationship between cause and 
effect in matters of fact as one can with number and, in this sense, conclusions based on matters of 
fact or experience have no certainty of outcome. 
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Experience has shown us that, hitherto, the frequent 
repetition of some uniform succession or coexistence 
has been a cause of our expecting the same succession 
or coexistence on the next occasion (1912:62). 
According to Hume, 'all arguments from experience are founded 
on the similarity, which we discover among natural objects, and by 
which we are induced to expect effects similar to those, which we 
have found to follow from such objects' (Enq. [ 1 777] 1990:800. My 
italics). In short, '[f]rom causes, which appear stmllar, we expect 
similar effects. This ls the sum of all our experimental conclusions' 
(Enq. [1777] 1990:800). Within this context, the idea of probability 
is, for Hume, 'the concurrence of...several views or glimpses [that 
imprint] the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior 
force and vigour; renders its influence on the passions and affections 
more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which 
constitutes the nature of belief and opinion' (Enq. [ 1777] 1990:811). 
Because of this, Hume concludes that, '[a]s a great number of 
views ... concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the 
imagination, beget that sentiment which we call belief, and give its 
object the preference above the contrary event, which ls not 
supported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not 
frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future' (Enq. 
[ 1777] 1990:812). 
Although he does not discuss the issue of certainty and 
probability, or a priori and a posteriori reasoning, in any detail, I 
assume this ls what Croft (1991:50, 87, 274) alludes to when he 
states that Collins' mistakes are chiefly due to the perils of 
induction. According to Croft, 'Tom's major intellectual 
characteristic is his reliance on induction to establish an hypothesis, 
and blindness in the face of facts which deny that hypothesis. The 
best example of this ls his unswerving belief in his theory of 
nomenology' (1991:96). And yet, Col11ns knows that nomenology, 'like 
all other sciences except Mathematics, sometimes runs cronk' (BBB, 
66). Collins is not unaware of the possibility of contrary outcomes 
associated with the inductive method. More to the point, Croft 
believes that '[f]or Furphy, the truth, reality itself, was a fiction; it 
was story. For Tom Collins, writing was a record of fact based on 
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obseivation and induction -histocy' (1991:51). 
Because of the importance of truth-embellishment for both 
Furphy and Collins, Croft's View is clearly false. Readers should not 
assume that, because of the lack of certainty, '[t]he suchness of life 
which we see from [Collins'] pen is one which is produced by 
induction, and it is usually wrong' (Croft,1991:173). One of the most 
remarkable features of the novels is their focus on the widespread 
use of induction in inferring and evaluating the many facets of the 
suchness of life. This is interesting, for Hospers (1990: 191) and 
Russell (1912:63, 69) both note that human beings, as well as 
animals, are naturally inclined to infer inductively in daily life. 
Hume's Views on this matter are no different, but he does offer a 
reason as to why inductive inferences occur. In A Treatise of Human 
Nature, he states that 'all probable reasoning is nothing but a species 
of sensation·, for 'lilt is not solely in poetcy and music (that] we must 
follow our sentiment, but likewise in philosophy' ( 1911: 105 ). 
In other words, '[w]hen I give the preference to one set of 
arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling 
concerning the superiority of their influence' (THN. 1911:105). 
According to Hume, '[o]bjects have no discoverable connection 
together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating 
upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the 
appearance of one to the existence of another' (THN. 1911: 105-106. 
My italics). Within the context of inductive inferences, Hume argues 
'that the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not 
founded on arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely from habit, 
by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of 
objects to which we have been accustomed' (THN. 1911:134-135). In 
this sense, 'there is no probability so great as not to allow of a 
contracy possibility; because otherwise it would cease to be a 
probability, and would become a certainty' (THN. 1911:136). But 
Hume also points out the following: 
[s]hould it here be asked me, whether I sincerely 
assent to this argument, which I seem to take such 
pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of 
those sceptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that 
our judgment is not in any thing possessed of any 
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measures of truth and falsehood; I should reply, that 
this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither 
I, nor any other person, was ever sincerely and 
constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and 
uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to Judge 
as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more 
forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller 
light, upon account of their customary connection 
with a present impression, than we can hinder 
ourselves from thinking, as long as we are awake, or 
seeing the surrounding bodies, when we tum our eyes 
towards them in broad sunshine .... My intention .. .is 
only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my 
hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes 
and (il{ects, are derived from nothing but custom; and 
that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of 
the cogitative part of our natures' (THN. 1 78-179). 
According to Stuart Hampshire, 'Hume tried to convince his 
readers that there can be no knowledge that can be called 
distinctively philosophical knowledge, no hope of rational insight 
into the structure of reality' (1966:4). Hampshire states that '[a] 
philosopher may study the anthropology of knowledge; he may 
describe the deep-rooted habits and customs which form our view of 
the external world and the system of our ordinary beliefs', but 'he 
can only remove the illusions and the pretences of traditional 
philosophy' (1966:4). Most importantly, a philosopher's Job is to 
point out 'the illusion that there must be some ultimate Justification 
of our habits of thought, which is external to these habits 
themselves' (Hampshire, 1966:4). I must disagree with some of 
Hampshire's interpretation of Hume, for Hume had stated that 
none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute 
the authority of experience, or to reject that great 
guide of human life; it may surely be allowed a 
philosopher to have so much curiosity at least, as to 
examine the principle of human nature, which gives 
this mighty authority to experience, and makes us 
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draw advantage from that similarity, which nature has 
placed among different objects (Enq. [l 777] 1990:800). 
Hume does not argue that no knowledge can be philosophical. 
Nor does he discount the possibility of a rational insight into the 
structure of reality, but he does stress that a knowledge which claims 
to know that structure with certainty ls false, since no conclusions 
derived from matters of fact can know the a priori relationship 
between causes and effects. Because of the fallaciousness of any 
claim to an a priori insight into the structure of reality, Hume ls 
opposed to any traditional philosophy which concerns itself with 
demonstrative proofs of experiential "facts". In this sense, Hume 
(Enq. [ 1 777] 1990:803) argues that the ultimate justification for our 
habits of thought, concerning matters of fact, ls custom, and that 
custom ls one's experience of an operation which has the propensity 
to repeat itself without human reason or understanding. Using the 
example of heat and flame, Hume states that 'we are determined by 
custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other', 
and that '[a]ll inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of 
custom, not of [a priori] reasoning' (Enq. [ l 777] 1990:804). 
According to Hume, '[c]ustom ... ls the great guide to human 
life', since '[l]t ls that principle alone, which renders our experience 
useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of 
events with those which have appeared in the past' (Enq. [ 1 777] 
1990:805). Hume's views on customs and habits are quite important 
to an understanding of the three novels and the romance plot, since 
the three novels show that the issue of induction ls more 
complicated than Croft affords. It ls true that probability in cause 
and effect ls not certainty, and that certain probable effects are more 
than likely to be met with a contrary outcome. But this ls not always 
the case. In other words, there are certain probable outcomes, which 
we may infer by way of custom or habit, that are more than likely to 
be fulfilled. When such outcomes are not fulfilled, we tend to look for 
the reason as to why they are not rather than conclude that an 
inductive method ls wrong. In these cases, we tend to examine the 
relationship between customs or habits of thought, degrees of 
support, and external but contrary influences. 
When reading Furphy's novels, I think that these points ought 
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to be kept in mind. Interestingly enough, the word induction itself 
seemed to have had some currency in the 1890s, particularly with the 
Coming Australian debate, and its usage sheds light on Collins' 
induction and the romance plot. In a Bulletin article published on the 
10th of November, 1894, the writer states that 
in any conjectural horoscope of the coming Australian, 
we must start from things as they are, not from things 
as they have been. History may be a light to our path, 
but it can never be the path itself. With patient 
observation of facts for a few years more, sufficient 
should be known of Australian character as modified 
by Australian conditions to enable general principles, 
the result of alien experience, to be aptly applied. But, 
without preliminary induction, deduction is a tool 
which slips in the hand (6). 
Or, as Collins states, 
[w]hat authority had the boundary man [Roderick 
Vivian] or I to dogmatise on the Coming Australian? 
Just the same authority as Marcus Clarke, or Trollope, 
or Froude, or Francis Adams -and that is exactly 
none. Deductive reasoning of this kind is seldom safe. 
Who, for instance, could have deduced, from certain 
subtly interlaced conditions of food, atmosphere, 
association, and what not, the development of those 
silky honours which grace the upper lip of the 
Australienne? No doubt there are certain occult laws 
which govern these things; but we haven't even 
mastered the laws themselves, and how are we going 
to forecast their operation? (SlL, 144. My italics). 
What Collins calls nature's "occult laws" is described by Hume 
as nature's secret powers. According to Hume, 'nature has kept us at 
a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the 
knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals 
from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of these 
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objects entirely depends' (Enq. [ 1777) 1990:798). What we apprehend 
we do by way of custom, but custom gives us no lnstgh t in to the 
relational power of the natural causality between two things. In 
Robert Wilson's view, 'Such ls Life ls, without a doubt, a 
philosophical novel' because '[t)wo philosophical problems dominate 
the novel', namely 'the often-discussed issue of free will versus 
determinism' and 'the nature of knowledge· (1979:127). 
More to the point, Wilson contends that '[h)ow men know -by 
what means and with what limitations- ls the "central" problem of 
Such ls Life and shapes, at least in part, its structure' (1979:128). 
And, '[l)n the course of Such ls Life, Tom comments upon two ways of 
knowing, each of which ts a solution to the persistent problem of 
knowledge' (Wilson, 1979: 129). According to Wilson (1979: 129), these 
two ways of knowing are, firstly, the subsumption of things to 
already established categortes or laws, and secondly, an emplrlcal 
identification of things which assert their individuality and thereby 
resist general classifications or categorization. Wilson ( 1979) calls 
the former categoric knowledge, and the latter tautegorlc knowledge. 
Discussing Collins' claim that 'the best kind of knowledge· ls 
'acquired from observation and experience' (SiL, 274), Wilson argues 
that it ought to be seen within 'his contempt for the English upper 
classes (and the novelists, such as Kingsley, who glorify them) since 
their knowledge depends upon already-formed categories' (1979: 129). 
Wilson (1979: 129) thinks that Furphy cleverly does not allow 
Collins' conclusions to stand because Collins' consistently fails to 
recognize and identify things properly vis-a-vis pre-existing categortes. 
According to Wilson (1979:131), knowledge, or ways of knowing in 
the novel, ls either categoric or tautegortc, and Colllns' preference for 
the tautegorlc ls his downfall. But Wilson makes a grave mistake 
when he assumes that Collins' preference for the tau tegortc exhibits 
a continual disregard for the categoric. While 1t ls true that Colllns 
attacks the Anglo-Australian idea of aristocracy and its categortes, 1t 
is not true that he has contempt for categoric knowledge altogether. I 
do not see how Wilson could have come to this conclusion since 
Collins ls quite prepared, as I have already shown, to refer 
lntertextually to a variety of canonical works, which can be said to 
constitute Wilson's definition of categoric knowledge. Yet Wilson 
acknowledges this, noting that 'Tom's chronicles are remarkably full 
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of categorical propositions', and '[n]ot all of these are false, ... but 
their mere presence sets off the theory that knowledge is experiential, 
particular, and intuitive' (1979: 137). 
That Collins gives preference to the tautegoric is true, but this 
preference should be seen as a consisten,t effort to recontextualize 
the categoric so that readers may judge and appreciate better the 
Australian experience, as indicated by the ideas of uplifting and 
upbuilding. Or, in light of the above-mentioned Bulleti.n article, 
Collins' preference for the tautegoric is the use of induction to 
observe general principles or customs and habits which could 
categorically delineate an Australian character. Wilson is right to 
note that a strict adherence to 'categorical knowledge· can 'lead to 
stiff-necked prejudices' (1979:130), but he fails to mention that the 
greater result of such categorical knowledge is the deep-seated and 
widespread colonial division and rivalry between the customs and 
habits of Anglo-Australianism and the idea of currency, as indicated 
by Quarterman's character. Perhaps this is another reason why 
Collins claims that '[t]he coming Australian is a problem' (SlL, 144). 
Nevertheless, Wilson soundly judges that 'the requirements of 
knowing have emerged from the novel as both categoric and 
tautegoric, neither being of much account on its own' (1979:142). 
To put it in simple terms, knowledge is constituted by both 
inductive and deductive methods. Yet Wilson fails to consider how 
many categories are themselves the product of tautegoric or inductive 
knowledge. In other words, how many categories are created by 
experience, customs and habits. Upon realising that he is on the 
Victorian, rather than the New South Welsh side of the Murray, 
Collins confesses the following to his reader: 
[m]y worldly-wise friend, .... [i]f you have never been 
bushed, your immunity is by no means an evidence of 
your cleverness, but rather a proof that your 
experience of the wilderness is small. If you have been 
bushed, you will remember how, as you struck a place 
you knew, error was suddenly superseded by a flash of 
truth; this without volition of judgment on your part, 
and entirely by force of a presentation of fact which 
your own personal error -however sincere and 
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stubborn- had never affected, and which you were no 
longer in a position to repudiate (SiL, 106). 
Perhaps one of the fundamental points that the novels make 
about induction and the use of categories is the notion that, in 
experience, truth comes from error, and that error changes the 
categories which underpin one's judgment, one's seeing and 
responding to life through custom and habit. This point is made 
almost twenty years later by John Dewey in his Reconstruction tn 
Philosophy. According to Dewey, '[o]ld truth has its chief value in 
assisting the detection of new truth .... Endless and persistent 
uncovering of facts and principles not known -such is the true spirit 
of induction' ([ 1920) 1957:34). Indeed, '[c)ontinued progress in 
knowledge ts the only sure way of protecting old knowledge from 
degenerating into dogmatic doctrines received on authority, or from 
imperceptible decay into superstition and old wives tales' (Dewey, 
[ 1920) 1957:34). Furphy appears to use Collins to point out that 
induction modifies established customs and habits, and that 
ignorant evaluations lead to the permanent marks which form some 
"new" customs or habits, but not necessarily one's which inspire 
eudatmonta. 
This adds scope to the novels' focus on tgnorance-shifting and 
their Epictetian emphasis on judgment, suggesting that inductive 
ways of seeing and responding to life can be improved by a tautegoric 
breaking or remaking of certain categories. It also explains why 
Collins ts so openly preoccupied with censorship, since he ts keen to 
point out that authors and artists must select and represent, or 
break and remake "life" in a manner that is sufficient for eudatmonia. 
To all intents and purposes, Furphy's use of the term "induction" ts 
similar to that in the aforementioned Bulletin article. But Furphy ts 
also astutely aware that customs and habits find their chief outlet in 
literature and art, and that literature and art generate the customs 
and habits which form the notion of culture. 
As one can see, Collins' use of induction in the novels is not 
so clear-cut as Croft concludes. Croft is right to point out that 
'Tom's reliance on the powers of induction leads him to some strange 
conclusions about Warrtgal Alf (1991: 173), but the situation ts not 
so simple that one can conclude that Collins is wrong. Despite being 
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aware of Collins' cunning concealment, Croft seems to take no heed 
of the possibility that cunning concealment runs throughout the 
romance plot. Even an appeal to Furphy's 1903 review cannot 
support the notion that Collins is wrong, since the review offers a 
rather interesting observation on this matter. Furphy states that 
'[u]nderneath this obvious dislocation of anything resembling 
continuous narrative, run several undercurrents of plot, manifest to 
the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author' (1969: 130. My 
italics). This simply suggests that the implied author either pretends 
to be unaware of a plot or has no intention of foregrounding these 
undercurrents to his readers. It does not state that the plot is wholly 
unnoticed by the implied author, which, in terms of Furphy's creative 
results, is absurd. 
As I mentioned earlier in my thesis, Furphy was attempting to 
steer both current and future readers of Such ts Life in the right 
direction, and the easiest way to do this was to point out both the 
existence of a romance plot and Collins' thematic strategies. In a 
letter to Cathels, which the editors, Barnes and Hoffmann, believe to 
have been written in 1895, but may also have been written as early 
as 1894 or as late as 1896, Furphy states that he 'worked [Johanna 
Jorgensen] into my opus as Nosey Alf, the boundary- rider, Cooper's 
sister supposed to have suicided, -though the narrator, Collins, never 
thinks of establishing the connection' (1995:24). According to a 
footnote by Barnes and Hoffmann, 'there is no way of telling whether 
the version Furphy was working upon was the "final copy" of Such is 
L!fe, as he hoped, or an earlier draft' (1995:24-25). But Barnes and 
Hoffmann think it is the final copy and that the year is 1895. If this 
is the case, then it pays to bear in mind that this final copy is the 
hand-written manuscript which he later edited into the 1903 novel at 
Stephens' request. More importantly, the fact that Collins never 
thinks of making the connection does not mean that Collins does 
not know the connection. It is more than likely that Furphy wanted 
to give Cathels a clue to Collins' strategy. 
For this reason, I must disagree with Deborah Crisp, who 
states that '[i]t is generally considered a clever irony that, despite the 
copious hints planted by Collins the author, Collins the first-person 
fails to recognise the "true" identity of Nosey Alf Jones towards the 
end of Such is Life' (1994:6). This is a vecy debatable statement and 
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can only be supported by providing evidence of a clear distance 
between Collins as implied author and hero. More importantly, it is 
debatable because it fails to address the complex issue of induction 
which links Collins, as implied author, to Collins, the hero, and vice 
versa, in a eudatmontc evaluation of life through art. Crisp's essay is 
itself a rather strange investigation of the romance plot, since she 
concludes that readers ought not to look to Molly Cooper for 'Nosey 
Alf s identity', but 'outside the pages of Such is Life', for such a move 
would 'reassess the evidence from a wider and more objective 
perspective' ( 1994:8). I think she places too much emphasis on 
reader-response theory, which does nothing more than advocate a 
dangerous idea of liberty in interpretation and devalues 
intertextuality as a method for greater insight into a work of 
literature. 
Within the context of Collins relationship to the romance plot 
and its characters, Nina Knight ( 1969:250) explains that Collins is 
quite correct about many details in Warrigal Alfs life, but his strange 
conclusions stem from his interpreting Alfs love story through 
Ouida. I think Collins' playfulness with Ouida is meant to 
foreground the inept use of inductive categories in seeing and 
responding to life. In other words, readers should not expect the 
novel's romance plot to conform wholly to the classic ingredients of 
the categorical romance, nor should they discount the ingredients of 
the romance category altogether. As Croft states, the Molly/ Alf 'story 
is a story of fidelity, of love, and it involves the classic ingredients of 
the romance: the genesis of love, its thwarting, suffering, and the 
quest for fulfilment' (1991: 112). I disagree, therefore, with Keogh's 
notion that, because of her disguise, Molly Cooper 'represents the 
woman who has broken free of traditional restrictions and who will 
therefore be more the equal of her partner rather than his property' 
(1989:62). Molly's disguise is far from a wilful breaking free in the 
sense that Jemima Quarterman has broken free. Instead, Molly's role 
as Nosey Alf is forced upon her because Anglo-Australian custom or 
habit responds to her facial disfigurement by making her 
unacceptable for marriage. But this leaves her in a catch-twenty-two, 
since the only option for her is marriage. 
Throughout her masquerade as Nosey Alf, Molly Cooper pines 
for her fiance, Alf Morris, despite being jilted by him because she was 
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no longer an object of beauty. Indeed, of all the female characters in 
the three novels, there are only two who sufficiently meet the criteria 
for the common notion of the romance heroine, namely Molly Cooper 
and Maud Beaudesart. Although not alike in their attitudes to love, 
both come from Anglo-Australian families, both are ruined 
financially by the economic mismanagement of a family member, and 
both possess the feminine quality of yearning for the customary 
husband. As Rodriguez notes, '[n]ot only does Furphy make Nosey Alf 
faithful to a romantic and virtuous love, conceived and actively 
pursued only when both partners are free; he gives her fineness of 
feature apart from the area of injury, and a womanly figure' 
(1975:181). This point is equally noted by Martin, who adds that 
'[h]is hut offers an additional record of his nature -the area in the 
front is swept, he grows flowers, [and] he keeps a domesticated cat' 
(1992:71). Knight thinks that '[t]he story of Alf and Molly relates to 
the Victorian romantic novel, to various other elements in Such ts 
L!fe itself and, most importantly, to Collins' continual rejection of 
the novelist's art' (1969:255). 
What Collins rejects is not the novelist's art but the telling of 
the wrong lies. Nevertheless, Knight's observations are quite helpful. 
Readers ought to be aware of the immense playfulness throughout 
the romance plot, particularly with the relationship between 
inductive categories and identity. In order to support his notion that 
Collins uses categories wrongly, Wilson uses many examples to point 
out 'Tom's plain misinformation' (1979: 136), most notably Collins' 
definition of a ship-chandler. According to Collins, a ship-chandler is 
'[a] man that supplies candles to ships' (SlL, 22). This is where the 
problems begin, because the text does not give any good reason for us 
to think that Collins seriously believes his own definition. Indeed, 
the definition is a reply to Mosey's asking what a ship-chandler is, 
and Mosey's question is itself an interruption of William Cooper's 
story about his sister, Molly, and her misfortunes. The two most 
likely reasons for this definition are, firstly, that Collins is being 
facetious to Mosey's interruption, and secondly, that Collins is 
pointing to the elaborate yet logical word-play and clues throughout 
the romance plot for his reader. 
It is interesting to note that Collins, the implied author, has 
Willoughby tell an amusing pun on the same page that Cooper 
291. 
begins his stm:y about Molly: '[a] student, returning from a stroll, 
encountered a countryman, carrying a hare in his hand. "Friend," 
said the student quietly, "is that thine own hare or a wig?" The joke, 
of course, lies in the play on the word "hare"' (SIL, 20). Willoughby's 
explanation of the pun is a clue to the reader to read observantly and 
think about the way in which words and their meanings can offer 
leads within a certain context. To return to the word "ship-chandler", 
its general definition is a dealer or merchant of shipping supplies, 
such as canvas or ropes. But, etymologically speaking, "chandler" 
can also mean a maker and merchant of candles since it derives from 
the French word, chandelier, meaning candle-seller, and has its 
origin in the word chandelle, or "candle". To all intents and purposes, 
Collins' use of a "categocy" is one in which he foregrounds polysemy 
as a strategic tool to the finer points of the romance plot. 
To consider another, more pertinent example, let us look at the 
following exchange between Moriarty and Collins on the subject of 
Nosey Alf: 
" ... Alfs a mis -mis -mis -dash it" -
"Mischief-maker?" I suggested. 
"No. -mis -mis"-
"Mysterious character?" 
"No, no. -mis -mis" -
"Tcy a synonym." 
"Is that it? I think it is. Well Alfs a misasynonym 
-woman hater- among other things" (SIL, 232). 
The word Moriarty is looking for is, of course, misogynist. But 
the word-play is an interesting one and serves to unveil some salient 
leads by the pun on the prefix "mis-". Furthermore, the use of the 
word "synonym" also offers some sharp clues to Nosey Alfs true 
gender, which, with the many added clues that Collins cunningly 
foregrounds, ought to lead readers to conclude that Nosey Alf is 
Molly Cooper. In short, misasynonym is meant to lead the observant 
reader to make the move from "man" to "wo-man" through the use of 
the prefix "mis-". Another example is the name "Nosey Alf' itself, in 
the sense that it is a direct clue to the disfigured Molly Cooper, as 
described by William Cooper in chapter of one. But, to be called 
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"nosey" also points to someone who is, proverbially speaking, deeply 
interested in the affairs of another. Although the word-play in the 
romance plot is, at times, quite direct, it can also be very elaborate. 
For this reason, readers need to tread carefully, for it is wrong to say 
that Collins misses Nosey Alf s true identity. 
Rather, the emphasis is strongly on obseivant reading and on 
the tautegorical reevaluation of categories, particularly With the 
"romance" genre and its customary or habitual depiction of male and 
female relations. As I have already discussed, Furphy's novels put 
forth the notion that the new world is historically and politically 
marked by the meaning of the New Man and the New Woman. Croft 
may note that Collins' 'question "Who is she?" leads us to the 
hidden story of Molly Cooper' (1983:10). But, the question 'Who is 
she?', which Collins asks in the Warrtgal Alf episode (SIL, 135) and 
the Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper episode (SiL, 258), also directs us to the 
categorical values and features of the emerging "Australienne" in 
light of an inductive uplifting and upbuilding of the nation. As 
Collins states to the facially disfigured Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper, 
[d]o we love a woman for her beauty, for her virtues, or 
for her accomplishments? .... In the first place ... we 
must inquire what the personal beauty of woman is, 
and wherein it consists. It consists in approximation 
to a given ideal; and this ideal is not absolute; it is 
elastic in respect of races and civilizations, though 
each type may be regarded as more or less rigid within 
its own domain (SIL, 260). 
Although he had offended Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper earlier on, 
by quoting the proverb that 'A woman's first duty ... is to be beautiful' 
(SiL, 259), an obvious slap in the face for Molly Cooper, Collins' 
explanation of the customary or habitual ideal of woman's beauty 
includes the potential for the retranslation of such ideals to suit the 
"Australian" experience. Collins foregrounds how categories influence 
our ways of seeing and responding to life, or our judgment, and he 
indicates that these categories can be remade tautegorically. One 
wonders whether or not Collins' view spurs Molly Cooper to abandon 
her role as Nosey Alf, the boundary rider, and pursue Warrtgal Alf to 
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Queensland. As Collins states, '(s]poken words inform the emotional 
side of our nature, through the intellectual' (SU., 254), but the true 
nature of social or cultural customs and habits is more properly felt 
rather than seen. In keeping with Collins' emphasis on truth from 
error, one wonders if Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper has seen the light in 
regards to the customary or habitual nature of beauty, 
understanding that a new approximation of beauty can increase the 
probability of her own happiness. 
Croft thinks that the romance plot will not 'end in marriage·, 
for 'Furphy was too much of a realist to let his romance end in such 
a state; instead he ends the story with a possibility, but no 
suggestion of a resolution' (1991:112). Indeed, '[as] with many 
formulations of the romance to be written in the early twentieth 
century, this one ends without closure, but it is a romance 
nevertheless -a particularly modern one which stresses gender 
confusion, the unresolved pursuit of happiness, and a deracinated 
restlessness' (Croft, 1991:113). But is not the possibility of 
resolution a suggestion of resolution? The Alf/ Molly romance should 
be read as a parable for the future direction of "Australia", 
particularly its customs and habits which influence the socio-
cultural way of seeing and responding to life. In this sense, one 
ought to bear in mind the success of the Falkland-Pritchard marriage 
and its emphasis on truth-embellishment. Perhaps Furphy was of the 
opinion that the categories which we use in making our Judgments 
not only have a tautegoric basis, but also end up being truth-
embellished. 
In this sense, Furphy seems to suggest that the success of a 
union between men and women in the Australian experience is 
wholly dependent upon a reevaluation of customs and habits toward 
gender roles. Bearing in mind Collins theory of sex-charm and sex-
value, Such ts Life seems to indicate that Molly Cooper moves from 
the former to the latter during the course of the novel. Instead of 
remaining an Anglo-Australian daughter, who lives her life in 
disguise because of inherited social customs and habits, she becomes 
a woman with calm courage, high moral standard and clear intellect. 
The situation seems to be much similar with "Warrigal" Alf Morris, 
who, during his illness and confessions to Collins, sees that beauty 
is not a necessary condition of marriage. Given the emotional bond 
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between Molly Cooper and Alf Morris, one could say that the success 
of their romance depends on their fulfilling certain conditions 
indicated by the Falkland-Pritchard marriage, though not necessarily 
to that extreme. 
In a letter to Miles Franklin, Furphy states that '[m]oral 
squalor is a poor foundation on which to build romance. Apart from 
all puritanism or sanctimoniousness, there ts such a thing as self-
reverence' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:160). According to 
Croft, 'Furphy ... realised the power of romance. The "mawkish" love 
stmy in Bellamy's Looking Backward made the novel in his opinion. 
And that love st01y led to the popularisation of Bellamy's radical 
social theories' ( 1991 : 113). In light of Collins' concern with u pllftlng 
and upbuilding the nation through literature and art, readers ought 
to be aware that the romance plot is but one piece in a much larger 
puzzle, and that it is a piece designed to emphasize both Furphy's 
and his implied author's views on categories, Judgment, experience 
and social relations. In this sense, one could say that the Alf/ Molly 
romance plot is an Australian romance which moves from moral 
squalor to self-reverence, foregrounding a way of seeing and 
responding to life that is conducive to eudalmonta. 
295. 
4. Conclusion: remarks on observant reading for future 
studies on Furphy. 
The originality of this thesis began with the teasing out of 
Barnes' suggestion that Such is Life needed to be seen as a cultural 
creation. But this thesis has taken Barnes' suggestion to all three 
novels, locating them firmly within the 1880s, and employing a 
socio-historical reading of that period in order to appreciate the 
novels more accurately. This had not been done previously. Equally, 
it has been the aim to appreciate Furphy's novels on the basis of 
what he meant by Collins' relationship to the ideas of uplifting and 
upbuilding. Using Furphy's letters, the 1903 review and textual 
evidence, the thesis has argued that a much more coherent view of 
the novels is to look at Collins as their implied author and hero, and 
that the novels themselves represent Collins' moral response to the 
colonial rivalry and division which plagued the federation movement 
in the 1880s. Indeed, the traditional view of Furphy as the actual 
and implied author of the novels, and Collins as the unreliable 
narrator, has been shown to be inconsistent with the novels 
themselves for a variety of reasons. Finally, the extended discussion 
of these main points has resulted in a much needed reevaluation of 
the romance plot and some other key episodes. 
Despite claiming this crucial ground, more work needs to be 
done. For this reason, I think we need to end with a question. What 
does Furphy mean by observant reading? Critical opinion has shown 
that the idea is important, since it is consistently pointed out that 
Collins is not an observant reader. But many critics have failed to 
draw out the full implication of the relationship between Collins as 
the implied author and the hero, adhering to the customary view 
that there is a clear case of unreliable narration in the novels. This 
is not the case. Furthermore, many critics have approached the idea 
of observant reading as a simple act of gathering and interpreting 
facts correctly. To a certain extent, Collins does appear to suggest 
this when he claims to have 'the more sterling, if less ornamental 
qualities of the chronicler' (SiL, 1). But the idea of 'an intuition 
which reads men like sign-boards', as well as 'a limpid veracity; and a 
memory which habitually stereotypes all impressions except those 
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relating to personal injuries' (SiL, 1 ), indicates something more. 
Observant reading requires the reader to engage with matters 
of fact in light of authorship, as well as uplifting and upbuilding. In 
this sense, the sterling elements of the chronicler do not amount to 
an ability to see facts for what they are, but to see them for what 
they could be. Collins' strategy is to 'afford to the observant reader a 
fair picture of Life as that engaging problem has presented itself to 
[him]' (SiL, 2. My italics). A fair picture of life is not necessarily a 
factually true one, as is meant to be the case with Journalism. In 
terms of observant reading, the idea of life as an engaging problem, 
and the fair picture as a solution, anticipates the unravelling of 
ambiguities and complexities characteristic of close reading. A fair 
picture is not simply reading and rereading the novels. It is reading 
and thinking about the issues set out in the opening paragraphs of 
Such ts Life, issues which represent Collins' response to life. 
Furthermore, these issues are carried through to the other two 
novels, so that the three novels together offer a response to the ideas 
of uplifting and upbuilding, or federating a nation. For these 
reasons, I think the idea of observant reading is an ethical one 
because it emphasizes an engagement with the way people see and 
respond to life, and the way they live life. As an ethical idea, 
observant reading brings immense scope to the core ideas of uplifting 
and upbuilding, and these core ideas unveil the exceedingly complex 
relationship between art and life. Given Collins' concerns, Furphy is 
wise to incorporate that complexity into his novels, particularly 
through the interrelated ideas of personal identity, national identity 
and authorship. 
In short, matters of fact may help to give a distinct flavour to 
an artistic reading of life, but the final product must be, as the 
novels stress, both truth-embellished and ethically rtght. As Furphy 
wrote to Franklin, 'I find it best to take some actual occurrence as a 
bed-log, and build thereon -telling the story, not as it did happen, 
but as tt should have done' (Barnes and Hoffmann, 1995:177. My 
italics). But, one must not follow 'the devices and desires of his own 
heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving untold 
the lies that he ought to have told' (SiL, 272. My italics). Readers and 
critics ought to bear in mind Plato's emphasis on first impressions 
and permanent marks, as well as his idea of the magnificent myth, 
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and its role in maintaining well-being or eudatmonia in Republic. 
Because of the core ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, as well 
as the issue of natural rights and civil rights, it is my contention 
that the novels require an ethical investigation of many of their 
episodes, for the authorial Collins encourages the observant reader 
to ask questions about their details. For example, in regards to the 
Glover episode, consider the following questions. In terms of duty, is 
it better to give someone who is down on his luck, food or money? If 
you gave them money, what would they do with it? Is it just to 
prosecute someone on the basis of custom or appearance? Given that 
customs necessarily lead to specific ways of seeing and responding to 
life, do customs necessartly lead to justice or well-being? Is it just to 
prosecute someone for damaging or destroying a part of your property 
which is considered worthless or an eye-sore? In short, each episode 
has a specific set of questions which need to be investigated 
ethically, for readers of the novels should not make rash conclusions 
about Collins' moral position, as has been the case in the past. 
I would also like to suggest that future research pay more 
attention to Rigby's Romance. Of the three novels, this one has been 
the most neglected. The reason for this seems to be the notion that 
the novel simply represents a word-for-word espousal of Furphy's 
basic belief in socialism. This is not the case. As I have already 
argued in my thesis, Furphy is not a socialist, and any expression of 
interest in socialism ought to be seen within the context of a 
Phllosophe's demand for human rights and moral progress. More 
importantly, Rigby's Romance is itself much too complicated a novel 
to be an espousal of socialism. Rigby himself does not fare well, and 
that has much to do with his notion that 'man is a law-abiding 
animal' and that 'you can make men anything you please by Act of 
Parliament' so long as 'such Act is sanctioned by a preponderant 
moiety of the national intelligence' (RR, 201). As I argued in my 
thesis, it is possible to make individuals Australian by an act of 
parliament, but I hardly think anyone could be made good, happy or 
virtuous in this way. Rigby's belief is problematic, and I think Rigby's 
socialist "Sermon on the Murray" is the antithesis of Christ's 
democratic "Sermon on the Mount", for Rigby shapes and divides 
humanity by law, while Christ brings it together through an appeal 
to rights and the compassionate side of human nature. 
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rugby's arrogant relationship to the other heroes during his 
determinist sermon strongly suggests that human nature is the 
spanner in the socialist's deterministic order of things. As Binney 
states, '[y]our system is outside the range of practical politics' 
because '[i]t would press too hard on personal liberty' (RR, 205). If 
Furphy's Rigby was, in any sense, the ideal male hero, then it should 
follow that, stylistically, Rigby ought to have disciples, not enemies. 
Readers should bear in mind Plato's Socrates, whose disciples 
challenge him, but do not threaten 'to tilt' him 'into the ensanguined 
river' (RR, 200). Within the context of uplifting and upbuilding the 
human order of things, I think Rigby's Romance continues the study 
of human nature begun in Such ts Life, and that Rigby himself is not 
excluded. This is especially the case when it comes to Rigby's 
opportunistic nature, as I have discussed in the first chapter of my 
thesis. Also, readers ought to bear in mind that Collins is still the 
implied author, despite his diminished status as hero, and that 
rugby's dialogue is ultimately controlled by him. Because this is so, I 
think future readers ought to examine the contrast between Collins' 
belief in rights with rugby's belief in law. 
Finally, besides Shakespeare and the Bible, as well as other 
works that form Furphy's mtdrashic string of pearls, I think future 
research particularly needs to consult the following texts in order to 
appreciate better the intellectual dimension of the novels: 
a Paine's The Rights of Man. 
a Epictetus· Encheiridion and The Discourses. 
a Aurelius' Meditations [to Himself]. 
a Plato's Republic. 
a Whitman's Leaves of Grass. 
a Emerson's essays, particularly 'The American 
Scholar' and 'Self-Reliance'. 
a Hume's Treatise on Human Nature and An Enquiry 
into Human Understanding, particularly the issues 
of induction, customs and habits. 
With this in mind, whatever aspect of the novels they discuss, 
future readers of Furphy need to pay close attention to the following 
set of interrelated ideas: 
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a eudatmonta. 
a rationalism and ignorance. 
a induction (particularly in terms of tautegoric and 
categoric "knowledge"). 
a customary and habitual conclusions in ways of 
seeing and responding to life. 
a intertextuality and recontextuality. 
a authorship and roleplay. 
a natural rights and civil rights. 
a the ethics of artistic representation. 
a obseivant reading and truth-embellishment. 
a censorship. 
a the relationship between personal and national 
identity. 
a the theocy of the controlling alternatives. 
a social architecture. 
Although I have tried to place them in a coherent sequence, 
no idea holds greater value than another. The value of each idea is 
shaped by others in the list, and the whole gets its value from the 
unifying consciousness of Tom Collins, as well as the core ideas of 
uplifting and upbuilding that are his concern. Furthermore, these 
ideas gtve value to the statement, "Such is life", because they provide 
the background for meaning. Furphy may state in his 1903 review 
that 'the studied inconsecutiveness of the "memoirs" is made to 
mask coincidence and cross-purposes, sometimes too intricate' 
(1969: 130), but this should not be taken as advocating an absolute 
freedom in interpretation. This makes reading Furphy more 
complicated, and it is, as some have argued, Furphy's downfall to 
make such demands on his readers. But this does not detract from 
the fact that an obseivant reader must be a methodical reader who 
reads to think within a supplied frame of reference, namely the ideas 
in the list, the socio-historical context, Furphy's belief in an 
Australian literature, his passion for certain key works in the 
Western tradition, and a concern with an enlightened uplifting and 
upbuilding of Australia. To ignore these things will only devalue 
Furphy's concerns, leading to some untenable conclusions in regards 
to Tom Collins, as has been the case in the past. 
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